Women often are not paid what they aim for and deserve, and they frequently have a hard time climbing up the organizational career ladder (e.g., England et al., 2020). Negotiations can be critical situations in which these difficulties manifest: When women are hindered from negotiating assertively, as they often are (e.g., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2022), they can end up not receiving their desired and fair level of pay and not being promoted (e.g., Säve-Söderbergh, 2019). What is worse, if women attempted to negotiate assertively, counterparts may evaluate these attempts negatively, revealing a risk to incur what is termed backlash (e.g., Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Rudman, 1998).
One solution to this predicament is the provision of specific negotiation strategies for women. In fact, extant research has made notable advances in the development of specific strategies that support women’s negotiation performance (e.g., imagining being an advocate; Bear & Babcock, 2017). Although the developed specific strategies generally could be useful (e.g., Bowles & Babcock, 2013), researchers have observed in three past studies that women do not intend to implement many of them, for instance, as women expect to achieve better economic outcomes if they simply asserted themselves (for details, see below; Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). This phenomenon is termed implementation gap. Implementation gaps were observed among women from the United States (US) and Germany, even when they had received theoretical rationales explaining how the strategies are supposed to work (Lietz et al., 2023). To support women in negotiating successfully, it seems, there is a need to identify specific strategies that women actually aim to implement.
Therefore, in recent qualitative work, Lietz et al. (2025) interviewed women with negotiation experience about the strategies that they actually use in their occupational life. They identified two promising specific strategies: The first is “Asking Tactically for an ‘Other-Promotion’” (ATOP). Before beginning to negotiate, women ask their counterpart, typically a supervisor, to provide a performance appraisal, expecting that it will highlight their accomplishments. Hereby, women subtly lead their counterpart to “promote” them (hence the term “other-promotion”; see also VanEpps et al., 2024), which makes it difficult for the counterpart not to grant women’s (reasonable) requests in the ensuing negotiation without publicly contradicting themselves. The second specific strategy is “Delineating Engagement and Advancing Legitimacy” (DEAL). Women thoroughly delineate how, exactly, they would contribute even more to their organization (i.e., their future engagement) if their requests would be granted. Through the description of their engagement, women’s requests may appear more legitimate (see also Bowles & Babcock, 2013), and the negotiation could be seen as an exchange of benefits (vs. a win–lose situation).
Yet, it remains unclear if only the selected group of women being interviewed in Lietz et al.’s study (2025) utilizes these strategies. If yes, researchers should know early, before investing all-too-many resources into the further development and promotion of these novel specific strategies. If not, researchers should know about these specific strategies that are more broadly implemented, thereby revealing tools that could go a long way in supporting women’s negotiation success. Hence, our goal with the current registered report (e.g., Chambers, 2013) was to examine which specific strategies women do, or do not, implement in salary negotiations. In a controlled laboratory study, women were presented the newly identified strategies of ATOP and DEAL, along with other specific strategies suggested in past research as well as the two standard negotiation behaviors of simple assertiveness and yielding (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). As such, our first main contribution was to illuminate whether ATOP and DEAL are strategies not characterized by an implementation gap. As our second contribution, we aimed to examine the implementation of specific strategies based on actual, observed behavior. In all related past research, women were simply asked about their expectations regarding different specific strategies and, crucially, their intentions to use them (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). Yet, people frequently do not behave in the way they intend to (e.g., Sheeran & Webb, 2016). Finally, in conducting a more realistic study including a measure of actual behavior, we thirdly contribute to the extant knowledge by offering a conceptual replication (e.g., Hüffmeier et al., 2016; Zwaan et al., 2018) of past studies on the implementation gap (see our Online Supplement).
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Women often show little assertiveness and obtain lower-than-desired negotiation outcomes in many, though not all, negotiations (e.g., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2022). At the root of these issues are “consensual beliefs” that people hold about women (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p. 574) and that define women’s gender role (Eagly, 1987). In many cultures, being communal (e.g., friendly or other-oriented) is seen as typical and desirable for women, whereas the opposite is true for being agentic (e.g., assertive or self-oriented; Bosson et al., 2022; Eagly et al., 2020). Following from these societal beliefs, women regularly encounter hindrances in negotiations (Kulik & Olekalns, 2012): Other people, including negotiation counterparts, can react negatively toward assertive women (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; for a meta-analysis on such backlash effects, see Williams & Tiedens, 2016). Therefore, women often cannot simply assert themselves when negotiating pay. If they did, they risk incurring backlash, and if they did not, they could end up with relatively low pay (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012).
One important way to support women’s negotiation performance is the provision of specific strategies. Researchers developed a number of clearly useful specific strategies, including relational accounts, feminine charm, and imagining being an advocate (see Table 1; for seminal research, see Bear & Babcock, 2017; Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Kray et al., 2012). First studies have indicated that these strategies help women to achieve better economic outcomes while evading negative social evaluations. But, unfortunately, recent research also suggests that women do not implement many specific strategies (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020).
Implementation Gaps for Specific Strategies and Underlying Mechanisms
An implementation gap exists when an evidence-based specific strategy is available for women’s use in negotiations, yet women are disinclined to use it—relative to their usage of a standard or conventional behavior (e.g., simple assertiveness or yielding; Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). The gap between the availability of a specific, evidence-based strategy and women’s actual usage (vis-à-vis their showing of standard behaviors) suggests that a specific strategy only has the potential to support women’s negotiation performance, but the potential is not realized due to a lack of implementation (for a similar example, see Nishii et al., 2018).
As of the day of this writing and as far as we know, researchers have conducted a total of three studies with four samples (three samples with women from Germany, one sample with women from the US) to examine such implementation gaps (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). In these studies, women’s intentions to use specific strategies were contrasted with their intentions to use simple assertiveness or simple yielding. In 11 of 12 comparisons (92%) between specific strategies and assertiveness, women were found to rather assert themselves. In six of 12 comparisons (50%), women were also found to rather yield than to use a specific strategy (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020; mirroring the main analyses conducted by these authors to test their hypotheses, we describe here comparisons collapsed across cultures and experimental conditions; for an even greater level of detail, please see the original articles). Moreover, in 12 of 12 comparisons (100%), women expected assertiveness to be more economically effective than specific strategies. Similarly, in 10 of 12 comparisons (83%), women expected yielding to result in better social evaluations (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). Interestingly, in eight of nine comparisons (89%), women also expected that using a specific strategy would perpetuate gender roles more than simple assertiveness (as explained in Footnote 2, yielding is a behavior that fully matches women’s gender role). The different kinds of expectations, particularly those regarding economic effectiveness, helped to explain where implementation gaps occurred (for an overview of all findings in the most recent and most comprehensive article on this topic, see Lietz et al., 2023, Table 13, pp. 106–107). Finally, Lietz et al. (2023) examined whether providing women with a theoretical rationale explaining how the specific strategies are meant to work would eliminate or reduce implementation gaps. Yet, they observed such an effect in only four of 36 comparisons (11%), suggesting that the provision of rationales was, by and large, ineffective in eliminating implementation gaps (Lietz et al., 2023). All told, we take away from the extant literature that further research into specific strategies that women do implement is needed.
ATOP and DEAL
Lietz et al. (2025) did exactly that: They interviewed a selective sample of women with negotiation experience and asked them how they negotiate in their occupational life in order to attain high economic outcomes without being evaluated negatively by their counterparts (i.e., how they navigate the female negotiation dilemma; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012). In doing so, Lietz et al. (2025) identified at least two specific strategies that might hold promise: First, ATOP. When women ask their negotiation counterpart to provide a performance appraisal before making a request, expecting that the appraisal will highlight their accomplishments, women induce their counterpart to engage in “other-promotion” (i.e., the counterpart “promotes” another person—the woman asking for a performance appraisal; see VanEpps et al., 2024). This strategy is noteworthy because self-promotion, whereby people highlight their own accomplishments, is known to trigger backlash (Rudman, 1998).
By contrast, being provided a positive performance appraisal can give women a bargaining advantage, as counterparts would publicly contradict themselves if they were not to grant women’s requests in an ensuing negotiation. As such, using this strategy could improve women’s economic negotiation outcomes—a consequence that women using this strategy may expect. When using this specific strategy, women also make salient the norm of meritocracy (e.g., Madeira et al., 2019), thereby potentially reducing the salience of women’s gender role (see Bowles et al., 2022, for an overview on the importance of gender being salient for the emergence of gender differences in negotiations). Therefore, using ATOP may also decrease people’s tendency to evaluate women negatively, since such backlash reactions are rooted in gender role dynamics (see above). Finally, as using ATOP does not require women to engage in female-stereotypic behavior, this strategy is unlikely to come across as perpetuating their gender role. Altogether, ATOP might be a worthwhile, newly discovered specific strategy for women in negotiations.
A second interesting strategy identified in the qualitative work is DEAL. When women thoroughly delineate how they would engage themselves in an organization upon receiving a raise, they frame the interaction as a “quid-pro-quo,” which makes salient the norm of reciprocity (e.g., Gouldner, 1960). Moreover, as women using DEAL outline what their counterpart gains upon granting requests (i.e., the delineated engagement), women’s requests may also appear more legitimate (see also Bowles & Babcock, 2013). As such, women using DEAL may again benefit in terms of increased economic outcomes, along with less negative social evaluations and less perpetuation of their gender role (again due to another norm being salient; see also Bowles et al., 2022). As such, DEAL is also potentially a noteworthy newly discovered specific strategy for women in negotiations.
What remains to be seen, however, is whether the specific strategies of ATOP and DEAL are attractive to women more generally (beyond the sample in the qualitative study by Lietz et al., 2025). That is because the sample in the conducted qualitative work was composed of a selective group of women with negotiation experience. Of course, this group might differ from women from other walks of life. For example, not all women gain as much negotiation experience as the women who were interviewed, but having experience could shape expectations about the consequences of using a particular strategy. In sum, although the only available qualitative study suggests that ATOP and DEAL are implemented strategies, quantitative research is needed that tests whether these two specific strategies are, in fact, not characterized by an implementation gap. This was the goal of our current study.
The Current Research
Based on our preceding rationales for the specific strategies of ATOP and DEAL, along with the initial suggestive evidence from the qualitative study, our overall proposition was that ATOP and DEAL would be actually implemented strategies (see our central Hypotheses 1 and 4). By contrast, specific strategies developed in the past (for an overview, see Table 1) were found to be typically characterized by an implementation gap. But why?
Past specific strategies often represent a blend of agency and communion. To illustrate, when women use the interesting strategy of feminine charm (Kray et al., 2012), they act flirty (a self-oriented, agentic attribute) and friendly (a communal attribute; e.g., Rudman et al., 2012). The same logic applies to the specific strategy of using a relational account (i.e., women highlight their relationships to others; Bowles & Babcock, 2013), and perhaps even imagining being an advocate (i.e., when simply thinking about the benefits of negotiating for others). Yet, people typically assume that ineffective negotiators are communal (see Kray & Thompson, 2005, Figure 1). Thus, people expect that simply asserting oneself—an attribute that supposedly characterizes effective negotiators (Kray & Thompson, 2005)—would be more economically effective than using past specific strategies (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). By the same token, if specific strategies involve a blend, such that negotiators highlight their relationships or think of being communal, people may expect that using these strategies would perpetuate the female gender role more than if they simply asserted themselves, which may again lead women not to implement past strategies (Lietz et al., 2023).
Notably, however, we reasoned that the strategies of ATOP and DEAL would not be characterized by these unfavorable expectations and resulting implementation gaps. When using ATOP and DEAL, negotiators do not blend their agency with communion. Rather, they let another person highlight their past accomplishments (as part of the performance appraisal) or highlight themselves their planned accomplishments (as part of their delineation of their future engagement). As such, these strategies do not involve stressing attributes that are seen as communal (and thus ineffective). Hence, relative to simple assertiveness, ATOP and DEAL should neither be expected to be less economically effective, nor to perpetuate the female gender role more. Women may even have better expectations regarding the economic effectiveness of ATOP and DEAL, as ATOP and DEAL are more specific approaches than simple assertiveness (other strategies are likewise specific, but they also appear somewhat communal, which may offset potential advantages related to their greater specificity). In the same vein, women may also have relatively favorable expectations regarding the effects of ATOP and DEAL on the perpetuation of the female gender role: If using ATOP or DEAL helps women to negotiate more successfully, these strategies may serve to help women climbing the career ladder, thereby potentially changing women’s gender role over time. Due to these relatively favorable expectations regarding their effects, women should intend to implement ATOP and DEAL as much as assertiveness (perhaps even more). We predicted:
H1. Relative to simple assertiveness, women (a) intend to use, and (b) actually use, ATOP and DEAL equally often (perhaps even more often).
H2. Relative to simple assertiveness, women expect ATOP and DEAL to lead to the same (or perhaps even better) economic negotiation outcomes.
H3. Relative to simple assertiveness, women expect ATOP and DEAL to perpetuate gender roles to the same extent (perhaps even less).
As noted previously, women also have unfavorable expectations regarding the effects of many past specific strategies on social evaluations (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). When women act flirty (Kray et al., 2012) or make ambitious requests while imagining being an advocate (likely unbeknownst to their counterpart; Bear & Babcock, 2017), they could be seen as not adhering to their gender role as much as when they simply yielded. Consequently, they may risk being unfavorably evaluated (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020), relative to when they would simply yield. As per the results of Lietz et al. (2023), using a relational account (Bowles & Babcock, 2013) is an exception here: Perhaps explicitly highlighting relationships with others is expected to evade unfavorable social evaluations (Bowles & Babcock, 2013). Due to their unfavorable expectations regarding social evaluations, women may again not implement certain specific strategies as compared to yielding (as per Lietz et al.’s, 2023, results, another exception here was imagining being an advocate).
We again reasoned that ATOP and DEAL would not be subject to these negative expectations and implementation gaps. When using ATOP or DEAL, women make salient the norm of meritocracy (Madeira et al., 2019) or reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), respectively. When other norms are salient, counterparts may not evaluate women’s negotiating in light of their gender role. If true, then women would evade negative social evaluations that normally follow from perceived gender role deviations (e.g., Rudman et al., 2012). Moreover, as yielding is the only approach that is fully aligned with the female gender role (Kulik & Olekalns, 2012), women may expect ATOP and DEAL to perpetuate their gender role less than yielding (the same logic regarding the expected perpetuation applies to past specific strategies; Lietz et al., 2023). Altogether, in the absence of negative expectations regarding social evaluations, yet more favorable expectations regarding the perpetuation of the female gender role, we predicted that women would implement ATOP and DEAL more than they would yield.
H4. Relative to simple yielding, women (a) intend to use, and (b) actually use, ATOP and DEAL more often.
H5. Relative to simple yielding, women expect ATOP and DEAL to lead to equally (or perhaps even more) favorable social evaluations.
H6. Relative to simple yielding, women expect ATOP and DEAL to perpetuate gender roles less.
Method
Open Science Practices
In the current registered report (e.g., Chambers, 2013), we use Open Science Practices (OSPs). To start, our methods description is completely transparent: We disclose our power analysis, sampling plan, all criteria for exclusion, and all measures (our study did not involve an experimental manipulation; Simmons et al., 2012). After the Stage-1 review process (see https://www.cos.io/initiatives/registered-reports), we revised our planned study based on the feedback received. We then uploaded this revised manuscript as our preregistration to the Open Science Framework (OSF), as it includes a full overview of our hypotheses, methods, and planned analyses: https://osf.io/2ehxj/?view_only=dae6d82736af4514959a374c0c474722. We also made available our study materials in their original form, our data, our analysis code, as well as screenshots of our Bayesian analyses and mediation analyses (as per the same link to the OSF).
Power, Sample, and Exclusions
Informed by past research (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020), we ran a power analysis with G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) using an effect size of f = 0.25 (α = .05; power = .80; number of measurements = 7, see below; correlation among measures = .05; nonsphericity correction = .167 = worst case, or most conservative setting). The analysis suggested a sample size of N = 105 women. All women had to have a negotiation counterpart, suggesting a needed sample size of N = 210. In anticipation of potential exclusions, our goal was to collect data from N = 230 participants (or 115 negotiation dyads; see also below).
We recruited our participants on the campus of a major German university. As planned a priori, we recruited exactly N = 230 participants in 115 pairs. Although not planned a priori, we had to exclude six dyads (i.e., n = 12 participants; six team leaders and six team members) from all analyses. In four of these cases, the data of the postnegotiation questionnaire revealed that the team members did not identify as a woman (one identified as a non-binary person; one did not respond to any questions regarding demographics, including gender, so that we could not be sure about their gender; the other two team members indicated to be a man). These exclusions were unforeseen: Our study is about specific negotiation strategies for women. Thus, when running our study, our experimenters had to make a guess regarding the participants’ gender to make sure that only women would assume the role of team member. Yet, of course, misidentifications are always possible and seemed to have occurred in these cases, likely due to participants’ physical appearance or pitch of voice. The fifth dyad was excluded because the team member outright disclosed their selected strategy to their counterpart right at the beginning of the negotiation, which clearly changed to course of the interaction and suggests that the team member was lacking comprehension. This issue again could not have been anticipated. Lastly, regarding the sixth excluded dyad, the experimenter had to terminate the study early because language difficulties were clearly evident shortly before the negotiation started (as such, these participants did not work on the postnegotiation questionnaire that included a language check). This decision again was not anticipated (during recruitment, the participant seemed sufficiently fluent in German). This procedure led to a generally usable sample of N = 218 participants (in 109 dyads).
Moreover, we had to exclude two further dyads from analyses regarding the postnegotiation questionnaire, in particular. While coding the videos, we noted that these two dyads actually negotiated twice, which again could not have been anticipated (they agreed to the team member’s salary within a few minutes and were wondering about the short time; then, they exchanged their reservation points and negotiated again). As such, the course of the interaction was clearly different, and the participants’ responses to the postnegotiation questionnaire became ambiguous (e.g., when team members had to indicate which strategy they had chosen during the negotiation, it is unclear which of the two negotiations they had in mind). Hence, the sample size in analyses regarding the team members’ postnegotiation questionnaire was N = 107. Yet, as the study went as planned prior to the negotiation, data regarding team members’ prenegotiation questionnaire were useable. Accordingly, the sample size in analyses regarding the team member’s prenegotiation questionnaire was still N = 109. Regarding the team leaders, excluding these two cases reduced the total usable sample to N = 107 team leaders, as the team leaders’ prenegotiation questionnaire included only a quiz (but not actually relevant dependent variables).
As planned a priori, one additional team leader was excluded due to failure at a comprehension check (further reducing the sample to N = 106 team leaders). Moreover, we planned a priori to exclude participants who indicated not to be sufficiently fluent in German to understand the study materials, based on a language check item included in the postnegotiation questionnaire (see below). This applied to one participant in the role of team member. Yet, we ultimately decided not to exclude this team member because she spoke perfectly fluent, native German in the videotaped negotiation. By contrast, while coding the videos, we observed two dyads in which the team leaders appeared not to be sufficiently fluent in German (although they indicated to be so in the postnegotiation questionnaire), which also led to slight misunderstandings regarding the negotiation. Therefore, these two additional team leaders were also excluded, further reducing the sample to N = 104 team leaders (the team members from these two dyads were not excluded, as the misunderstandings were resolved and as the negotiations proceeded normally; thus, the team leaders’ language issues should not have affected the team members). One final team leader was excluded because the participant was not yet of legal age (i.e., only 16 years old), an issue that we again could not have anticipated. This further reduced the sample to N = 103 team leaders.
The last exclusion criterion we planned a priori concerned technical errors, such that our camera did not record the conducted negotiation. This happened for three dyads (for one dyad, the battery failed, and for the two further dyads, the videos were lost due to a corrupt secure digital-card; SD-card). Yet, we ultimately decided to exclude these cases only in analyses that concerned the team members’ behavioral data, as coded from the videotapes (see Hypotheses 1b and 4b), but not, for instance, from analyses regarding the team members’ expectations and intentions as indicated in the prenegotiation questionnaire. These responses were given beforehand and could not have been influenced by the technical difficulties that occurred only afterwards. Moreover, the concerned negotiations proceeded normally and ended in mutual agreement about the team members’ salaries, thereby enabling related exploratory analyses as well as analyses that concerned the team leaders’ evaluation of the team members. Thus, we had to exclude three additional team members only from analyses regarding Hypotheses 1b and 4b that concerned their behavior during the negotiation, in particular, which were tested based on the videos (reducing the sample to N = 106 team members in analyses of the behavioral data as coded from the videotapes).
Finally, we had to exclude one last team member from analyses of these behavioral data, in particular. Here, the team member did not use any specific strategy, yet also made no salary request and immediately agreed to the team leader’s first offer. As explained below, we relied on the team members’ first requests to code whether they had used assertiveness or yielding (if they had not used any specific strategy at all). As this participant had not made any request, we were unable to code the kinds of behaviors that are relevant for our research question. Taken all together, our procedure resulted in a final sample size of (a) N = 105 team members in analyses on the behavioral data as coded from the videotapes, (b) N = 107 team members in analyses on team members’ postnegotiation questionnaires, (c) N = 109 team members in analyses on team members’ prenegotiation questionnaires, and (d) N = 103 team leaders in analyses on team leaders’ postnegotiation questionnaires.
Of the N = 109 participants in the role of team members and N = 103 participants in the role of team leader, n = 207 were students, even though we did not prevent non-students from taking part in our research (cf. Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; n = 3 indicated to be employed, and n = 2 indicated to pursue other activities; i.e., freelance writing or voluntary work). The average age of our participants was MTeamMember = 22.53 (SDTeamMember = 5.97; rangeTeamMember: 18–77), and MTeamLeader = 23.49 (SDTeamLeader = 7.24; rangeTeamLeader: 18–83). The student participants majored in diverse disciplines. Our participants were offered 12 €. Our research was supported by a grant from the German Research Foundation.
Procedure and Design
Participants were asked to take part in a laboratory study that was supposedly about people’s experience and behavior in negotiations. After providing informed consent, participants were told that they would conduct a pay negotiation either in the role of a “team member” or a “team leader” (i.e., a supervisor). The negotiation concerned the team member’s pay (see below and the Appendix). Team members in our analyses were always women, as we were interested in women’s implementation of specific strategies (see our introduction, but also our exclusions described above). Team leaders were either women or men, which allowed us to explore whether the gender of the counterpart influenced any results (according to past research, the gender of an evaluator does not influence the likelihood of reacting with backlash, for instance; thus, we did not pose related hypotheses; e.g., Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Therefore, we aimed to recruit n = 115 women (for the role of team member) + n = 58 men (for the role of team leader) and n = 57 women (also for the role of team leader), resulting in N = 230 participants. However, following our a priori plans and addressing unforeseen issues, we had to exclude participants from analyses (see above). Moreover, please note that we had slightly less success in recruiting men for our study. Thus, our final usable sample was composed of n = 109 women in the role of the team member + n = 45 men and n = 58 women in the role of the team leader.
In preparation for the negotiation, participants received information and a prenegotiation questionnaire (see below) specifically for their role on the computer. For team members, the role information included background information on their employment in the organization (called Alpha; Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), including their own past job performance (i.e., their accomplishments). Moreover, they were informed about the specific topic of the negotiation—their pay (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Pay is a masculine-stereotypic negotiation issue that, typically, hinders women’s negotiation performance (e.g., Bear, 2011). Finally, and importantly, team members were presented in randomized order five specific strategies and two standard behaviors (i.e., assertiveness and yielding) that could be used in the negotiation (see Table 1). For each specific strategy and standard behavior, team members received a short description and, for the specific strategies, a theoretical rationale to make them comprehensible (recall that providing such a rationale did not make a marked difference for the implementation; Lietz et al., 2023).
As noted earlier, assertiveness and yielding represent standard behaviors that serve as our baselines (Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). As such, they are relatively generic as compared to the specific strategies, which are—by definition—more specific. Following prior work (e.g., Lietz et al., 2023), we only provided a description for assertiveness and yielding, as there are no theoretical rationales that would be comparable to those provided for the specific strategies. Moreover, past research investigating implementation gaps showed that women tended to be more (not less) inclined to use standard negotiation behaviors, particularly assertiveness—despite the greater specificity of the specific strategies. Still, when adapting past materials (especially from Lietz et al., 2023) and developing new materials for our study, we paid close attention to the language and length of the provided information. That is, the descriptions for all specific strategies as well as the standard behaviors were matched to have exactly 40 words. In the same manner, all theoretical rationales had also exactly 40 words. Moreover, we made sure that the structure of the descriptions and theoretical rationales for the newly added specific strategies of ATOP and DEAL closely mirrored those for the extant specific strategies (see Table 1). As per the suggestion of our review team, we also removed the term “feminine” from the strategy description of “feminine charm.” Doing so might mitigate overly stereotypic associations that could influence the results.
Prior to the negotiation, team leaders (i.e., supervisors) were informed about the negotiation topic (i.e., the team member’s pay). As such, team leaders’ background information also dealt with the team member’s employment in the organization, including the team member’s past job performance. Team leaders were asked to work on a prenegotiation questionnaire (i.e., a quiz) on the computer, checking whether they fully understood the provided information (if participants made a mistake on this quiz, they had to repeat it). Doing so ensured that team leaders were able to provide a performance appraisal, if a team member utilized ATOP. Both team members and team leaders were provided with a notepad and pen so that they could take notes for the negotiation. On a final note, team members and team leaders prepared for the negotiation in the same room.
After preparing for the negotiation, participants came together at a negotiation table to conduct the pay negotiation. They had a total of 20 minutes to negotiate. The negotiation was videotaped, allowing us to gauge which specific strategy or standard behavior women in the role of the team member actually implemented (for our coding procedure, see below). Team members were instructed twice to choose only one strategy or behavior for the negotiation (see below). The negotiation itself was based on the exercise and scenarios developed by Amanatullah and Morris (2010), Mazei et al. (2020), and Lietz et al. (2023), though adapted to the context of the current study (for a translation, see the Appendix; for the original materials, see our provided link to the OSF). After the negotiation, participants worked on another questionnaire on the computer, they were debriefed, received their remuneration, and they were thanked.
Measures
Prenegotiation Questionnaire for Team Members
Following extant research on the implementation gap, team members were asked—for each of the five specific strategies and two standard behaviors—how they expected it to influence (a) their economic outcomes (two items, e.g., “What do you think: How much does this behavior lead you to achieve a good economic outcome [e.g., a higher salary]?”; α = .83–.92), (b) social evaluations (two items, e.g., “What do you think: How much does this behavior lead to building a positive relationship with your counterpart?”; α = .65–.90), and (c) the perpetuation of women’s gender role (two items, e.g., “What do you think: How much does this behavior lead to a perpetuation of the common societal role of women?”; α = .82–.93). The six items were presented in randomized order. Then, team members were asked to indicate for each specific strategy and standard behavior to what extent they intended to use it (two items; e.g., “How likely would it be for you to use this behavior in this negotiation situation?”; α = .89–.96). The general order to first measure women’s expectations and then their intentions to implement a specific strategy or standard behavior was important because the expectations are theorized to drive implementation intentions. Yet, note that all measures regarding a strategy or behavior were presented on the same page.
To ensure transparency, we used items from Lietz et al. (2023, Study 2). Those can be seen in their original form in German, along with English translations, in their supplemental materials1. Altogether, our study involved a within-subjects design with seven levels, corresponding to the five strategies and two standard behaviors presented to team members (see Table 1).
Table 1 Specific Strategies, New and Old, as well as Standard Negotiation Behaviors
Note. The table and many contents were adapted from Lietz et al. (2023, see especially pp. 85–86).
As part of the prenegotiation questionnaire for team members, they were instructed to only use one of the seven presented approaches during the upcoming pay negotiation with their counterpart. In preparation for the negotiation, team members were also asked to indicate which of the seven specific strategies or standard behaviors they would choose for the negotiation (one item, adapted from Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). As a last instruction before the negotiation, team members were told a second time that they could enact only one specific strategy or standard behavior.
Prenegotiation Questionnaire for Team Leaders
After reading their role instructions for the negotiation, the team leaders’ prenegotiation questionnaire was composed of a quiz. As aforementioned, role instructions for team leaders included information on the team member’s employment and their past job performance. To make sure that team leaders paid attention to the provided information, they were asked six specific questions about the provided information. If they made at least one mistake, they were provided with the correct answers and asked to take the quiz again. This procedure was repeated until team leaders only gave correct answers.
Videotaped Negotiation
All negotiations were videotaped, as our key question concerned which specific strategies women implement in negotiations. We initially planned that two student assistants would code the videotapes. However, we eventually decided that one of the authors would conduct the full coding because we realized that the coding process was more difficult than we had anticipated (see below). One student assistant was then carefully taught all specific strategies in a designated training session and also coded 25% of the videotapes.
Still, in an attempt to calibrate our coding scheme, the student assistant began by coding a first set of only five videotapes. Afterwards, the student assistant conferred with the author who coded all videotapes to check (a) whether the interpretation of the displayed strategies was similar for both coders (i.e., both coders correctly and independently recognized a strategy if a women used it), and (b) whether or not the coding scheme was already suitable. Based on these discussions, the coding scheme was slightly adjusted. Then, the author coded all videos a second time, whereas the student assistant independently coded their share of 25% of the videotapes (including the five previously coded videos), both using the updated coding scheme (reported below).
In the event that team members actually implemented more than one strategy—despite our clear and repeated instructions—we focused in our hypothesis tests on the strategy that was implemented first. We aimed to do so for the following reasons: First, research suggests that the beginning of a negotiation is a particularly relevant and decisive phase (Curhan & Pentland, 2007; see also Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). As such, women’s first choice is especially consequential. Second, as women were presented many specific strategies and standard behaviors, their memory should be most fresh when they begin to negotiate. Hence, we reasoned that we could most reliably code women’s first choices, when they were most likely to enact a specific strategy in the way it was presented to them. Third, as team members were instructed to make a single choice, we reasoned that their choice would be readily apparent. Fourth, ATOP is a specific strategy that is used right at the beginning of the negotiation (i.e., asking for a performance appraisal first). Fifth and finally, we reasoned that it would be relatively difficult to reliably identify an episode of “pure” assertiveness or “pure” yielding later in the negotiation process. The typical flow of a negotiation entails making concessions—that is, most negotiators yield over the course of a negotiation, at least to some extent (if they intend to come to an agreement, which people typically do; see Tuncel et al., 2016). Therefore, we reasoned that it could become unclear where to draw a clear line between assertiveness and yielding. Distinguishing between assertiveness and yielding at the beginning of a negotiation is somewhat less difficult, however, because ambitious first offers are a signpost of assertiveness (e.g., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Hüffmeier et al., 2014). Taken together, focusing on women’s first choice allowed for clearer and more stringent hypothesis tests.
Based on these considerations, our coding scheme and procedure was as follows: To test our hypotheses, we created a categorical variable that indicated which specific strategy or standard behavior women had used (first), using the categories of 1 = ATOP; 2 = DEAL; 3 = relational account; 4 = feminine charm; 5 = imagining being an advocate; 6 = assertiveness; 7 = yielding.2 To do so, we mainly examined women’s verbal behavior. If they had made a statement that matched a strategy description, we judged this event as women having implemented the respective specific strategy. Please note, however, that imagining being an advocate is an exception here: This specific strategy is not visible to others—women imagine being an advocate. Therefore, women’s implementation of this single specific strategy was derived from their answers to an item presented after the negotiation (see below).
Please also note that women could have not enacted any specific strategy over the course of the whole negotiation. On the one hand, this observation would be already telling: If women had not shown a single specific strategy, it reveals an implementation gap. On the other hand, in the absence of any shown specific strategy, we then needed to categorize women’s behavior as “assertiveness” or “yielding.” To do so, we assigned the code “assertiveness” if women in the role of the team member had made a first offer that was higher than or equal to 50,000 €. By contrast, we assigned the code “yielding” if they had made a first offer lower than 50,000 €. Our reasoning for this approach was as follows: Our negotiation task is partly based on the exercise developed by Amanatullah and Morris (2010). They noted that, “Participants were also told that the job candidate had another offer from another company that was nonnegotiable and likely near the market mean of $40,000. Given this information, all participants were expected to enter the negotiation with a reservation point near $40,000” (p. 259). Thus, in our negotiation task, team members were told that their reservation point was 40,000 € (we used Euro values, as we conducted our research in Germany). Amanatullah and Morris (2010, p. 260) also observed that women who negotiated their own salary intended to make an opening offer of “49.15,” on average (this number is “in thousands of dollars”). Hence, in the context of our task, a first offer that was higher than this number (i.e., 50,000 €) was relatively ambitious, whereas a lower offer was less ambitious.
Although we focused on the previously outlined categorical variable in our analyses, as the underlying coding should allow for relatively clear hypothesis tests, it remained possible that women would implement more than one specific strategy over the course of the negotiation (please recall that capturing episodes of “pure” assertiveness or “pure” yielding later in the negotiation is difficult, as most negotiators yield to their counterpart at least to some extent). To explore this interesting possibility, we created a dummy-variable indicating whether women had used more than one specific strategy (0 = No, 1 = Yes).
Moreover, as noted above, we had to adjust the coding scheme because the author who coded the videos readily observed that a number of women implemented some of the specific strategies partially. For example, regarding the specific strategy of DEAL, some women began to delineate their future engagement, yet this description was not particularly detailed. As for the specific strategy of a relational account, women sometimes based their salary requests on their relationships to the organization, team leader, or their team, but not in a way that matched the provided strategy description. To address this unexpected issue, we adjusted our coding scheme as follows: Although we initially planned to create dummy-variables for each specific strategy to capture whether or not they were used at least once during the negotiation (0 = No, 1 = Yes), we added a third option, thereby coding whether women had used a specific strategy not at all, fully, or only partially (0 = No, 1 = Yes, 2 = Partially). This procedure resulted in seven further variables, one for each of the five presented specific strategies and the two standard behaviors (the standard behaviors of assertiveness and yielding could not have been shown partially, since we coded these behaviors based on women’s first requests). These additional variables were used for exploratory analyses.
As aforementioned, a quarter (i.e., 25%) of the videotapes was coded by a student assistant, whereas one of the authors coded all of the videotapes. We computed Cohen’s κ as our measure of interrater reliability. The values were as follows: κ = .79 for the main categorical variable indicating the first used strategy; regarding the variables that needed to be revised to reflect the fact that strategies were sometimes used partially: κ = .93 (for ATOP), κ = .55 (for DEAL), κ = .43 (for the relational account), κ = 1.00 (for feminine charm), κ = .79 (for assertiveness), and κ = .84 (for yielding); and finally, regarding the dummy-variable indicating whether or not women had used multiple strategies: κ = .27.3 In summary, the degree of interrater agreement varied across the different coded variables. Importantly, please note that the agreement in case of the coded variable that is relevant for our hypothesis tests—the categorical variable indicating the first used strategy—was fully acceptable.
In light of the partially low values for Cohen’s κ, we delved deeper into the observed interrater reliability. There were eleven disagreements between coders in total (in nine out of thirty videos). In five cases, the disagreements concerned the usage of the relational account: The coders disagreed whether or not women had used this strategy partially. Similarly, in four cases, the coders disagreed whether or not women had used DEAL partially. In another case, only one of the coders identified the usage of DEAL. In the last case, the disagreement concerned the question of whether ATOP was used. As these details reveal, it was comparably difficult to reliably code whether certain strategies were used partially (9 out of 11 disagreements). This is relatively unsurprising, because it should be more difficult to reliably identify partially used strategies than fully used strategies (as reported above, we were successful in reliably coding whether a strategy was fully used, as can be seen in the comparably high reliability for the main categorical variable for our hypothesis tests). On a final note, please also recall that the coded variables including the level of “partially used” were used only in exploratory analyses.
All disagreements were resolved through discussions, after the coders jointly rewatched the videos, notified each other when they identified a strategy, and explained on what grounds they coded a strategy. Finally, they discussed the cases in depth and mutually agreed on the final coding results included in our dataset, which can be found via the OSF-link (see above).
Negotiated Pay
By asking our participants as well as by inspecting the videotapes, we gauged the amount of pay for the team members that the negotiators agreed upon. This outcome provided the basis for interesting exploratory analyses (see below). However, we were unable to provide a conclusive test of the effects of using a particular specific strategy on women’s negotiated pay because we could not know in advance how many women would use which specific strategy or standard behavior—that is our question. Moreover, importantly, please note that our study did not involve an experimental manipulation of the specific strategy or standard behavior that was enacted by the team member. Therefore, all potential results on the consequences of women’s choices can only be correlational, but not causal, in nature.
Postnegotiation Questionnaire for Team Members
After the negotiation, team members worked on another questionnaire on the computer. First, they were asked to indicate which of the seven specific strategies or standard behaviors they had implemented in the negotiation (one item, adapted from Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). This item was used to infer whether women had used the strategy of imagining being an advocate (Bear & Babcock, 2017)—a choice that would be invisible to observers and the coders of the videotapes (see our results section below). Furthermore, for exploratory reasons, team members were asked to indicate to what extent they perceived their own requests as “legitimate,” “justified,” and “inappropriate,” capturing women’s own experience of legitimacy (three items, adapted from Bowles & Babcock, 2013; the last item was reverse-coded; α = .82). Furthermore, as two comprehension checks, team members were asked to indicate the topic of the negotiation (adapted from Mazei et al., 2023) and the name of the organization in the negotiation (i.e., Alpha; Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Team members indicated whether or not they believed to be sufficiently fluent in German to understand the study materials—a language check. Finally, we measured demographics.
Postnegotiation Questionnaire for Team Leaders
Team leaders also worked on a questionnaire that included the following measures: They indicated how “legitimate,” “justified,” and “inappropriate” they perceived the requests of the team member (three items, adapted from Bowles & Babcock, 2013; the last item was again reverse-coded; α = .71). Likewise, they responded to standard measures of backlash (i.e., willingness to work together, three items, adapted from Bowles & Babcock, 2013; α = .83; work-based backlash and personal backlash, three items each, adapted from Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; α = .64 and α = .66, respectively) and their perception of the degree to which the behavior of the team member perpetuated gender roles (two items, adapted from Lietz et al., 2023; α = .92). Please note again that these measures were only collected for exploratory reasons: Since we could not know a priori how many women would implement which specific strategies, we were unable to provide a systematic test of the consequences associated with women’s strategy use (see our exploratory analyses below). Team leaders also received the same comprehension checks and the same language check as team members. Finally, we measured demographics.
Results
Data Preprocessing
As our data preprocessing steps, we first examined whether participants met any of our specified exclusion criteria (see above). As the next step, we used a method developed by Judd et al. (2001) that was also used in past research (for extended descriptions in the context of the current research, see Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). This method involves computing difference scores, such that women’s expectations (or intentions) for any one specific strategy were subtracted from those regarding either assertiveness or yielding. Positive values on the resulting difference scores reflect an implementation gap, such that a standard behavior (e.g., assertiveness) is preferred over a specific strategy. Likewise, a positive difference score regarding women’s expectations suggests that a standard behavior is expected to yield more positive outcomes—except for the perpetuation of gender roles, for which the reverse is true.
Then, we examined the difference scores to check whether they were normally distributed, using Shapiro-Wilk-Tests (e.g., Field, 2013). We used a statistical test to examine potential deviations from a normal distribution, rather than a graphical procedure (e.g., QQ-Plots), as the results of formal statistical tests allow for an objective decision (if the test was statistically significant, α = .05, the data were assumed not to be normally distributed). The Shapiro-Wilk-Tests suggested a deviation from the normal distribution for nine out of the 12 difference scores that were relevant for Hypotheses 1–6 (i.e., differences between the standard behaviors of assertiveness and yielding on the one hand and the specific strategies of ATOP and DEAL on the other hand, regarding certain expectations, depending on the particular hypothesis, and women’s intentions to use a behavior or strategy). We also inspected Box plots to examine the presence of outliers, which are graphically displayed as asterisks or dots. We observed outliers on eight of the 12 difference scores that were relevant for Hypotheses 1–6. Following our plans made ex ante, we kept potential outliers in our dataset, yet conducted robust analyses (details are provided below).
Likewise, we examined the original scales that formed the basis for the previously noted difference scores. Recall that all types of expectations and also women’s intentions were measured with two items for each standard behavior and specific strategy. As such, we averaged their responses to the respective two items to create scales. As per Shapiro-Wilk-Tests, there was a deviation from the normal distribution for 15 out of the 16 scales that were relevant for our key hypotheses. Moreover, we observed outliers on eight of the 16 scales. Finally, we also inspected the means of the scales that were relevant for Hypotheses 1–6 to examine the presence of floor effects or ceiling effects. These means ranged from 2.24 to 5.46 (on a rating scale that ranged from 1 to 7). As such, floor or ceiling effects did not seem to pose a problem for the current research (which was expected, as these, or at least very similar, measures were used in past research; Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020). Table 2 presents means and standard deviations for all seven options provided to team members.
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for Key Study Variables
Note: N = 109.
Hypothesis Tests
We provided focused comparisons to test our specific hypotheses. As Hypotheses 1a, 2, and 3 (and later Hypothesis 5) concerned potential non-differences between specific strategies and standard behaviors (see above), we used the previously noted computed difference scores and ran Bayesian one-sample t-tests, using JASP (JASP Team, 2023). As we observed a deviation from a normal distribution or outliers regarding all difference scores involved in these comparisons, we always used the Wilcoxon signed-ranked version of these Bayesian analyses (with 1000 samples, which is the default setting). The results are presented in Table 3 (N = 109 in all analyses).
Regarding Hypothesis 1a and considering ATOP, the evidence was very slightly in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Please note, however, that the descriptive statistics suggested that women slightly favored ATOP over assertiveness (see Table 2). Considering DEAL, the evidence was moderately in favor of the predicted null hypothesis. As such, there was no implementation gap regarding ATOP and DEAL when comparing these specific strategies to assertiveness. Hypothesis 1a was supported.
Table 3 Bayesian Analyses
Note: N = 109.
Regarding Hypothesis 2 and considering ATOP, the evidence was in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Yet again, the descriptive statistics suggested that ATOP was expected to yield better economic outcomes than regular assertiveness (see Table 2). Considering DEAL, the evidence was again moderately in favor of the null hypothesis. Altogether, Hypothesis 2 was supported: If anything, the newly discovered strategies of ATOP and DEAL were expected to be more economically effective than assertiveness.
Regarding Hypothesis 3 and considering both ATOP and DEAL, the evidence was in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Moreover, this time, the descriptive statistics suggested that both ATOP and DEAL were expected to lead to greater perpetuation of gender roles than assertiveness. Therefore, we followed-up on these noteworthy observations that were at odds with the hypothesis by running regular one-sample t-tests using the difference scores (with bootstrapping, 2,000 samples, bias-corrected and accelerated; Field, 2013). These analyses were not planned ex ante. Both ATOP and DEAL were expected to perpetuate gender roles to a greater extent than assertiveness (both p’s ≤ .005; both d’s ≤ -0.26). These effects were not observed in Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests that were part of the omnibus tests reported in the Online Supplement. Still, taken all together, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
To examine Hypotheses 4a (and later Hypothesis 6) that concerned predicted differences relative to simple yielding, we submitted the previously noted difference scores again to one-sample t-tests (N = 109 in all analyses). To prevent alpha-inflation, we adjusted the alpha-level here to α = .025 (two comparisons regarding behavioral intentions, and, later, also the expected perpetuation). Considering ATOP, the analysis was significant, t(108) = -9.67, p < .001, d = -0.93 (as planned a priori, this analysis was conducted with bootstrapping, 2,000 samples, bias-corrected and accelerated; Field, 2013). Considering DEAL, the analysis was also significant, t(108) = -8.48, p < .001, d = -0.81. Thus, Hypothesis 4a was clearly supported: Women preferred to implement both ATOP and DEAL more than to simply yield.
To test Hypothesis 5, we again ran Bayesian analyses, as was planned a priori (also using the Wilcoxon signed-ranked version, with 1000 samples). The results are included in Table 3. Considering ATOP, the evidence was slightly in favor of the null hypothesis. Considering DEAL, the evidence was slightly in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Still, the descriptive statistics suggested that both ATOP and DEAL were expected to produce better social evaluations than yielding. As such, Hypothesis 5 was also supported.
Finally, to test Hypothesis 6, we again ran one-sample t-tests (N = 109). Considering ATOP, the analysis was significant, t(108) = 10.77, p < .001, d = 1.03. Considering DEAL, the analysis was also significant, t(108) = 11.21, p < .001, d = 1.07 (as planned a priori, this analysis was conducted with bootstrapping). Altogether, both ATOP and DEAL were expected to lead to less perpetuation than yielding, fully supporting Hypothesis 6.
To examine Hypotheses 1b and 4b, which concerned the question of which specific strategy women actually chose for the negotiation, we conducted χ2-goodness-of-fit tests (cf. Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020) and examined the frequencies with which each specific strategy or behavior was chosen. Importantly, we ran these analyses both for the choice-measure that was part of team members’ prenegotiation questionnaire as well as their actual strategy choice during the negotiation (as mostly coded from the videotapes, using the primary categorical variable that we described above). These analyses provide insights into the differences between all considered specific strategies and standard behaviors.
Regarding the choice-measure of the prenegotiation questionnaire (N = 109), the analysis was significant, χ2(6) = 142.81, p < .001. Women’s indicated intended choices were as follows: n = 57 for ATOP, n = 17 for DEAL, n = 5 for relational account, n = 4 for imagining being an advocate, n = 2 for feminine charm, n = 17 for assertiveness, and n = 7 for yielding. In summary, ATOP was the most preferred strategy. As such, data on women’s intended choices on the prenegotiation questionnaire supported Hypotheses 1b and 4b.
Please recall that women were also asked to self-indicate their actual choice on the post-negotiation questionnaire. An exploratory analysis on this measure was again significant, χ2(6) = 120.99, p < .001 (N = 107 in this analysis). Women’s self-indicated actual choices were as follows, and highly similar to their indicated intended choices: n = 53 for ATOP, n = 15 for DEAL, n = 4 for relational account, n = 4 for imagining being an advocate, n = 3 for feminine charm, n = 17 for assertiveness, and n = 11 for yielding.
Importantly, the choice-measure of the prenegotiation questionnaire included the total set of seven options provided to women in the role of team member. Yet, as mentioned earlier, women’s potential use of the specific strategy of imagining being an advocate could not be coded based on the videotapes. That is, if women imagined being an advocate, we were necessarily unaware of this choice. Therefore, we inspected women’s responses to the first item included in the post-negotiation questionnaire presented to team members that concerned the question of which option they had just implemented. If women indicated to have chosen imagining being an advocate, they received the code 5 = imagining being an advocate on the categorical variable that captured women’s actual behavior (see above). Please note that this issue does not represent a problem for women’s indicated choice on the prenegotiation questionnaire. This is why we planned to test Hypotheses 1b and 4b in two different ways.
Lastly, we examined women’s first choice of specific strategies or behaviors as observed in the videotapes (N = 105 in this analysis). Again, the analysis was significant, χ2(6) = 130.40, p < .001. Women’s actual first choices were as follows: n = 54 for ATOP, n = 11 for DEAL, n = 4 for relational account, n = 4 for imagining being an advocate, n = 2 for feminine charm, n = 13 for assertiveness, and n = 17 for yielding. Again, ATOP was the most frequently used strategy, whereas DEAL was slightly less frequently chosen in comparison to yielding and assertiveness. Altogether, data on women’s actual behaviors partially supported Hypotheses 1b and 4b, such that the hypothesis was supported for ATOP but not for DEAL.
Exploratory Analyses
Relationships to Outcomes
As we mentioned above, we could not anticipate the exact frequency with which women implemented certain specific strategies or standard behaviors. Moreover, it is worth recalling that we did not manipulate the strategic choice of the female team member. As a result, we could not provide conclusive tests on the consequences of using a particular specific strategy or standard behavior. Thus, we limited ourselves to exploratory analyses on the relationships between women’s choices and their outcomes. These outcomes include the team members’ pay, how legitimate their counterpart (i.e., the team leader) found the team member’s negotiating, backlash, and the degree to which gender roles were perceived to have been perpetuated, as indicated by the team leader. We always ran Kruskal-Wallis-Tests (i.e., a robust alternative to a regular ANOVA) with women’s actual strategic choice (as coded from the videos) as the predictor (N = 99 in all analyses).
Pay. The Kruskal-Wallis-Test with pay as the dependent variable was not significant, p = .070 (dyads not reaching an agreement were not included; for the dyads that negotiated twice, we used their first agreed upon salary for this analysis).
Perceived legitimacy. The Kruskal-Wallis-Test with perceived legitimacy (as rated by the team leader) as the dependent variable was not significant, p = .618.
Backlash. The three Kruskal-Wallis-Tests with all three forms of backlash (see above) as the dependent variables were not significant, all p’s ≥ .538.
Perceived perpetuation. The Kruskal-Wallis-Test with perceived perpetuation (as rated by the team leader) was significant, p = .013. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni-correction suggested only one significant difference: Women using DEAL were perceived by their counterpart as perpetuating gender roles less than women who simply yielded (p = .012).
Gender of Counterpart
Team members’ expectations and intentions. As further exploratory analyses, we tested whether team member’s expectations (i.e., regarding economic outcomes, social evaluations, and the perpetuation of gender roles) and behavioral intentions were affected by the gender of their counterpart (i.e., the team leader). These exploratory analyses are interesting because team members and team leaders prepared for the negotiation in the same room, so that the team members knew about the gender of their negotiation counterpart (e.g., Bowles et al., 2007). As many (though not all) variables were not normally distributed (when split by the counterpart’s gender), we always ran Mann-Whitney-U-Tests for the sake of simplicity (as robust alternatives to regular t-tests; N = 103 in all analyses). Please note that this section entails a large number of tests, as we explored whether the gender of the team leader affected four dependent variables for each specific strategy or standard behavior.
Out of the 28 tests, only three were significant: (1) Team members negotiating with a male team leader expected assertiveness to be more economically effective than team members negotiating with a female team leader (p = .010). Moreover, (2) team members negotiating with a male team leader expected yielding to be less economically effective than team members negotiating with a female team leader (p = .013). Lastly, (3) team members negotiating with a male team leader expected assertiveness to perpetuate gender roles less than team members negotiating with a female team leader (p = .025). In summary, the gender of the team leader made only little difference, and no novel specific strategy was affected.
Team leaders’ evaluations. Similarly, we explored whether the gender of the team leader influenced their evaluations of the focal women in the role of team member (e.g., Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Here, we again examined the gender of the team leader as a predictor of the team leaders’ perceived legitimacy, the three forms of backlash, and the team leaders’ perceived perpetuation. Again, we ran Mann-Whitney-U-Tests (N = 103 in all analyses). The results suggested that the gender of the team leader only affected the three forms of backlash: Female team leaders had higher ratings on the backlash scales than male team leaders (all three p’s ≤ .030): Given the wording of the backlash items, this meant that female team leaders (as compared to male team leaders) evaluated the team members more favorably (e.g., they were more willing to work together with the team members).
Additional Variables Coded from Videotapes
Finally, as we examined the entire negotiation episode based on our video recordings, we explored the additional variables on women’s strategic choices that we described above. Specifically, we examined how many women had used more than one specific strategy, both fully or partially (using the respective variable). Lastly, using the five variables indicating whether or not women had used each specific strategy at least once during the negotiation, again both fully or partially, we conducted χ2-goodness-of-fit tests (cf. Lietz et al., 2023; Mazei et al., 2020) and explored how often each specific strategy was used by women in the role of team member (irrespective of which specific strategy they had used first; N = 105).
Regarding the use of multiple strategies, the majority of women (n = 83) used only one strategy, whereas n = 22 women used multiple strategies, six of them fully and 16 of them partially. The analysis was significant, χ2(2) = 100.17, p < .001, indicating that significantly fewer women implemented multiple strategies as compared to using only one strategy.
As for the specific strategy of ATOP, 55 women implemented this strategy fully, 50 women did not use it, and no participant used this strategy partially. Concerning DEAL, 21 women implemented this strategy, of which 13 used it fully and eight used it partially (the remaining 84 women did not use DEAL). Furthermore, 15 women used a relational account, of which seven implemented it fully and eight partially (90 women did not use this strategy). Regarding feminine charm, three women used this strategy, two of them fully and one partially (the remaining 102 women did not use feminine charm). Lastly, imagining being an advocate was fully used by four women (and 101 women did not use this specific strategy; it was not used partially). All χ2-goodness-of-fit tests were significant (p < .001), except for ATOP (p = .626). This suggests that women were likely to not use (vs. use) any one particular strategy (which is fully expectable, as we asked our participants to use just one strategy), except for ATOP, for which women were equally inclined to use it versus to not use it.
Discussion
Our goal was to examine whether the novel specific strategies of ATOP and DEAL are not characterized by an implementation gap. Our results revealed that women intended to use ATOP and DEAL at least as much as assertiveness—unlike past specific strategies, for which we observed implementation gaps, in line with past research (see the Online Supplement; e.g., Lietz et al., 2023). Women also expected ATOP and DEAL to produce at least equally good economic outcomes when compared to assertiveness (though also greater perpetuation of gender roles) and at least equally good social evaluations when compared to yielding. Finally, our video coding revealed that ATOP was clearly the most implemented strategy.
Conclusion and Implications
Theoretical and Practical Implications
We reasoned that ATOP and DEAL would not be characterized by unfavorable expectations regarding the achievement of economic outcomes and resulting implementation gaps. Specifically, we theorized that using ATOP and DEAL would not involve blending agency with communion, so that these strategies do not involve stressing attributes that are commonly perceived as ineffective (e.g., Kray & Thompson, 2005). In line with this theorizing, women did not expect ATOP and DEAL to be less economically effective than assertiveness. Consequently, women intended to use ATOP and DEAL at least as much as simply being assertive. Moreover, women were even more inclined to use ATOP and DEAL in comparison to yielding. And when going by our video coding of women’s actual strategic choices during the negotiation, ATOP was clearly the most often used approach. Altogether, we observed, in line with our general proposition, that the strategies of ATOP and DEAL were not characterized by implementation gaps (unlike past specific strategies for which we observed implementation gaps; see the Online Supplement; see also Lietz et al., 2023).
However, although we reasoned that ATOP and DEAL would not be expected to perpetuate gender roles more than assertiveness, at least in some analyses, they were. In the case of ATOP, one reason could be that women thought of asking the counterpart to provide a performance appraisal, rather than directly engaging in self-promotion, as being an accommodating act. In the case of DEAL, perhaps delineating the benefits of women’s engagement for the organization was perceived as an other-oriented (i.e., communal) act. As such, both ATOP and DEAL may still have certain components that let them appear as more gender role perpetuating in comparison to outright and pure assertiveness. Still, the three past specific strategies were also expected to perpetuate gender roles more than assertiveness (see the Online Supplement). Moreover, we observed as part of our omnibus tests reported in the Online Supplement that ATOP and DEAL were expected to perpetuate gender roles less than at least some past specific strategies (i.e., relational account and feminine charm). As such, ATOP and DEAL appear to be strategies that perpetuate gender roles to a relatively small degree. In this respect, future research is needed that examines the actual role-perpetuating effects of the specific strategies, not just women’s related expectations. This is an important point, because women were not disinclined to use ATOP and DEAL, despite their potential for gender role-perpetuation.
Women are still underpaid and often have a difficult time climbing up the career ladder (e.g., England et al., 2020). Thus, specific strategies that women are inclined to use in salary negotiations could go a long way in effecting change toward greater gender parity in the workplace. As such, we made the notable observation that women were particularly likely to use ATOP in a salary negotiation. Therefore, negotiation trainers and educators are advised to consider teaching ATOP, and perhaps also DEAL, when preparing women to negotiate in their occupational life. Still, organizations themselves are also advised to make sure that women would be evaluated and treated fairly, reducing the risk of women incurring backlash in the first place (e.g., Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013; Bowles et al., 2007). For instance, organizations could reduce ambiguity in salary negotiations (e.g., Bowles et al., 2022) and clarify when it is appropriate for employees to negotiate.
Limitations and Future Research
We contributed to the literature by examining implementation gaps for novel specific strategies as well as by simulating a real interactive negotiation (rather than utilizing a scenario design, as was done in past research on the implementation gap; e.g., Lietz et al., 2023). Still, future research is needed that addresses the limitations of our research. To start, as our focus was on the question of which strategies women would like to implement, we did not manipulate women’s strategic choices. As such, we could only provide first exploratory analyses on the consequences of using a particular strategy. Future research should manipulate women’s strategic choices and test the consequences conclusively and in depth.
Moreover, as described in our Method section (and as can also be seen in the Appendix), we had to include information on women’s past job performance in the role instructions, so that the team members could know what using ATOP would mean for them and so that team leaders could actually provide a performance appraisal, if asked for. In turn, the given performance information, suggesting that the team member had done a great job, might have increased women’s inclination to use ATOP, a strategy that capitalizes on the past performance. Still, it is important to keep in mind that having done a great job is the quintessential reason for why people seek a raise in the first place. In other words, in real life, people likely have a hard time in getting a raise when they have not excelled at their job, and many people likely do not feel justified in seeking a raise in such a situation. Moreover, the given information on the team member’s past job performance does not explain why past specific strategies were, in fact, characterized by an implementation gap. Nevertheless, the past job performance certainly can be conceptualized as a moderator of women’s inclination to utilize strategies that capitalize on that performance, so that future research could examine this factor in greater depth.
It is worth recalling that our study was conducted in Germany. Therefore, future studies should conduct additional research in other cultures (for an example of a cross-cultural examination, see Shan et al., 2016). Moreover, future research would be helpful that deliberately compares specific strategies that vary on continuum ranging from communal to agentic (our consideration of yielding and assertiveness is an example of this general approach, but we mean here considering specific strategies, not standard behaviors). In doing so, researchers could delve deeper into the question of when, exactly, women begin to perceive a strategy as perpetuating gender roles, for instance. This approach can certainly provide insights above and beyond those contributed in the current study. Finally, as we focused on a salary negotiation, in particular, future research would be welcome that examines the usage of the novel specific strategies in other kinds of negotiations. This avenue for research would again help the field to see to what extent our findings generalize.
Conclusion
Prior to our study, the extant literature suggested that specific strategies for women in negotiations are typically characterized by an implementation gap (e.g., Lietz et al., 2023). This is problematic, as gender inequalities still characterize many workplaces today. However, the good news is that we observed that ATOP, perhaps also DEAL, represent actually implemented strategies. As such, we have taken an important step forward in finding ways to support women’s negotiation performance.
Author Note
Prior to running our study, we used the revised registered report as a preregistration. Our original materials, data, and analysis code are available here: https://osf.io/2ehxj/?view_only=dae6d82736af4514959a374c0c474722. We have no known conflicts of interest to disclose. This research was supported by a grant from the German Research Foundation (MA 9683/3-2). We also thank Katrin Kaufmann, Jonah Schmidt, Isis Fischer, Kamil Herrmann, Melanie Karb, and Linda Dresel for their help in collecting the data for this research.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Instructions for the Team Members (Emphasis always in Original)
The current study is about a negotiation between a team member and the leader of a team. The negotiation concerns the salary of the team member.
In the negotiation, you take on the role of team member and negotiate in accordance with that role. Your counterpart in the negotiation takes on the role of team leader. You thus conduct a negotiation with your team leader about your own salary.
In what follows, you receive further background information. In preparation for the negotiation, you may take notes, if you like to. You can find a pen and a paper block at your seat.
After graduating from TU Dortmund University a few years ago, you began your career in consulting. Although you were interested in staying near Dortmund after graduating, you did not want to work for a big and impersonal corporation. Therefore, you work for the company “Alpha” for three years now. You have made very rewarding experiences while working at Alpha, and you value the small, intimate working environment; both aspects led Alpha to be a company that you enjoy working for.
You are among the especially well-performing members of your team. For instance, within a few months, you were able to successfully built up an important, already existing client into a major client. To do so, you not only presented realistic and excellent solutions to the client, you also worked very fast and efficiently. This also led Alpha to being recommended. Because of these recommendations, you also managed to attract new orders. In sum, your goal attainment is approximately at 106%.
All conditions regarding your job are already agreed upon, except for one… your salary. As Alpha is a small company, the salary structure is very flexible and open for negotiations. An appointment was scheduled for today in which you will discuss your salary with the leader of your team. Your team leader is a well-connected member of Alpha and has wide influence in the company. Therefore, your reputation within Alpha might be strongly influenced (both positively or negatively) by the impression that your team leader has of yourself after the negotiation.
In preparation for today’s negotiation, you did a lot of research, including a Google search about salaries in your line of work. Based on your research, you decided for yourself that you aim to get a minimum annual salary of 40.000 €. This salary represents your lower bound, that is, your reservation point.
The results of the negotiation are very important to you. You have a clear idea about what you want to achieve in the negotiation. Try to vividly imagine the situation. Maybe you have already conducted such a negotiation in the past—then try to think back of this past situation.
Please keep in mind that your salary will be the only topic in the negotiation. All other aspects of your job have already been agreed upon. Thus, you cannot negotiate any further conditions (e.g., contract period, bonuses, promotions, etc.). You negotiate exclusively your annual salary with your counterpart.
Important note: Because you sought a meeting with your team leader, it is your task to begin the conversation and to speak first. So, please start the negotiation yourself!
Below, you will be described different behaviors that you could show in this situation. Please evaluate each behavior using the following questions. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers. Select the response options that fit your opinion best.
Appendix B. Instructions for the Team Leaders (Emphasis always in Original)
The current study is about a negotiation between a team member and the leader of a team. The negotiation concerns the salary of the team member.
In the negotiation, you take on the role of team leader and negotiate in accordance with that role. Your counterpart in the negotiation takes on the role of team member. You thus conduct a negotiation with your team member about the team member’s salary.
In what follows, you receive further background information. In preparation for the negotiation, you may take notes, if you like to. You can find a pen and a paper block at your seat.
You work in consulting, for the company “Alpha.” You have made very rewarding experiences while working at Alpha, and you value the small, intimate working environment; both aspects led Alpha to be a company that you enjoy working for. For the past few years, you lead a team at Alpha. It is your job to assign tasks to team members, to keep an eye on your team members’ performances, and also to talk with your team members about salary every once in a while.
Today, an appointment with one of your team members was scheduled to talk about the salary of the team member. All other conditions concerning the team member’s job are already agreed upon. As Alpha is a small company, the salary structure is very flexible and open for negotiations.
Your team member works at Alpha for three years now and is among the especially well-performing members of your team. For instance, within a few months, your team member was able to successfully built up an important, already existing client into a major client. To do so, the team member not only presented realistic and excellent solutions to the client, but also worked very fast and efficiently. This also led Alpha to being recommended. Because of these recommendations, your team member also managed to attract new orders. In sum, your team member’s goal attainment is approximately at 106%.
You prepared for today’s negotiation and decided for yourself to grant a maximum annual salary of 60.000 €. This salary is your upper bound, that is, your reservation point.
The results of the negotiation are very important to you. You have a clear idea about what you want to achieve in the negotiation. Try to vividly imagine the situation. Maybe you have already conducted such a negotiation in past—then try to think back of this past situation.
Please keep in mind that your team member’s salary will be the only topic in the negotiation. All other aspects of the team member’s job have already been agreed upon. Thus, you cannot negotiate any further conditions (e.g., contract period, bonuses, promotions, etc.). You exclusively negotiate with your counterpart about the annual salary.
Important note: Because the team member sought a meeting with you, it is the team member’s task to begin the conversation and to speak first. So, leave it to the team member to start the negotiation!
Below, you will take a short quiz concerning the provided information. This is meant to ensure that you have carefully read the information.
see https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03616843221128484#supplementary-materials↩︎
During the coding of the videos, we noticed that some women implemented specific strategies only partially. This issue is decribed in greater detail below, and we investigated these cases in exploratory analyes. Since we aimed to conduct conservative hypothesis tests, we categorized only those strategies or standard behaviors as the first ones if they were implemented fully. In this respect, we observed two dyads in which women used a specific strategy only partially—but no other specific strategy—so we coded their approach as a standard behavior.↩︎
Due to women’s rare usage of the past specific strategies, the student assistant who coded 25% of the videos did not encounter the strategy of imagining being an advocate (i.e., the team members from these videotapes did not indicate to have used this strategy as their self-indicated actual choice in the postnegotiation questionnaire). Thus, we could not report Cohen’s κ for this particular strategy.↩︎