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Only When It's Fair: Transparency Perceptions Influence Negotiation Initiation

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Abstract

Negotiation has a considerable impact on individuals' lives and has been proposed as a key mechanism to address the gender wage gap. Most people, especially women, however, are hesitant to initiate a negotiation. According to the theoretical model of negotiation initiation proposed by Reif and Brodbeck (2014), people are more likely to initiate negotiations in response to perceived discrepancies between their current (offered) outcome and their own expectation, yet very little is known regarding *what* influences perceptions of discrepancy. To better answer this question, we integrate fairness theory with negotiation initiation theory to predict that transparency regarding relative pay and performance increases the likelihood of detecting a negative discrepancy when it exists due evaluation of the offer based on fairness norms. We predict transparency will be especially beneficial for women, and that perceived negative discrepancy leads to negotiation initiation. Across two studies, we find that transparency significantly enhances the positive relationship between performance-based discrepancies and perceived negative discrepancies. Moreover, both studies confirmed the link between perceived discrepancy and negotiation initiation as well as initiation amount. However, we did not find gender differences. Thus, the results support the benefits of transparency, but transparency was not particularly beneficial for women, because women and men were equally likely to negotiate regardless of transparency. While transparency may not "level the playing field" for women specifically, it does create a fairer playing field for everyone.

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Introduction

Negotiation has an important impact on individuals' lives, affecting outcomes such as salaries, personal benefits, and career trajectories, and it is proposed as a key mechanism to address the gender wage gap (Babcock & Laschever, 2009; Craver et al., 2004). However, an imbalance around negotiation initiation expectations has emerged, where organizations typically expect that individuals will negotiate at a higher rate than individuals report being willing to do. In fact, recent survey data finds that 55% of employees are *unwilling* to ask for a pay raise (Hagh, 2021) and similar numbers are reported regarding negotiations during the hiring process (Maurer, 2018). This discomfort with negotiation is supported by scholarly research as well. In laboratory experiments, even when participants are explicitly told that they can negotiate, 44-74% still choose *not* to initiate (Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Exley et al., 2020). While these figures reflect that both men and women leave opportunities on the table, women are more likely than men to do so (Kugler et al., 2018). Thus, what motivates or inhibits people – particularly women – from initiating negotiation is an important question that we seek to understand.

According to the theoretical model of negotiation initiation by Reif and Brodbeck (2014), people are more likely to initiate negotiations in response to perceived discrepancies between their current (offered) outcome (e.g., pay level, benefits, etc.) and their own standard (or expectation) as negotiation serves to reduce the discrepancy between the two. This perceived situational discrepancy triggers affective, cognitive, and motivational responses (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2017). More specifically, a perceived discrepancy causes an affective reaction (e.g., dissatisfaction), which, coupled with one's cognitive appraisal (or estimation) of their ability to negotiate successfully as well as their desire for and expectation of receiving an improved outcome from negotiation, leads to negotiation initiation. Typical explanations for why women in particular are less likely to negotiate include women appraising their ability to negotiate successfully as lower than men (Reif et al., 2019) and reporting expectations of receiving the desired, positive outcome from negotiation as less probable (e.g., Andersen et al., 2021; Miles & Lasalle, 2008). This is particularly true in counter-normative situations such as in self-oriented (or masculine) contexts (e.g., negotiating for a pay raise) versus other-oriented (or feminine) contexts (e.g., negotiating on behalf of another person or team; Kugler et al., 2018).

It is also possible that some people fail to initiate a negotiation because of differences in their tendencies to perceive a discrepancy in the first place – a tendency that may also be influenced by gender. A perceived discrepancy, according to Reif and Brodbeck (2014, 2017), results from comparing one's current situation to their own standards. Reif and Brodbeck stop short of describing *how* people develop these standards which predicate a perceived discrepancy. In fact, to our knowledge, only one study has examined antecedents to perceived discrepancies (Reif & Brodbeck, 2017). In this study, the authors had people write salary expectations and then based on their responses the authors created an "objective discrepancy" by offering them a specific amount below (negative discrepancy), above (positive discrepancy), or equal to (no discrepancy) their expectations. While this study was able to show a strong correlation between objective and perceived discrepancy, they do not address the question of *how* people developed those initial expectations used to create the "objective discrepancy." Moreover, these researchers found mixed gender effects on those initial expectations (male participants had higher salary expectations in Study 2, but not Study 1). This leaves open the possibility that differences in the propensity to initiate negotiation exist because gender differences in standards and expectations exist, which lead to gender differences in perceived discrepancies.

Our goal in this research is to investigate pay and performance transparency effects on perceived negative discrepancy (i.e., receiving less than expected based on one's relative performance). To do so, we integrate equity theory and fairness norms with negotiation initiation theory, to better understand how people form discrepancy perceptions. Fairness theory allows us to consider how social norms around fairness develop and how people use social comparison information (i.e., relative performance) to establish norms and evaluate situational fairness. In a typical employee compensation situation, such as the current research context, employees make social comparisons with coworkers (i.e., a referent other) to gauge their pay standing and the fairness of the reward based on their relative performance. However, research shows that these comparisons are often based on inaccurate estimates due to lack of disclosure (secrecy), poor assumptions about the performance of oneself and others, and the use of ambiguous referents (e.g., Burroughs, 1982; Carrell & Dittrich, 1978; Cullen & Perez-Truglia, 2018; Lawler, 1966). Lack of disclosure creates a situation where people are more likely to rely on ambiguous data points such as stereotypes (e.g., men perform better) and general social norms (e.g., women earn less than men). Thus, it is possible that some portion of the difference detected in one's propensity to negotiate could be due to a reliance on ambiguous social norms, which result in differing expectations and behaviors (e.g., women expect lower pay).

Pay transparency, defined as information disclosure about coworker pay and performance, could create clearer norms for all employees (especially women) by providing neutral (and non-gendered) social comparison information. With coworker pay information available, people should be less likely to rely on ambiguous social norms, but it is still an open question as to whether people will use this information fruitfully (Brown et al., 2022), especially women who worry about experiencing backlash for negotiating (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). Thus, in this research we test whether discrepancy perceptions, i.e., perceptions of unfair distribution of outcomes, differ depending on the level of transparency the situation provides and the gender of the negotiator. We examine if transparency allows employees to have a greater awareness of whether discrepancies exist, subsequently allowing employees to know when and how to advocate for themselves regarding pay or other benefits. Moreover, we test if these effects are particularly beneficial for women.

In this research, we investigate these relationships in a performance-based pay situation. Given that approximately 90% of employers have performance-based pay (Gerhart & Fang, 2015), the potential impact in this context is substantial. Moreover, based on the recognition that a performance-based pay context creates a situation where pay raises will range depending on performance, we can examine discrepancy size (no discrepancy represents a fair outcome and negative discrepancy represents an unfair outcome) by offering the same small raise to everyone (i.e., equality-based payments) rather than offering raises based on one's performance (i.e., equity-based payments). Related to this point, we can test our use of fairness theory by examining the amount of the employees' negotiation initiation, a novel variable that warrants inquiry (cf. Reif & Brodbeck, 2017). If fairness (equity) is driving one's negotiation initiation, then we would expect there to be a strong correlation between one's performance level and the size of one's initiation amount, which has meaningful impact on negotiation outcomes (Bateman, 1980; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Figure 1 below displays our conceptual model.

Figure 1.
Conceptual model



Integrating Fairness Theory to Understand Perceived Discrepancy

Reif and Brodbeck's model of negotiation initiation is preconditioned on the premise that people will be motivated to negotiate when they detect (or perceive) a discrepancy by comparing their current situation (e.g., a low offer) with their own expectations (e.g., performance-based expectations) and find their expectations were not met. However, subsumed within this premise is the idea that an individual enters a situation with unambiguous expectations and standards.

To understand how people develop situational standards and expectations, we turn to the literature on workplace fairness. In bridging these literatures, we equate perceived negative discrepancies with perceived unfairness. When considering distributive fairness (especially regarding pay) people evaluate whether the outcomes received are fair relative to what they expected (Colquitt, 2001), which echoes the evaluation made to determine a perceived negative discrepancy (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014). Moreover, fairness research suggests that people have a natural cognitive preference for fair and equitable exchange relationships (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978), including the exchange relationship between employee and employer, and a lack of fairness would lead to dissatisfaction. Again, this mirrors the relationships outlined in Reif and Brodbeck's (2014) model of negotiation initiation, where a perceived negative discrepancy leads to dissatisfaction (Reif & Brodbeck, 2017). Thus, traditional fairness research, especially regarding distributive fairness, can inform our understanding of how perceived discrepancies develop and translate into negotiation initiation.

Fairness theory helps shed light on what informs these initial situational standards and expectations. More specifically, fairness theory finds that people make social comparisons to establish their expectations and evaluate fairness norms (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978). In other words, people tend to determine what is fair based on what others have received (e.g., others in my department received a 3% raise, so 3% is fair) or based on their experience in a similar situation (e.g., I typically receive a 3% raise, so 3% is fair). Social norms, however, are conditional based on the situation, meaning people follow these norms when they are aware of the norm for the situation and the situation reinforces following the norm (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010). Thus, people may apply a general norm (e.g., a 3% raise is fair) until the situation cues a different norm. In absence of information about situational norms, people will rely on default norms and assumptions and apply them to the situation. General norms around dividing rewards

include equality, equity or random (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010); in the context of business, equity is typically considered the more appropriate norm (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976).

Equity norms are based on the ideas of Equity Theory (Adams, 1963). According to equity theory, a perception of fairness is based on whether a person feels that they have received "outputs" relative to their "inputs," particularly in light of what "outputs" others receive for their "inputs" (Adams, 1963;Greenberg, 1988). Importantly, the choice of referent has a significant impact on one's fairness perception (e.g., Chen et al., 2002; Gibson & Lawrence, 2010; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). The intention to pursue additional outputs, such as to increase one's salary through negotiation, is dependent upon the perception that they have not received appropriate outputs compared to their relevant referent (e.g., colleagues).

Equity norms are particularly important in a performance-based pay system, which means that rewards are contingent on meeting specified performance metrics, and rewards increase as performance level increases. There is a strong correlation between having a performance-based pay structure and individual performance (e.g., Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Jenkins et al., 1998) as well as positive employee attitudes (e.g., van Yperen et al., 2005; Werner & Ones, 2000). When compensation is based on performance, employees feel a sense of control because employees control the amount of effort they put into their job, and performance-based pay rewards them for their effort (e.g., van Yperen et al., 2005; expectancy theory, Vroom, 1964). In fact, when people know that they are in control of their performance, they perceive an equitable division of rewards as fairer (than equality), even if the equitable payment is not to their advantage (Fair process effect; e.g., Greenberg & Folger, 1983; van den Bos, Vermunt, et al., 1997). Research also finds that people adjust their assessment of fairness based on changes to coworker outcomes, even when their own outcomes do not change (Werner & Ones, 2000). In other words, one's perception of a discrepancy may not be directly related to meeting objective performance metrics, as it is greatly influenced by the relative performance information available.

It would then be expected that if all employees, regardless of performance level, were offered a reward amount associated with low performance that this would create an "objective discrepancy" for moderate and high performers. We label this as "performance-based pay discrepancy." If people in this situation are likely to encounter a negative discrepancy, the question we ask is at what point do employees perceive the offer as unfair. In other words, at what level of performance will an employee find a minimal raise to be unfair such that they perceive it as a negative discrepancy worthy of initiating negotiation? While many factors may impact perceiving this discrepancy, we expect based on the equity norm that one's output should be relative to their input. Thus, higher performance should result in greater reward expectations (and lower performance results in satisfaction with lower rewards. Thus, we hypothesize:

H1. A performance-based pay discrepancy is positively related to perceived discrepancy.

Perceived Discrepancy and Negotiation Initiation

By definition, a negotiation is initiated when individuals start negotiating intentionally and on their own terms (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014). Importantly, negotiation initiation occurs independent of negotiation success (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2017), meaning that one can successfully initiate a negotiation even if they do not achieve any of their goals in negotiating. As a result, the antecedents of negotiation initiation vary from broader negotiation research and rely on separate theory to predict when individuals will choose to negotiate. Accordingly, Reif and Brodbeck's (2014) theoretical model of negotiation initiation provides a parsimonious rationale for initiation based on long-standing affect and cognitive-motivational theories. At its core, this model proposes that decisions to negotiate reflect a calculation that encompasses the perceived utility that negotiated action will have on their end goals against the costs of taking direct action. Thus, based on Reif and Brodbeck's model and the existing

research that shows a strong link between perceived discrepancy and negotiation initiation (Reif et al., 2019, 2020; Reif & Brodbeck, 2017), we expect that a perceived discrepancy is positively associated with negotiation initiation. Thus:

H2a. Perceived discrepancy will mediate the relationship between performance-based pay discrepancy and negotiation initiation.

Existing negotiation initiation research has primarily focused on the binary decision of whether one initiates a negotiation (e.g., Small et al., 2007) or intends to (e.g., Reif et al., 2020; Reif & Brodbeck, 2017). However, this literature has not yet examined initiation amount, which is known to impact the outcome of the negotiation (Bateman, 1980; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Negotiation initiation is not simply about the choice of whether to negotiate, but also requires a calculation based on an individual forming expectations about what they deserve (compared to their current offer) and determining an initiation amount based on this calculation. People adjust their initial proposals based on their strategic positioning that encompasses more than just whether they are happy with their current state. As Reif & Brodbeck (2014) show, cues about how the initiating amount will be received and whether it will result in a positive outcome shapes what individuals ask for. For example, one study shows that one's initiation calculation includes backlash costs – or rather the perceived or actual social consequences of making an ask (Toosi et al., 2019). As such, workers adjust their willingness to negotiate not only based on the costs, but also how much they are willing to ask for (within the threshold of what they believe will minimize social costs). Prior research has also found that criteria of fairness are indeed important in setting an initiation amount in a negotiation (Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004; Gächter & Riedl, 2006). Thus, we expect that the magnitude of perceived discrepancy also impacts the initial amount with which an individual initiates the negotiation. Thus:

H2b. Perceived discrepancy is positively related to negotiation initiation amount, mediating the relationship between performance-based pay discrepancy and initiation amount.

Transparency (High vs. Low)

It is important to note that in workplace negotiations, especially salary negotiations, management often has more information than employees regarding the parameters of the negotiation and the range of outcomes available, among other things. This asymmetry in information between the worker and management creates what negotiation researchers call structural ambiguity – or "the degree of uncertainty in parties' understanding of the economic structure of the [potential] negotiation (Bowles et al., 2005, p. 952)" – within the negotiation situation. We suspect these same ambiguity effects are relevant for developing a discrepancy perception as well.

The presence of structural ambiguity is often the default state under which salary negotiations operate, with approximately two-thirds of the employees in the private sector in the United States reporting that their companies have a pay secrecy policy in place (Hegewisch & Williams, 2014). However, a countermovement towards pay transparency has started to gain traction due to increased legislation on the topic. Pay transparency is typically thought of as the disclosure of information about coworker pay levels (Colella et al., 2007). In many contexts, particularly in response to pay transparency legislation, pay transparency includes presenting applicants with pay ranges associated with each job title. For existing employees, and related to pay raises, pay transparency often takes the form of presenting ranges or average raise data. While this information provides some basis on which to inform expectations via a calculation of one's input to output, it leaves an important part of the equation ambiguous – that of the referent other's input and output. As such, we consider this approach to represent low pay transparency. While this does not represent complete secrecy (i.e., no pay information beyond one's own pay level), low transparency remains ambiguous.

However, many companies choose to provide a greater level of pay transparency (high transparency), with the presentation of explicit formulas for determining pay raises and complete transparency about who receives what level of raise (e.g., Buffer; Whole Foods). High transparency provides information about situational norms, and it would specifically reinforce the equity norm in a performance-based pay situation (cf. Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). High transparency also provides objective information about what others have received (i.e., outputs) relative to what they have provided (i.e., inputs). Information disclosure, however, does not guarantee that people will use the information, or that all people will know how to use the information. In fact, research shows that employees are less likely to seek social comparison pay information when they see their situation as fair (Smit & Montag-Smit, 2019). We suspect, however, that presenting people with the lowest pay level within the range will ignite initial concerns of unfairness, which will push them toward seeking and using the information available to them. In other words, when there is a performance-based pay discrepancy, people will use the transparent information to choose an appropriate social referent for comparison and establish an accurate standard of their own worth.

Making an equity-based evaluation requires relative comparison information about both sides of the equity equation (input and output). In the case of performance-based pay, employee performance is one key metric for developing a standard upon which one would base their expectations. However, performance metrics and standards are often rife with ambiguity, and the relationship between performance and level of pay increase is often obscured. In some cases, managers and organizational leaders will intentionally use ambiguous metrics to remain flexible when allocating rewards. When there is a lack of accurate information, people are likely to still make judgments, using ambiguous assumptions and data points (Brown et al., 2022). In a performance-based pay context, situational cues may include meaningful and non-meaningful cues about one's own performance compared to others' performance.

Reducing ambiguity about what others receive for their inputs reduces variation in whether an individual believes the offer they received was fair, relative to their expectations and should decrease the chance they incorrectly perceive their pay as unfair. Therefore, when pay and performance information is transparent, individuals have a clear indicator of whether a performance-based pay discrepancy exists. As such, we expect transparency to moderate the relationship between performance-based pay discrepancy and perceived discrepancy such that transparency increases the likelihood that a person will *perceive* a greater negative discrepancy when a larger performance-based pay discrepancy exists. Inherent in this prediction is that people will use the information provided to them when there is greater transparency.

H3. Transparency will moderate the relationship between performance-based pay discrepancy and perceived discrepancy such that this relationship is stronger under condition of high transparency compared to low transparency.

H4a. Transparency will moderate the indirect relationship between performance-based pay discrepancy and negotiation initiation such that this relationship is stronger under condition of high transparency compared to low transparency.

H4b. Transparency will moderate the indirect relationship between performance-based pay discrepancy and negotiation initiation amount such that this relationship is stronger under condition of high transparency compared to low transparency.

Overview of Studies

To examine the antecedents of perceived discrepancy as well as the extent to which transparency alleviates structural ambiguity and increases negotiation initiation, we designed two studies aimed at testing the theoretical model in both a high and low situationally ambiguous context (Kugler et al., 2018).

These studies differed on a number of important qualities that allowed us to not only replicate our results, but also increase the generalizability of our conclusions. The first study was based on existing protocols for research on negotiation initiation in a lab-based experimental setting with primarily undergraduate students with high situational ambiguity (Small et al., 2007). We based a second study loosely on the scenario presented in the first, but with a more realistic, low situationally ambiguous scenario of a salary negotiation. While the study was an online-based experimental setting, it involved a working population.

Study 1

Method

Design and Recruitment

Study 1 used an experimental design with eight (high vs. low pay transparency X high vs. low performance transparency X female vs. male) experimental conditions. 430 participants were recruited at three public American universities via email announcements (including faculty and staff), university-sponsored subject pools, and in-class announcements. Participants were told upon recruitment that they would have the opportunity to earn between $3 and $10 for participating in the "Word Game Study."

Procedure and Participants

Using a procedure outlined by Small et al. (2007), participants signed up for an individual session. They were greeted by a researcher and told that participation would involve playing the game, "Boggle" – which we referred to as the "word game." The rules of the game were displayed for the participant and summarized by the researcher. Participants were given an opportunity to ask clarifying questions and when they were ready, they started playing the game. There were four rounds and each round lasted three minutes. When they were finished with the game, they alerted the researcher who instructed them to begin on a Qualtrics survey while their score was calculated. Pay and performance transparency were manipulated between the end of the game and payment. The experiment was set up to be a performance-based pay situation in which greater performance should lead to greater pay expectations, yet participants were offered the lowest possible amount ($3USD) and given the opportunity to negotiate.

Of the 430 who participated, 331 performed well enough on the task (i.e., generated more than 30 words across three games) to create an unfair situation such that they deserved ($4-$10) more than they were offered ($3). Only these 331 participants were included in model testing. In this sample, 197 were female and 137 were male (41%); ages 18-63, median age = 21; 14% had a high school education, 72.5% has some college, 7% had a bachelor's degree, and the remaining 6.5% had a graduate degree.

Manipulation and Measurement

Performance was measured as participants' actual performance (i.e., objective scores) on the Boggle task, meaning that this independent variable was not independently manipulated. Since all participants were offered the same amount of $3, this measure was used to determine the performance-based discrepancy level which varied based upon participants true performance.

Transparency was manipulated in two ways in this study. First, using Qualtrics survey software, the participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: *high or low pay transparency*. In the *high pay transparency* condition, participants viewed a table of individual names with scores and pay level associated with each name. They were reminded that they were able to earn between $3 and $10USD for participating in the study and told that the table represented scores and payment amounts for other individuals who had participated in the study. The scores were presented in rank order, and payment was distributed such that it was clear that those who performed better received greater payment. Scores listed ranged from 15 to 101, and payment levels ranged from $3 to $10USD (scores above 30 earned more than $3). In the *low pay transparency* condition, participants were reminded that they could earn between $3 and $10USD for participating in the study.

Performance transparency was manipulated after scoring. After approximately three minutes (during which the participant was viewing pay information as just described), the researcher announced that they had finished tallying the participant's score. At this point, based on a coin flip completed before the session started, the researcher read one of two possible research scripts. For those who were randomly assigned to the *high performance transparency* condition, the researcher provided them their objective numeric score for the game. Alternatively, for the *low performance transparency* condition, the researcher let them know that they did "well" in the game, replicating language used in Small et al. (2007).

The two transparency factors were combined to create a "fully transparent" condition versus "not fully transparent" condition. The fully transparent condition includes participants that received both pay and performance information. The three remaining conditions were collapsed to form the not fully transparent condition, because these conditions contained low levels of pay transparency, performance transparency, or both. We found this collapsing of conditions appropriate given they did not differ significantly on our measure of perception (*M*s = 4.15 – 4.23; $F = .103$, *ns*) and negotiation initiation (*M*s = .103 - .123; $F = .102$, *ns*).

Perceived negative discrepancy was measured as performance perceptions given that people who believe they performed better should expect greater payment and would thus have a greater discrepancy between what they believe they should have received and what was offered. We chose not to ask directly about payment expectations before negotiation in this experiment to reduce any possible demand effects that could have occurred from just asking about expectations. Instead, after receiving payment for participation, the participant was asked to finish completing the brief survey that they started before negotiation. This follow-up survey asked participants, "How do you think your Boggle performance in this session compares to other participants in this study?" with response options from "1-much worse than average" to "4-average" to "7-much better than average."

Negotiation initiation was measured based on actual behavior. After the researcher provided performance feedback, they offered the participant $3USD (holding out three $1 bills for the participant) and asked, "Is $3 okay?" At this point, participants had the chance to negotiate for more money. As described in Small et al. (2007), participants who explicitly asked for more money were given the amount they requested. If participants complained about the amount offered but did not ask for more money, the researcher repeated the prompt of offering $3 and asking if that amount was okay. If the participant asked how the payment was determined, the researcher explained that they could provide more details at the end of the experiment, and then they repeated the offer of $3 and asked if $3 was okay. It was only if the participant explicitly asked for additional money (if a vague

request for more money was requested without a specific number, they were asked to clarify how much more they were requesting), were they given the additional payment. This request was classified as negotiating (1), and all other responses were classified as not negotiating (0).

Multiple *control variables* were also included[1]. Both male and female students worked in the experimenter role in return for a wage or class credit (n = 19). Students were trained on the experiment protocol by the authors and conducted the experiment for at least one full semester. Experimenter gender was not randomly assigned. Instead, *experimenter gender* was captured by the experimenter attributing their name to the session. These were later coded as 1 (Female) and 0 (Male) and controlled for in the analyses. Moreover, one of the data collection sites used a psychology subject pool as a recruiting source. Given that this was a secondary incentive, which may have influenced the participants to focus less attention on the amount of money they earned for doing the experiment, we included *subject pool* as a control.

Additional control variables included *age*, *education*. Also, because the predictions are premised on the extent to which individuals identify with their gender identity, we include measures of masculinity and femininity, specifically Bem's Sex Role Inventory (BSRI, 1974) measure of *Masculinity* (a = .879) and *Femininity* (a = .851). Participants rated the extent to which each item listed (e.g., act as a leader, is compassionate) describes them in general and most of time, and items were measured on a scale of 1 (Not at all like me) to 5 (Just like me).

Results and Discussion

Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the study variables. Negotiation initiation is positively correlated with participant education level (r = .117, p < .01) and reported masculinity level (r = .211, p < .01). Both were included as control variables during model testing. Consistent with existing research (e.g., Sczesny et al., 2018), which provides evidence to the validity of our sample, men agreed to more masculine attributes than women (r = -.267, p < .001) and women agreed to more feminine attributes compared to men (r = .240, p < .001) on the BSRI.

Interestingly, participant gender was not significantly correlated with negotiation initiation (r = -.033, *ns*, p = .547), which suggests that men and women initiate negotiation to a similar extent. In fact, a total of 15.7% of the male participants and 18.2% of the female participants negotiated for greater payment (see Table 2). This contradicts some existing research (e.g., Small et al., 2007; Kugler et al., 2018). Gender also did not correlate significantly with participant performance (r = .078, p = .153) such that women and men performed equally well on the task (mean performance levels per condition displayed in Table 2). There was also not a significant correlation between gender and perceived discrepancy based on performance (r = -.025, *ns*, p = .655).

Hypothesis Testing

The conceptual model was tested using the PROCESS 4.0 regression macro for SPSS v28. This macro uses a bootstrapping approach (5000 samples) to assess the indirect effects at differing levels of the moderators (Hayes, 2013). For *negotiation initiation*, which is a dichotomous DV, the macro

[1] All hypotheses were also tested without the inclusion controls. Results did not differ. See Appendix D for additional results.

tested a binary logistic regression (1 = yes, 0 = no). Significant effects are supported by the absence of zero within the bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.

First, we tested the unconditional mediation model (H1 & H2a, b; Template Model 4). Results indicate that participants' perceptions fully mediate the relationship between performance and negotiation initiation such that there is a direct effect of performance on perceived discrepancy (B = .025, SE = .003, t = 9.212, p < .001; supporting H1), a direct effect of perceived discrepancy on negotiation initiation (B = .561, SE = .164, Z = 3.431, p < .001), and an indirect effect of performance on negotiation initiation via perception (B = .014, SE = .005, CI: .006, .025; supporting H2a). The direct effect of performance on negotiation initiation was non-significant (B = .007, SE = .008, CI: -.010, .025), indicating full mediation. Moreover, perception partially mediated the relationship between performance and initiation offer amount, with a direct effect of perceived discrepancy (B = .484, SE = .100, t = 4.844, p < .001) and an indirect effect of performance on initiation offer amount via perception (B = .012, SE = .003, CI: .006, .019; supporting H2b).

Next, the moderated mediation model was tested with transparency as the moderator (H3, H4a, b; Template Model 7; see Table 3, Models 1, 3, 4). This model explicitly tests the direct conditional effects on the mediator (perceived discrepancy) and dependent variables (negotiation initiation and initiation offer amount) as well as the conditional indirect effects on these DVs due to the mediator of perceived discrepancy. Results support transparency as moderator of the relationship between objective performance and perception (B = .026, SE = .006, t = 4.555, p < .001) and conditional indirect effect on negotiation initiation (B = .014, SE = .005, LLCI: .006, ULCI: .027) and initiation offer amount (B = .012, SE = .004, LLCI: .006, ULCI: .021). When transparency was low, performance had a significant effect on perceived discrepancy (B = .0187, SE = .0032, t = 5.945, p < .001), but this effect was significantly stronger when transparency was high (B = .0434, SE = .0047, t = 9.214, p < .001; see Figure 2), supporting H3 and H4a, b.

Finally, we tested the full model with a 3-way interaction (Template Model 11) including full transparency and gender as moderators of the mediator (see Table 3, Model 2). There was no 3-way interaction with gender (B = -.015, SE = .013, t = -1.180, *ns*) and gender did not moderate (2-way interaction) the relationship between performance and perceived discrepancy (B = .002, SE = .006, t = 0.725, *ns*), meaning male and female participants had equivalent expectations based on their performance, and their perceptions were equivalently influenced by transparency.

Supplemental Qualitative Findings

As a follow-up to testing the quantitative model, we examined open-ended responses to the questions of why or why not people negotiated in this experiment. This question was asked on a Qualtrics survey after negotiation and payment occurred. First, the researchers read through all the responses to develop a comprehensive set of codes that would capture all the reasons provided (see Appendix A-B for definitions and sample quotes). For participants who chose to negotiate, reasons for this action included: (1) Good performance, (2) Unfairness/ Dissatisfaction with the offer, (3) Transparency, and (4) Need (based on personal circumstances). For participants who chose not to negotiate, reasons for inaction included: (1) Poor performance, (2) Fairness/ Satisfaction with the offer, (3) Authority (of the experimenter), (4) Social reasons, (5) Lack of awareness, and (6) Lack of need.

Table 1.
Study 1 Correlation table

		Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1	Age	21.18	6.09											
2	Education	2.03	0.76	.632**										
3	Masculinity	3.54	0.55	-.059	-.101	*.879*								
4	Femininity	3.54	0.50	-.097	-.041	-.044	*.851*							
5	Subject pool	0.49	0.50	-.324**	-.361**	.118*	-.030							
6	Female Experimenter	0.70	0.45	-.023	.011	-.069	-.012	.035						
7	Performance	49.75	23.90	.042	.118*	.102	-.044	-.021	-.100					
8	Perceived Discrepancy	4.00	1.22	.059	.113*	.193**	-.113*	-.038	-.001	.474**				
9	Female	0.57	0.50	.099	.158**	-.267**	.240**	-.218**	.050	.078	-.025			
10	Pay Transparency	0.54	0.50	-.025	.060	.005	.061	.007	-.018	.069	-.009	.076		
11	Objective Feedback	0.53	0.50	.047	.005	-.026	-.003	.083	.059	.027	-.001	-.097	.019	
12	Negotiation Initiation	0.14	0.34	.021	.117*	.211**	-.009	-.094	.042	.207**	.305**	-.033	.123*	.131*

N = 334; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 2.

Study 1 Negotiation initiation per condition

	N 334	Mean Performance	N (%) who negotiated	Mean (SD) Amount Negotiated $
Low Pay Transparency	**153**			
Low performance transparency	***73***		***9 (12.3%)***	***8.11 (1.97)***
Males	27	61.6 (21.9)	5 (18.5%)	8.00 (1.87)
Females	46	51.1 (15.2)	4 (8.7%)	8.25 (2.36)
High performance transparency	***80***		***9 (10.8%)***	***9.67 (1.00)***
Males	42	56.8 (20.8)	3 (7.1%)	10.0 (0.00)
Females	38	56.5 (18.2)	6 (15.8%)	9.50 (1.23)
High Pay Transparency	**181**			
Low performance transparency	***83***		***9 (11.3%)***	***9.33 (2.00)***
Males	29	50.2 (21.7)	3 (10.3%)	10.0 (0.00)
Females	54	63.0 (24.8)	6 11.1%)	9.00 (2.45)
High performance transparency	***98***		***29 (29.6%)***	***6.97 (2.08)***
Males	39	53.7 (16.6)	14 (35.9%)	5.93 (1.33)
Females	59	62.7 (24.3)	15 (25.4%)	7.93 (2.22)

Figure 2.

Study 1: Moderating effect of transparency on the relationship between performance-based discrepancy and perceived discrepancy



Table 3.
Study 1 regression results

	Mediator: Perceived Discrepancy						DV: Negotiation Initiation			DV: Initiation Offer Amount		
	Model 1 (2-way)			Model 2 (3-way)			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI
Intercept	2.565	1.283	3.847	2.693	1.334	4.053	-9.236	-13.18	-5.29	-4.269	-6.63	-1.90
Age	-0.001	-.023	.022	0.001	-.023	.023	-0.034	-.108	.039	-0.029	-.071	.012
Education	0.119	-.080	.318	0.120	-.081	.321	0.360	-.235	.955	0.335	-.034	.704
Masculinity	0.318**	.114	.522	0.295**	.084	.506	1.059**	.432	1.686	0.762**	.380	1.145
Femininity	-0.227*	-.449	-.006	-0.193	-.422	.037	0.206	-.426	.837	0.188	-.223	.599
Subject Pool	-0.064	-.299	.171	-0.071	-.311	.168	-0.572	-1.276	.131	-0.467*	-.903	-.032
Female Experimenter	0.169	-.063	.401	0.180	-.053	.414	0.357	-.336	1.050	0.188	-.143	.714
Performance	0.017**	.011	.024	0.015**	.001	.024	0.008	-.007	.024	0.011*	.001	.025
Full Transparency	-1.540**	-2.230	-.849	-2.089**	-3.312	-.866						
Female				-0.332	-1.088	.424						
Discrepancy x Full Transparency	0.026**	.015	.037	0.037**	.016	.058						
Discrepancy x Female				0.005	-.008	.017						
Full Transparency x Female				0.710	-.803	2.223						
Discrepancy x Full Transparency x Female				-0.015	-.040	.011						
Perception							0.551**	.231	.872	0.484**	.287	.680
Pseudo R^2 / R^2		**.306****			**.312****			**.230****			**.214****	

Note. 95% confidence intervals for all confidence intervals; CI = Confidence Interval; LLCI = Lower limit of confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit of confidence interval
N = 333; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Responses to these questions were coded by three independent coders blind to experimental condition and other relevant case factors (e.g., participant gender). The three research assistants independently read each comment and assigned codes to each comment. Multiple codes were assigned to comments that mentioned multiple ideas. Based on this coding process, agreement level among the three research assistants exceeded acceptable standards ($ICC_1 > .7$). Thus, a code was assigned to each comment when at least two of the research assistants agreed with the same code for the comment. Furthermore, the first author spot checked a random sample of fifty codes and agreed with the determined code in all fifty cases.

When asked why they ***did*** negotiate, the most common reasons were a perception of *good performance* that deserved more than the amount offered (74.5%) and *transparency* of the provided information to justify a request for more (54.5%). Transparency (as a condition) had a significant impact such that 85.7% (24 of the 28 who negotiated) of those who were provided total transparency cited receiving the information as their reason for negotiating. 1 (of the 9 total) who negotiated in the low performance and pay transparency condition also cited information as their reason for negotiating stating that the information regarding the range ($3 being the minimum) was enough information to help her request more. 4 (out of 9 total) who only received the pay information without explicit performance feedback stated that the information provided motivated them to request greater payment. Chi-square test reveals that participants cited transparency as their reason for negotiating significantly more when provided high pay transparency versus low (χ^2 (1,55) = 20.36, p > .001). Likewise, participants cited transparency as their reason for negotiating significantly more when provided total transparency compared to conditions with low levels of transparency (χ^2 (1,55) = 22.35, p < .001). No other differences emerged in the written comments based on experimental condition or participant gender.

When asked why they ***did not*** negotiate, the most common reasons were a perception of *poor performance* that deserved the amount offered (31.1%), being *satisfied with the offer* of $3 (29.3%), and *social reasons* such as not wanting to appear rude (18.9%). Women were significantly more likely to reference social reasons: 23.1% of female participants cited social reasons whereas 12.7% of male participants cited social reasons. These percentages are significantly different according to the chi square test (χ^2 (1,270) = 4.60, p = .022). No other significant differences emerged.

Discussion

Overall, Study 1 confirmed that a performance-based pay discrepancy led to a perceived discrepancy and that this relationship was enhanced when performance and pay transparency was high. Transparency provides information to make the discrepancy apparent, which then increases the likelihood someone will initiate a negotiation in a face-to-face context according to our findings. Moreover, transparency enhanced the correlation between performance and the initiating offer amount such that high performers opened with larger initial offers ($8-10) compared to moderate performers ($5-7). Interestingly, we found the effect to only increase negotiation initiation rates to almost 30%, which leaves a large portion of individuals still not asking for what they deserve. Based on qualitative data, almost 20% of those non-negotiators stated that they were reluctant to negotiate for social reasons (not wanting to be rude) with women being more likely than men to cite this reason.

Surprisingly, results do not support any gender differences in negotiation behaviors. While we are not the first study to find no gender differences in negotiation initiation (cf. Ren et al., 2022), it is worth ruling out alternative explanations of these null findings. It could be argued that null findings were due to the sample chosen for the study. While student samples have been used in past studies finding a gender difference, many years have passed since these initial studies were published. It

could be that because the original findings showing that "women don't ask" were so popularly consumed, young adults may be more aware of this phenomenon today than in the past. Thus, women (and men) may purposefully attempt to engage in counter-stereotypical behavior to avoid conforming to the negative stereotype. This is likely coupled by the fact that the gender difference in agency – a core reason why women are believed to initiate negotiations less than men – has decreased in recent years meaning that young women today are more likely to have traits associated with negotiation success. (Donnelly & Twenge, 2017).

Study 2

As such, Study 2 is designed to address potential sample and methodological concerns present in Study 1. More specifically, in Study 2 we manipulate performance to control for performance level upfront (rather than through statistical means). Manipulating performance level means that we were able to control the level of negative discrepancy between what a person "should" be offered and what they are actually offered. In this way, we have designed a task in which everyone "should" negotiate based on their performance, because people are told that they are either a moderate performer or a high performer, yet they are offered the lowest amount, which is presumably for low performers.

Further, in Study 2, everyone is given some baseline level of performance feedback. They are clearly informed that they are in a performance review meeting where they will be told their raise. The link between performance and pay may be stronger based on this setup as well as the expectation that negotiation is expected in a meeting discussing one's pay raise (i.e., low situational ambiguity). This was likely not the case in the Study 1, where negotiating for compensation to complete a university study is uncommon (i.e., high situational ambiguity).

Method

Design and Participants

In Study 2, an experimental design with eight (moderate vs. high performance X high transparency vs. low transparency X female vs. male) experimental conditions was employed. A total of 266 individuals (131 females and 132 males; ages 20-74, median Age = 35) recruited from MTurk using the CloudResearch platform participated in exchange for $1.50. In this sample 71.8% work full-time, 8.6% work part-time, 14.7% are self-employed or gig workers, and 4.9% are retired or unemployed. The sample ranges from 2-50 years of work experience (mean = 15.34 years). 72.8% of the sample is White/Caucasian, 11.7% Black/African American, 5.3% Hispanic/Latinx, 3.8% Asian, 3.4% Native American, and 3.3% multiple races or other. 4% of our sample have a high school diploma, 23.1% with some college, 50.9% with a 4-year degree, and 13.9% with more than 4 years of college.

Procedure

Participants entered a virtual negotiation scenario that asked them to imagine they worked as a sales representative for an advertising firm and were asked to place themselves in the situation described over the next several pages. To ensure that participants took the appropriate amount of time to read the provided details of the scenario that followed, a minimum time (10-30 seconds based on pre-testing) was set for each page of the survey that contained scenario details.

They first received information about the organization and their role as a sales representative. They then were told that it was time for their annual performance review, which is when their supervisor would present them with their annual merit raise. They were told that raises generally range from 3-10% of one's base salary (which they were told is $53,000). They were told that on the next page they would receive information that was provided to them prior to this review including (1) their written performance evaluation and (2) some pay information. From there, subjects were randomly assigned (by the Qualtrics survey software) to one of four experimental conditions that differed based on two factors: (1) transparency (high vs. low transparency) and (2) performance level (high vs. moderate) (see Appendix C for full set of manipulation materials).

Data Cleaning. 839 individuals completed the study. All participants were allowed to complete the study (rather than kicking people out of the study for failing an attention check) and responses were scanned post-hoc for quality. Two overt (e.g., "Please select 'Strongly Disagree'") and two veiled (e.g., "My workplace is physically located on the moon") attention check items were included among the Likert scale measures. 406 individuals were excluded for missing two or more of the attention check items. Two additional questions were used to confirm their understanding of the virtual negotiation scenario. 73 people failed to correctly answer both of these questions. A remaining 104 incorrectly answered one of the two questions. In all these cases, we examined their open-ended responses; 85 of these cases were excluded based on low quality open-ended responses (e.g., "good" as their text response to multiple open-ended questions). 9 additional cases were excluded because questions were not answered, or text was pasted from the survey into the open-ended text box[2].

Manipulation and Measurement

Performance (high vs. moderate) was manipulated based on the performance review information provided to the participant in the scenario. Moderate performance was defined as performance that was centered around the average which represented meeting expectations. High performance was defined as performance that was above average and represented exceeding expectations. The amount and type of information provided about this set level of performance was dependent upon whether the participant was in the high or low transparency condition.

Low transparency was defined as the condition in which information was ambiguous and limited about both performance and pay. Whereas *transparency* was defined as the condition in which information was concrete, objective, and extensive about both performance and pay.

Regarding *performance*, in the *low transparency condition* they were provided a vague statement about their performance. More specifically, for the *moderate* performance, they were told they were "met expectations this year" and that it "met the requirements of the position on a number of different levels" and for the high-performance condition, they were told they were "outstanding job this year" and that it was "superior on a number of different levels." In the *high transparency* condition, subjects were provided a rating of their performance on a scale of 1 (unsatisfactory) to 5 (outstanding) on 8 different performance indicators. In addition, they were provided concrete values on four objective performance indicators (e.g., number of new clients sighed, sales totals for new clients). More specifically, for *moderate* performance, they were given "3s" representing "meets expectations" on the 8 different indicators and were given concrete values on the four objective indicators that were in between the highest and lowest values for the company (which they would see on the next page). For high performance, they were given "5s" representing "outstanding" on the 8 different indicators

[2] We also tested the hypotheses under loosened exclusion criteria and results held. See Appendix D.

and were given concrete values on the four objective indicators that were among the highest values for the company (which again, they would see on the next page).

Regarding *pay*, in the *low transparency* condition, they were told the following: "when pay raises were given last year, they generally ranged from a 3% to a 10% increase in annual salary." In the *high transparency* condition, they were told the same thing, but also provided a chart with information about the objective performance information (e.g., clients signed, sales totals) of twelve other sales representatives as well as their associated raise percentage. Replicating the design of Study 1, this information revealed a performance-based pay system based on the equity norm. The information was organized according to performance so that it was quickly discernable that higher performers earned larger raises.

Several design measures were taken to increase the effectiveness of the manipulations. Before providing participants with the performance and pay information, the survey clearly indicated that participants would be shown the information before their meeting with their supervisor only, so they should study and remember the information provided to them. Moreover, after the relevant information was provided, participants responded to two attention check items regarding details from the scenario (current salary, raise range), as previously described, participants were removed from the study for failing both attention check items. Moreover, all participants were given the opportunity to review the scenario information a second time (after responding to the two attention check items) if they were uncertain of some of the details.

Perceived discrepancy was measured as perceived performance given the performance-based pay situation, which created a performance-based discrepancy (replicating Study 1). It was also measured more directly as pay expectation based on their perceived performance. These items were measured after reading the performance and pay information ahead of their meeting with their supervisor, participants responded to two questions (embedded among the manipulation check items) intended to measure their expectations in the moment: perceived performance (1-Not well at all to 5-Extremely well) and the level of raise they think they deserved (0-10%). Correlation between these two items is .549. Thus, they were averaged together to form the perceived discrepancy variable.

Negotiation Initiation was determined using a similar protocol as Study 1. The hypothetical performance meeting ends with the supervisor saying, "I am giving you a 3% raise ($1590). Is that okay?" Following this, participants read, "Please type out your response to your supervisor. Please respond as though you were actually in this situation. What would you say to your supervisor?" Like Study 1, we defined negotiation as a clear request for more money even if the exact amount of that request was unclear. After writing their open-ended response, participants selected whether they agreed with the supervisor's offer. In cases where the open-ended response was ambiguous, we used this self-report item to inform whether they thought they negotiated and erred on the side of agreeing with the participant's self-report.

Participants also responded to additional control variables of age and years of work experience. Additionally, as we did in Study 1, we included Bem's Sex Role Inventory (BSRI, 1974) measure of Masculinity (a = .841) and Femininity (a = .885). For a similar reason we included a measure of Gender Role Beliefs (J. Brown & Gladstone, 2012), Entitlement (Campbell et al., 2004), and Social Desirability (1 item: "I have never told a lie").

Results

Table 4 displays the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the study variables. Negotiation initiation is positively correlated with years of work experience (r = .170, p < .01) and

negatively associated with Gender Role Beliefs (r = -.176, p < .01) and social desirability (r = -.264, p < .01). Moreover, *perceived discrepancy* is positively correlated with femininity (r = .135, p < .05), Gender Role Beliefs (r = .146, p < .05) and entitlement (r = .200, p < .01). These variables were included as control variables during model testing [3]. Interestingly, participant gender was not significantly correlated with negotiation initiation (r = .085, *ns*), which suggests that men and women initiate negotiation to a similar extent. In fact, a total of 60.6% of the male participants and 68.7% of the female participants negotiated for greater payment (see Table 5).

Conceptual Model Testing

The conceptual model was again tested using the PROCESS 4.0 regression macro for SPSS v28 using the same parameters as in Study 1. First the unconditional mediation model was tested (H1 & H2a, b; Template Model 4). Results indicate that participants' perceptions mediate the relationship between performance level and negotiation initiation such that there is a direct effect of performance on perceived discrepancy (B = 3.164, SE = .281, t = 11.269, p < .001), a direct effect of perceived discrepancy on negotiation initiation (B = .365, SE = .073, Z = 5.008, p < .001), and an indirect effect of performance on negotiation initiation via perception (B = 1.154, SE = .279, CI: .741, 1.825). The direct effect of performance on negotiation initiation was non-significant (B = -.041, SE = .360, CI: -.745, .664), indicating full mediation. Moreover, perception fully mediated the relationship between performance and initiation amount, with a direct effect of perceived discrepancy (B = .568, SE = .054, t = 10.617, p < .001) and an indirect effect of performance on initiation amount via perception (B = 1.812, SE = .258, CI: .1.336, 2.362; supporting H2b).

Next, the moderated mediation model was tested with transparency as a moderator (Template Model 7; see Table 5, Model 1, 3, 4; H3, H4a, b). Like Study 1, results support transparency as moderator of the relationship between objective performance and perception (B = 1.569, SE = .572, t = 2.745, p < .01) and the conditional indirect effect on negotiation initiation (B = .581, SE = .250, LLCI: .165, ULCI: 1.154) and initiation amount (B = .892, SE = .352, LLCI: .239, ULCI: 1.622). When transparency was low, performance had a significant effect on perceived discrepancy (B = 2.514, SE = .374, t = 6.717, p < .001), but this effect was significantly stronger when transparency was high (B = 4.084, SE = .430, t = 9.507, p < .001; see Figure 3).

Finally, we tested the 3-way interaction including transparency and gender as moderators of the mediation model (see Table 6, Model 2). Similar to Study 1, there was no 3-way interaction, meaning male and female participants had equivalent expectations based on their performance and their perceptions were not significantly influenced by transparency.

Supplemental Qualitative Findings

As a follow-up to testing the quantitative model, we again examined open-ended responses to the questions of why or why not people negotiated in this experiment. The codes used and coding process was the same as Study 1. Based on this coding process, agreement level between the two researchers was 92.56%, which exceeded acceptable standards (ICC_1 > .7). Thus, a code was assigned to each comment when one of the researchers assigned the code.

When asked why they ***did*** negotiate, the most common reasons were a perception of good performance that deserved more than the amount offered (93.6%) and using the provided

[3] Results held with and without the inclusion of control variables. See Appendix D for additional results.

Table 4.
Study 2 Correlation table

		Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1	Age	38.34	11.84											
2	Work Experience	15.34	11.62	.856**										
3	Masculinity	45.97	10.92	.011	-.032	*.841*								
4	Femininity	54.02	10.29	.086	.010	.116	*.885*							
5	Gender Role Beliefs	3.30	1.40	-.007	**-.193****	**.199****	.086	*.915*						
6	Entitlement	3.71	1.40	-.199**	-.334**	**.386****	.031	**.538****	*.897*					
7	Social Desirability	2.10	1.69	-.017	**-.249****	**.195****	.013	**.437****	**.431****	*.921*				
8	Female	0.50	0.50	**.218****	**.188****	**-.134***	.110	-.117	**-.141***	**-.139***				
9	High Performance	0.49	0.50	.016	.034	-.059	.086	.041	-.002	.032	-.004			
10	Transparency	0.43	0.50	.014	.025	-.001	-.102	-.113	-.069	-.050	.057	-.003		
11	Perceived Discrepancy	4.13	0.84	.037	.048	.023	**.172****	**.129****	**.170****	.053	.021	**.564****	-.051	
12	Negotiate	0.65	0.48	.101	**.170****	.013	-.040	**-.176****	-.081	**-.264****	.085	**.172****	.074	**.331****

N = 266; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 5.
Study 2 Negotiation initiation per condition

	N 266	N (%) who negotiated	Mean (SD) Amount Negotiated %
Low Transparency	**151**		
Moderate performance	***77***	***43 (55.8%)***	***6.58 (1.53)***
Males	39	21 (53.8%)	6.74 (1.41)
Females	37	21 (56.8%)	6.50 (1.67)
High performance	***74***	***50 (67.6%)***	***7.84 (1.92)***
Males	40	24 (60.0%)	7.65 (1.82)
Females	34	26 (76.5%)	8.00 (2.02)
High Transparency	**115**		
Moderate performance	***59***	***34 (57.6%)***	***5.68 (1.43)***
Males	28	17 (60.7%)	5.76 (1.03)
Females	30	17 (56.7%)	5.59 (1.77)
High performance	***56***	***45 (80.4%)***	***8.42 (1.84)***
Males	25	18 (72.0%)	8.00 (2.03)
Females	30	26 (86.7%)	8.85 (1.54)

Figure 3.
Study 2: Moderating effect of transparency on the relationship between performance-based discrepancy and perceived discrepancy



Table 6.
Study 2 regression results

	Mediator: Perceived Discrepancy						DV: Negotiation Initiation			DV: Initiation Amount		
	Model 1 (2-way)			Model 2 (3-way)			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI
Intercept	8.443	6.355	10.530	8.350	6.355	10.51	-2.617	-5.024	-.211	-.499	2.466	1.468
Age	-0.024	-.074	.026	-0.025	-.077	.026	0.031	-.020	.082	.028	-.017	.082
Work Experience	0.042	-.010	.095	0.044	-.010	.097	-0.007	-.062	.049	.007	-.040	.049
Masculinity	-0.006	-.033	.021	-0.006	-.033	.022	0.020	-.009	.050	.011	-.012	.050
Femininity	0.030*	.003	.057	0.032*	.005	.060	-0.028	-.058	.002	-.022	-.046	.002
Gender Role Beliefs	0.097	-.150	.344	0.126	-.127	.380	-0.342*	-.617	-.067	-.261*	-.471	-.067
Entitlement	0.429**	.169	.690	0.392**	.122	.661	0.071	-.215	.356	.009	-.222	.356
Social Desirability	-0.063	-.258	.133	-0.049	-.247	.149	-0.346**	-.552	-.140	-.274**	-.446	-.140
Performance	2.491**	1.769	3.213	2.428**	1.423	3.432	-0.041	-.745	.664	.211	-.371	.664
Transparency	-0.972**	-1.745	-.200	-0.731**	-1.845	.383						
Female				-0.015	-1.057	1.027						
Discrepancy x Transparency	1.593**	.481	2.704	0.932	-0.670	2.533						
Discrepancy x Female				0.098	-1.369	1.566						
Transparency x Female				-0.346	-1.904	1.213						
Discrepancy x Transparency x Female				1.128	-1.099	3.355						
Perception							0.365**	.222	.507	0.568**	.463	.674
Pseudo R^2 / R^2		**.409****			**.410****			**.309****			**.480****	

Note. 95% confidence intervals for all confidence intervals; CI = Confidence Interval; LLCI = Lower limit of confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit of confidence interval
N = 266; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

information to justify a request for more (34.9%). High transparency (as a condition) had a significant impact such that 57.0% (versus 16.1% in low transparency condition) of those who were provided high transparency cited receiving the information as their reason for negotiating. Chi-square test reveals that participants cited transparency as their reason for negotiating significantly more when provided high pay transparency versus low (χ^2 (1,172) = 31.35, p > .001). Furthermore, high performers were significantly more likely to reference the information provided: 42.1% of high performers cited the information available whereas only 26.0% of moderate performers cited information. These percentages are significantly different according to the chi square test (χ^2 (1,172) = 4.87, p = .036). No other differences emerged in the written comments based on experimental condition or participant gender for why people negotiated.

When asked why they ***did not*** negotiate, the most common reasons were a perception that the offer was fair (74.5%) and that they deserved the amount offered based on their performance level (55.3%), authority of the supervisor was also mentioned by 19.1% of the sample. No differences were detected based on the conditions of performance or transparency or gender.

Discussion

Study 2 replicates the moderating effect of transparency on the relationship between performance and negotiation initiation in a virtual performance-based pay context with low ambiguity regarding negotiation (i.e., pay raise meeting). Our findings show that the size of the performance relates to one's perception of negative discrepancy when offered an unfair raise, which in turn drives the likelihood of negotiation initiation. This relationship is enhanced when there is transparency, and the qualitative responses to the question of why people negotiated show that transparency was an important factor in the decision to negotiate.

Study 2 also replicates the unexpected null effects of participant gender that was also found in Study 1. This suggests that the null effects may not be limited to just college students, but a working sample as well – which – while there has been literature that has suggested diminishing gender differences in negotiations (e.g., Ren et al., 2022), was still surprising.

General Discussion

The current research sought to examine pay and performance transparency and participant gender as predictors of when a negative perceived discrepancy is experienced and whether it leads to negotiation initiation in a performance-based pay context. To test this, we designed two complementary studies – one in a high situationally ambiguous context and one in a low situationally ambiguous context (Kugler et al., 2018). Across these two studies, we found that transparency significantly enhances the positive relationship between performance-based discrepancies and perceived negative discrepancies. Moreover, both studies confirmed the link between perceived discrepancy and negotiation initiation as well as initiation amount. However, we did not find gender differences, which contradicts our predictions.

Fairness, and equity in this case, provided a useful framework for considering the factors that may impact the discrepancy perceptions that drive negotiation initiation. In a performance-based pay context, a desire for equity drives the experience of discrepancy perceptions when the offered pay was low (i.e., unfair as based on contextual clues). Moreover, this desire for more equitable (i.e., fair) outcomes motivated people to initiate a negotiation by asking for greater pay. Further confirming the importance of fairness, the initiating amount correlated positively with perceived discrepancy and performance. That is, high performers initiated negotiations with a higher initiation amount than

moderate performers, showing that the equity norm dictated not only the initiation behavior, but the specific ask itself.

Importantly, we found that this relationship was enhanced when there was performance and pay transparency. Considering this result in the light of fairness theory, we would expect that the equity norm would dictate perceptions and behavior in this context, such that exposure to information that showed an equity-based pay system reinforced and enhanced expectations around these norms. In many organizational contexts there is no objective number to achieve, and therefore no (or very limited) context on which to assess the fairness of outcome (i.e., pay) distributions. This highlights the importance of this often-missing information as a driver of negotiation initiations as well as initiations that are fair both to the employee and to the organization. Collectively, the use of fairness theory substantially enhances our ability to understand the way, and under which conditions, discrepancies are perceived and lead to negotiation initiation.

Across the two studies, open-ended data also revealed that most individuals who negotiated cited their performance level as their reason for negotiating – and that people who did not negotiate were also most likely to mention that the offer seemed "fair" based on their performance. In this sense, we find that people do not need direct instructions to negotiate to see the opportunity to negotiate. Instead, negotiation seems to be driven by natural desires for fairness, and the more information that was provided to the participants, the more confident they were about what they deserved. More specifically, people were overall more likely to ask for more money if they thought they deserved it by performing well on the assigned task. Further, when participants were given information about how others performed and were paid and were able to compare that to their own performance, it was clear that their sense of injustice was more likely to cause action, in this case, they sought to balance the scale by asking for more money.

Unlike previous research examining negotiation initiation (cf. Small et al. 2007), the current studies did not find gender differences in negotiation initiation. In examining the number of men and women who negotiated, no statistically significant differences emerge, and the raw percentages are equivalent. Most surprising is that we did not find an effect of men negotiating more than women in the control conditions. In study 1, we utilized the same protocol as that described in Small et al (2007), but we do not find the gender differences they found in the control conditions. This suggests that the initial effects found in previous research are not as stable as originally thought. While some papers have replicated the gender difference in negotiation initiation, others have not. In fact, a comprehensive meta-analysis of over 120 empirical studies found that while on average men engage in negotiation at a greater rate than women overall, this difference was largely dependent upon context and are subject to vary (Mazei et al., 2015).

Theoretical Implications

We chose to focus on perceived discrepancy as the mediator between a performance-based pay discrepancy and negotiation initiation. However, if we think about perceived discrepancy under the broader umbrella of inequity perceptions, negotiation initiation is one of several possible outcomes, as perceptions of inequity also drive job dissatisfaction, reduced performance, and employee turnover (e.g., Day, 2012; Greenberg, 1990; Griffeth & Gaertner, 2001). Thus, this research has implications for the fairness literature as well by showing the importance of transparency in establishing strong equity norms. As we found, perceptions were more strongly correlated with performance when performance and pay information was available, showing that transparency increases the situational norm of equity. Equity perceptions are known to enhance motivation and performance, primarily based on the expectation that greater effort should result in greater reward

(e.g., Expectancy theory). We confirm this possible outcome in our Study 2 qualitative data, where people accepted the low raise offer and opted to focus on their own performance to increase their chance of a higher future raise. This only occurred under the conditions of transparency where equity was salient, and people could rely on the expectation that higher performance will lead to higher reward. Noteworthy, this was only true for moderate performers where a small discrepancy existed so they could see it as justified. When the discrepancy was large, negotiation seemed to be the most justified action, perhaps suggesting a clear indication that the participant knew the equity norm was violated, which provided strong justification for their action: negotiation initiation.

Moreover, our research finds that transparency exposes the reality of a pay structure. In the current research, transparency exposed an equity-based pay structure such that higher performers earned higher pay increases and lower performers earned lower pay increases. However, organizations may also allocate equality-based pay increases (every employee receives the same percentage increase) or random pay increases (metrics for determining raise level are ambiguous or unknown). Other researchers (Cullen & Pakzad-Hurson, 2016) have found that transparency pushes employers towards compressing pay such that all employees make similar wages (including high and low performers). We contribute to the existing research on pay transparency to show that transparency's effect is primarily in exposing the fairness of the underlying pay structure. Existing research that finds pay compression as a result of transparency may have had a pay structure that did not clearly follow an equity norm. In this case, when pay decisions appear more random or ambiguous, transparency may have an opposite effect from what we found. In fact, it is possible that transparency would reduce negotiation initiation when the pay structure is ambiguous. Future research could examine the effect of transparency in varying pay structures such as equality-based and random or ambiguous.

Finally, we examined gender as an antecedent to perceived discrepancies based on existing research pointing to the importance of gender as a factor. However, other individual differences may have an impact of how people develop pay expectations, therefore impacting a perceived discrepancy in an unfair pay situation. For example, prosocial personality traits can impact the extent to which people follow or violate social norms in other economic situations (Zhao et al., 2017). Given that gender norms seem to have a dissipating effect (i.e., we did not find gender effects), it may be fruitful for future research to examine other individual differences that may be relevant for how people establish, evaluate and follow social norms.

Practical Implications

As our research confirms, transparency, and the more accurate social comparisons that result from transparency, are important for establishing one's own standard and expectations. Despite the wide-spread resistance from organizations to provide transparency, this line of research suggests a major benefit for organizations in that those that are more deserving of higher pay will ask – whereas those that are less deserving are less likely to ask. We postulate that this would reduce the effects of wide-spread pay dissatisfaction as well by producing a more accurate assessment of pay fairness. Based on this research, we recommend that managers be more transparent with employees. Transparency provides information that allows employees to justify their request for more money. Given the link to fairness, providing more information may have the added benefit of increasing fairness perceptions because people feel more in control of the outcome.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

While this study was critical in that it was one of the first to examine more directly antecedents of perceived discrepancy, it is important to acknowledge a number of limitations that should be addressed in future work. First, while a strength of our study was that we used two complementary studies – with behavioral outcomes – our particular protocols did have a number of important limitations to note. Our studies only examined the influence of pay transparency in a very specific situation – following performance of a task and in a situation where future interactions with the co-negotiator are non-existent. Future research should look at the impact of pay transparency in situations where performance is not also a factor – such as the case of salary negotiations at the start of a new job. Additionally, future research could manipulate the extent to which participants perceive a social consequence based on future anticipated interactions with their co-negotiator as would also be the case in a work setting where one is likely to work alongside individuals, they engage in negotiation in the future.

Relatedly, we did not have a truly "secret" condition – which, in a pay-for-performance scenario may be rare – is not rare within the broader private and public sector. In all conditions, participants were provided, at a minimum, a general understanding of both their performance and pay raise range – this information, while limited, does provide some context on which individuals may base perceptions of pay discrepancy. Future work should seek to examine these effects for conditions of complete "secrecy" – or rather, in situations in which no information if provided on the side of the employer regarding typical pay ranges nor performance. This context again would be more realistic for salary negotiations prior to beginning a new role, and thus would be an important context to understand the potential power of transparency on behaviors in this context as well.

Lastly, our laboratory experimental condition provided strong casual evidence, but the utilization of a lab protocol did come at the cost of limited experimental control in terms of maintaining consistency of experimenters. To ensure that sufficient data was collected on which to have the power to base our conclusions, data had to be collected over multiple semesters across multiple institutions – which ultimately meant we relied upon nineteen different experimenters. While we took great care in ensuring that the protocol across experimenters remained consistent, and statistically controlled for things such as experimenter gender, there may be effects from this variability that we were unable to account for. Future work should seek to replicate these effects in conditions in which resources available allow there to be greater consistency in the experimenters that lead the protocol.

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Appendix A. Coding of open-ended reasons for initiating negotiation

Code	Definition	Sample quote(s) from Study 1	Sample quote(s) from Study 2
(1)Good performance	Participant referenced some aspect of their performance, typically a perception of good performance warranting higher payment	"Because of the score that I had received" "I received a score of 83 and it was clear that other participants that scored in the 80's and specifically 83 received $9 as payment so when asked if I was okay receiving $3 I was not."	"The quality of my work was high, so I deserve more than the minimum raise available" "Because, I performed my job well."
(2)Unfair/ Dissatisfied with offer	Participant referenced that they were dissatisfied with the amount they were offered or found the offer unfair.	n/a	"because 3% raise was not satisfying" "The offered raise does not reflect my performance, and is unfair when compared to past figures."
(3)Transparency	Participants referenced the performance or pay information that they received during the experiment	"Seeing that other players who had gotten 50 points had received more than $3 in pay which was the starting reward made me want to ask for more money." "the chart I was shown gave most players $4.00 for getting a score of 21 points and I was only offered $3.00."	"My numbers and performance indicated a better raise based on overall company numbers of other employees." "My performance summary clearly stated exemplary work, that I believe is a lot more deserved of a pay raise on the higher end of the spectrum, not the lowest."
(4)Need	Participants referenced a need for the money uncontrolled by the experiment/scenario.	"I was relying on the ten dollars and am broke."	"due to my family situation"

Appendix B. Coding of open-ended reasons for NOT initiating negotiation

Code	Definition	Sample quote(s) from Study 1	Sample quote(s) from Study 2
(1)Poor performance	Participant referenced some aspect of their performance as the reason for not negotiating, typically a perception of poor performance not warranting higher payment	"I assumed I was being paid correctly in correspondence to my performance in the game." "My score was not that great and I had a feeling I deserved $3."	
(2)Fair/ Satisfied with offer	Participant referenced the fact that they were satisfied with the amount that they were offered and perceived it as fair.	"I have only been here for 20 minutes and 3 dollars for 20 minutes of work equates to 9 dollars an hour and that's better pay than I've had at any other job." "I volunteered to do this study, receiving any money is a gift."	"Because it is better to have a raise than nothing at all. Sometimes we need to be contented on what we are getting." "Because it [the offer] was appropriate"
(3)Authority	Participant referenced the researcher/manager and their knowledge and experience as the reason why they did not negotiate for higher pay. That is, participants had the expectation that the researcher/manager would know how much their performance was worth, and they deferred to their expertise.	"I trusted that I was paid the fair amount based on the score I received." "I just felt that it was the researcher's choice to give me money to begin with, so whatever she felt she wanted to give me, I wasn't going to question it."	"because the manager knows my performance more than me" "He has already made up his mind and decided based on the data. I will make sure my data looks better next year."
(4)Social	Participant referenced some social reason such as not wanting to be rude or pushy for not asking for a higher payment.	"I did not want to go against what was expected of me." "I thought it might be rude." "I would feel bad trying to get more money."	"Because I thought whether my negotiation may bring negative thought about me to the supervisor" "i think the 3 percent was beneficial enough. i dont want to push it and sound ungrateful."
(5)Lack of awareness	Participants stated that they did not negotiate for higher pay because they did not realize that negotiation was an option.	"I didn't think I could, but also $3 is better than nothing" "I didn't think that it was a negotiable quantity (even though in retrospect, the tester did ask me if that was an all right amount)"	N/A
(6)Lack of need	Participants referenced the fact that $3 was sufficient and they did not need more because of their existing financial situation.	"My family is fairly well financially situated, so I am not in any dire need for every dollar I can get."	"Because I don't care"

Appendix C
Study 2 Manipulation Materials

High Transparency for Pay

At Wotzi we believe that salary information should be available to all inquiring team members. Wage transparency helps promote inclusiveness and ensures our compensation system is fair. The following is a summary of the pay raises given to your cohort last year:

When pay raises were given last year, they generally ranged from a 3% to a 10% increase in annual salary.

SALES REP	*YEAR*	*# CLIENTS CONTACTS JUNE '18-'19*	*# CLIENTS SIGNED JUNE '18 - JUNE '19*	*SALES TOTAL JUNE '18 - JUNE '19*	*TOTAL # OF CLIENTS SIGNED FROM START*	2018 PAY	2019 PAY	RAISE %
ROBERTS, L.	2	11	4	$324,000	10	$51,000	$53,040	4%
YATES, M.	2	16	6	$408,000	15	$51,500	$53,045	3%
ADAMS, J.	2	13	7	$415,000	15	$52,000	$53,560	3%
PETERS, O.	2	14	6	$384,000	13	$51,500	$53,560	4%
BETZELL, K.	2	21	14	$608,000	27	$53,000	$55,650	5%
LAWSON, G.	2	24	12	$617,000	22	$52,500	$55,650	6%
GARMEN, F.	2	26	15	$640,000	29	$53,500	$56,175	5%
HANOVE, A.	2	24	14	$663,000	28	$53,000	$56,710	7%
STEVENS, J.	2	42	24	$980,000	49	$54,000	$58,320	8%
DEEDS, A.	2	44	23	$1,005,000	49	$54,500	$59,405	9%
LYNDON, C.	2	56	25	$1,100,500	54	$54,500	$59,950	10%
JOHNSON, D.	2	45	27	$1,423,000	51	$55,000	$60,495	9%

Low Pay Transparency

At Wotzi we believe that pay raise ranges should be available to all inquiring team members. Raise range transparency helps promote inclusiveness and ensures our compensation system is fair. The following is a summary of the pay raises given to your cohort last year:

When pay raises were given last year, they generally ranged from a 3% to a 10% increase in annual salary.

High Transparency for High Performance

Annual Performance Review

Employer Name: Wosti Advertising **Department:** Sales & Marketing

Job Title: Sales Representative **Supervisor:** Quinn Johnston

Years with Company: 2 **Current Salary:** $53,000

Summary of Performance: **Performance Definitions**

5	Outstanding	Performance is superior on a consistent and sustained basis
4	Exceeds Expectations	Performance exceeds normal job requirements.
3	Meets Expectations	Performance meets position requirements.
2	Needs Improvement	Performance meets some of position requirements, objective and expectations.
1	Unsatisfactory	Performance does not meet position requirements, objective and expectations. Immediate attention to improvement is required.

Quality of Work: Sales records and customer record management databases are complete, accurate, and in an acceptable format.	5
Individual Effectiveness: Displays cooperative attitude at work, exhibits integrity and sincerity with others to achieve set objectives	5
Communication: Expresses ideas and information in sales presentations that are complete, clear, concise, and organized. Conveys information to supervisors, team members, and customers in a timely, clear, and concise manner. Actively listens to others.	5
Service Focus: Takes a personal interest in both customers' satisfaction, creates a positive environment for interaction and takes appropriate action to meet their needs.	5
Judgement and Decision Making: Realistically weighs and evaluates information, separates important from unimportant, assesses probable consequences and takes appropriate action, and demonstrates the ability to make sound and timely decisions. Accountable for results and makes decisions that meet the objectives of the department.	5
Team Building: Contributes positively to the team's culture. Achieves group participation to improve the performance of the entire team.	5
Job Knowledge: Demonstrates comprehension of sales and presentation techniques and skills, as well as system processes and procedures necessary to perform the job.	5
Initiative. Generates ideas and initiatives action to seek information to solve problems. Proposes innovative ideas. Follows through with plans and tasks; self-starter.	5

Number of Potential Clients Contacted: 46

Number of New Clients Signed: 26

Sales Total for New Clients: $1,230,000

Number of Clients Signed To-Date: 52

Comments: You did an outstanding job this year. Your work was superior on a number of different levels and you maintained this quality of work throughout the year.

Low Transparency for High Performance

Annual Performance Review

Employer Name: Wozti Inc. **Department:** Sales & Marketing

Job Title: Sales Representative **Supervisor:** Quinn Johnston

Years with Company: 2 **Current Salary:** $53,000

Summary of Performance:

You did an outstanding job this year. Your work was superior on a number of different levels and you maintained this quality of work throughout the year.

High Transparency for Moderate Performance

Annual Performance Review

Employer Name: Wozti Advertising **Department:** Sales & Marketing

Job Title: Sales Representative **Supervisor:** Quinn Johnston

Years with Company: 2 **Current Salary:** $58,000

Summary of Performance: **Performance Definitions**

5	Outstanding	Performance is superior on a consistent and sustained basis
4	Exceeds Expectations	Performance exceeds normal job requirements.
3	Meets Expectations	Performance meets position requirements.
2	Needs Improvement	Performance meets some of position requirements, objective and expectations.
1	Unsatisfactory	Performance does not meet position requirements, objective and expectations. Immediate attention to improvement is required.

Quality of Work: Sales records and customer record management databases are complete, accurate, and in an acceptable format.	5
Individual Effectiveness: Displays cooperative attitude at work, exhibits integrity and sincerity with others to achieve set objectives	5
Communication: Expresses ideas and information in sales presentations that are complete, clear, concise, and organized. Conveys information to supervisors, team members, and customers in a timely, clear, and concise manner. Actively listens to others.	5
Service Focus: Takes a personal interest in both customers' satisfaction, creates a positive environment for interaction and takes appropriate action to meet their needs.	5
Judgement and Decision Making: Realistically weighs and evaluates information, separates important from unimportant, assesses probable consequences and takes appropriate action, and demonstrates the ability to make sound and timely decisions. Accountable for results and makes decisions that meet the objectives of the department.	5
Team Building: Contributes positively to the team's culture. Achieves group participation to improve the performance of the entire team.	5
Job Knowledge: Demonstrates comprehension of sales and presentation techniques and skills, as well as system processes and procedures necessary to perform the job.	5
Initiative. Generates ideas and initiatives action to seek information to solve problems. Proposes innovative ideas. Follows through with plans and tasks; self-starter.	5

Number of Potential Clients Contacted: 23

Number of New Clients Signed: 13

Sales Total for New Clients: $615,000

Number of Clients Signed To-Date: 26

Comments: You meet expectations this year. Your work met the position requirements on a number of different levels.

Low Transparency for Moderate Performance

Annual Performance Review

Employer Name: Wozti Inc. **Department:** Sales & Marketing

Job Title: Sales Representative **Supervisor:** Quinn Johnston

Years with Company: 2 **Current Salary:** $53,000

Summary of Performance:

You met expectations this year. Your work met the position requirements on a number of different levels.

Appendix D
Additional Results (Study 1 & 2)

Table D1. Study 1 regression results without control variables

	Mediator: Perceived Discrepancy						DV: Negotiation Initiation			DV: Initiation Amount		
	Model 1 (2-way)			Model 2 (3-way)			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI
Intercept	3.131**	2.756	3.506	3.428**	2.863	3.994	-4.941**	-6.26	-3.62	-1.191**	-1.983	-.400
Performance	0.019**	.013	.025	0.015**	.006	.025	0.006	-.008	.021	0.012*	.001	.023
Full Transparency	-1.493**	-2.187	-.799	-2.203**	-3.434	-.972						
Female				-0.533	-1.288	.222						
Discrepancy x Full Transparency	0.025**	.014	.036	0.037**	.017	.060						
Discrepancy x Female				0.006	-.006	.017						
Full Transparency x Female				0.968	-.546	2.483						
Discrepancy x Full Transparency x Female				-0.018	-.044	.007						
Perception							0.658**	.350	.966	0.561**	.365	.758
Pseudo R^2 / R^2		**.267****			**.278****			**.154****			**.155****	

Note. 95% confidence intervals for all confidence intervals; CI = Confidence Interval; LLCI = Lower limit of confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit of confidence interval
N = 333; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table D2. Study 2 regression results with loosened exclusion criteria

	Mediator: Perceived Discrepancy						DV: Negotiation Initiation			DV: Initiation Amount		
	Model 1 (2-way)			Model 2 (3-way)			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI
Intercept	11.532	11.022	12.042	11.766	11.041	12.49	-2.340	-3.361	-1.320	-.524	-1.56	.520
Performance	2.080**	1.366	2.795	2.364**	1.336	3.393	-0.013	-.511	.485	.340	-.182	.862
Transparency	-1.171**	-1.916	-.425	-1.361*	-2.417	-.305						
Female				-0.440	-1.471	.592						
Discrepancy x Transparency	1.340**	.282	2.398	1.523	-0.004	3.050						
Discrepancy x Female				0.212	-1.230	1.654						
Transparency x Female				0.435	-1.072	1.942						
Discrepancy x Transparency x Female				-0.336	-2.480	1.809						
Perception							0.217**	.128	.306	0.465**	.374	.555
Pseudo R^2 / R^2		**.243****			**.242****			**.112****			**.302****	

Note. 95% confidence intervals for all confidence intervals; CI = Confidence Interval; LLCI = Lower limit of confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit of confidence interval
N = 353; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table D3. Study 2 regression results without control variables

	Mediator: Perceived Discrepancy						DV: Negotiation Initiation			DV: Initiation Amount		
	Model 1 (2-way)			Model 2 (3-way)			Model 3			Model 4		
Variable	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI	Effect	LLCI	ULCI
Intercept	11.299	10.779	11.819	11.436	10.704	12.17	-2.623	-3.923	-1.323	-.964	-2.19	.259
Performance	2.593**	1.851	3.336	2.364**	1.336	3.393	-0.087	-.731	.557	.286	-.324	.896
Transparency	-0.943**	-1.732	-.153	-0.900	-2.032	.232						
Female				-0.247	-1.296	.802						
Discrepancy x Transparency	1.354**	.225	2.484	0.940	-0.685	2.565						
Discrepancy x Female				0.447	-1.049	1.942						
Transparency x Female				0.011	-1.584	1.606						
Discrepancy x Transparency x Female				0.716	-1.567	2.999						
Perception							0.268**	.151	.386	0.526**	.419	.634
Pseudo R^2 / R^2		**.335****			**.339****			**.309****			**.370****	

Note. 95% confidence intervals for all confidence intervals; CI = Confidence Interval; LLCI = Lower limit of confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit of confidence interval
N = 266; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

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Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Examining the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Non-Intervention Principle as a Conflict Management Strategy in the Horn of Africa

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Abstract

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) advocates for non-intervention principle as a conflict management strategy in the Horn of Africa. However, the principle's contribution and effectiveness in conflict management have sparked debates and concerns. Thus, the purpose of this article is to critically examine the IGAD non-intervention principle in conflict management, focusing on its actual contributions and potential shortcomings. The principle is assessed based on its stated objectives and the attainment of the desired outcomes. The study used the principles of non-intervention and responsibility to protect to examine the IGAD's non-intervention. The study adopted qualitative research methodology with a case study design. Four interstate interventions were selected as case studies and used as data sources. The findings demonstrate that IGAD's non-intervention policy fails to prevent and manage interstate intervention and intrastate conflicts. The principle does not manage to protect the sovereignty of its member states, as the region witnessed four cases of interstate intervention between 2005 and 2020. The principle's inability to prevent and manage interstate interventions and intrastate conflicts demonstrates its limitations in achieving desired outcomes. The article has identified four limitations of the principle: lack of clarity on non-intervention and internal affairs, mismatch between rhetoric and state practice, IGAD's lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the principle's limitations in dealing with contemporary peace and security challenges in a region with high level of conflicts. This article further illustrates that the principle not only has limitations in managing conflicts but also contradicts its objectives, hindering the organization's leadership role.

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Introduction

Since its 1996 revitalization, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been tasked with maintaining regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa (IGAD Agreement, 1996, Art. 7(g) and 6(d)). To this effect, IGAD adopted shared norms and principles aligned with its goals for peace, stability, and prosperity, using them as part of the lawful mechanisms for conflict management and regional security. Specifically, Article 6 of the IGAD Agreement (1996) outlines its norms and principles, including the sovereign equality of all member states, non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states, peaceful settlement of interstate and intrastate conflicts through dialogue, maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security, and conflict resolution within the IGAD framework before referring them to other regional and/or international organizations. The non-intervention principle, a fundamental principle of the organization, has been in place for nearly thirty years to guide interstate relations in the region (see. Art. 6(b)) and Art. 6(d)) of the IGAD Agreement). The principle has been viewed as an important conflict management strategy aimed at preventing governments to meddle in neighboring states' internal affairs, managing interstate wars, and ensuring regional stability in the region (Asnake, 2015).

However, the contribution and efficacy of the IGAD's non-intervention principle have sparked significant debates and concerns. On the one hand, the principle has been scrutinized, revealing contradictions in its actions and indicating that it is not in line with its stated objectives. The organization consistently fails to effectively implement its non-intervention stance, as its implementation has not been definitively established in reality (Adetula, Redie, & Jaiyebo, 2016). IGAD member states, despite claiming to uphold the principle, have consistently been involved in the domestic affairs of their neighbors (Asnake, 2015). On the other hand, the principle contradicts its mandate to uphold regional peace and security, as evidenced by numerous recent conflicts in the region. IGAD, due to its non-intervention as a conflict management strategy, has shown a reluctance to intervene in the domestic conflicts of its member states (Adetula et al., 2016). The organization's inability to intervene in member states' internal affairs could hinder its ability to assume leadership roles in conflict management. In this regard, Asnake (2015) argues that IGAD's lack of intervention hinders its ability to deal with crises such as human rights abuses and violations in its member states.

Moreover, IGAD's non-intervention principle often clashes with international norms like human rights protection, humanitarian intervention, and responsibility to protect (henceforth the R2P) concepts, which advocate for regional and international intervention in state affairs. According to Apuuli (2004), IGAD's non-intervention principle limits the organization to conduct humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations in member states' internal conflicts.

The aforementioned contradictions and concerns about the IGAD's non-intervention principle necessitate further investigation to determine whether it is a viable strategy that can contribute to conflict management in a region with high levels of interstate and intrastate conflicts. The principle's actual contributions and potential limits as a conflict strategy need to be questioned and critically examined. Thus, the article challenges the organization's non-intervention principle, arguing that it lacks clear outcomes and is incompatible with effective conflict management. The article explores the dilemma of IGAD's non-intervention strategy, where regional governments are involved in internal conflicts of other states and the organization is hesitant or unable to intervene in internal conflicts of its member states without their consent. However, it should be stated that the article does not argue

that IGAD's failure is solely due to its principles, like non-intervention. Rather, it argues that IGAD's efforts at conflict management are hindered by its non-intervention principle.

Research Questions

To examine the overall contributions, effectiveness, and potential failures of the IGAD's non-intervention principle as a viable conflict management strategy, we asked:

RQ1. Does the IGAD's non-intervention principle achieve its intended objectives?

RQ2. What explanations could hinder IGAD's non-intervention principle from achieving its desired outcomes?

RQ3. How does IGAD's non-intervention principle contribute to the organization's failure to manage regional conflicts?

Significance of the Study

The article contributes to the existing literature in four of its thematic areas. First, the article provides a comprehensive understanding of conflict management, a concept that is not frequently explored in the existing literature. Second, the article fills a gap in the literature on the role of regional organizations (ROs) in conflict management, despite extensive research on international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN). Third, this article provides fresh insights into non-intervention as a conflict management strategy for ROs and explores their interconnectedness. The literature extensively explores the concept of non-intervention, but its application as a conflict management strategy in ROs is rarely studied. Fourth, this article provides a comprehensive case study on non-intervention and conflict management in the Horn of Africa, highlighting the IGAD's non-intervention strategy.

Methodology

Study Design

The article employed a qualitative research design. The article aims to explore the qualitative aspects of IGAD's non-intervention principle, examining its contributions, effectiveness, and potential limitations in preventing and managing interstate intervention and intrastate conflicts. Creswell (2009) emphasizes the significance of qualitative research in comprehending and delving into individuals' perspectives of social or human issues. Neuman (2013) also asserts that qualitative research involves gathering ideas and opinions from subjects using a natural setting.

Case Study Method

The article employed a case study method within the qualitative research design. Four unilateral state interventions were selected as case studies, including Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, Kenya's intervention in Somalia, Uganda's intervention in South Sudan, and Eritrea's intervention in Ethiopia's Tigray war. Despite those four cases influencing it, the recent Tigray conflict (2020-2022), the role of IGAD in managing the conflict, and the organization's reaction to Eritrea's intervention in the conflict triggered the writing of this article.

Sampling Methods

The study used purposive sampling method. The selection of those four cases was based on three reasons. First, they are the best examples of whether the IGAD's non-intervention contributes to the management of inter-state intervention and conflict. Second, they excel in demonstrating various types of interventions, including state-state, state-non-state regional organizations, and state-non-state armed groups. The selection of a case without considering these all cases does not adequately explain the IGAD non-intervention, which includes various interventions mentioned above. Third, there are no other analogous cases of unilateral state intervention since the organization's expanded mandate in 1996 to include maintaining regional peace and security in the region.

Data Collection and Analysis Methods

The article used the four cases as its data sources. In other words, the article evaluates the IGAD non-intervention principle using the four case studies for interstate intervention and moving on to considerations of other intra-state conflicts where the organization failed to take leadership roles due to the principle's limitations and flawed application. Finally, the data was analyzed using a descriptive qualitative analysis. This tool is crucial for analyzing social concepts, perspectives, and actions (Tilahun, 2009).

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation of the article is primarily based on international principles of non-intervention and the R2P. These principles are useful for understanding and assessing the effectiveness and limitations of the IGAD non-intervention strategy in conflict management. Concepts such as conflict management, non-intervention, and the R2P are also intensively discussed. The discussion then moves on to the nexus between ROs and conflict management, non-intervention and ROs, the R2P and ROs, and non-intervention and conflict management.

Conflict Management

Conflict management is a complex term with various interpretations. Anderson (1990) and Thomas (1992) found that conflict management has a broad scope of application. Burton (1987) defined conflict management as the process of containing a dispute or preventing its escalation. Similarly, Thakore (2013) defined conflict management as strategies and approaches for controlling and resolving conflicts. Alagappa (1997) conceptualized conflict management into three stages: prevention, containment, and termination, suggesting these stages may overlap in practice. Alagappa's conflict prevention strategy aims to prevent escalating conflicts and hostilities or disruptive behavior. Similarly, Breslawski, Cunningham, and Fleishman (2022) reveal that conflict prevention is a non-violent conflict management activity that occurs when violence is possible but the conflict is currently non-violent. Conflict containment is a strategy used to prevent the spread of conflict by denying victory to conflicting parties and halting both horizontal and vertical escalation (Alagappa, 1997). Alagappa (1997) further identifies conflict termination as the third component of conflict management, which involves bringing hostilities to a suitable end through settlement or resolution.

The aforementioned definitions demonstrate that conflict management is an inclusive concept that encompasses conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Thus, this article employs the conflict management concept to encompass both conflict resolution and prevention.

Thakore (2013) argues that conflict management involves addressing the entire structure of a conflict, addressing destructive elements like hostility, and helping parties with incompatible goals to find solutions. Breslawski et al. (2022) also argue that conflict management involves prompt prevention and response to disputes, involving strategies from IOs, ROs, national governments, and non-state actors. Following the end of the Cold War, international actors like the UN, ROs, civil society organizations (CSOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a crucial role in managing conflicts. However, this article highlights the role of ROs in conflict management.

Regional Organizations and Conflict Management

The literature on conflict management often demonstrates that IOs like the UN have a significant advantage in conflict management. For example, Breslawski et al. (2022) discovered that conflict management is not solely the UN's responsibility, despite being the primary focus of conflict management literature. Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism has been used for conflict management due to the international community's reluctance to engage in domestic conflicts (Alagappa, 1997). Since then, ROs have significantly contributed to peace and security, and conflict management (Acharya, 2004; Asnake, 2015; Breslawski et al., 2022). Asnake (2015) remarks that ROs are vital for regional security governance. Breslawski et al. (2022) further underlined that ROs, due to their geographical location and extensive conflict management experience, can effectively manage conflicts, enabling quick response and direct impact on member states. Gartner (2011) also suggests ROs are effective mediators due to shared identities, trust, and protection from civil war spillover effects and legitimacy. Breslawski et al. (2022) further added that regional actors are motivated to initiate early involvement in disputes to respond swiftly to potential crises or conflict escalations, coordinating responses through meetings and appointing special envoys.

Non-Intervention: Definitions and Its Application in State and Non-State Actors

The term non-intervention is challenging to define due to its complex legal and political interpretations. The concept's widespread use in various contexts and applications in IRs and international law makes it challenging to unpack. Wu (2000) identifies non-intervention as a complex and contentious issue at both international and regional levels. The principle, despite its political rhetoric in IRs, is also rooted in substantial legislation, including judicial rulings, treaties, and UN resolutions. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of non-intervention in IR, international law, and the UN Charter.

The terms non-intervention and non-interference are frequently used interchangeably and are distinct. Scholars like Raynova (2017), Jamnejad and Wood (2009), Sean (2014), and Mumuni (2017) have explored the definitions of non-intervention and non-interference in various situations. Jamnejad and Wood (2009) suggest that non-intervention is more commonly used, while interference may indicate a larger restriction when combined with intervention. Raynova (2017) asserts that although these phrases are often used interchangeably, they have distinct meanings. According to Mumuni (2017), non-intervention is frequently used synonymously with non-interference, although the latter may refer to a broader prohibition. Sean (2014), Stanton (1993), and Jamnejad and Wood (2009) also differentiated between non-intervention and non-interference. Watts (2015) suggests that interference can also involve low-intensity activities. Jennings and Watts (2009) qualify that interference must be forceful, dictatorial, or coercive, thereby denying the intervening state control over the issue at hand. Jamnejad and Wood (2009) reveal that interference is a form of coercion, while

non-intervention is the subordination of sovereign will. Similarly, Stanton (1993) emphasized the role of coercion in non-interference, distinguishing between a foreign presence with a host state's consent and an interfering force. The UN defines intervention as coercive interference, whether economic or military, with a country's autonomous internal affairs, whether unilateral or multilateral. However, this article uses non-intervention and non-interference interchangeably.

The article outlines three distinct ways of non-intervention: between states, state and non-state regional and international actors, and state and non-state armed groups. The principle of non-intervention between states is an intriguing conceptual distinction that warrants inclusion. The principle of non-intervention prohibits state threats or the use of force against territorial integrity or political independence and prohibits dictatorial intervention in other states' internal affairs. The principle is closely linked to the role of state sovereignty and serves as a safeguard for it. Abegunde (2021) asserts that the concept [non-intervention] allows a state to establish laws for its citizens without external interference, thereby enhancing its legitimacy as an international community member. Wu (2000) also notes that the concept deals with states that are the most influential and legitimate players in IRs, focusing on bilateral, regional, and global interaction. Similarly, Jamnejad and Wood (2009) qualify that non-intervention is a principle respecting a state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence and refraining from interfering in other states' internal affairs.

The principle of non-intervention between states and non-state armed groups is also another intriguing conceptual distinction that warrants inclusion. The international community distinguishes between states' non-intervention and non-state armed groups in the international law. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that member states have an inherent right to defend themselves individually or collectively if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until the Security Council (henceforth the SC) takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945). The Article permits states to defend themselves against non-state attacks, but self-defense measures must be assessed based on the necessity, magnitude, and proportionality of the attack.

The third distinction of non-intervention pertains to the involvement of states and non-state actors, including regional and international organizations. Wu (2000) identifies non-intervention as a fundamental concept in interstate relations and intergovernmental cooperation. The principle has been incorporated into numerous international agreements, including the UN Charter, the Friendship Relations Declaration, the Venin Convention, the Geneva Convention, the International Court of Justice, and Nicaragua. The UN Charter upholds the principle of non-intervention as a fundamental principle of international law. It is a jus *cogens* norm in international law, reflecting a state's inviolable nature and recognized by the international community (Shen, 2001; Guerreiro, 2022). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter stipulates that all members shall refrain in their international relations from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN (UN Charter, 1945).

Regional Organizations and the Principle of Non-Intervention

ROs like the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union (AU)), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and IGAD have adopted the principle of non-intervention to respect other states' sovereignty and prohibit intervention in their internal affairs.

Article 4 of the Treaty on the EU, as amended in the 2012 consolidated version, emphasizes the non-intervention of other EU members in their internal affairs. Article 4(2) of the Union also states that the Union must uphold the equality and national identities of Member States, including regional and local self-government, and uphold essential state functions like territorial integrity, law, and national security (EU Treaty, 2012).

Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act (AU CA) establishes the principle of non-intervention, with three fundamental instruments relevant to this principle (AU, 2000). Article 4(a) affirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. Article 4(f) of the Union prohibits the use or threat of force among Union countries. Article 4(g) states that non-intervention by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.

The ASEAN explicitly prohibits any form of intervention in its internal affairs. The ASEAN Charter mandates member countries to uphold Article 2(2), promoting independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, national identity, non-intervention in internal affairs, and freedom from external interference (ASEAN, 2008).

The OAS Charter mentions non-intervention in Articles 3 and 19. Chapter IV of the Charter outlines the non-intervention concept's rights and duties, including the freedom to develop cultural, political, and economic life freely. Article 3 of the OAS grants states the right to establish their own political, economic, and social systems, while also requiring them to refrain from interfering in other states' affairs (Jamnejad & Wood, 2009). Article 19 explicitly prohibits any form of interference in the affairs of states, including non-coercive measures (Guerreiro, 2022).

Non-intervention as a Conflict Management Strategy of Regional Organizations

Another critical subject of discussion in this article is how ROs and IOs adopt non-intervention as a conflict management strategy. Conflict management strategies are various methods, tools, activities, and actions used to prevent and effectively manage conflicts (Thakore, 2013). Breslawski et al. (2022) also note that ROs employ four primary conflict management strategies: rhetorical, diplomatic, economic, and military, each of which can significantly reduce violence. Boutros-Ghali (1992) proposes four conflict prevention strategies: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building, which are part of the conflict management literature. Similarly, Alagappa (1997) identified nine strategies of ROs for conflict management, including norm-setting, assurance, community-building, deterrence, non-intervention, isolation, intermediation, enforcement, and internationalization.

The article aims to showcase the literature on the use of non-intervention by ROs as a conflict management strategy. Scholars like Alagappa (1997), Haacke and Williams (2009), and Asnake (2015) identified that non-intervention is a conflict management strategy. Alagappa (1997) suggests that regional institutions can use non-intervention strategies when they prefer not to intervene in a specific conflict. Asnake (2015) defines non-intervention as a conflict management strategy enabling regional states to resolve bilateral disputes without involving a third party, like a RO. Similarly, Haacke and Williams (2009) explored that non-intervention is recommended when conflict parties want bilateral resolution, and if this is not possible, third-party mediation or arbitration from within or beyond the region is a possibility. According to Alagappa (1997), regional institutions often opt for non-

intervention in domestic conflicts due to principle adherence, lack of government invitation, capability, conflict intractability, anticipated costs, tension between principles, and belief in marginal conflict resolution impact.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Concept: A Challenge to Non-Intervention

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of non-intervention has undergone significant challenges and changes. It has been weakened by changes in state sovereignty understandings, practices, and shifting state responsibilities. It faced numerous challenges, especially in cases of severe human rights violations (Alagappa, 1997). Sarkin (2009) and Almedia (2002) challenge the non-intervention concept for lack of defending human rights and ensuring international peace and security, highlighting inherent constraints and the need for humanitarian actions. The limitations of non-intervention in protecting human rights led to the shift from non-intervention to intervention, resulting in new concepts like the R2P and humanitarian intervention (HI).

R2P, a response to the 1990s atrocities in Rwanda and Yugoslavia (Clifford, 2022; Djupmark Ödegaard, 2022), was developed by South Sudanese diplomat Francis Deng and the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (Sarkin, 2009). The 2001 ICISS report suggests that the debate on human rights protection should shift from the right to intervene to the R2P, acknowledging military intervention as an extraordinary measure (ICISS, 2001). The report added that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from catastrophes like mass murder and starvation, but when unable, the broader community assumes responsibility (Ibid. para.10-13).

Despite debates about its origin (Sarkin, 2009), the R2P has been endorsed in various UN documents, including the 2004 High-Level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challenges, and Change, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, and several UN General Assembly resolutions. Most importantly, in 2005, the UN World Summit adopted the R2P doctrine as an official policy, emphasizing state responsibility to protect the world population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (World Summit Outcome, 2005). The 2005 UN World Summit underscored the international community's responsibility to protect the world's population from major severe human rights abuses and crimes like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing (World Summit Outcome, 2005, supra note 10, paras. 138–139). The outcome further upheld the R2P principle, prohibiting states from being involved in such crimes and human rights violations (Sarkin, 2009; Clifford, 2022; Djupmark Ödegaard, 2022). Since its adoption, the R2P has been implemented in conflicts in Libya, Cote d'Ivoire, Syria, and other regions (Clifford, 2022).

Furthermore, the UN General Secretary has emphasized the importance of R2P, which has been emphasized in various UN SC resolutions. Specifically, the UN SC has introduced R2P as a norm in international law, with resolutions 1674 and 1706 promoting its widespread acceptance and development (Sarkin, 2009). The World Summit Outcome document further noted that the international community through the UN is tasked with using diplomatic, humanitarian, and peaceful means to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter. The UN Charter emphasis that in situations where peaceful negotiations are insufficient, forceful intervention is the only viable option for protecting citizens within a state (Kabau, 2012). Article 2(7) of the Charter also allows enforcement measures to be exempt from state intervention prohibition, referring to forceful intervention in a state. Article 42 grants the SC the authority to take the necessary actions. Article 39 of the charter empowers

the UN SC to identify and address peace threats, including states' responsibilities to prevent and punish genocide.

Regional Organizations and the Adoption of the R2P as an Intervention Mechanism

Regional organizations can facilitate the implementation of the R2P through peaceful negotiations and consensual interventions (Kabau, 2012). The UN Charter empowers ROs to address international peace and security threats, with the UN SC's authorization, outlining principles and modalities for their engagement. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter grants ROs the authority to enforce rules and regulations, ensuring peacekeeping, peacemaking, and enforcement operations are conducted under UN mandate (Asnake, 2015). The UN Charter empowers ROs to resolve internal conflicts within their regions, as per Article 52, aiming to maintain international peace and security. Article 53(1) of the UN Charter also permits ROs to intervene and enforce actions with the approval of the SC for managing regional conflicts within their mechanisms (Kabau, 2012). This article explores the use of ROs' intervention mechanisms for implementing the R2P in conflict management efforts, focusing on their intervention instruments.

Since 1993, the OAS has prioritized democracy and human rights protection in the Northern American region (Alagappa, 1997), shifting its focus from non-intervention to R2P (Schnably, 1993). In 1991, the OAS shifted towards an interventionist stance, committing to the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System (Schnably, 1993). The Santiago commitment, a pledge by OAS foreign ministers to expedite processes for promoting and safeguarding representative democracy, prioritizes democratic regime protection over non-intervention (Alagappa, 1997). To that end, the OAS has been instrumental in resolving conflicts in Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador-Honduras (Nguyen, 2002).

The EU has implemented the R2P and adopted intervention mechanisms to effectively manage conflicts and safeguard human rights in Europe. The EU, a powerful regional organization, has shown a growing interest in conflict resolution, particularly in European countries (Giannaki, 2007). Article 7 of the EU Treaty establishes a mechanism for the Union to intervene in the domestic affairs of member countries. Article 7(1) of the EU's Treaty allows the Council to determine if a Member State is at risk of serious breach of Article 2 values after a reasoned proposal from one-third of Member States, the European Parliament, or the European Commission.

The EU, a significant regional and global actor (Giannaki, 2007), has significantly contributed to peace and security in Europe and around the world through its effective conflict management capabilities (Juncos & Blockmans, 2018). Rummel (2004) suggests the EU's involvement in conflict resolution was influenced by its failure to prevent the Yugoslavian civil wars and conflicts in Africa in the mid-1990s and its response to the USA's global crisis management dominance. Giannaki (2007) praised the EU's intervention in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The EU's membership power is crucial for conflict management, and Croatia's exclusion from NATO's Partnership for Peace has led to economic and technical losses and international isolation (Giannaki, 2007). Giannaki (2007) further notes that the EU and NATO collaborated to manage the conflict in FYROM, negotiating an all-party government and providing financial aid for a peaceful resolution.

Before its 2001 dissolution, the OAU prioritized non-intervention over protection against widespread human rights abuses (Sarkin, 2009; Aning & Atuobi, 2009). The OAU, despite resolving the DRC conflict and facilitating the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal (Sarkin, 2009), faced criticism for failing to stop the Rwandan genocide or end wars in Liberia and Burundi (Kindiki, 2003). The OAU's inability to manage conflicts and protect human rights led to its transformation into the AU in 2000, adopting an interventionist approach, indicating a shift from non-intervention to a non-indifference principle.

Former AU Commission Chair, President Alpha Oumar Konare, made a significant statement advocating for non-indifference for the first time. Konare deemed it unsustainable for African countries to remain silent in the face of neighboring countries' atrocities (Murithi, 2009). The new AU doctrine, rooted in Pan-Africanism, urges African countries to cease indifference to their neighbors' suffering, promoting peace, security, and well-being through political will (Aning & Atuobi, 2009). Thus, non-indifference refers to the shift from non-intervention to intervention, enabling the AU to intervene in member states in severe situations like genocide, war crimes, and war against humanity (AU CA, 2000). Five years later, after the adoption of the AU in January 2005, African leaders endorsed the R2P in the Ezulwini Consensus recognizing the need for protective measures (Aning & Atuobi, 2009). Article 4 of the AU legalizes R2P in Africa and affirms the Union's right to intervene in member states. This article permits intervention without a specific state request or invitation, potentially targeting a state's government if it is the perpetrator of atrocities. Article 4(f) also allows the Union to use or threaten force among AU states in cases of the aforementioned crimes. Furthermore, Article 4(j) grants member states the right to request Union intervention to restore peace and security.

The AU has initiated R2P, involving military intervention in conflicts in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, and Comoros (Kabau, 2012; Murithi, 2009). In 2003, the AU intervened in Burundi for the first time and established the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to ensure peace and promote R2P. The AMIB played a crucial role in establishing peace in Burundi, despite its fragile nature, establishing relative peace in most provinces by the end of its mission (Kabau, 2012). The AU has also facilitated peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia, relying on territorial state consent, but has shown reluctance to resort to forceful intervention in Darfur and Libya (Kabau, 2012; Murithi, 2009). The AU and the Sudanese government were negotiating ceasefire agreements to establish the AU Mission in Sudan but failed for various reasons (Kabau, 2012). On March 6, 2007, the AU's Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Ambassador of Somalia, signed the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) (Ibid.).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has implemented interventionist approaches for conflict management and human rights protection. ECOWAS, unlike other regional economic organizations, is highly involved in security issues (Haftel & Hofmann, 2017). The organization is implementing conflict management mechanisms to swiftly resolve disputes without relying on the international community (Breslawski et al., 2022). It has demonstrated its effectiveness (Abegunde, 2021) and extensively intervened in many conflicts in West Africa. The organization intervened in the Liberian civil war in 1990 (Sarkin, 2009) and approved the ECOMOG mission, demonstrating its involvement in intervention efforts (Abegunde, 2021). In 1998, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone, extending the ECOMOG mission to the region (Sarkin, 2009; Abegunde, 2021). Moreover, ECOWAS intervened in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and 2001, threatening expulsion due to its involvement in the 2003 coup d'état (Sarkin, 2009). It also led peaceful resolutions and restored constitutional governments in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia (Breslawski et al., 2022). Specifically, the organization played a crucial role in resolving conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire since its intervention in 2002 (Sarkin, 2009).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has implemented principles and protocols related to the R2P. The 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation permits the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security (OPDS) to authorize intervention as a last resort (art. 2). In 1998, the SADC intervened in the DRC conflict (Sarkin, 2009). Moreover, South Africa and Botswana, under SADC's guidance, intervened in Lesotho in 1998 to prevent a coup d'état, but the charter, mandate, and motivations remain controversial (Likoti, 2007).

The IGAD's Non-Intervention and Management of Interstate Intervention

As indicated in the introduction, since its mandate was expanded to include peace and security in 1996, the IGAD has implemented the non-intervention principle as a conflict management strategy to prevent and manage interstate interference and wars in the Horn of Africa (IGAD Agreement, 1996). Article 6(b) of the IGAD Agreement mandates member states to reaffirm their commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Asnake (2015) asserts that the IGAD employs non-intervention and state sovereignty principles to prevent member states from interfering in each other's internal affairs and resorting to war and violence.

The question is whether non-intervention is a viable strategy for conflict management and regional security, and to what extent it achieves the aforementioned objectives. Thus, the article examines the effectiveness, contribution, and potential failure of the IGAD's non-intervention strategy in preventing and managing interstate intervention, violence, and intrastate conflicts in the region. However, it should be apparent from the start that this article acknowledges that IGAD's non-intervention is not expected to prevent all armed conflicts and enmity among the member states but argues that reducing and managing interstate intervention and violence is desirable.

Although IGAD advocates for collective measures against regional peace and security threats, as stated in Article 18, unilateral interventions have historically worsened the region's peace and security situation. The region has witnessed a rise in unilateral state interventions in neighboring states' internal affairs, with IGAD member states routinely involving in neighboring countries' internal conflicts. Between 2005 and 2020, only fifteen years, the region has experienced four unilateral state interventions in other states' internal conflicts. This article examines four unilateral state interventions as case studies, evaluating the IGAD non-intervention in each of these cases.

Ethiopia's Intervention in Somalia

Ethiopia intervened militarily in the Somalia conflict from December 2006 to January 2009, claiming to counter Islamic Court Union (ICU) terrorist threats. However, this intervention has remained a contentious one. The question is why Ethiopia intervened? What was the response of IGAD to the military intervention? Ethiopia justified its military intervention based on two legal perspectives: the right to self-defense and the threat of an armed attack. First, Ethiopia claimed its inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In fact, the article grants Ethiopia the right to self-defense against an armed attack or a threat from a non-state actor. However, Ethiopia's international legal claims have been criticized for failing to comply with international law on self-defense and terrorist threats. Allo (2010) argues that Ethiopia failed to meet at least two legal requirements of international law outlined in UN Charter Article 51. First, the country did not provide a clear description of the scale and impact of the armed attack. Second, the response to the terrorism threat in Somalia was not proportional, as it occupied major cities, including the Mogadishu, the capital city and stayed

for three years from 2006 to 2009. Allo (2010) further contends that Ethiopia's military intervention in collective self-defense violates international law, as Ethiopia and Somalia have not signed any bilateral agreement.

Second, Ethiopia justified its military intervention against a terrorist threat by citing a clear threat and growing fear of an attack by the non-state actor, the UIC. Allo (2010) contends that the UIC's armed attack not only does not necessarily indicate an armed attack but also that the attack was not a major danger to its territorial integrity and political independence. Thus, the UIC's threat to Ethiopia was deemed insufficient to justify self-defense. In terms of proportionality, Ethiopia's three-year occupation of Somalia's major cities and airports, despite claims of self-defense, does not accurately reflect the proportion of armed attacks (Allo, 2010). Similarly, the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2013) asserts that Ethiopia's intervention was disproportionately reacted to, despite the potential for a terrorist retaliatory campaign.

What was IGAD's reaction to Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia? Redie (2012) criticized IGAD for supporting Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, arguing it aimed to influence the international community and other regional member states. Redie (2019) reveals that Ethiopia used IGAD to support its 2006 invasion of Somalia to safeguard its national security from the threat of ICU. Thus, the IGAD's response to Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia has led to a loss of trust among its member nations, particularly Eritrea. Eritrea's 2007 suspension from IGAD membership was due to Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, which in turn intensified its involvement in the Somali crisis, turning it into a proxy war with Ethiopia (Woodward, 2013). In fact, IGAD is legally unable to support unilateral interference in another state's internal affairs. However, this article argues that IGAD's inability to withdraw Ethiopia's three-year presence in Somalia demonstrates its failure to adhere to its non-intervention stance, as evidenced by Ethiopia's control over major cities, including the capital, Mogadishu.

Kenya's Intervention in Somalia

On October 16, 2011, Kenya launched a military intervention in Somalia (ICG, 2012; Birkett, 2013; Yirga, 2014). The military intervention, referred to as *Operation Linda Nchi* in Kiswahili, was described as an invasion by the ICG (2012) and Birkett (2013). Kenya's intervention, which resembled Ethiopia's intervention, was motivated by various factors. Menkhaus (2012) argues that kidnappings prompted Kenya's offensive against al-Shabaab, while plans for a Kenya-backed military operation in the border region had been in the works for some time. Similarly, Yirga (2014) revealed that Kenya's military intervention was driven by economic, political, and strategic factors, in addition to frequent kidnappings and terrorist attacks. Yirga further explained that the military operation was linked to Kenya's strategic goal of creating a buffer state in southern Somalia. Similarly, ICG (2012) also reported that Kenya planned to establish a buffer zone in Jubaland, southern Somalia, between itself and al-Shabaab-controlled territory, with 2500 militiamen trained for this purpose. The buffer zone was created to ensure Kenya's uninterrupted oil exploration and secure offshore oil blocks between Kenya and Somalia, prompting military intervention (Yirga, 2014).

The question arises as to the legal justification for Kenya's military intervention in Somalia. Kenya used almost the same legal justification as Ethiopia did in Somalia: self-defense and an act against an armed attack. Kenya justified its military operation by citing a series of kidnappings by al-Shabaab, a non-state actor affiliated with Al-Qaeda, on Kenyan territory (Gettleman, 2011; Birkett,

2013). Kenya's actions could be justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter (Birkett, 2013), which grants member states the right to defend themselves in case of an armed attack, pending Security Council action (UN, 1945). Birkett (2013) further argued that Kenya's self-defense measure meets the international law necessity criterion, despite controversial views on necessity. He further noted that Kenya urged al-Shabaab to cease operations amid attacks and kidnappings, ignoring calls for help, and thus has used armed force in self-defense. However, this article contends that al-Shabaab's threat to Kenya was insufficient to justify self-defense. We argue Kenya's response is illegal and violates international law as it used force against Somalia's territorial integrity by sending troops into its territory. In this regard, the ICG (2012) notes that the threshold and magnitude of al-Shabaab's armed attacks were not mentioned, except for frequent attacks and kidnappings. The ICG (2012) further underscored that a small group approved military intervention swiftly without proper consideration.

In terms of proportionality, this article also posits that the legal foundations were disproportionately influenced by economic motives. In this regard, Birkett (2013) reports that Kenya's operation reached Kismayo, 190 kilometers from its border, to drive al-Shabaab beyond Kismayo, less than 200 kilometers from the Somali-Kenyan border. Similarly, ICG (2013) found Kenya's long-term occupation of southern Somalia does not make its self-defense proportional. The ICG (2013) contends that despite the potential for a stable, extremist-free, and viable polity in the Juba Valley, the response was disproportionately retaliatory. The ICG further deemed Kenya's intervention excessive and an invasion, disregarding the unintended consequences (Ibid.).

Subsequently, what was IGAD's reaction to Kenya's intervention in Somalia? The IGAD promptly supported the scaling-up of security operations on October 21, 2011 (IGAD's 41st Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary Session, 2011), less than a week after the Kenyan military offensive began. The IGAD meeting shifted Kenya's hot pursuit of kidnappers to weaken al-Shabaab and establish a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia (ICG, 2012). Despite convincing IGAD member states that its involvement targeted an armed terrorist group, Kenya's unilateral engagement was criticized. The organization has been criticized for not adhering to its non-intervention principle, ignoring the Kenyan troop's withdrawal from Somalia for nearly a year before joining the AU's mission, AMISOM. IGAD's failure to take steps to remove Kenyan troops from Somalia can be seen as support by for the military incursion as the ICG (2012) and Birkett (2013) described Kenya's intervention as an invasion. However, IGAD has no power to endorse a state's unilateral state intervention against another sovereign state. Therefore, Kenya's unilateral action breached IGAD's and international norms by interfering in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state.

Eritrea's Intervention in Ethiopia's Tigray Conflict

Eritrea's involvement in Ethiopia's Tigray conflict is a recent instance of state interference. The Ethiopian government and the TPLF engaged in an armed conflict on November 4, 2020, that ended on November 2, 2022, following the signing of the Pretoria peace deal. During the two-year civil war, Eritrean troops, along with the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and Amhara paramilitary forces, fought against the Tigray forces (Blanchard, 2021; ACLED, 2022; Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2022; Abel, 2023). AI and HRW (2022) accused Eritrean troops of numerous human rights violations and war crimes, including mass killings, massacres, extrajudicial activities, rape, looting, and property destruction in Tigray.

The first question is why Eritrea is involved in the armed conflict in Tigray? The political interpretation of Eritrea's involvement in the conflict is influenced by the historical relationship between the Eritrean government and the TPLF. Collins (2021) and Reid (2022) found that the conflict between Eritrea and the TPLF significantly influences the relationship between the two countries. The TPLF and Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) have a history of conflict dating back to the 1970s, despite supporting each other during the armed struggle against the *Derg* regime in Ethiopia (Reid, 2022). The relationship between the two parties has been more strained since the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrean war (Collins, 2021). In 2018, Ethiopia's political dynamics under Prime Minister Abiy significantly impacted the relationship between the TPLF and the Eritrean government. Despite reconciliation efforts between the two countries under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's leadership, the regime in Eritrea and the TPLF's relationship remains unresolved. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's power struggle with the TPLF escalated, leading to the Tigray conflict on November 4, 2020, exacerbating Eritrea's disputes with the TPLF and resulting in its military intervention in the two-year destructive war in the Tigray region.

The normalization of the two countries provided President Isaias of Eritrea with an opportunity to seek revenge against the TPLF. Eritrea's defeat in the 1998 conflict under TPLF Ethiopian leadership (Reid, 2022; Collins, 2021) can be attributed to President Isaias, who sought military intervention to defeat the TPLF as a way of retaliation (Aucoin et al., 2022; Abel, 2023). Aucoin et al. (2022) argue that Isaias believes defeating the TPLF would strengthen military and political power in the Horn of Africa. Reid (2022) also argues that Isaias used the Tigray war for three benefits, including to end Eritrea's international isolation, gain influence in Ethiopia's internal affairs, and seek revenge on the TPLF, which had outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily and diplomatically. Similarly, Abel (2023) asserts that Eritrea has achieved objectives in the Tigray war, such as weakening the TPLF, devastating northern Ethiopia, decimating Tigray's economy, and capturing shared territory.

The second question is about the legal basis for Eritrea's military intervention. Eritrea's intervention has sparked legal debates involving invitation, self-defense, and coercion elements. The article presents three legal justifications for Eritrea's involvement in the Tigray conflict. First, there are claims that the Ethiopian government provided an invitation to Eritrea. Legally speaking, international law allows a state to intervene by invitation in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) (Clifford, 2022). Clifford defined NIAC as an armed conflict within a state's territory, with Eritrea's actions primarily occurring within Ethiopia's borders, making it non-international (Ibid.).

However, the most contentious issue is whether the Ethiopian government invited Eritrea. Although this issue will be addressed under the coercive element, Ethiopia's invitation to Eritrea has been disputed due to a lack of precise information. However, some reports show that Ethiopia has requested Eritrea's intervention. For example, Clifford (2022) argues that Eritrea's involvement is the Ethiopian government's invitation to deter the TPLF's attack. Clifford further claims that a state has the right to seek external assistance to end a civil war, but the situation in Ethiopia appears to be different (Ibid.). For him, Ethiopia's third-party invitation to Eritrea violates R2P, as Eritrea committed war crimes, targeting civilians and arresting political dissidents in Tigray. R2P is a concept that justifies third-party intervention to protect the population from atrocities like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and prevent these international crimes (ICISS, 2001; World Summit Outcome, 2005; Sarkin, 2009). Similarly, Djupmark Ödegaard (2022) notes that the Ethiopian government's inability to protect its citizens is a violation of the R2P principle. Clifford (2022) also concludes that the R2P

doctrine establishes a legal norm that Eritrea's intervention is unconstitutional, despite Ethiopia's acceptance.

Second, Eritrea's intervention includes a self-defense component. The Ethiopian government claimed Eritrea's involvement was primarily for self-defense purpose. After five months of denial, Prime Minister Abiy announced in April 2021 that Eritrean troops crossed the border to avoid TPLF attacks, promising to leave once the Ethiopian military controls the border (Reuters, 2021). Similarly, Clifford (2022) asserts that Eritrea's continued involvement in Ethiopia is driven by fear of a resurgence of the TPLF. In this context, however, Eritrea has never justified its military intervention for self-defense purpose. Rather, in response to Prime Minister Abiy's speech, Eritrea's minister of information claimed the Prime Minister's speech was mistranslated but did not respond to inquiries about the mistranslated part or reports of atrocities (Reuters, 2021). Therefore, with no confirmation from Eritrea, it is difficult to prove that Eritrea's intervention was justified by self-defense.

Third, Eritrea's intervention has a coercive element. Ethiopia's invitation to Eritrea is disputed because Ethiopia's invitation to Eritrea is not officially documented, despite reports from rights groups and IOs. Prime Minister Abiy's speech on Eritrean troops crossing the border to avoid TPLF attacks is insufficient to justify his government's invitation. Moreover, Eritrea and Ethiopia's governments denied Eritrea's involvement, despite evidence of human rights violations against civilians in captured areas until April 2021 (Abel, 2023). However, five months later, the Prime Minister confirmed Eritrea's involvement, agreeing to withdraw its forces from Tigray and maintain territorial sovereignty (Reuters, 2021). This indicates that Eritrea's intervention was initially implemented without Ethiopia's consent or invitation, indicating the coercive nature of the intervention.

Furthermore, on November 02, 2022, the Ethiopian government and the TPLF signed the Pretoria peace deal, but Eritrea and Ethiopia resisted acknowledging Eritrea's involvement. The peace agreement advocates for the withdrawal of foreign forces but does not explicitly mention Eritrea's withdrawal or its involvement in the conflict. In addition, Eritrean forces remained active in rural areas of Tigray after the Pretoria agreement, despite being required to leave the region (Abel, 2023). The presence of Eritrean forces demonstrates either Eritrea's refusal to leave the region or Ethiopia's desire for its presence, highlighting the coercive nature of the intervention. This article concludes that Eritrea's involvement in Ethiopia's internal conflict is a violation of international law in terms of invitation, self-defense, and coaction. International law violations, by definition, involve violations of regional norms, like the non-intervention norm of the IGAD.

The other key question is how IGAD responded to Eritrea's involvement in the conflict? IGAD has not recognized or denied Eritrea's intervention in the conflict, unlike Kenya and Ethiopia's interventions in Somalia, nor has it demanded its evacuation, like Uganda's involvement in South Sudan. Most importantly, IGAD has been hesitant to condemn Eritrea's involvement. Collins (2021) argues that despite evidence suggesting Eritrean forces were involved in the conflict, IGAD has been excluded from the war in Tigray, indicating it's more than just an internal issue. Its inaction in Eritrea's intervention can be attributed to various reasons. First, Ethiopia holds a significant influence in IGAD. Abel (2023) claims that Ethiopia's significant influence within the IGAD regional bloc has hindered its ability to effectively resolve the conflict. Second, the IGAD member states show a lack of political commitment and willingness to address Eritrea's intervention. Third, in 2018, regional dynamics, including leadership changes in Sudan and Ethiopia, the restoration of relations between Somalia,

Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and a lack of political interests, influenced IGAD's leadership role in addressing the conflict.

Uganda's Intervention in South Sudan

Uganda's 2013 military intervention in South Sudan's conflict is another example of a unilateral state intervention. On December 15, 2013, Uganda launched a military intervention in South Sudan (Apuuli, 2014; De Bello, 2014). The question then arises as to why Uganda intervened in the conflict in South Sudan? According to Apuuli (2014) and De Bello (2014), Uganda's military involvement is reportedly driven by national and regional security concerns and economic interests. The question raises the legal justification for Uganda's military intervention in South Sudan. According to Apuuli (2014), Uganda provided four justifications for its intervention: an invitation from the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), a request from the UN Secretary-General, IGAD sanctions, and the evacuation of Ugandan and foreign citizens.

First, Uganda claimed it was invited by the GoSS to uphold peace and order in South Sudan. Ugandan officials, including Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga, claimed to have received an invitation from GoSS, citing South Sudan's President Kiir's letter to President Museveni (Tajuba, 2014). However, Apuuli (2014) argues that Ugandan officials' claim is illegal and in violation of international norms due to the GoSS's failure to send a letter requesting intervention. Apuuli further noted that government interventions in civil wars, either on its behalf or for opposing groups, are illegal, implying that a state's intervention in another state's civil war is prohibited (Ibid.).

Second, Uganda's intervention was also justified by a request from UN Secretary-General Genry-General Ver. De Bello (2014) argues that Uganda's military presence received minimal support, especially from the UN. Similarly, Apuuli (2014) argues that the UN Secretary-General's plea to President Museveni does not legalize military involvement, as the proposal focuses on finding a diplomatic solution rather than a military one.

Third, Uganda's military intervention was justified by the authorization of IGAD. Ugandan officials claimed that Uganda's presence in South Sudan was permitted by IGAD (Mukisa, 2014). Musisi further noted that Samuel Lominsuk, South Sudan's ambassador to Uganda, has defended Uganda's intervention in South Sudan, claiming that the intervention was made under the IGAD (Ibid.). However, Uganda's military presence in South Sudan has sparked debates and concerns among IGAD countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan (De Bello, 2014), despite the country claiming legal authorization for its actions from the organization (Apuuli, 2014). IGAD and the aforementioned states disagreed with Uganda's involvement, citing it as escalating the conflict and potentially undermining the peace process (Ibid.). Uganda denied involvement in the de-escalation of the conflict, claiming that its forces played a crucial role.

The disagreement between IGAD and Uganda raises the question of IGAD's authority to authorize military intervention by one state in another. If so, Uganda's intervention in South Sudan is deemed illegal by this analysis, as it contradicts the long-awaited precept of non-intervention in a state's domestic affairs. First, IGAD has no legal authority to authorize a country's military intervention in another. Second, neither IGAD nor the UN is capable of doing so (Apuuli, 2014). However, IGAD commended Uganda's efforts in protecting South Sudan's vital infrastructure during its 23rd extraordinary meeting in December 2014 (IGAD Communiqué of the 23rd Extraordinary Session, 2014). If considered authorized, IGAD offered Uganda support to safeguard vital infrastructure and facilities,

with Uganda's assistance being limited to this matter (Apuuli, 2014). Apuuli further argued that the IGAD communiqué does not explicitly authorize Uganda's intervention beyond securing critical infrastructure and installations (Ibid.). Rather, Ugandan officials may have misinterpreted IGAD's support in securing infrastructure facilities as authorization, even though IGAD's communiqué does not make it legal. Thus, the article argues that Uganda's intervention is deemed illegal not only due to the IGAD's non-intervention but also under international law.

Finally, IGAD imposed a directive for Uganda to withdraw its forces from South Sudan, citing its policy of preventing simultaneous conflict. This article posits that IGAD's sole non-intervention contribution led Uganda to withdraw from South Sudan. This article argues that IGAD's involvement in Uganda's withdrawal was driven by the interests of the member states, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. This would not have occurred if these countries were not interested in Uganda's withdrawal. This raises the question of why IGAD did not actively prevent and oversee Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, Kenya's intervention in Somalia, and Eritrea's intervention in Ethiopia. This also begs the question of whether IGAD maintains a consistent approach in its application of non-intervention. The Eritrean intervention in Ethiopia's Tigray conflict serves as a prime example of this fact. Why did IGAD back Ethiopia and Kenya's intervention in Somalia? Why has there been silence on Eritrea's involvement in the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict? Why has IGAD pushed Uganda to withdraw its troops from South Sudan? This may require further research, but IGAD has been inconsistent when implementing its non-intervention principle, which could be influenced by member states' interests.

Four Explanations Influence the IGAD's Non-Intervention in Managing Conflicts

The article attempts to provide an explanation why the IGAD's non-intervention strategy has not had a positive impact on decreasing and managing interstate intervention and intrastate conflicts. The analysis reveals that IGAD's non-intervention strategy is a failed attempt at preventing and managing mutual intervention, destabilizing, and managing regional crises. This article found four main explanations for why IGAD's non-intervention strategy fails to effectively manage conflicts and ensure regional peace and security. These four explanations include a lack of clarity on non-intervention and internal affairs, a mismatch between the principle's rhetoric and state practice, a lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the principle's inherent limitations to deal with contemporary peace and security challenges in a region with high level of interstate and intrastate conflicts.

Lacks of Clarity on Non-intervention and Internal Affairs

The 1996 IGAD Agreement lacks clarity on its non-intervention and internal affairs, as it lacks a sufficient definition or explanation of internal affairs governing its inability to intervene in a member state. The IGAD Agreement is unable to provide precise answers to the following questions: what if atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing are committed in one of its member states? The question raises doubts about the R2P concept, which aims to prevent potential atrocities like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing in one of its member states. When and how can IGAD intervene to stop such atrocities committed in one of its member states? The IGAD Agreement does not address these specific inquiries. In contrast, as described in the theoretical framework section, various IOs and ROs have defined non-intervention in member states' internal affairs and implemented intervention measures to prevent international crimes. For example, ASEAN demands non-intervention, refraining from criticizing governments'

actions, directing criticism at violating non-intervention principles, and denying support to rebel groups seeking destabilization or overthrow (Wu, 2000). Similarly, the AU, as clearly stated in Article 4(h), has the authority to intervene in Member States' domestic affairs in grave situations, such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (AU, 2000).

The lack of clarity on the concept has led to IGAD's inability to prevent and manage inter-state interference in its member states. In 2013, Jacobsen and Nordby also noted that IGAD's inability to address potential conflict issues in member states is due to unclear definitions of internal affairs. Similarly, Mehari and El Fassi (2015) found that IGAD's involvement in peace and security issues is hindered by a lack of clarity on the distinction between unjustified and legitimate interference. Jacobsen and Nordby (2013) further suggest that a lack of clarity on internal affairs poses a threat to fragile regional security, potentially hindering institutional action of the organization.

Mismatch between the Principle's Rhetoric and State Practice or/and Lack of Adherence

The article claim that the IGAD's non-intervention strategy has largely failed due to a misalignment between rhetoric and state practice. The region's states, despite their rhetorical adherence to the principle, have shown inconsistent practices in their implementation. Asnake (2015) found that IGAD's regional security interdependence advocates cooperation without state intervention, but state practices frequently disrupt this principle, leading to forceful intervention and alliance shifts. Redie (2012) also asserts that IGAD has in principle established non-intervention, but it does not currently exist in practice. According to Asnake (2015), despite member states' commitment to the principle, it does not prevent interstate violence and conflict, highlighting its poor record in managing such issues. Asnake further criticized the IGAD's non-intervention, arguing it doesn't prevent member states from interfering and its inability to effectively contain inter-state intervention is poor or nonexistent (Ibid.). That is why the Horn of Africa states are well-known for their mutual intervention and destabilization in each other's internal affairs (Healy, 2011; Elowson & Albuquerque, 2016). As previously discussed, in the past fifteen years (2005–2020), the region has experienced four unilateral state interventions, including Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, Kenya's intervention in Somalia, Uganda's intervention in South Sudan, and Eritrea's intervention in Ethiopia.

Moreover, the principle does not prohibit member states from engaging in war and violence against each other. The region has experienced both interstate and proxy wars throughout its history. In 2015, Asnake noted that despite all member states technically adhering to this norm, it doesn't necessarily prevent them from engaging in war and violence within their respective borders. The region has experienced numerous interstate conflicts, including the Ethio-Eritrea war (1998–2000), the Eritrea-Djibouti war in 2008, the Sudan-South Sudan conflict since 2012, the Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute since 2013, and the Ethio-Sudan border conflict since 2020.

A proxy war is a common strategy used for destabilization and intervention in domestic matters in the region. A proxy war is a destabilizing strategy where each government uses subtle tactics to undermine the stability of the others. The Horn countries have a history of proxy wars, where they intervene and destabilize each other's enemies to achieve their own security goals (Cliffe, 1999). Proxy war, including support for rebel armed groups, is a significant foreign policy tool among Horn of Africa governments, potentially contributing to numerous interstate conflicts (Cliffe, 1999; Berouk, 2011; Healy, 2011).

Lastly, as we said, one may wonder how a principle may have such a profound effect. However, a decrease or management of conflicts is a desirable outcome of such principles in order to determine whether the principle is beneficial to the organization's day-to-day operations and achievement of its objectives. Moreover, it should be clear that IGAD's non-intervention is not a stand-alone issue but rather that it is not strictly applied or adjusted in the interventionist approach. The article's critic is not concerned with IGAD's endorsement of the principle but with its lack of practical and empirical application and incapacity to achieve the intended goals. This article argues that the IGAD's non-intervention strategy is merely a facade and nominal, lacking effective implementation in terms of practicability and implementation. Acharya (2009) noted that ASEAN's success in conflict management can be attributed to its commitment to non-intervention. Asnake (205) also analyzed ASEAN's non-intervention strategy, arguing it ensures regional security by preventing interstate conflict among its member states. Acharya (2009) highlighted ASEAN's ability to sustain cooperation among its member countries through non-intervention, effectively resolving numerous territorial disputes.

In contrast, Asnake (2015) found that IGAD member states have not fully implemented their commitment to non-intervention, resulting in hindered effectiveness due to inconsistent state practices. IGAD's goal of becoming a genuine regional security actor is hindered by mutual intervention, destabilization, and member countries' refusal to distance themselves from force use (Asnake, 2015). Similarly, Healy (2011) argues that IGAD's conflict management practices are significantly influenced by the region's history of mutual intervention, characterized by armed force, mistrust, and shifting state alliances. This makes IGAD's non-intervention serve as a case study of failed non-intervention, demonstrating its inability to prevent and manage interstate disputes and mutual intervention in multiple regional crises. IGAD's failure to take collective regional security measures is evident in Ethiopia's 2006 intervention in Somalia, Kenya's 2011 intervention in Somalia, Uganda's 2013 intervention in South Sudan, and Eritrea's 2020 intervention in Ethiopia. These unilateral state interventions demonstrate IGAD's inability to manage regional crises collectively, despite its norms and principles prohibiting doing so.

IGAD's Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms and Capacity to execute its Treaty Obligations

Kingah and Langenhove (2012) argue that the function of ROs is influenced by three factors: willingness, legitimacy, and capability. Legitimacy refers to the RO's recognition or acceptance as a regional security actor and its position in the multilateral arena (Nguyen, 2002). The acceptance of an RO is significantly influenced by its true power, influence, and perception by states and other IOs and ROs. An RO's lack of enthusiasm can lead to other organizations disregarding its efforts to promote peace in its region (Nguyen, 2002). Similarly, Kingah and Langenhove (2012) highlight that gaining acceptance from other IOs and ROs is challenging, particularly when an RO lacks essential human resources and material assets for peace and security.

The capability of ROs is another determinant factor, influenced by their organizational capacities and operational experiences. According to Nguyen (2002), the effectiveness of an RO in peace and security depends on its organizational capacity, operational experience, financial resources, strong institutional framework, and sophisticated command structures. Similarly, Alagappa (1997) found that the challenges that regional institutions face in conflict management include maintaining unity, neutrality, limited authority, and capacity, including financial and human resources. For example, the delivery capacity of ROs can be impacted by limited financial resources and weak staffing;

hence, it is crucial to consider both input and output aspects when formulating expectations and budgetary figures (Kingah & Langenhove, 2012).

The willingness of an RO is the most crucial factor. The term "willingness" in this context refers to two distinct aspects. First, the degree to which member states are willing to entrust power to an RO (Nguyen, 2002) Second, the extent to which an RO can exercise the authority granted to it, including the authority to interfere unilaterally in any member state within the regional space (Kingah & Langenhove, 2012). Thus, empowerment through regional constitutional texts or unambiguous empowerment of the RO through regional treaties and protocols can influence the willingness to act. Kingah and Langenhove further noted that the constitutional texts of several ROs grant them the right to intervene and enforce measures, playing a crucial role in preserving regional and international peace and security (Ibid.).

The IGAD, based on three determinant factors and intervention and enforcement mechanisms, is deemed one of the weak ROs. In terms of acceptance, IGAD aims to become the leading regional body for promoting peace and security in the region (IGAD, 1996). However, the IGAD's role as a primary regional security actor has a poor track record. Several studies indicate that IGAD has not yet effectively addressed regional conflicts in the region. Healy (2011) and Adetula et al. (2016) argue that IGAD is behind ECOWAS and SADC in terms of regional security acceptance. The organization has a poor record in ensuring regional security (Asnake, 2015), as it has proven ineffective in preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts (Elowson & Albuquerque, 2016). For example, it has not been a leading mediator in most regional conflicts, including the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war, the northern Uganda conflict (Borchgrevink & Lie, 2009; Healy, 2009; Asnake, 2015), the Darfur conflict (El-Affendi, 2009; Redie, 2012), the Eritrea-Djibouti border war (Ferras, 2013; Redie, 2012), and the civil war in Ethiopia's Tigray region (Collins, 2021; Abel, 2023).

In terms of capacity, the IGAD is a weak institution with significant institutional incapability. The organization and its institutions are often non-functional due to a lack of necessary capacity, authority, and autonomy (Adetula et al., 2016). In terms of the power to act (willingness), IGAD has limited power and authority to execute its treaty obligations. The organization is criticized for its weak structure and limited authority, indicating its inability to effectively function as a regional security actor. Scholars like Healy (2009), Solomon (2014), Witt (2014), Asnake (2015), Adetula et al. (2016), and Redie (2012) have criticized IGAD for its institutional weakness and insufficient mechanisms to effectively fulfill its authority and responsibilities. Similarly, Coe and Nash (2020) assert that IGAD's level of activity is comparable to SADC, but its institutional engagement is selective due to its institutional weaknesses.

Whose fault is it that IGAD is such a weak RO, and what factors contribute to its failure to create a stable region? The question may be beyond the article's scope, but it is crucial to analyze IGAD's non-intervention as it significantly contributes to its weaknesses. The first to blame for IGAD's dismal performance as a regional security actor is its member states. In other words, IGAD's failure is partly attributed to member states creating a weak security organization lacking legal authority and enforcement mechanisms, among other factors. The organization has encountered challenges in its enforcement mechanisms due to two factors.

First, IGAD member states are reluctant to providing sufficient constitutional authority to achieve the organization's regional objectives. They lack the political will and commitment to compromise their sovereign powers to achieve common objectives and interests, including ensuring

regional security in the turbulent region of the Horn of Africa (Adetula et al., 2016). That is why the IGAD peace and security framework cannot enforce military and diplomatic actions, including sanctions and military interventions, on its member states (Micheale et al., 2022). Farole (2018) asserts that IGAD faces challenges in managing regional conflicts due to a lack of enforcement capacity, states violating non-intervention principles, and a strong desire for unilateral interventions. Similarly, Hull et al. (2011), cited in Adetula et al. (2016), argue that IGAD lacks enforcement mechanisms against member states, especially during conflicts and humanitarian emergencies (p. 9).

Second, it is also important to note that IGAD's regional security shortcomings stem not only from a lack of enforcement instruments and member states reluctance to grant authority but also from its fundamental institutional weaknesses. IGAD is a subpar RO for effectively implementing its principles and mandates, with the main challenge being the insufficient implementation of its norms and principles. For example, the IGAD's non-intervention policy may not be a major issue, but it has three faults. First, IGAD has not fully committed to or adhered to the non-intervention principle (Asnake, 2015). Second, it does not make it clear in its treaty obligation what constitutes internal affairs reflecting non-intervention (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2013; Mehari & El Fassi, 2015).

Third, the IGAD lacks amendment procedures that can intervene or shift from non-intervention to intervention approaches. Many regional organizations, as discussed in the ROs and R2P section, have adopted intervention approaches like the R2P to enhance their active and leading roles in addressing conflicts. For example, the AU played a pivotal role in military intervention in conflicts in Burundi and Somalia (Kabau, 2012; Murithi, 2009). ECOWAS also played a role in resolving conflicts in Liberia in 1990 (Sarkin, 2009), Sierra Leone in 1998 (Sarkin, 2009; Abegunde, 2021), Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and 2001, and Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 (Sarkin, 2009). The OAS played a pivotal role in resolving conflicts in Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador-Honduras (Nguyen, 2002). The EU also played a crucial role in resolving conflicts in Croatia and FYROM (Giannaki, 2007). The SADC sought to handle the crisis in DRC in 1998 (Sarkin, 2009) and staged a coup in Lesotho in 2007 (Likoti, 2007).

Unlike the aforementioned ROs, the IGAD lacks instruments to enforce its treaty duties, exposing the organization's limitations in resolving internal disputes. This article contends that adopting intervention mechanisms such as R2P and humanitarian strategies can help IGAD's contribution to conflict management. However, it is worth noting that not all ROs with intervention instruments are successful in their conflict management responsibilities. For example, the AU, despite its intervention mechanisms under Article 4h, has not effectively resolved conflicts in the Darfur conflict in Sudan and the Libya conflict (Kabau, 2012). Abel (2023) argues that the AU failed to maintain R2P after the Tigray war, reverting to non-interference principles and disengaged from Ethiopian dynamics, resulting in ineffective mediation.

The IGAD's Non-Intervention Limitations in Addressing Cotemporary Peace and Security Problems

Non-intervention is a conflict management strategy used when external actors have a minimal impact on domestic conflict management (Alagappa, 1997). As noted in the R2P section, however, states are responsible for protecting their citizens, and if they fail, the international community can intervene, particularly in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Given the region's current complex peace and security challenges and threats, the IGAD non-intervention strategy has limitations in tackling the aforementioned international crimes. Alagappa (1997)

identifies the limitations of non-intervention as a conflict management strategy in regional organizations, highlighting three key points. First, regional institutions' lack of involvement in domestic conflicts significantly hinders their role as agents of conflict management. Alagappa further notes that the lack of intervention in managing internal conflicts, particularly those in Africa, often renders regional institutions irrelevant and ineffective (Ibib.). For example, the OAU's reputation in Africa and internationally has been significantly tarnished due to its non-intervention mechanism and reluctance to engage in domestic conflicts. Second, regional institutions often favor incumbents due to their status quo character, as seen in Tanzania's former President Julius Nyerere's statement that the OAU protects African Heads of State (El-Ayoutty, nd. cited in Alagappa, 1997, p. 431). Third, regional institutions can both contain and intensify domestic conflicts, as seen in Burma, by reinforcing the government's power and escalating the persecution and insecurity of political change-seeking groups (Alagappa, 1997).

Given the limitations of the IGAD's non-intervention in achieving the desired outcomes, the article argues that the principle has inherent limits, not only because it is yet to be adequately implemented, but also because it is inappropriate in a region marked by a high level of both violent and non-violent intervention among its member states. Specifically, critics of the article attributed the organization's inability to effectively manage conflicts, particularly those involving grave incidents like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, to its failure to implement a non-intervention strategy. Adetula et al. (2016) argue that IGAD's non-intervention approach is outdated and ineffective in addressing current peace and security issues. Similarly, Asnake (2015) criticized IGAD's non-intervention, arguing it hinders its ability to effectively handle crises like human rights abuses within member states. Apuuli (2004) also asserts that IGAD's non-intervention hinders its capacity to execute regional peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions.

IGAD's Non-Intervention and Its Role in the Organization's Failure

This section discusses how IGAD's non-intervention strategy is used by member states as a preventive strategy, hindering its leadership role in managing regional conflicts in the region. This article contends that the principle has not only failed to achieve its desired objectives but has also contributed to the organization's failure to play a leading role in managing regional crises. In other words, the study posits that IGAD's non-intervention strategy hinders its ability to intervene in member states internal conflicts and influences its leadership role in regional conflicts, as member states use it as a preventive measure. The IGAD aims to become the leading regional organization in promoting and maintaining peace and security in the region (IGAD Agreement, 1996). To that end, IGAD adopted Art. 18(c) on conflict resolution, requiring member states to resolve disputes within the sub-regional mechanism before referring them to other regional or international organizations (IGAD Agreement, 1996).

IGAD, despite its objective to resolve disputes within this regional body, has a poor track record of leading numerous regional crises. For example, IGAD did not take a leadership role in managing the Ethio-Eritrea war 1998-2000 (Healy, 2009; Asnake, 2015), the Darfur conflict (El-Affendi, 2009; Redie, 2012), the Ugandan-LRA conflicts (Borchgrevink & Lie, 2009), the Eritrea-Djibouti border war in 2008 (Ferras, 2013), Sudan and South Sudan (Elowson & Albuquerque, 2016), and Ethiopia's Tigray region (Collins, 2021; Aucoin et al., 2022; Abel, 2023).

The question is why IGAD is unable to take a leadership role in addressing regional conflicts before other ROs and IOs. Despite other factors like a lack of enforcement mechanisms and political commitment among member states contributing to its failure, IGAD's failure to take on leadership roles is also partly attributed to its non-intervention strategy. The organization's non-intervention principle is not its issue, but member states misuse it to prevent the organization from intervening and taking a leadership role in addressing their conflicts. The article argues that IGAD's non-intervention strategy hinders its regional security mission, posing a significant challenge to its ability to intervene in regional conflicts and daily activities. Mehari and El Fassi (2015) and Adetula et al. (2016) also highlighted that IGAD has faced challenges from member states regarding sovereignty and internal affairs sensitivity. Similarly, Apuuli (2004) asserts that sovereignty and non-intervention have hindered IGAD from executing critical mandates like regional peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions.

Furthermore, the principle is deemed unsuitable for IGAD to intervene in the internal crises of its member states. The article argues that IGAD's non-intervention strategy is a legal and intentional preventive and defensive measure to protect member states' sovereignty and internal affairs. It is utilized by member states as an avoidance strategy to prevent IGAD from influencing their internal affairs and sovereignty. In this regard, Asnake (2015) reveals that IGAD member states employ non-intervention as a legal preventive measure to prevent foreign actors' intervention in their internal crises. Thus, the principle serves as a safeguard mechanism for protecting state sovereignty from external meddling.

More importantly, the principle permits member states to block IGAD from intervening in their internal affairs. States that are strongly obsessed with non-intervention in their internal affairs use the principle that permits member states to halt IGAD's intervention even in cases of severe humanitarian crises, human rights violations, or international crimes. Three instances have been reported where states have denied IGAD's intervention in managing intrastate conflicts. First, Ethiopia blocked IGAD from intervening in the Ethio-Eritrea war from 1998 to 2000 (Redie, 2012; 2019). Second, Sudan refused IGAD's intervention in the Darfur conflict in 2003 (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009), despite the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the conflict (Bellamy, 2005). The ICC has requested an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, the former Sudanese president, for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (Aning & Atuobi, 2009). In 2020, Ethiopia denied IGAD from intervening in the Tigray conflict (Collins, 2021; Aucoin et al., 2022; Abel, 2023).

The IGAD's non-intervention policy not only allows governments to impede the regional process but also lacks an effective tool to address their internal grievances. The IGAD, for nearly three decades, has been hindered by the lack of legal authority to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. The IGAD, due to the region's 'non-intervention' principle, was unable to intervene in its member states' conflicts and could not conduct meaningful interventions. In other words, the organization is denied the right to intervene for humanitarian or conflict resolution purposes in the internal affairs of its member states. IGAD's legal and policy documents do not include the concept of R2P in forceful intervention to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. What if the member countries reject IGAD's efforts to manage internal crises, which amount to international crimes including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity? In 2003, IGAD's inability to stop the Darfur crisis in Sudan, which was alleged to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, damaged its credibility. Bellamy (2005) highlights the 2003–2004 Darfur crisis as a prime example of

a situation where intervention is the only possible solution to prevent further violence. IGAD's involvement in conflict management in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and the South Sudanese conflict is largely due to these countries' willingness to manage their disputes through this regional body.

The Tigray War in Ethiopia is a litmus test for IGAD's failure to intervene and take the lead in regional conflict management. The IGAD's stance and role in the Tigray conflict were subpar amidst the increasing atrocities, partly due to institutional issues (Abel, 2023). The organization has shown a lack of interest in actively participating and making meaningful efforts to resolve the two-year civil war (Collins, 2021; Aucoin et al., 2022). The question aims to explore the reasons behind IGAD's hesitation in taking a leadership role in the conflict. First, the organization declared the conflict an internal affair in Ethiopia. Similarly, Abel (2023) argues that Ethiopia's significant influence within the IGAD bloc has hindered its ability to effectively intervene in resolving the conflict (Abel, 2023). Second, Ethiopia has reportedly blocked international intervention in the conflict, including IGAD, citing it as a domestic matter of law and order operation. Tsegaye (2021) asserts that the Ethiopian former foreign minister's spokesperson stated on October 28, 2021, that the Tigray conflict is an internal issue within the country's legal framework.

Conclusion

The article concludes that IGAD's non-intervention as a conflict management strategy has shown flaws in dealing with regional crises. It has been ineffective in managing conflicts, ensuring regional peace and security, and potentially failing to achieve its objectives due to minimal contribution to interstate interference and internal conflicts. Not only does the principle fail to avoid and manage unilateral interstate intervention and internal conflicts, but it also fails to protect the sovereign power of its member states. Between 2005 and 2020, the region has seen four unilateral state interventions and four interstate wars, excluding the devastating 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. None of these unilateral state interventions and interstate wars were carried out within the auspices of IGAD. Moreover, the region has witnessed numerous interstate conflicts, including those between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea and Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan, Kenya and Somalia, and Ethiopia and Sudan. The IGAD's ineffective implementation of the non-intervention principle does not prevent state intervention or respect state sovereignty. IGAD not only fails to prevent interstate wars but also fails to take the lead in managing them. However, as explained, it is worth noting that the IGAD's non-intervention is not expected to prevent all armed conflicts and enmity among member states but suggests that reducing and managing interstate intervention and violence is desirable.

Moreover, the IGAD's non-intervention has not only failed to achieve its objectives but has also contributed to its failure to take a leadership role in managing regional conflicts. The principle is incompatible with the realization of IGAD's mandates and objectives and is inappropriate in a region with high levels of both violent and non-violent interventions between member states. It is posing a significant challenge to its goal of becoming a genuine regional security actor. The IGAD, for nearly three decades, has been hindered by the lack of legal authority to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. More importantly, the principle permits member states to block IGAD from intervening in their internal affairs. The study reveals IGAD's inaction in Ethiopia's Tigray region and Sudan's Darfur crisis, highlighting its inability to take leadership roles and member states' ability to halt its intervention.

The article finally remarks that why the IGAD's non-intervention has failed to achieve the desired outcomes. The first to blame is its member states' reluctance to implement the principle in practice. IGAD member states frequently violate the principle, despite recognizing it as a foundation for regional security cooperation and conflict management strategy. However, the principle's shortcomings are not only due to the lack of member state adherence but also to its fundamental institutional weaknesses. With all at odds, IGAD has to be criticized for its inadequate implementation of the principle. This is because the fact that IGAD has been inconsistent when implementing its non-intervention principle, which could be influenced by member states' interests. The organization's inconsistency in implementing the principle has negatively impacted its credibility and effectiveness in managing regional conflicts. However, it is worth noting that the article does not necessarily contradict the IGAD's adoption of the principle. Rather, it argues that IGAD has not effectively implemented or modified its principle to enable interventionist mechanisms, allowing the organization to intervene in member states' internal affairs.

Paper Implications

The findings of this article have policy implications. The results of the study indicate that IGAD policymakers have not adequately assessed the contribution and potential failures of the non-intervention strategy in managing conflicts. Thus, the findings can assist policymakers in evaluating the principle's effectiveness and potential limitations, potentially leading to more effective solutions. In a region with high levels of violent conflicts and interstate interventions, strict obedience of the principle or adoption of intervention and enforcing mechanisms is quite necessary. However, the article reveals that IGAD and its members, despite their rhetorical commitment, have shown reluctance to implement the principle in practice. The organization faces criticism for its inadequate implementation of a principle, which member states use to prevent intervention in domestic conflicts, contributing to its failure in conflict management. This could determine the organization's future existence, which has been harmed by its inability to fully adhere to the principle, making it a weak regional security actor.

What should the IGAD policymakers do? This may need further research but IGAD policymakers should prioritize the following tasks, which have policy implications for the organization's future endeavors. First, IGAD policymakers should strictly adhere to the principle in practice to achieve the desired outcomes. Second, IGAD policymakers can adopt an intervention mechanism like R2P similar to other ROs by transitioning from non-intervention to intervention strategies. Implementing intervention and enforcing mechanisms can enhance the organization's active and leading role in conflict management. IGAD policymakers must address the Horn of Africa's high violent conflicts, requiring a robust IGAD with sufficient constitutional power, including intervention mechanisms such as military and forceful interventions when peaceful means are insufficient. Third, the IGAD policymakers should enhance the organization’s regional security cooperation by compromising the sovereign powers of its member states to enhance its role in conflict management and regional peace and security.

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Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Early-Life Power and Self-Interested Behavior: The Interplay Between Past and Present

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Abstract

In this paper, we develop the concept of early-life power (ELP)—the sense of power someone has in their life before becoming an adult. We propose that the known positive relationship between power and self-interested behavior will be enhanced by high ELP and that, for those with high power, self-interested behavior will be higher for those with higher ELP. Study 1 adapts Anderson et al.'s (2012) chronic power scale to develop a retrospective measure of ELP and validates the measure. We test our predictions empirically, using self-reported self-interested behavior (Study 2) and results from the dictator game (Study 3). In these two studies, we operationalize current power in three ways: subjective power, objective power, and position. The results partially support our hypotheses.

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Introduction

The past is not dead. In fact, it's not even past. – William Faulkner

Power refers to "the ability to control resources, own and others', without social interference" (Galinsky et al., 2003: p. 454), which emphasizes that the power holder possesses valued tangible and intangible resources that others do not possess. However, power is not simply the control over resources or composed solely of one's social position. Power is also a psychological state called sense of power. Sense of power refers to "the perception of one's ability to influence another person or other people" (Anderson et al., 2012). Most research on power has adopted the perspective of the approach–inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003), which says that powerful people act with more freedom and less constraint than those who are lower in power. As a result, powerful people are more likely to display self-interested behavior (e.g., Magee & Langner, 2008). Self-interested behavior means that an individual uses power to benefit themselves (Rus et al., 2010; Williams, 2014; Schmid et al., 2019).

However, it is not inevitable that power, or sense of power, leads to self-interested behavior. There are many factors that can dampen or enhance that relationship. According to Williams (2014), the effect is enhanced by self-focused goals (which can be created by personality traits, self-construals, or motivations) and also by threats to power (such as positional insecurity, low social status, and self-doubt) and a desire to preserve power. This paper explores another moderator—early-life power (ELP). We define ELP as the subjective sense of one's overall power and influence early in life, particularly in late adolescence. Early life experiences play an important role throughout the human lifespan (Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart, 1985). Inglehart and Abramson (1994) argue that pre-adult social learning and educational experiences shape individuals' values. We believe that one's early life experiences of power can have a strong effect on people, and shape how they respond to power later in life.

In this paper, we develop the concept of ELP and examine how it can affect the relationship between power and self-interested behavior. In Study 1, we then develop a retrospective scale for ELP by modifying the established chronic power scale by Anderson et al. (2012) and validating this version of the scale. Next, we test our hypotheses about ELP in two empirical studies. In Study 2, we look at self-reported self-interested behavior. In Study 3, we look at self-interested behavior using the dictator game (DeCelles et al., 2012). In both studies, we operationalize current power in three ways: as subjective experience of power, as objective power (e.g., having authority over budget, hiring), and position power (being a manager versus a non-manager). Lastly, we discuss the implications of our findings for management.

Power

Power can be defined objectively or subjectively. Looking objectively, one can determine access to resources based on formal position and authority. Someone who is a supervisor objectively

has power over someone who is a subordinate. The supervisor can hire and fire employees, assign tasks, allocate pay and rewards, and provide performance reviews and resources. Looking subjectively, power is the psychological experience of control. Subjective power is usually correlated with objective power but may still be different. For example, social psychologists have used manipulations that do not change objective power but do change subjective power. One way they do this is to ask subjects to think of times when they were powerful or less powerful (Galinsky et al., 2003). These manipulations change the subjective experience of power despite there being no objective change of power. Power can also be thought of as acute or chronic. Acute power occurs when there is a momentary opportunity to affect the outcomes for another person, while chronic power is one's ongoing, stable sense of power in life. Much research focuses on how chronic power affects the use (and abuse) of acute power in cases such as revenge, harassment, and abusive behavior (Strelan et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2017; Foulk et al., 2018).

Self-Interested Behavior

Self-interested behavior refers to "actions that benefit the self and come at a cost to the common good" (DeCelles et al., 2012); that is, actions in which individuals pursue their own interests at the expense of others. One of the most stable and well-established effects of power is that it drives self-interested behavior. For instance, Rus et al. (2010) showed that higher power by leaders results in higher self-serving behavior by leaders. And Bendahan et al. (2015) showed that there is an effect of leader's power (moderated by leader's testosterone) on that leader's level of corruption[1]. There are several explanations for this relationship. We discuss two of them here.

The first comes from the approach–inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003), which investigated how power affects an individual's affect, cognition, and behavior. They made three assumptions: (1) power activates human behavior without consciousness, (2) power enhances trait-consistent behavior, and (3) power affects social attention, i.e., low-power individuals attend to others more carefully, whereas high-power individuals are attended to more carefully by others. They hypothesized that high-power individuals have more resources and freedom, which allows them to act without interference or serious social consequences. Further, such elevating freedom leads to higher levels of these people's approach systems, such as attention to rewards, positive emotions, and disinhibition. On the contrary, low-power individuals have fewer resources and more constraints, which leads to enhanced inhibition systems, including attention to threats, negative emotions, and situationally constrained behavior. In sum, power endows high-power people with the freedom to pursue potential rewards, and they can act with less constraint and ignore social norms. Powerful individuals display unethical behavior because they are able to be more enthusiastic about protecting their own self-interest and have the freedom to be indifferent to others' needs (Lammers et al., 2010; Vriend et al., 2016). They engage in self-interested behaviors because they have leverage to get what they want.

A second explanation for the relationship between high power and self-interested behavior comes from the social distance theory of power (Magee & Smith, 2013). Magee and Smith (2013) argue that when there is asymmetric dependence between two individuals, the result is asymmetric experiences of social distance. The high-power person experiences independence, allowing them to

[1] Other papers with findings related to power enhancing self-interested behavior include Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh (2001), Maner & Mead (2010), Rus et al. (2012), DeCelles et al. (2012), Sassenberg et al. (2012), Wisse & Rus (2012), Pitesa & Thau (2013), Wang & Sun (2016), Giurge et al. (2021).

be distant from others, while the low-power person is highly dependent on others, making them need to seek out affiliation with others. That higher social distance experienced by high-powered individuals leads them to assume less similarity with others, experience lower susceptibility to social influence, and experience fewer social-engaging (versus disengaging) emotions. High-power individuals view low-power individuals as resources to be used to achieve their own goals. They engage in self-interested behavior because they do not have as much understanding of and empathy toward others.

Since there is evidence in support of both arguments, we assume that both mechanisms are valid. Neither explanation precludes the other, and in either case, the overall relationship between power and self-interested behavior is clear. We should note that the effects of power on self-interested behavior occur whether that power is objective or subjective and whether the power is acute (momentary) or chronic (ongoing) (Williams, 2014; DeCelles et al., 2012). To distinguish from ELP, we refer to all of the established approaches to power as measures of "current" power. We provide the following established baseline prediction based on prior results and existing theories of power–behavior relations:

H1.: Current power is positively related to self-interested behavior.

While the link between current power and self-interested behavior has been established, there are also many factors that can dampen or amplify this effect. In a theoretical review, Williams (2014) argues that there are a number of individual difference variables that can impact the relationship. Powerful people who are higher in narcissism, hold self-enhancing values, or are motivated by personal power are more likely to respond to both acute and chronic power with self-interested behavior. These are cases where personality and values are more focused on self-enhancing goals. Those with self-enhancing goals are more likely to act on opportunities for self-interest that come from power. The effect of current power on self-interested behavior is also moderated by threats to power, which can occur due to a sense of insecurity about one's position, self-doubt about one's power, or challenges to the legitimacy of one's power (Fast & Chen, 2009; Maner & Mead, 2010; Fast et al., 2012). Once high-power individuals receive signals that their current power might be threatened, they are likely to display negative behavior to preserve or restore their power. We suggest that an additional moderator is what we call early life power (ELP). That is, the degree to which a person experiences power at a young age. We argue that early life experiences of power shape sensitivity to current power later in life.

Early-life Power

Early-life power (ELP) is the subjective sense of one's overall power and influence (Anderson et al., 2012) in early life, culminating in experiencing power in adolescence (approximately age 15–18). ELP is shaped by early life experiences in the family, school, and social interactions during formative years. One way in which a person can develop a sense of power in their formative years is by being an older sibling, who can dominate over younger siblings (Bigner, 1974), or by being an only child who is listened to attentively by parents. Early life experiences can also affect perceived power through their impact on locus of control. In one study across 46 developing countries where rain has a major impact on livelihoods, rain shortages before age five reduced adult perceptions of locus of control (Shoji, 2020); in another study, childhood poverty was associated with adult health behaviors, in part through a lower locus of control from being poor at a young age (Pedron et al., 2021). In yet another study, "higher SES adolescents feel more internal locus of control in largest part because their parents discuss school more often with them, their homes have more books and other cognitive resources,

they receive higher grades in middle school science and social studies, they are more likely to attend a private rather than public school, their friends are more academically oriented, and they feel safer at school" (Shifrer, 2019, p.74). Having more social capital and wealth as an adolescent was associated with civic engagement, indicated greater confidence to act on the external world (Lenzi et al., 2012). An adolescent who is skilled at athletics or music builds greater self-esteem and sense of mastery, in part because they are met with others respecting them (Lanter & Blackburn, 2015; Darrow et al., 2009), enhancing their personal experience of power and influence. In many ways, large and small, a young person develops a sense of power, feeling either that others should defer to them or that they should defer to others. While one's sense of power may become quite different later in life (either stronger or weaker), we believe that how power is experienced throughout one's life is shaped by power early in life.

Early life experiences of many types are known to provide a lens through which later life experiences are viewed. Early life experiences "stick" with people, even though their circumstances have changed. According to Inglehart's theory of value change (Inglehart,1971), individuals' pre-adult experiences shape their long-term values. For instance, people who face economic hardship as children may work excessively even after they have become financially stable, based on a deeply-embedded fear of poverty. Inglehart (1971) found that the degree of economic security individuals felt in their formative years influences their later political behavior. In France, in 1970, the younger (16–34 years old) generation showed a political preference for post-bourgeois values (i.e., freedom and change), while the older (45–65) generation showed more political preferences for acquisitive values (i.e., economic security and domestic order). Research that is based on the World Values Surveys (Inglehart & Abramson, 1994) found that younger birth cohorts were more post-materialist than older cohorts, reflecting their pre-adult experiences. Just looking at the current state of a person's economic life may not be enough to explain their behavior. Similarly, looking at their current experience of power (whether it be acute or chronic) may not be enough to fully understand how people respond to power.

While early life experiences occur from birth through adolescence, there is evidence that adolescence is when early life experiences culminate in personality formation and, relatedly, we argue, a person's sense of ELP. As Meeus et al. (2011) point out, "There is systematic evidence that personality becomes more mature and stable in adolescence" (p.1192). For example, the relative strength of each of the Big Five personality traits tend to become stable in adolescence (Klimstra et al., 2009); measures of extraversion at age 16 were predictors of indicators of well-being in adulthood, such as life satisfaction, and self-esteem (Blatný et al, 2015); and, identity formation tends to happen during adolescence (approximately age 14), allowing "teenagers to develop their own identity in ways that are distinct from their parents" (Zohar et al., 2019, p.12). Another way to look at the role of adolescence is the impact on autobiographical recall of events, and the formation of a personal biography. Both life narratives and autobiographical reasoning tend to occur during adolescence, because that is the time when one develops the necessary cognitive tools to engage in such reasoning (Habermas & Bluck, 2000). In summary, adolescence is a key stage in pre-adult life, accumulating childhood experiences into a more well-formed, stable, long-lasting psychological base. As people think back to their sense of power in early life, this stage of pre-adult life is likely to be most strongly remembered, and memories of power at this stage are likely to incorporate the impact of events from earlier childhood years. For these reasons, we focus on this stage of life when examining ELP.

ELP, Current Power, and Self-Interested Behavior

Next, we examine how levels of power in adulthood should be more salient for those with higher ELP and that higher salience should, in turn, make the relationship between current power and self-interested behavior stronger for individuals with higher ELP. We will build this argument in three steps: a) ELP shapes whether current power is experienced as a loss or gain, b) losses draw attention more than gains, and c) greater attention to power will create a stronger relationship between current power and self-interested behavior.

First, we consider how ELP shapes whether people experience a gain or loss frame with regard to their current level of power. If someone has low ELP, they can either have gained power across their life (if they have high current power) or have no changes of power across their life (if they have low current power). Combining these two possibilities, on average, those with lower ELP are more likely to experience gains in their power. By contrast, if someone has high ELP, they can either have lost power across their life (if they have low current power) or have no changes of power across their life (if they have high current power). Combining these two possibilities, on average, those with higher ELP are more likely to experience losses to their power. Thus, we expect high ELP to produce a power loss frame, while low ELP to produce a power gain frame. Those with high ELP and low current power will, we argue, have a deep-seated sense of loss of power across their lives, while those with low ELP and high current power will have a deep-seated sense of gain of power across their lives.

Second, we examine the effects of loss/gain frames on attention to one's own power. According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), losses are weighed more heavily than gains. Thus, the experience of having lost power since adolescence will have a greater impact than the experience of having gained power since adolescence. The greater effect of losses compared to gains has been shown with higher arousal in response to losses than gains (Hochman et al., 2010), greater effects on people whose daily experiences are negative than positive (Ganzach & Karshai, 1995), and a greater effect on people from losing versus gaining money (McGraw et al., 2010).

However, there have also been mixed results that question the validity of prospect theory's idea that people "weigh" losses more than gains (e.g., Glockner & Pachur, 2012). Instead, there is an emerging consensus that more attention is paid to losses than gains. Lejarraga et al. (2019) propose that "organisms may be generally attentive toward losses because the next loss can be deadly in an uncertain environment; there is no equivalent critical threshold in the domain of gains. Thus, organisms must devote resources to detecting losses" (p.646). They are highly attentive to losses, even though they do not value gains and losses differently. Pachur et al. (2018) explain that some of the findings of prospect theory (specifically, how losses versus gains are weighed) can actually be explained by "the allocation of attention during the process of information acquisition" (p.159). They found that loss aversion was associated with paying more attention to losses and gains rather than differences in valuing losses versus gains. And Yechiam and Hochman (2013) argue that "losses have a distinct effect on attention but do not lead to an asymmetry in subjective value" (p.498). This "attention-based" view of losses says that losses affect *attention* more than gains. Thus, we would expect that the loss frame that comes from high ELP will produce greater attention on one's own power than the gain frame that comes from low ELP. Those high in ELP will be very attentive to their power level, while those low in ELP will be less attentive.

Third, we examine how variations in the level of attention to power might affect the power–self-interested-behavior relationship. As discussed when developing H1, power is a driver of self-interested behavior. However, that is based on having power operating—consciously or subconsciously—in the mind of the individual. Power must be active in a person's lived experience. It seems likely that if power is less prominent in a person's experience, its effect on self-interested

behavior would be weaker. If power is more prominent in a person's' experience, the effect of power on self-interested behavior would be stronger. Thus, if high ELP drives a loss frame that draws attention to power, that attention should strengthen the relationship between power and self-interested behavior. However, if low ELP drives a gain frame that reduces attention to power, that lack of attention should weaken the relationship between power and self-interested behavior.

Stepping back now, we look at other research on the effects of life experiences on how losses are experienced. Is there any evidence that early life experiences specifically shape later life approaches to losses versus gains? Kim and Lee (2014) found that children exposed to war developed an aversion to risk that could be observed five decades after the war. Bucciol and Zarri (2013) found that attitudes to financial risk were shaped by two key life experiences—natural disasters and the loss of a child. Huh et al. (2016) found that childhood trauma was associated with loss aversion among depressive patients. Furthermore, Wang and Yan (2020) found that people who experienced prior personal shocks were more risk-averse to medium or large losses. While each of these studies focus on loss aversion, their result might (like other studies of prospect theory) actually be grounded in greater *attention* to losses rather than greater weighting of losses. One study talks specifically about attention: Lakshman et al. found that African-American children who were exposed to early life trauma were more attentive to threats (i.e., angry faces versus happy faces). Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:

H2.: The positive effect of current power on self-interested behavior will be stronger for those higher in Early Life Power than those lower in Early Life Power.

Levels of Self-Interested Behavior among those with High Power

So far, we have looked at the main effects of current power on self-interested behavior (H1) and how that effect might be stronger for those higher in ELP (H2). Next, we focus just on those who have high current power and ask whether the tendency to engage in self-interested behavior is stronger for those who grew up with power (high ELP) or without power (low ELP). Would we expect more self-interested behavior from those who have preserved the power they experienced in adolescence, or from those who gained greater power than they had in their adolescence? This addresses the absolute levels of self-interested behavior, rather differences in the slope of the relationship between current power and self-interested behavior (as in H2). We apply theories of entitlement to explore this question.

The sense of entitlement is a psychological state in which one feels that one is more deserving of positive outcomes than others (Campbell et al., 2004; Tomlinson, 2013; Zitek et al., 2010). This state is one of extreme self-focus and self-interest. Entitlement can occur when someone has had a beneficial outcome in the past and, therefore, expects it to be there in the future. This is the case for people who are in more powerful social groups, such as men and whites. According to Major (1994), there is a "lesser sense of personal entitlement among members of objectively disadvantaged groups (p.294)." While the term ELP is not used in the work on entitlement, implicit in entitlement theory is the idea that people who grow up having something from a young age believe that they deserve to continue having that benefit later in life. Thus, people high in ELP should also come to expect that they deserve to have that power—that they are entitled to power.

The impact of entitlement can be seen in several domains. Major et al. (1984) show that men feel more entitled than women to earn higher pay, and in experiments men do pay themselves more than women for the same work (for other work on entitlement and pay see Barron, 2003; Major, 1989). Pornari et al. (2013) show that sexual violence is associated with "relationship entitlement" (see also

Parkinson, 2017 and Busch et al., 2002 for work on entitlement and sexual violence). Webster et al. (2022) found that high-performing employees feel more psychological entitlement, which leads to less organizational citizenship behavior by those entitled employees. Moreover, Wang et al. (2020) found that those in upper classes have an even stronger desire to gain more wealth and status than do lower-class individuals. In each of these cases, those that grow up with high levels of benefits and control early in life come to expect it later in life, feel entitled to take what they want (sexually and financially) and contribute less—the very definition of self-interested behavior. Thus, if those high in ELP feel entitled to their power, they too will feel free to take what they want, and act self-interestedly.

Thus, we propose the following:

H3.: Among those high in current power, self-interested behavior will be higher for those with higher ELP than those with lower ELP.

An alternative and opposite view is that if you gain power later in life, keeping that added power is more important than for those who grew up with power. Only those who did not have power early in life have a clear sense of how bad it can feel to be powerless and as a result have a greater desire to preserve their escape from powerlessness, including acting in self-interested ways. There are studies showing that those who are less powerful have a desire to acquire more goods as a way to gain status and lesson their powerlessness (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008) and engage in more lying and self-promotion to be sure they make desired gains (Li et al., 2023). Although these studies are not about ELP, the logic might still hold when applied to early life power since feelings of powerlessness early in life may persist despite recently acquired power and since recently acquired power may feel more precarious. This greater desire to protect recently gained power might include lying, self-promotion, and other self-interested behaviors. Thus, we propose the following alternative hypothesis:

Alternative H3.: Among those high in current power, self-interested behavior will be higher for those with lower ELP than those with higher ELP.

Overview of Research

This paper presents three studies. Study 1 develops and validates a retrospective scale for ELP; that is, a scale that asks people to think back to assess their level of power at adolescence. While we would ideally like to have measures of power from when they really were 18 years old, that strategy is not feasible without a conducting a 20- or 30-year research study. Study 2 tests our hypotheses with a sample of line employees and managers, using self-reports of self-interested behaviors. For this study, we measured current power in three ways: subjective experience of power, objective power, and position in one's organization. Study 3 tests our hypotheses with a sample of adults who were asked to make pay allocations in an online version of the dictator game (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994; DeCelles et al., 2012; Raihani et al., 2013). This approach provided a more objective measure of self-interested behavior than was used in Study 2. Study 3, again, includes three measures of current power.

Study 1: Measurement of ELP

Study 1 was designed to create and validate a retrospective measure of ELP by modifying the chronic power scale (subjective power) from Anderson et al. (2012). We test that our measure of ELP is distinct from chronic power (discriminant validity, Hinkin, 1998), which is especially important given that we are unable to reach back in history to document feelings when participants were actually 18 years old. It is possible that memories of power early in life could be a reflection of current power. Thus, it is critical to show that our measure of ELP is distinct from current power. We also check whether the new ELP scale is predictive of several self-perceptions associated with power (convergent validity, Hinkin, 1998). The self-perceptions we chose were optimism (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), confidence (See et al., 2011), self-importance (Rucker et al., 2010) and self-esteem (Fast et al., 2009). Lastly, we look at whether ELP adds explanatory power to the prediction of these self-perceptions, after controlling for current power.

Sample

We recruited participants from Mechanical Turk (Mturk). We used a survey pre-filter to include participants from 18–25 years old and from 35–45 years old to ensure we had variation in age, given the possible concern that ELP could only be remembered for younger people, closer to the time when they were adolescents. Thus, we wanted to ensure that there was discriminant validity with current power for older participants, not just younger ones. Also, since we would expect older participants to be more advanced in their careers, they might inherently have more current power than younger participants (the average age for first time manager is around 30 years old [Zenger, 2012]). We wanted to ensure discriminant validity for both those who have more current power than those who have less current power.

We restricted participation to IP addresses located in the United States. There were 69 people in the 18–25 age group and 73 people in the 35–45 age group. Demographics of the two groups were roughly equivalent, except for age.[2] Means, standard deviations, correlations, and scale Cronbach's Alpha are shown in Table 2.

Measures

Early-life Power. We created our measure of early life experience of power by adapting the personal sense of power scale (Anderson et al., 2012). We changed the wording to be past tense and added a specific age period (15 to 18) in front of each item. Respondents were asked to rate their levels of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). A sample item is, "When I was 15 to 18 years old, I could get others to listen to what I say." Our goal was to build off of a well-established and frequently-used scale, but shift the focus from current power to these same experiences at the adolescent stage of life. The reliability coefficient was .93. The exploratory factor analysis results suggested that we should retain eight items (see Table 1).

[2] The average age of the 18~25 age group was 22.86 years old (*SD*=1.45) and of the 35~45 was 38.00 years old (*SD*=3.73). The 18~25 age group was 56.5% male, whereas in the 35~45 age group was 46.6% male. The 18~25 age group was 35% high school degree, 19% 2-year college degree, 45% 4-year college degree, and 1 % master's degree; the 35–45 age group was 25% high school degree, 22% two-year college degree, 41% four-year college degree, 11 % master's degree, and 1% doctoral degree.

Table 1 Exploratory Factor Analysis of ELP Items[a] (N = 142) (Study 1)

Items	*Mean*	*SD*	ELP
1. When I was 15 to 18 years old, I could get others to listen to what I say.	4.01	1.76	.77
2. When I was 15 to 18 years old, my wishes did not carry much weight.	3.59	1.80	.79
3. When I was 15 to 18 years old, I could get others to do what I wanted.	3.64	1.65	.85
4. When I was 15 to 18 years old, even if I voiced them, my views had little sway	3.84	1.70	.78
5. When I was 15 to 18 years old, I think I had a great deal of power.	2.85	1.67	.76
6. When I was 15 to 18 years old, my ideas and opinions were often ignored.	3.96	1.75	.85
7. When I was 15 to 18 years old, even when I tried, I was not able to get my way.	3.86	1.70	.85
8. When I was 15 to 18 years old, if I wanted to, I got to make the decision.	3.45	1.75	.76
Cumulative the explanation of variance (%)			64.35
Cronbach's α			.93

Note. [a] Using a principal axis factor analysis.

Current subjective Power. We used the eight-item personal sense of power scale (Anderson et al., 2012) to measure current subjective power. Respondents were asked to rate their levels of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). A sample item is, "I can get others to listen to what I say."

Optimism. Optimism is a variable that reflects the extent to which people hold generalized favorable expectancies for their future. We used Scheier et al.'s (1994) six-item scale to measure optimism. Respondents were asked to rate their levels of agreement on a five-point Likert scale (1 =strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree). A sample item is, "In uncertain times, I usually expect the best."

Self-Importance. We used Rucker et al.'s (2010) two-items scale to measure self-importance. Respondents were asked to respond to questions on two eight-point scales: "How important are you as an individual? (1=not important at all, 8=very important);" "I am a person of worth (1=totally disagree; 8=totally agree)."

Confidence. We used See et al.'s (2011) three-item scale to measure confidence. Respondents were asked to rate their levels of agreement on a six-point Likert scale (1=no confidence; 6=complete confidence). A sample item is, "Please indicate your level of confidence in your own judgment when making decisions."

Self-esteem. We used the four-item Lifespan self-esteem scale to measure self-esteem (Harris et al., 2018). Respondents were asked to rate their levels of feeling on a five-point Likert scale (1=really sad; 5=really happy). A sample item is, "How do you feel about yourself?"

Demographic Variables. Age, gender, and education level (high school or below, two-year college, four-year college degree, graduate or professional degree or above).

Results

Discriminant Validity of ELP. We tested discriminant validity of ELP with respect to subjective power by conducting a CFA to see if the items loaded as expected onto ELP and current subjective power. The baseline two-factor model (χ^2/df = 2.80; CFI = .90; IFI = .90; NFI = .86; RMSEA = .11;

SRMR= .06) yielded a better fit than an alternative one-factor model (χ^2/df = 7.52; CFI = .64; IFI = .65; NFI = .61; RMSEA = .21; SRMR= .21) (Hu & Bentler, 1999), providing evidence of an adequate discriminant validity and independence of the two measures. This is important, since it provides reassurance that people can differentiate between their early life experiences of power and their current experience of power. In addition, we examined the correlation between ELP and subjective power. The result (r =.33, p < .001; see Table 2) shows a moderate correlation between ELP and subjective power, which provides further support that these two constructs are distinct. The moderate correlation suggests that ELP is somewhat predictive of later life experience of power, but not fully predictive.

Looking more closely at different age groups, we found that the correlation between ELP and current subjective power was significant in both the 35–45 year old sample (r = .28, p=.027, n=73) and the 18–25 year old sample (r = .40, p = .001, n=69). As expected, the correlation was somewhat higher for the younger group since the older age group has had more later life developments than younger respondents. However, this difference (Z_r=.79, p=.430) was not statistically significant. This result shows ELP still has an effect on the older age group, albeit perhaps a bit weaker than occurs for the younger age group. Moreover, age was not correlated with ELP, eliminating any concern that perceptions of ELP might be affected by how many years back one has to remember. Furthermore, current subjective power was not correlated with age, eliminating a concern that current power is necessarily associated with age. Lastly, we looked at the standard deviation (*SD)* of ELP separately for the younger and older samples and found that they are similar: *SD*=1.41 for the younger sample, and *SD*=1.45 for the older sample.

Convergent Validity of ELP. Next, we examined the relationship between ELP and power-related self-perceptions. Looking at Table 2, we can see that ELP was associated with optimism, self-importance, confidence, and self-esteem, all with p-levels p<.001. In addition, we looked at whether ELP explained variance in these self-perceptions after controlling for the effect of current power. For all four self-perception constructs, ELP added significantly to the model R^2 after accounting for subjective power and controls for age, gender, and education (see Table 3). Thus, there is evidence that people can distinguish between ELP and current power, and that the two have different effects on relevant psychological states.

Summary

Study 1 develops a new ELP scale, adapted from Anderson et al. (2012), and this scale was validated including convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity. We found that ELP and subjective power are different constructs, and after controlling for current subjective power ELP still explained variance in individuals' perceptions of optimism, confidence, self-important and self-esteem. Second, we found that the relationship between ELP and current subjective experience of power remains at older ages, even though the effect may diminish somewhat with age. While we were unable to document actually feelings held as 18 years old, we were able to document participants' stable understanding of their ELP looking back from their current adult perspective.

Study 2: ELP and Self-Reported Self-Interested Behavior

Study 2 examines Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 and the Alternative Hypothesis 3. These hypotheses refer to current "power," which can be operationalized in several ways. One is to look at subjective experience of current power, which Williams et al. (2017) call "chronic" power. This measure was used in Study 1 and is a self-reported expression of how one feels about their own ongoing level of power. However, this approach only captures the psychological experience of power. It would be both fruitful

Table 2 Means, SDs, Correlations, and scale Cronbach's Alphas[a] (Study 1)

Variables	*Mean*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Age	30.64	8.11										
2. Gender[b]	1.49	0.50	.12									
3. Group[c]	0.51	0.50	.94***	.10								
4. Education[d]	2.28	0.99	.17*	.07	.15							
5. ELP	3.65	1.43	-.05	-.08	-.03	.06	(.93)					
6. Current subjective power	4.81	1.27	.14	.04	.15	.02	.33***	(.92)				
7. Optimism	3.43	1.01	.19*	-.00	.21*	.07	.35***	.61***	(.91)			
8. Self-Importance	5.70	1.71	.21*	.09	.26**	.16	.32***	.52***	.63***	(.81)		
9. Confidence	4.30	1.01	.17*	-.15	.22**	.02	.38***	.55***	.58***	.63***	(.84)	
10. Self-Esteem	3.54	1.01	.13	.06	.17*	.12	.37**	.59***	.68***	.71***	.67***	(.94)

[a] n = 142. Cronbach's Alphas appear in parentheses along the diagonal.
[b] Dummy-coded: 2 = female, 1 = male.
[c] Dummy-coded: 0 = 18~25 age group, 1 = 35~45 age group.
[d] Dummy-coded: 1 = high school degree or below, 2= 2-year college degree, 3= 4-year or university degree, 4= master's degree, 5= doctoral degree.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3: Incremental Validity Tests[a] (Study 1)

Predictors	*Optimism*		*Self-Importance*		*Confidence*		*Self-Esteem*	
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6	Model7	Model8
Control variables								
Age	.11	.12	.11	.13	.11	.14	.03	.05
Gender[b]	-.05	-.03	.05	.06	-.19**	-.17*	.03	.04
Education[c]	.04	.03	.12	.11	.00	-.02	.10	.09
Main predictors								
Current subjective power	.60***	.54***	.50***	.44***	.54***	.47***	.58***	.51***
ELP		.17*		.18*		.22***		.20**
ΔR^2		.03*		.02*		.04**		.04**
Total R^2	.37	.40	.29	.31	.33	.37	.34	.38
F-value	22.06***	19.47***	15.38***	13.87***	18.12***	17.29***	19.49***	18.03***

[a] n = 142.
[b] Dummy-coded: 2 = female, 1 = male.
[c] Dummy-coded: 1 = high school degree or below, 2= 2-year college degree, 3= 4-year or university degree, 4= master's degree, 5= doctoral degree.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Table 4 Means, SDs, Correlations, and Scale Cronbach's Alphas [a] (Study 2)

Variables	*Mean*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Age	41.09	5.9										
2. Gender[b]	1.5	0.5	-.09									
3. Education[c]	3.42	0.7	.12	.05								
4. Tenure[d]	7.44	9.71	.16	-.06	.08							
5. Social desirability	0.84	1.2	-.03	.29**	-.15	-.03	(.66)					
6. ELP	3.83	1.21	.09	.09	.04	-.03	-.03	(.93)				
7. Current Subjective power	5.21	0.94	.16	-.02	.12	-.01	.13	.31**	(.92)			
8. Current Objective power	2.87	1.36	.09	-.09	.08	.17†	.10	.22*	.35**	(.95)		
9. Position[e]	1.99	1.08	.03	.06	.16†	.22*	.09	.19	.26**	.79**		
10. Self-interested behavior	1.92	0.68	-.14	-.15	-.03	-.07	-.32**	.22*	.10	.21*	.20*	(.81)

[a] n = 109. Cronbach's Alphas appear in parentheses along the diagonal.
[b] Dummy-coded: 2 = female, 1 = male.
[c] 1 = high school degree or below, 2 = 2-year college degree, 3 = 4-year or university degree, 4 = master's degree, 5 = doctoral degree.
[d] Tenure was reported by years.
[e] 1= employee, 2 = line management, 3 = middle management, 4 = senior/ executive management.
† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

and essential to use alternative, objective conceptualizations of power (DeCelles et al., 2012). Our second approach to measuring current power is to look at specific areas of control and influence, such as the ability to control who is hired and how much people are paid. This is called "objective" power. A third approach is to look at the type of position held, such as employee, manager, executive, and to presume that those at higher organizational levels have more power to control resources than those lower in the hierarchy. This is called "position" power. We test our hypotheses with all three approaches to measuring power. In this study, self-interested behavior is self-reported.

Procedure

We tested our hypotheses by recruiting subjects in the United States through Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). We also excluded participants who participated in Study 1. We conducted a power analysis with the program G*Power to determine the sample size needed to detect a medium effect size with a power of 0.80 (Faul et al., 2007). Based on the calculation and prior related research, our sample size in this study should reach 85 or above in total. We ensured variance in position power by pre-screening to ensure that half the subjects were supervisors (n=55) and half were subordinates (n=54). The average age of the resulting sample was 41.09 (*SD*=5.90), the sample was 60% male, and the mean education level was 3.42 (*SD*=.70), with "3" represented four-year college. Means, standard deviations, correlations, and scale Cronbach's Alpha are shown in Table 4.

Measures

Early-life Power. We used the same scale as in Study 1.

Current Subjective Power. We used the same measure as in Study 1.

Current Objective Power. We used Wisse and Sleebos's (2016) eight-item scale. Respondents are asked to indicate the degree to which they agree (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with statements that they have authority to take certain actions such as "I have the authority to fire my subordinates."

Current Position Power. We ask participants to indicate their hierarchical position in the current company by identifying their role: (1) nonmanagerial position, (2) line management, (3) middle management, or (4) senior/executive management (see Begley et al., 2006). This scale represents low (1) to high (4) position power.

Self-interested Behavior. We used Rus et al.'s (2010) eight-item self-interested behavior scale into a self-report scale of self-interested behavior. Respondents indicated the number of times they performed each behavior during the past year (1=never; 5=always). A sample item is, "I have negotiated a bonus for myself that was substantially higher than the bonus my coworkers received."

Control variables. We controlled for respondents' age, gender, education, organizational tenure because prior research suggests that these variables affect self-interested behavior (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005, Rus et al., 2012). We also controlled for social desirability. Since our measure of self-interested behavior is self-reported, it can be expected that those who care about looking good to others may underreport their self-interested behavior. We used the five-item scale developed by Hays et al. (1989). Respondents were asked to rate their levels of agreement on a five-point Likert scale (1=definitely true; 5= definitely false). A sample item is "I am always courteous even to people who are disagreeable."

Results

Preliminary Analyses. We first conducted a CFA to verify the items loaded as expected onto our four study constructs, i.e., current subjective power, ELP, current objective power, and self-interested behavior. These analyses[3] providing evidence of discriminant validity and independence of the four measures. Table 4 provides the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for all variables. We note that age is not correlated with ELP (or any study variables), which suggests that how far back one has to remember when reporting ELP does not affect remembered levels of ELP.

Hypotheses Testing

First, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression to test Hypothesis 1 (see Table 5). After controlling for age, gender, education, tenure and social desirability, Models 1, 3, and 5 of Table 5 show that current subjective power, current objective power, and position were positively related to self-interested behavior ($b_{current\ subjective\ power}$ = 0.17, p =.061; $b_{current\ objective\ power}$ = 0.28, p =.002; $b_{position}$ = 0.28, p =.003). Therefore, Hypothesis 1was supported.

Models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5 show tests of H2. Model 2 shows that the interaction of current subjective power and ELP does not predict self-interested behavior ($b_{current\ subjective\ power \times ELP}$ = 0.10, p = .337). However, Models 4 and 6 do show that the interaction of current objective power and ELP, and of position and ELP, predict self-interested behavior ($b_{current\ objective\ power \times ELP}$ = 0.19, p = .029; $b_{position \times ELP}$ = 0.22, p = .021), so that Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. Conventional procedures were then applied for plotting the moderating pattern from Models 4 and 6 (see Figure 1 and 2) at one SD above and below the mean of ELP (Aiken & West, 1991). Consistent with our prediction, Figure 1 illustrates that, for participants with higher ELP, there was a positive relationship between current objective power and self-interested behavior (simple slope b = 0.60, p = .005). For participants with lower ELP, the relationship was not significant (simple slope b = -0.18, p =.446). Figure 2 illustrates that, for participants with higher ELP, there was a positive relationship between position and self-interested behavior (simple slope b = 0.24, p < .001). For participants with lower ELP, the relationship was not significant (simple slope b = 0.04, p =.696).

For Hypothesis 3, we look at the results for current objective power and position since those measures of power showed an interaction effect with ELP. To test Hypothesis 3, which focuses on the effect of ELP on those with high current power, we examined the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior for respondents in the top 33% of objective power, and those who had and

[3] Based on the conventional ratio of items (indicator = 5:1), we used randomly parceling items as indicators for constructs that had more than five items (Little et al., 2002). We used conventional fit indices to evaluate model fit: the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the standardized root mean residual (SRMR), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Cut-off criteria (CFI and TLI > .90, SRMR and RMSEA < .08) were used to indicate acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2015). The baseline four-factor model (χ^2/df = 1.47; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; SRMR = .07; RMSEA = .07) yielded a better fit than an alternative three-factor model that combing ELP and current subjective power (χ^2/df = 5.19; $\Delta\chi^2$=193.91, p<.001, Δdf= 3; CFI = .76; TLI = .68; SRMR = .16; RMSEA = .19), than an alternative two-factor model that combed ELP, current subjective power and current objective power (χ^2/df = 9.14; $\Delta\chi^2$=219.579, p<.001, Δdf= 2; CFI = .50; TLI = .38; SRMR = .21; RMSEA = .27), and than an alternative one-factor model (χ^2/df = 10.26; $\Delta\chi^2$=69.891, p<.001, Δdf= 1; CFI = .43; TLI = .29; SRMR = .23; RMSEA = .29).

Table 5 Linear Regression Models Predicting Self-interested Behavior[a] (Study 2)

Predictors	*Self-interested behavior*					
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
Control variables						
Age	-.16†	-.18†	-.15†	-.18*	-.13	-.14
Gender[b]	-.05	-.10	-.02	-.09	-.03	-.07
Education[c]	-.08	-.07	-.08	-.09	-.11	-.14
Tenure[d]	-.05	-.04	-.10	-.07	-.12	-.11
Social desirability	-.35***	-.33***	-.36***	-.36***	-.37***	-.33**
Main predictors						
Current subjective power (CSP)	.18†	.15				
Current objective power (COP)			.28**	.24**		
Position[e]					.28**	.21*
ELP		.17†		.19**		.13
Interaction effect						
CSP × ELP		.10				
COP × ELP				.19*		
Position× ELP						.21*
ΔR^2		.04†		.06*		.07**
Total R^2	.12	.15	.17	.22	.16	.22
F-value	3.40**	3.29**	4.58***	4.75***	4.48***	4.84***

[a] n = 109.
[b] Dummy-coded: 2 = female, 1 = male.
[c] 1 = high school degree or below, 2= 2-year college degree, 3= 4-year or university degree, 4= master's degree, 5= doctoral degree.
[d] Tenure was reported by years.
[e] 1= employee, 2 = line management, 3 = middle management, 4 = senior/ executive management.
† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

self-interested behavior for those in the middle and bottom 33% of objective power and for those who did not have managerial positions.[4] For the sample in the top 33% of objective power, we found a positive relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior (b= 0.43, p = .015), as predicted in H3. positions as managers or above (see Table 6). FFor completeness, we also report the relationship for those in the middle and lower third of subjective power and objective power in Table 6. However, H3 pertains only to those with high power. For those with managerial positions, we found a positive relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior (b= 0.37, p = .009), supporting H3. These

[4] For the middle 33% of objective power, the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior was not significant (b= 0.18, p = .292). For the bottom 33% of objective power, the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior was not significant (b= 0.14, p = .432). For non-managers, the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior was not significant (b= 0.08, p = .563).

results show that for participants with higher current objective power and position, ELP was positively related to self-interested. Therefore, for these two measures of power, Hypothesis 3 was supported. Since H3 was supported, Alternative Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Figure 1 Interaction effect of ELP and current objective power (Study 2)



Figure 2 Interaction effect of ELP and position (Study 2)



Table 6 Linear Regression Results of ELP Predicting Self-interested Behavior for Subgroups[a] (Study 2)

	ELP → self-interested behavior[b]		
			Tests of H3
Predictors	Bottom 33% score of predictor	Middle 33% score of predictor	Top 33% score of predictor
Current objective power	N=35 *b*= -0.14 *p* = 0.432	N=36 *b*= 0.18 *p* = 0.292	N=38 *b*= 0.43 *p* = 0.015
Position power	Non-managerial position N=54 *b*= 0.08 *p* = 0.563		Managerial position N=55 *b*= 0.37 *p* = 0.009

[a] n = 109.
[b] Control variables: Age, gender, education, tenure, and social desirability.

Summary

There are three findings in Study 2. First, we found that high current power was positively related to self-interested behavior. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported, confirming alignment with the existing literature. Second, people with higher ELP showed more self-interested behavior in response to higher levels of current power for two of our three measures of power (objective and position power). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported, suggesting that those who experienced more power in their formative adolescent years were more sensitive to the absence or presence of power later in life. Third, among those with higher current objective and position power, higher ELP was associated with more self-interested behavior, providing partial support for H3. This finding supports the argument that those who grew up experiencing more power were more likely to abuse current power than those who grew up without as much power.

It is worth exploring the fact that the subjective power X ELP interaction was not significant, while hte interaction terms of ELP with objective measures of power were significant. There have been other studies where objective measures of power show effects but not subjective measures of power (e.g., Smith & Hofmann, 2016). This may be because objective power is a precursor to felt power (e.g., Heller et al., 2023) potentially providing more powerful effects. Moreover, psychological effects, such as our theorized greater attention on power for those higher in ELP, can still be experienced even in cases where there is low self-awareness of those effects (e.g., implicit attitude tests) (Greenwald et al., 1998) and even if the effect is about attention, such as the tendency to have more attention on angry than happy faces (Pinkham et al., 2010).

There are some limitations in Study 2. First, we used a self-report scale of self-interested behavior. Second, we measured our variables at the same time. As a result, there is a chance that some of our results may be due to common method variance (although this is less likely for the

interaction results). We addressed these concerns by conducting an additional study which uses an experimental design, collected data in two phases separated by several weeks, and increased the sample size.

Study 3: ELP and Objective Self-interested Behavior

Study 3 tests Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, and Alternate H3, as was done in Study 2, but does so with an objective measure of self-interested behavior—the dictator game.

Procedure

We recruited participants from Mturk. We used a filter that required all participants to be between 35 to 45 years of age and hold a full-time job. We restricted the age range to ensure similarity of years from adolescence. We also restricted participation to IP addresses located in the United States and excluded participants who participated in Studies 1 or 2. Power analysis (Faul et al., 2007) suggested that our sample size should reach 85 or above. However, due to the two-phases design, we recruited more participants than Study 2 to account for expected drop-off between study phases.

The experiment included two phases, the second of which launched two weeks after the first. Following DeCells et al.'s (2012) procedure, we measured relatively stable variables in the first phase, whereas self-interested behavior was in the second phase. In the first phase, participants rated their own ELP, current subjective power, current objective power, and demographic variables (age, gender, and educational level). After two weeks, the participants got instructions about how to play a dictator game with another Mturk worker. They had a brief chat with what they thought was another Mturk worker (but was really a computer acting as another Mturk worker) and decided how to allocate ten points (see more detail below). Then, participants were debriefed.

Sample

At Time 1, 403 participants completed the questionnaire. At Time 2, these 403 participants were sent an invitation message to complete another questionnaire for the second wave of the study. Of the 403 participants, 299 participants completed the second wave, representing a response rate of 74.19 %. The number of participants was also close to other research on power and self-interested behaviors (e.g., DeCells et al., 2012). The final sample used to test our hypotheses was those who completed both phases of the study. The average age of the resulting sample was 38.03 (*SD*=2.85), 41.5% were male, and education level was 23% high school degree, 21% two-year college degree, 34% four-year degree, 18% master's degree, and 4% doctoral degree. The means, standard deviations, correlations, and scale Cronbach's Alpha are shown in Table 7.

Measures

Early-life Power (Phase 1). We used the same scale as in Studies 1 and 2.

Current subjective power (Phase 1). We used the same scale as in Studies 1 and 2.

Current objective power (Phase 1). We used the same scale as in Study 2.

Self-interested behavior (Phase 2). We used the dictator game to measure self-interested behavior (DeCelles et al., 2012; Forsythe et al., 1994; Raihani et al., 2013). Participants were instructed that they would play a decision-making game and would be randomly paired with another Mturk worker (in reality, the computer program). Participants were told (accurately) that we were holding a

lottery for a $100 bonus and the tickets that they would receive for this lottery would depend upon their decisions in this game. The number of lottery chances they would have to win the $100 would be based on the number of points they ended up with (more points would give the participant more chances to win). They were given ten points to split with another Mturk worker, and it was up to that participant alone to decide (to "dictate") how these ten points would be split. The study participants could give the other worker zero points, keeping ten for themselves, give the other worker one, and keep nine for themselves, and so on. How many points they give to themselves is a measure of self-interested behavior (DeCelles et al., 2012), with a higher number representing higher self-interest.

Control variables. As in Study 2, we controlled for respondents' age, gender, education, and organizational tenure. We did not control for social desirability since our measure of self-interested behavior was objective and behavioral.

Results

Preliminary Analyses. We first conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to see if the items loaded as expected onto our three study constructs, i.e., ELP, current subjective power, and current objective power. This analysis[5] provided evidence of adequate discriminant validity and independence of the three measures. Table 7 reports the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations, and scale Alphas for all the studied variables. We note that age is not correlated with ELP (or any study variables), which suggests that how far back one has to remember when reporting ELP does not affect remembered levels of ELP. Also, age is not correlated with position or current objective power or current subjective power, suggesting that there is similar variation of current power for younger and older respondents.

Hypotheses Testing

We conducted a hierarchical linear regression to test Hypothesis 1 (see Table 8). Looking at Model 1, 3, and 5 of Table 5, after controlling age, gender, education, and tenure, showed that perceptions of current subjective power predicted self-interested behavior ($b_{current\ subjective\ power}$ = 0.13, p =.03), but neither current objective power nor position were positively related to self-interested behavior ($b_{current\ objective\ power}$ = 0.05, p =.42; $b_{position}$ = -0.03, p =.68). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was partially supported.

[5] Based on the conventional ratio of items (indicator = 5:1), we used randomly parceling items as indicators for constructs that had more than five items (Little et al., 2002). We used same conventional fit indices to evaluate model fit as Study 2. The baseline three-factor model (χ^2/df = 2.06; CFI = .99; TLI = .98; SRMR = .02; RMSEA = .06), yielded a better (and acceptable) fit than an alternative two-factor model combing ELP and current subjective power (χ^2/df = 22.01; $\Delta\chi^2$=522.922, p<.001, Δdf= 2; CFI = .73; TLI = .62; SRMR = .19; RMSEA = .27), and an alternative one-factor model combing ELP, current subjective power and current objective power (χ^2/df = 47.53; $\Delta\chi^2$=710.925, p<.001, Δdf= 1; CFI = .37; TLI = .16; SRMR = .25; RMSEA = .40).

Table 7 Means, SDs, Correlations and Scale Cronbach's Alpha [a] (Study 3)

Variables	*Mean*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Age	38.03	2.84									
2. Gender[b]	1.59	0.49	.09								
3. Education[c]	2.59	1.13	.11	-.08							
4. Tenure[d]	5.69	4.75	.08	-.08	-.04						
5. ELP	3.73	1.23	-.03	-.08	-.10	.08	(.91)				
6. Current subjective power	5.08	1.00	-.04	-.11	.05	.14*	.30**	(.89)			
7. Current objective power	2.44	1.21	-.08	-.21**	.09	.17**	.16**	.30**	(.94)		
8. Position[e]	1.92	1.04	-.11	-.20**	.02	.18**	.12*	.24**	.80**		
9. Self-Interested behavior	5.89	2.13	-.10	.04	.05	.09	.04	.14*	.07	-.00	

[a] n = 299. Cronbach's Alphas appear in parentheses along the diagonal.
[b] Dummy-coded: 2 = female, 1 = male.
[c] Dummy-coded: 1 = high school degree or below, 2 = 2-year college degree, 3 = 4-year or university degree, 4 = master's degree, 5 = doctoral degree.
[d] Tenure was reported by years.
[e] Dummy-coded: 1= employee, 2 = line management, 3 = middle management, 4 = senior/ executive management.
[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 8 test Hypothesis 2. Models 2 and 4 show that the interaction effect of current subjective power and ELP and of current objective power and ELP predict self-interested behavior ($b_{current\ subjecitve\ power \times ELP} = 0.20$, $p = .001$, $b_{current\ objective\ power \times ELP} = 0.14$, $p = .016$). However, the interaction effects of position and ELP on self-interested behavior was not significant ($b_{position \times ELP} = 0.08$, $p = .180$), providing partial support for Hypothesis 2. Conventional procedures were then applied for plotting the moderating pattern (see Figures 3 and 4) at one standard deviation above and below the mean of ELP (Aiken & West, 1991). Consistent with our prediction, Figure 3 illustrates that, for participants with higher ELP, there was a positive relationship between current subjective power and self-interested behavior (simple slope $b = 0.62$, $p < .001$), while for participants with lower ELP, the relationship was not significant (simple slope $b = -0.09$, $p = .587$). Figure 4 illustrated that, for participants with higher ELP, there was a positive relationship between current objective power and self-interested behavior (simple slope $b = 0.34$, $p = .041$), while for participants with lower ELP, the relationship was not significant (simple slope $b = -0.21$, $p = .239$).

For Hypothesis 3, we examined current subjective power and current objective power since the interaction of those two measures of power with ELP were significant. We examined the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior for those respondents in the top 33% of subjective power and for the top 33% of objective power (see Table 9). For completeness, we also report the relationship for

Table 8 Linear Regression Models Predicting Self-interested Behavior[a] (Study 3)

Predictors	*Self-interested behavior*					
	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
Control variables						
Age	-.11†	-.11†	-.11†	-.11†	-.12*	-.11†
Gender[b]	.07	.06	.06	.06	.05	.06
Education[c]	.06	.07	.07	.07	.07	.07
Tenure[d]	.09	.06	.10†	.10	.11†	.10†
Main predictors						
Current Subjective power (CSP)	.13*	.13*				
Current Objective power (COP)			.05	.03		
Position[e]					-.03	-.03
ELP		-.02		.03		.04
Interaction effect						
CSP × ELP		.20***				
COP × ELP				.14*		
Position× ELP						.08
ΔR^2		.04**		.02*		.01
Total R^2	.04	.08	.03	.05	.03	.03
F-value	2.51*	3.59**	1.66	2.11*	1.57	1.47

[a] n = 299.
[b] Dummy-coded: 2 = female, 1 = male.
[c] 1 = high school degree or below, 2= 2-year college degree, 3= 4-year or university degree, 4= master's degree, 5= doctoral degree.
[d] Tenure was reported by years.
[e] 1= employee, 2 = line management, 3 = middle management, 4 = senior/ executive management.
† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

those in the middle and lower third of subjective power and objective power in Table 9.[6] However, H3 pertains only to those with high power. For those in the top 33% of current subjective power, there was a positive relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior (b= 0.24, p = .008), providing support for H3. For the top 33% score of current objective power, the relationship between ELP and

[6] For those in the middle 33% score for current subjective power, the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior was not significant (b= 0.00, p = .974). For the bottom 33% we found a negative relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior (b= -0.27, p = .009). For those in the middle 33% of current objective power, the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior was not significant (b= 0.09, p = .423). For the bottom 33% score of current objective power, the relationship between ELP and self-interested behavior was not significant (b= -0.15, p = .11).

self-interested behavior was in the expected direction, but not significant (*b*= 0.13, *p* = .15), suggesting that we have only partial support for H3 (based on the results from subjective power just discussed). Therefore, the Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. Since there was no case of a significant negative coefficient for those with high current power, Alternative Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Figure 1 Ir



Figure 4 Interaction effect of ELP and current objective power (Study 3)



Table 9 Linear Regression Results of ELP Predicting Self-interested Behavior for Subgroups[a] (Study 3)

	ELP → self-interested behavior[b]		
Predictors	Bottom 33% score of predictor	Middle 33% score of predictor	*Tests of H3* Top 33% score of predictor
Current subjective power	N=97 *b*= -0.27 *p* = 0.009	N=79 *b*= 0.00 *p* = 0.974	N=123 *b*= 0.24 *p* = 0.008
Current objective power	N=95 *b*= -0.15 *p* = 0.148	N=96 *b*= 0.08 *p* = 0.431	N=108 *b*= 0.124 *p* = 0.185

[a] n = 299.

[b] Control variables: Age, gender, education, and tenure.

Summary

In Study 3, the results provided partial support for Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, and no support for Alternative Hypothesis 3. First, current subjective power was associated with higher self-interested behavior, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. However, current objective power and position power were not significantly associated with self-interested behavior. However, there were significant interaction effects of ELP with current power, such that the association between current subjective power and self-interested behavior was stronger for those higher in ELP, and there was an association between current objective power and self-interested behavior for those who were higher in ELP. Thus, when considering two of our three measures of power (current subjective power and current objective power), Hypothesis 2 was supported. Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 3, among those high in current subjective power, ELP was associated with higher self-interested behavior. However, this same effect was not significant for those highest in current objective power. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported.

General Discussion

This study introduces the construct of ELP, which is an adaptation of Anderson et al.'s (2012) idea of chronic power. While there is a rich and well-developed body of literature on power (Galinsky et al., 2015), the tendency has been to look only at the impact of current power on power-related behaviors such as self-interested behavior (Williams, 2014). We argue that early-life experiences of power—having more or less of it—shape how power is experienced later in life. We created a version of Anderson et al.'s (2012) chronic power scale that looks at a person's experience of power when they were in their late adolescent years (remembered as an adult) and shows that ELP is a construct that is distinct from current subjective power. Moreover, we show that, looking at emotions that are known to be related to power (optimism, self-importance, confidence, and self-esteem), ELP provides added explanatory power above what is provided by current subjective experience of power. This approach is consistent with research showing that in several areas, such as how people approach wealth and

develop political views, early life experiences are foundational (Inglehart, 1971, 1985; Inglehart & Abramson, 1994; Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Once one recognizes the existence of ELP, it is possible to think of current power as representing no change from early life power in some cases, an increase in power from early in life in other cases, or a decrease in power from early in life in still other cases. Drawing on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), we expect that the experience that will draw most attention to power is the case of loss of power— moving from high early life power to low current power. That is, those who grew up with power will be most attuned to whether they do or do not have power; certainly, those who did not grow up with power will also notice the difference between having or not having current power, but sensitivity to that difference should be higher for those high in ELP. That is what we proposed in Hypothesis 2, and what we found empirically.

Across two studies, we looked at the known positive effect of power on self-interested behavior and examine whether this effect was stronger for those with high ELP than those with low ELP. That is, whether those who had greater power in adolescence tend to respond more to differences in current power than those who lacked power in their formative years. This tests for a difference in slopes between those high and low in ELP. We examined this Hypothesis first using self-reported self-interested behavior as the dependent variable (Study 2), and second using objective self-interested behavior as the dependent variable (Study 3). We also examined this hypothesis using three different measures of current power – subjective power, objective power, and position power. This provided six tests of our hypothesis. The result did not support our hypothesis in every case but did support our hypothesis in the preponderance of the cases (in four of the six tests).

We also addressed the question of whether a tendency to abuse having high power would be stronger among those who grew up with greater sense of power (or to be more exact given methodological constraints, among those who have a perception that they grew up with more power). We argued, based on theories of entitlement (Campbell et al., 2004; Tomlinson, 2013; Zitek et al., 2010), that people with higher current power who grew up with high power (high ELP) would exhibit greater levels of self-interested behavior than those people with higher current power who did not grow up with power (low ELP). We tested this hypothesis in the four cases where we found support for Hypothesis 2; in three of those cases we found support for Hypothesis 3 (with the fourth showing a similar, albeit non-significant pattern). Thus, it does seem that among those with higher power, higher ELP is associated with greater self-interested behavior (not lower self-interested behavior, as suggested by Alternative H3). Power combined with growing up with power produces the highest level of self-interested behavior.

This work adds to Williams' (2014) analysis of factors that affect opportunistic use of power. Williams (2014) saw that the impact of power on self-interested behavior could be moderated by the presence of self-focused goals or threats to power. ELP, we believe, has elements of both. We based H2 on the idea that those with higher ELP would be more sensitive to current power levels since their experience included losses, rather than gains; this is a form of threat to power discussed by Williams (2014). We based H3 on the idea that those with higher power at a young age would be more likely to expect and use power, thereby expressing a kind of self-focused behavior.

There are implications of these results for managers. There is a great deal of research about the use and abuse of power in the role of leadership. One of the more important tools a manager has is building positive relationships with subordinate (high Leader-Member Exchange; Liden et al., 1997), since this has been shown to improve subordinate motivation (Graves & Luciano, 2013), organizational citizenship behavior (Anand et al., 2018), and commitment (Tremblay et al., 2017). Inversely, there are bad organizational outcomes from abusive supervision (Tepper et al., 2017). While a manager might have the ability, due to their power, to impose their will on others, it would be wise

to refrain from doing so in most cases. As part of that effort, a manager might want to consider their early years, and reflect on whether they might have experienced a great deal of power at that time. If they did, they might want to approach situations with a mental check on whether they might be overstepping the use of their current power; they might try to recognize whether there is a natural tendency to slip into excessive use of power, since it's use may be driven not by the demands of the situation, but the fact that past high levels of power makes use of power seem too natural.

Future Research Directions. Our H3 (and Alternate H3) focused only on those with high power. This approach was driven by the importance of understanding why those with high power to abuse power, and what conditions might amplify or dampen this pattern. We were able to address that question, but there is also more to be explored about those with current lower power. How does ELP affect those with low power? Although we had no hypotheses about this issue, we did report relevant data. Study 2 showed (see Table 6) no significant effects of ELP on self-interested behavior for those low in current objective power or current position power, but Study 3 (which has a more objective measure of self-interested behavior; see Table 9) showed that when current subjective power was low, higher ELP was associated with lower self-interested behavior and there was a similar (albeit not significant) for those low in current objective power. Future research can explore if this pattern holds, and what drives it.

Another opportunity for future research is to look at other effects of power besides self-interested behavior and see if high ELP amplifies those other effects as well. Given that we expect the overall loss frame of high ELP to generate more attention to a person's current power, it might amplify known effect of power on revenge, harassment, and abusive behavior (Strelan et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2017; Foulk et al., 2018) not just self-interested behavior.

Finally, our studies were based on self-reported current power (reported as experience of power, objective power, and position). Future research could use other methods to measure power-related constructs, such as the recall method (Galinsky et al., 2003), role-playing (Galinsky et al., 2003), and word fragments (Galinsky et al., 2008). Most importantly, current power could be manipulated experimentally (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003).

Limitations. Our study has some limitations. First, while we theorize about actual power in early life, we were only able to measure participants current memory of that early-life power. That is the best we can do without conducting a true, 20-year longitudinal study, but it is not ideal. That said, there is support for the idea that recall is fairly accurate: many power-related experiments use the recall method (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003), and previous research found that people are moderately accurate when retrospectively assessing their personality change over time (Oltmanns et al., 2020). Moreover, Study 1 showed that even for those over age 35, they were able to clearly distinguish between current power and ELP.

Second, Study 2 uses a single source of self-reported data. This poses the risk of common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). However, single-source data is unlikely to produce interaction effects of the type posited in our second hypothesis (Siemsen et al., 2010). Also, this problem is not present in Study 3, since it included an objective measure of self-interested behavior – the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994; DeCelles et al., 2012; Raihani et al., 2013). The other limitation of this study is that we do not hypothesize about, or measure, intervening psychological processes that create the effects we find. Our theory suggests that there are elements of both threats to power and self-directed behavior inherent in ELP, so the intervening psychological processes are likely to be complex and multi-faceted. Still, it is important to document the core effect of ELP, which can be explored further in the next stages of research.

We believe that understanding of the use – and sometimes abuse – of power can be better understood by adding an awareness of Early Life Power. We introduce this new construct in the hope of advancing our understanding of power, and research on power.

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