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An Angry Face and a Guilty Conscience: The Intrapersonal Effects of Fake Anger in Negotiation

David A. Hunsaker[1], Teng Zhang[2], and McKenzie Rees[3]

1 NYU Shanghai, Shanghai, China
2 Penn State Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA
3 Brigham Young University, Utah, USA

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Correspondence
David Hunsaker, NYU Shanghai, 1555 Century Avenue, Pudong New District, Shanghai, China 200122.
david.hunsaker@nyu.edu

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Abstract

Research on anger in negotiation suggests that expressing anger can have detrimental effects on the relationship between the parties but may also improve the expresser's economic outcomes, resulting in the use of fake anger (i.e., anger that is expressed but not felt) as a negotiation strategy. Based on research on moral emotions, we argue that fake anger in negotiation will lead to expressers' guilt, which in turn negatively impacts their self-perception and their overall subjective experience of the negotiation. Across three studies (two online and one face-to-face), we consistently demonstrate that fake anger lowers negotiators' feelings about themselves as well as their overall subjective value, and that guilt mediates this effect. We discuss implications of these findings for theory and practice of negotiation and propose an agenda for future research.

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> Anger is an acid that can do more harm to the vessel in which it is stored than to anything on which it is poured.
>
> —Mark Twain

In recent years, anger has become an ever more prevalent component of the public discourse in an increasingly polarized political environment (Desilver, 2022; Mounk, 2022). In the U.S. alone the last two decades have witnessed political and social movements including The Tea Party Movement, Occupy Wall Street, and Black Lives Matter in which individuals' expressions of anger have resulted in violence in some protests and inflamed the rhetoric of these important societal debates. However, it is worth noting that not all of the anger has been genuine. Public protests and debates can be—and have been—fueled by individuals or entities whose identities and interests lie outside of a given debate but who participate with an intent to disrupt genuine discourse around an issue (see D'Arcus, 2004; Shantz, 2020). For example, some companies openly advertise paid protesters, paparazzi, and publicity stunts for corporations and politicians (Koren, 2018). On a broader scale, there have been thousands of tweets and retweets by Russia-backed bots that, according to William Evanina, then-director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, worked to "inflame social divisions, promote conspiracy theories and sow distrust" in U.S. elections (Strohm, 2020).

The words and actions of the individuals described above demonstrate the existence of expressions of inauthentic beliefs or emotions that can be used to achieve a particular goal in a contentious social context including a negotiation. Consistent with this notion, the expression of anger has been shown to be an effective tool for improving expressers' own economic outcomes in negotiation (e.g., Sinacuer & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004). For example, expressing anger has been shown to motivate the recipients to make more concessions in negotiation (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010) as anger implies a threat (Sinaceur et al., 2011). On the other hand, research has also shown that experiencing anger tends to have the opposite effects. For instance, experiencing anger can distract negotiators, leading them to think less rationally (Parkinson, 2000) and less clearly (Buck, 1991; Daly, 1991). Furthermore, angry negotiators tend to make errors in perceiving their own interests because of these distractions (Lerner, 2005). As a result, negotiators who feel anger may achieve suboptimal economic outcomes in a negotiation.

Based on these findings in the negotiation literature, it may seem logical to suggest that to succeed in a negotiation, negotiators should simply express anger that they do not actually feel (i.e., fake anger). However, building on prior research on fake anger (e.g., Campagna et al., 2016; Côté et al., 2013; Hideg & Van Kleef, 2016) and moral emotions, especially guilt (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 2007), we argue that fake anger in negotiation will have detrimental, intrapersonal effects on the expressers because it can lead to expressers' guilt, which in turn will have a negative impact on their self-perception as well as their overall subjective experience of the negotiation.

Anger in Negotiation

Negotiation is a give-and-take decision making process among two or more parties that is often fraught with negative emotions such as anger. A substantial amount of negotiation research has shown that anger can elicit concessions from the recipients and thus result in better economic outcomes for the expressers (e.g., Butt & Choi, 2006; Lelieveld et al., 2011; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2012). For instance, Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) found that negotiators who expressed anger were able to extract larger concessions from their counterparts because they were perceived as tough. Furthermore, Van Kleef et al. (2004) found that negotiators conceded more to an angry counterpart because they assumed that the anger expresser was reaching the limits of the bargaining range and that they needed to make more concessions to avoid an impasse.

Notably, the economic or monetary gains as a consequence of anger expression in negotiation are subject to some important boundary conditions. For instance, anger that is expressed toward the individual results in fewer concessions than anger expressed toward the behavior (Steinel et al., 2008). Moreover, the intensity of expressed anger can interact with the cultural value of power distance, such that high-intensity anger is less effective in eliciting concessions from high-power-distance service employees because of the perceived inappropriateness of the anger (Glikson et al., 2019). Similarly, workplace anger can backfire in the process of solving problems or improving situations when high-status supervisors express anger toward their low-status subordinates, who tend to be more sensitive to negative feedback due to a lack of status (Callister et al., 2017).

Although expressing anger in negotiation can generally help negotiators improve their economic outcomes through perceptions of toughness and narrowing bargaining range, doing so often brings a relational cost. Recipients of expressed anger tend to have less desire to work with the angry negotiator in the future (Allred et al., 1997) and are often motivated to seek retaliation when given the opportunity (Adam & Brett, 2015; Wang et al., 2012). In multiparty negotiations, anger expression can also cause the expresser to be left out of coalitions (Van Beest et al., 2008). Furthermore, negotiators who express anger are often perceived by their counterparts as selfish, motivating the counterparts to exit the negotiation without an agreement (Yip & Schweinsberg, 2017).

What has been notably missing in the growing literature on anger in negotiation is an examination of the *intrapersonal* effects of anger on the expressers, as opposed to the *interpersonal* effects on the recipients and the relationship between the parties. This is an important omission because we know that the subjective or psychological experience of a negotiation matters to negotiators (Curhan et al., 2006; Curhan et al., 2009; Curhan et al., 2010). In other words, while they value the economic outcomes, negotiators care equally about their relationship with the counterparts, the fairness of the negotiation process, and the feelings about themselves after a negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006). Importantly, these dimensions of subjective value have implications not just in the current negotiation, but for future negotiations as well (Curhan et al., 2009; Curhan et al., 2010). For instance, in a two-round negotiation, negotiators who experienced higher subjective value in the first round of the negotiation were able to achieve better economic outcomes in the second round of that negotiation (Curhan et al., 2010).

Fake Anger, Guilt, and Subjective Value

Similar to the work on anger in negotiations, research on *fake anger*, or expressed anger that negotiators do not feel, has demonstrated a variety of negative consequences for negotiators (Campagna et al., 2016; Côté et al., 2013; Hideg & Van Kleef, 2016). For example, fake anger led recipients to ask for more from their counterpart during a negotiation (Côté et al., 2013; Hideg & Van Kleef, 2016). Similarly, Campagna et al. (2016) found that fake anger hurt trust between parties and negatively affected deal implementation. In addition to these interpersonal drawbacks, we argue that expressing fake anger in negotiation can have negative intrapersonal outcomes as well, including feelings of guilt and a more negative self-perception (and a more negative subjective experience of the negotiation) for the expressers. When they do not actually feel angry, expressers of anger are intentionally taking advantage of their counterparts in an effort to reap the economic benefits of anger expression. Thus, expressing fake anger is likely to raise ethical concerns in the minds of the expressers about their own behavior (Campagna et al., 2019; Lewicki et al., 2016) and result in a feeling of guilt, which is one of the moral emotions—or emotions that result from the successful or failed enactment of a group norm or standard that is valued by an individual (Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007).

As a self-conscious moral emotion, guilt is conceptualized as “an affective state associated with a focus on specific behaviors – behaviors that often involve harm to someone or something” (Tangney, 1991, p. 599). Because expressing fake anger can lead a counterpart to make more concessions and therefore suffer economically, expressers of fake anger may perceive that this behavior (i.e., expressing fake anger) has caused harm to their counterparts’ economic interests. Causing harm to others has been shown to elicit guilt in an

individual whose behavior is responsible for others' suffering (Baumeister et al., 1994; Haidt, 2003; Hoffman, 1982). In addition to causing harm to the counterpart's economic interests, expressing fake anger can also damage the relationship between the parties and cause relational harm. Indeed, research has shown that expressing anger in negotiation is detrimental to the relationship between the parties (Campagna et al., 2016; Pietroni et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012). Because of the economic harm to the counterpart and the relational harm to the parties, we hypothesize that negotiators who express fake anger are likely to experience guilt. Furthermore, because guilt typically evokes a negative evaluation of the self (as opposed to others) and provides crucial feedback on the unacceptability of one's own behavior (Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney et al., 2007), we hypothesize that it will result in the expressers' negative self-perception as well as negative subjective experience of the negotiation. In other words, we hypothesize that expressing fake anger in negotiation will be negatively associated with expressers' self-perception and subjective experience of the negotiation, and that these effects will be mediated by expresser guilt.

Overview of Studies

We tested our hypotheses in three studies. Study 1 examined the proposed main effect – the negative relationship between fake anger and expressers' self-perception and subjective experience of the negotiation. Study 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 and test the proposed mediating effects of expresser guilt. Both Studies 1 and 2 used online samples and provided conservative tests of our hypotheses, because participants knew that their negotiation was hypothetical and that they would simply type an angry message to their counterparts. Study 3 used a face-to-face sample in a laboratory setting to replicate the findings of the first two studies and to increase the generalizability of our findings.

Study 1

Method

Participants

We recruited 133 working adults from the Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) labor marketplace to participate in an online negotiation study. Of the participants, 39% were female, 65.2% were White or European American, 14.9% were Asian or Asian American, 9.2% were Black or African American, 6.4% were Latino or Hispanic, and 1.4% self-identified as Other. Participants had a mean of 35 years of age (SD = 12.15). The sample size was based on an *a priori* power analysis for a two-condition (i.e., fake anger vs. control) experimental design, where power is 80%, $\alpha = .05$, and Cohen's f effect size is estimated at 0.25.

Procedure

After providing their consent, participants were asked to read a scenario about a negotiation regarding the purchase of a used armchair. They were asked to imagine that they would be the seller. They were also instructed to imagine that their asking price for the chair was $90, that their reservation price was $60, and that the buyer had offered to purchase the chair for $50.

To manipulate fake anger, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: fake anger and control (no anger), and asked to type in a counteroffer to the buyer. In the fake anger condition, participants were presented with information about how expressing anger in negotiation is useful for gaining concessions and asked to send an angry message with their counteroffer. Suggestions for angry messages were offered (e.g., "Are you kidding me?? That offer makes me REALLY angry"). This manipulation was adapted from previous work

in the literature (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). In the control condition, participants were simply asked to send a message and a counteroffer to the buyer.

All participants were told to imagine that their counterpart (i.e., the buyer) had accepted their counteroffer. Throughout the study, it was clear to participants that they were only part of a hypothetical negotiation scenario. Finally, participants completed a questionnaire with dependent measures and demographic questions.

Measures

Feelings about the Self. We used the 4-item Feelings about the Self subscale of the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) (Curhan et al., 2006) to measure negotiators' self-perception after the negotiation. Participants answered the following four questions: "Did you behave according to your own principles and values?", "Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator?", "Did you "lose face" (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation?", and "Did this negotiation positively or negatively impact your self-image or your impression of yourself?". Responses were on a 7-point scale with varied anchors appropriately matched to each question (e.g., 1 = *not at all*, 7 = *perfectly*, and 1 = *it negatively impacted my self-image*, 7 = *it positively impacted my self-image*). These items were then averaged together to form a composite score of Feelings about the Self (α = .51).[1]

Overall Subjective Value. We used the entire SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) to measure negotiators' overall subjective experience of the negotiation. Specifically, we took the mean of all four subscales of the SVI – Feelings about the Self, Feelings about the Relationship, Feelings about the Process, and Feelings about the Instrumental Outcome. Two questions from the Feelings about the Process subscale were removed because they did not make sense in the context of a hypothetical negotiation scenario: "Do you feel your counterpart(s) listened to your concerns?" and "Did your counterpart(s) consider your wishes, opinions, or needs?". Similarly, responses were on a 7-point scale, and the items were then averaged together to form a composite score of the SVI (α = .84).

Other Measures. To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants responded to the question, "Were you asked to express anger in this negotiation?" (yes/no/not sure). As a control measure, participants were also asked, "How angry did you actually feel during the negotiation?" (1 = *not at all angry*, 7 = *very angry*).[2]

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables are presented in Table 1. To check the effectiveness of our manipulation, we examined participants' responses to the question, "Were you asked to express anger in this negotiation?" (yes/no/not sure). A chi-square analysis was statistically significant, χ^2 (2, N = 133) = 118.63, p < .001, indicating that the manipulation was successful. The "not sure" option was included to capture any uncertainty in the manipulation, and only three participants selected this option.

[1] In their original work, Curhan et al. (2006) acknowledged that "the Self factor appears to have the least internal cohesion among items—suggesting, perhaps, a more multifaceted nature—and the lowest level of association with other scale factors." Therefore, this lower reliability score was not a complete surprise. In Studies 2 and 3, the reliability scores for this scale improved to α = .71 and α = .76, respectively.

[2] In anticipation of potential mediators of the main effect, we also included several exploratory variables, none of which were included in our hypotheses. These variables were moral self-image, emotional dissonance, guilt and shame proneness, importance of displaying authentic emotions, and moral identity.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2
1. Felt anger	2.56	1.81		
2. Feelings About the Self	4.69	1.05	-.16	
3. Global Subjective Value	5.08	.88	-.75*	.82**

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

We ran a series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test our hypothesis that negotiators who express fake anger will have more negative self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation than those who express no anger. Results showed a statistically significant effect of fake anger on Feelings about the Self across conditions, $F(1, 130) = 24.02$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$. As hypothesized, negotiators in the fake anger condition ($M = 4.29$, $SD = 0.98$) had significantly lower feelings about themselves after the negotiation than those in the control (no anger) condition ($M = 5.11$, $SD = .94$), $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$ (Figure 1). Similarly, results also showed a statistically significant effect of fake anger on overall subjective value across conditions, $F(1, 130) = 23.11$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$. As hypothesized, negotiators in the fake anger condition ($M = 4.75$, $SD = 0.82$) had significantly lower overall subjective value after the negotiation than those in the control (no anger) condition ($M = 5.43$, $SD = 0.88$), $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$.

Figure 1

Mean of Subjective Value Measures by Condition (Study 1)



Note. Error bars represent the standard error.

An alternative explanation for our results might be that asking negotiators to express anger could lead them to actually feel angry. This felt anger might in turn be responsible for their negative self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation. To rule out this possibility, we also ran our analyses after controlling for felt anger in the models, and our findings remained the same. Specifically, after controlling for felt anger, negotiators in the fake anger condition still reported lower feelings about themselves, $F(1, 130) = 20.46$,

$p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$ and lower overall subjective value, $F(1, 130) = 18.46$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$ than those in the control (no anger) condition.

Discussion

Study 1 provided initial empirical support for our hypothesis that fake anger will have negative intrapersonal effects on expressers' self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation. Compared with those who did not express fake anger, negotiators who did had lower feelings about themselves and lower overall subjective value after the negotiation. In Study 2, we sought to replicate the findings in Study 1 and test our hypothesis that the negative effects of fake anger on expressers' self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation are mediated by expresser guilt.

Study 2

Method

Participants

We recruited 185 working adults from Prolific Academic, an online participant pool, to participate in a negotiation scenario study in exchange for monetary payment. In accordance with our *a priori* exclusion criteria, seven participants were excluded for failing one or both attention checks embedded in our questionnaire, resulting in a final sample size of $N = 178$. Of these participants, 49.4% were female, 65.7% were White or European American, 13.5% were Asian or Asian American, 11.2% were Latino or Hispanic, 10.7% were Black or African American, and 2.8% self-identified as Other. Participants had a mean of 31.3 years of age ($SD = 11.81$). Sample size, exclusion criteria, hypotheses, and all study materials were preregistered on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/yv4uh.[3]

Procedure

Study 2 was identical to Study 1, with the exception that after going through the hypothetical negotiation scenario, participants answered questions about their feelings of guilt before completing the dependent measures and demographic questions.[4]

[3] For exploratory purposes, we also included a "fake happiness" condition in this study but did not make any hypotheses about its effects. This was explicitly stated in the preregistration. As a point of information for the reader, when compared to the control condition, fake happiness did not have a significant effect on feelings of guilt, shame, or subjective value. With the "fake happiness" condition, the sample size is N = 280.

[4] We included a few exploratory variables in our questionnaire. All were included in the preregistration, and none of them were included in our hypotheses. These included emotional dissonance, desire for future interaction, state shame, and the importance of displaying authentic emotions. Full materials and hypotheses are available at the preregistration link provided in the text above.

Measures

Feelings about the Self. We used the same subscale of SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) as in Study 1 to measure negotiators' self-perception after the negotiation. The items were averaged together to form a composite score of Feelings about the Self (α = .71).

Overall Subjective Value. We used the same SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) as in Study 1 to measure negotiators' overall subjective experience of the negotiation. The items were averaged together to form a composite score of SVI (α = .84).

Guilt. We used the State Shame and Guilt Scale to measure participants' feelings of guilt after the negotiation (Marschall et al., 1994). Participants answered the following five questions based on a 5-point scale (1 = *not feeling this way at all*, 5 = *feeling this way very strongly*): "I feel remorse, regret;" "I feel tension about something I have done;" "I cannot stop thinking about something bad I have done;" I feel like apologizing, confessing;" and "I feel bad about something I have done." These items were averaged together to form a composite score of guilt (*α* = .94).

Other Measures. We used the same items as in Study 1 to measure participants' felt anger and check the effectiveness of the manipulation of fake anger.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables are presented in Table 2. To check the effectiveness of our manipulation, we examined participants' responses to the question, "Were you asked to express anger in this negotiation?" (yes/no/not sure). A chi-square analysis was statistically significant, χ^2 (2, *N* = 178) = 160.36, *p* < .001, suggesting that the manipulation of fake anger was successful.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3
1. Felt anger	1.98	1.43			
2. Guilt	1.89	1.13	.21**		
3. Feelings About the Self	4.71	1.28	-.16*	-.65**	
4. Global Subjective Value	4.89	1.09	-.18*	-.64**	.86**

*p < .05. **p < .01.

To test our main effect and mediation hypotheses, we used the Preacher and Hayes (2004) bootstrapping method, with 10,000 iterations. As in Study 1, the results showed a statistically significant effect of fake anger on Feelings about the Self, *b* = -1.34, *SE* = .16, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-1.66, -1.02], such that negotiators in the fake anger condition had lower feelings about themselves than those in the control (no anger) condition. The analysis also revealed a significant, positive effect of fake anger on guilt, *b* = 1.07, *SE* = .15, *p* < .001, 95% CI[.78, 1.37]. Negotiators in the fake anger condition experienced a higher level of guilt than those in the control (no anger) condition. In addition, there was a significant, negative effect of guilt on Feelings about the Self, *b* = -.59, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-.72, -.45]. When both fake anger and guilt were added to the model as predictors of Feelings about the Self, fake anger remained significant, *b* = -.71, *SE* = .16, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-1.03, -.40], indicating partial mediation (Figure 2). The indirect effect of the model was significant, *effect* = -.63, 95% BCCI[-.93, -.35] because zero is not included in the confidence interval. Therefore, our hypotheses that fake anger is negatively associated with expressers' self-perception and that this effect is mediated by expresser guilt were supported.

Figure 2

Mediation Model with Feelings About the Self as the Dependent Variable (Study 2)



Note. Standard errors are included in brackets next to regression coefficients.
*$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Similarly, results also showed a statistically significant effect of fake anger on overall subjective value, $b = -.98$, $SE = .15$, $p < .001$, 95% CI[-1.26, -.69]. Specifically, negotiators in the fake anger condition had lower overall subjective value than those in the control (no anger) condition. The mediation analysis revealed a significant, negative effect of guilt on overall subjective value, $b = -.53$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI[-.65, -.41]. When both fake anger and guilt were added to the model as predictors of overall subjective value, fake anger remained significant, b = -.41, $SE = .14$, $p = .004$, 95% CI[-.69, -.13], indicating partial mediation (Figure 3). The indirect effect of the model was again significant, effect = -.57, 95% BCCI [-.82, -.33] because zero is not included in the confidence interval. Therefore, our hypotheses that fake anger is negatively associated with expressers' overall subjective experience of the negotiation and that this effect is mediated by expresser guilt were supported.

Figure 3

Mediation Model with Global Subjective Value as the Dependent Variable (Study 2)



Note. Standard errors are included in brackets next to regression coefficients.
*$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 again offered empirical support for our hypotheses that fake anger in negotiation will result in expressers' negative self-evaluation and overall subjective experience of the negotiation, and that these effects are mediated by expresser guilt. Despite the converging empirical evidence in Studies 1 and 2, both

studies were scenario-based experiments that were conducted with online participants. Although they provided a conservative test of our hypotheses because participants in both studies merely typed an angry message in a hypothetical negotiation scenario, it was unclear whether our findings would also be observed in a face-to-face setting. Thus, in Study 3, we sought to replicate the findings from the first two studies in a face-to-face negotiation in which participants could use the full range of verbal and nonverbal cues to express fake anger.

Study 3

Method

Participants

We recruited 198 undergraduate students from a large university in the western United States to participate in a face-to-face negotiation study in exchange for course credit. The sample size was determined by an *a priori* power analysis using G Power. In total, 99 dyads were formed. Three dyads were excluded from the analysis because the negotiators in those dyads incorrectly indicated the same negotiation role, and we were unable to determine which participant was the recipient of anger-related instructions in those dyads. An additional five dyads were excluded because the anger expressers in those dyads reported that they had not expressed any anger during the negotiation, despite being instructed to do so. This led to a final sample size of 182 participants (or 91 dyads). Of these participants, 30.8% were female, 84.6% were White or European American, 9.9% were Latino or Hispanic, 6.6% were Asian or Asian American, 2.2% were Black or African American, and 3.3% self-identified as Other. Participants had a mean of 23.0 years of age (*SD* = 3.32).

Procedure

Participants were invited into the laboratory and randomly assigned to one of two roles in a three-issue, integrative negotiation between a homeowner and a contractor over the construction of an outdoor deck. To manipulate fake anger, participants in the role of homeowners were randomly assigned to one of two conditions – fake anger or control (no anger). In the fake anger (vs. control) condition, homeowners were instructed to express anger (vs. no emotion) during the negotiation because expressing anger (vs. no emotion) would help them get a better deal. Furthermore, they were instructed to consider using facial expressions such as frowning (vs. keeping a poker face), physical expressions such as banging a fist on the table (vs. staying calm), and vocal cues such as using aggressive sentences (vs. keeping their voice steady). These instructions were adapted from previous research on anger in negotiation (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Participants in the role of contractors received no instruction about using anger (vs. no emotion).

Participants were given five minutes to read their role information and prepare for the negotiation – homeowners in one room and contractors in another. Participants were then randomly paired up with someone in the opposite role and given ten minutes to negotiate. If participants failed to reach an agreement by the end of ten minutes, their negotiation was considered an impasse. Following their negotiation in separate rooms, participants returned to their assigned rooms (i.e., homeowners vs. contractors) prior to the negotiation and completed a survey questionnaire on a computer, which included the manipulation check, dependent measures, and demographic questions. They were then debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Measures

Feelings about the Self. We used the same subscale of SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) as in Studies 1 and 2 to measure negotiators' self-perception after the negotiation. The items were averaged together to form a composite score of Feelings about the Self (α = .76).

Overall Subjective Value. We used the same SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) as in Studies 1 and 2 to measure negotiators' subjective experience about the negotiation. The only exception was that this time we included the two items that were removed in the first two studies because participants in this study conducted the negotiation. The items were averaged together to form a composite score of the SVI (α = .92).

Guilt. We used the same scale (Marschall et al., 1994) as in Study 2 to measure participants' feelings of guilt after the negotiation. These items were averaged together to form a composite score of expresser guilt (*α* = .91).[5]

Other Measures. We used the same item as in Studies 1 and 2 to check the effectiveness of the manipulation. Moreover, because not all participants in the fake anger condition might be able to easily express anger by following the instructions, we also measured self-reported anger and counterpart-reported anger. Specifically, we asked participants to respond to two items on a 7-point scale, "To what extent did YOU express anger in this negotiation?" and "To what extent did YOUR PARTNER express anger in this negotiation?" (1 = *none at all*, 7 = *a lot*).[6]

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables are presented in Table 3. To check the effectiveness of our manipulation, we examined participants' responses to the question, "Were you asked to express anger in this negotiation?" (yes/no/not sure). A chi-square analysis was again statistically significant, χ^2 (1, *N* = 91) = 248.92, *p* < .001, indicating that the manipulation of fake anger was successful.

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3
1. Expressed anger	2.35	1.67			
2. Guilt	1.58	.84	.37**		
3. Feelings About the Self	5.14	1.16	-.44**	-.53**	
4. Global Subjective Value	4.97	1.05	-.43**	-.44**	.79**

*p < .05. **p < .01.

To test our main effect and mediation hypotheses, we again used the Preacher and Hayes (2004) bootstrapping method, with 10,000 iterations. As in Studies 1 and 2, the results showed a statistically significant effect of fake anger on Feelings about the Self, *b* = -.87, *SE* = .24, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-1.34, -.40], such that negotiators (i.e., homeowners) in the fake anger condition had lower feelings about themselves than those in the control (no anger) condition. Similarly, the analysis also revealed a significant, positive effect of fake anger on guilt, *b* = .35,

[5] State shame was also measured as part of this scale.

[6] The study also included two exploratory variables which were not included in our hypotheses—importance of displaying authentic emotions and desire for future interaction.

SE = .18, *p* = .049, 95% CI[.001, .70]. Negotiators in the fake anger condition experienced a higher level of guilt after the negotiation than those in the control (no anger) condition. In addition, guilt had a significant, negative effect on Feelings about the Self, *b* = -.67, *SE* = .12, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-.92, -.43]. When both fake anger and guilt were added to the model as predictors of Feelings about the Self, fake anger remained significant, *b* = -.63, *SE* = .21, *p* = .003, 95% CI[-1.05, -.22], indicating partial mediation (Figure 4). The indirect effect of the model was significant, *effect* = -.24, 95% BCCI [-.56, -.01] because zero is not included in the confidence interval. Therefore, our hypotheses that fake anger is negatively associated with expressers' self-perception and that this effect is mediated by expresser guilt were again supported.

Figure 4

Mediation Model with Feelings About the Self as the Dependent Variable (Study 3)



Note. Standard errors are included in brackets next to regression coefficients.
*$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Similarly, results showed a statistically significant effect of fake anger on overall subjective value, *b* = -.67, *SE* = .21, *p* = .002, 95% CI[-1.09, -.25], such that negotiators in the fake anger condition had lower overall subjective value than those in the control (no anger) condition. In addition, the mediation analysis also revealed a significant, negative effect of guilt on overall subjective value, *b* = -.48, *SE* = .12, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-.71, -.24]. When both fake anger and guilt were added to the model as predictors of overall subjective value, fake anger remained significant, *b* = -.50, *SE* = .20, *p* = .01, 95% CI[-.90, -.10], indicating partial mediation (Figure 5). The indirect effect of the model was significant, *effect* = -.17, 95% BCCI [-.40, -.01] because zero is not included in the confidence interval. Therefore, our hypotheses that fake anger is negatively associated with expressers' overall subjective experience of the negotiation and that this effect is mediated by expresser guilt were again supported.

As an exploratory analysis, we also ran an additional mediation model using self-reported fake anger as the predictor, Feelings of the Self as the outcome, and guilt as the mediator. Using the same bootstrapping method with 10,000 iterations (Preacher & Hayes, 2004), we found that negotiators who expressed higher levels of fake anger had lower feelings about themselves, *b* = -.32, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-.45, -.18], as well as higher levels of guilt, *b* = .18, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, 95% CI[.09, .28]. Guilt also had a significant, negative effect on Feelings about the Self, *b* = -.60, *SE* = .13, *p* < .001, 95% CI[-.86, -.35]. When both self-reported fake anger and guilt were added in the model, self-reported fake anger remained significant, *b* = -.20, *SE* = .06, *p* = .002, 95% CI[-.33, -.08], indicating partial mediation. The indirect effect of the model was significant, *effect* = -.11, 95% BCCI [-.22, -.03], because zero was not included in the confidence interval.

Figure 5

Mediation Model with Global Subjective Value as the Dependent Variable (Study 3)



Note. Standard errors are included in brackets next to regression coefficients.
*$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Similarly, we also ran the same exploratory analysis with self-reported fake anger as the predictor, overall subjective value as the outcome, and guilt as the mediator. Again, we found that negotiators who expressed higher levels of fake anger had lower overall subjective value, $b = -.26$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI[-.38, -.14]. Guilt had a significant, negative effect on overall subjective value, $b = -.40$, $SE = .12$, $p = .002$, 95% CI[-.64, -.16]. When both self-reported fake anger and guilt were added in the model, self-reported fake anger remained significant, $b = -.19$, $SE = .06$, $p = .003$, 95% CI[-.31, -.07], again indicating partial mediation. The indirect effect of the model was significant, effect = -.07, 95% BCCI [-.16, -.02], because zero was not included in the confidence interval.

These exploratory analyses added empirical support to the statistically significant findings in our original mediation analyses and were also consistent with our findings in Study 2, suggesting that expresser guilt mediates the effects of fake anger on expressers' Feelings about the Self and overall subjective value.

Discussion

In Study 3, we tested our hypotheses in a face-to-face negotiation. The results of this study again provided empirical evidence that fake anger in negotiation has a negative impact on the expresser's self-perception and this effect is due to an increased feeling of guilt. However, our results also suggested that it was more difficult to express fake anger in a face-to-face setting, resulting in a weaker effect than what we had observed in earlier online negotiation studies. In other words, some participants restrained their expression of fake anger in a face-to-face setting, suggesting possibly that fake anger is aversive to people, especially when they need to express it to their counterpart's face. Alternatively, it could be because negative emotions such as anger might generally be more difficult to feign (Kopelman et al., 2006). To alleviate the concern with the difficulty in expressing fake anger in a face-to-face negotiation, we conducted a series of exploratory analyses with self-reported fake anger as the predictor and observed similar patterns of results.

General Discussion

In this research, we examined the intrapersonal effects of fake anger in the context of negotiation. Specifically, we found converging empirical evidence across three studies that fake anger in negotiation had negative effects on expressers' self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation due to expresser guilt. Study 1 provided initial empirical evidence that negotiators who expressed fake anger in a hypothetical online negotiation had worse feelings about themselves and lower overall subjective value. Study

2 expanded our research by testing our proposed mechanism for these effects and found that expresser guilt mediated the negative effects of fake anger on expressers' self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation in an online negotiation. Study 3 provided further empirical support for our hypotheses by demonstrating that negotiators who expressed fake anger in a face-to-face negotiation also had worse feelings about themselves and lower overall subjective value due to a feeling of guilt. Together, these findings demonstrate a real risk with expressing fake anger in negotiation from an intrapersonal (vs. interpersonal) perspective in that it can negatively impact expressers' self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

Our research makes several contributions to the growing literature on fake anger in negotiation. First, our research adopts an intrapersonal perspective and represents one of the first to explore negotiators' self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation after expressing fake anger in a negotiation. While previous research on fake anger examined its *interpersonal* effects (Campagna et al., 2016; Côté et al., 2013; Hideg & Van Kleef, 2016), and recent negotiation research started to pay more attention to the expresser's perspective more generally (e.g., Jang & Bottom, 2021), negotiation scholars have yet to directly examine the *intrapersonal* effects of fake anger in negotiation. This introspective process is especially important for negotiators because how negotiators feel about themselves after a negotiation can affect their future motivation to work toward agreements with others (Curhan et al., 2006), and any perceived threats to the self can have a negative impact on their economic outcomes in future negotiations as well (Curhan et al., 2009; Curhan, et al., 2010; White et al., 2004). Furthermore, our focus on the intrapersonal effects of fake anger aligns the work on fake anger in negotiation with the research on emotional labor, which has convincingly indicated that inconsistencies between a person's experienced and expressed emotions result in negative employee and organizational well-being (for a review, see Grandey & Gabriel, 2015). Our work brings this broader literature into focus for negotiators by specifically demonstrating how fake anger affects negotiators' self-perception and subjective value.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, we build on research on moral emotions to investigate the role of guilt in the connection between the expression of fake anger and negative self-perception and subjective experience of the negotiation. We found that guilt is an important mechanism through which fake anger leads to both lower feelings about the self and lower overall subjective value in a negotiation. Although researchers have studied guilt in the negotiation context (e.g., Campagna et al., 2019; Cohen, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2006), our research on guilt as a self-condemning moral emotion offers a relevant explanation for why fake anger leads to a negative self-assessment. Therefore, our work also contributes to the broader research on moral emotions by showing that a moral emotion (i.e., guilt) may be triggered when individuals express a different emotion (i.e., anger) that they do not feel.

Our research also contributes to the practice of negotiation in that we have shown that it is important for negotiators to pay attention to the intrapersonal (vs. interpersonal) effects of fake anger expression in negotiation. While expressing anger that one does not feel has well-documented economic benefits in negotiation (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004), our research suggests that negotiators ought to carefully weigh these immediate economic benefits against the potential long-term psychological costs of such behavior. Given the importance of negotiators' psychological experience in determining their long-term success in negotiation (e.g., Curhan et al., 2009; Curhan et al., 2010), it is in negotiators' best long-term interest to avoid expressing fake anger in negotiation and instead remain true to their feelings by displaying authentic emotions.

Finally, our findings may also add to a broader discussion about societal discord as a whole, especially when the political environment has become increasingly polarized in a society (Desilver, 2022; Mounk, 2022). As some organizations and entities seek to use inauthentic emotions such as fake anger to inflame public discourse

and further polarize public opinion, it is helpful to acknowledge the detrimental effects of such inauthentic emotional expressions not just on society as a whole but on the expressers themselves.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

While this research enhances our understanding of the intrapersonal effects of fake anger on expressers' self-perception and subjective experience of the negotiation, our studies have several limitations and thus introduce some avenues for future research. First, building on the connection between emotion expression in negotiation and moral emotions, our research examined a self-conscious moral emotion – guilt. Future research could expand this line of inquiry by investigating other self-conscious moral emotions, such as embarrassment (Tangney et al., 2007), and whether and how they may also be elicited by the expression of fake emotions, such as anger.

Second, while our research focused on understanding how the expression of fake anger affected self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation, the broader work on subjective value in negotiation has shown that subjective value can also influence the economic outcomes of a negotiation (Curhan et al., 2010). Thus, it would be fruitful for future research to explore how fake anger, and the resulting guilt, may impact expressers' economic outcomes in future negotiations. For example, do negotiators who express fake anger in an initial negotiation tend to make more concessions in subsequent negotiations because they feel guilty? Questions like these can add to our understanding of the relationships between fake emotions, subjective value, and economic outcomes of a negotiation.

Third, our findings related to lower subjective value may offer some insight into why violent protests—in which negative emotions run high and escalate the conflicts between groups—often lead to individuals feeling negatively toward those with whom they disagree. More broadly, our work may offer a key individual contributor to how hostile organizational climates are initiated or sustained. Indeed, Curhan et al. (2010) have suggested that subjective value tends to have a trickle-down effect that impacts future negotiations and relationships. Furthermore, work on emotional contagion has suggested that negative emotions in particular can spread to others, causing elevated emotions among the groups (Barsade, 2002). Therefore, future research could build on our work, which was focused on the negotiation context, and examine the intrapersonal effects of fake anger in other contexts including the organizational context. Additional research in this area can help to increase the generalizability of our findings and shed more light on how fake anger influences the expressers across different situations.

Finally, future research can also explore important boundary conditions that may allow fake anger to have more or less of an impact on expressers. An interesting question may focus on the differing levels of guilt that could result from expressing fake anger across different cultures. Individual differences such as power, gender, and personality may also have a similar impact. For example, because of their overemphasis on their personal goals (Smith & Galinsky, 2010), do individuals with high power feel less guilty about expressing fake anger? Or, because power allows for greater authenticity (Kifer et al., 2013), are powerful individuals less likely to express fake anger overall? Although our studies did not investigate the effects of variables such as power due to the focus of our research, the potential influence of these variables creates another avenue to explore the intrapersonal effects of fake anger in future research.

Conclusion

As asserted by Mark Twain in the opening quote, anger is often more destructive to the individuals expressing it than to those receiving it. Our research demonstrated that expressing anger that one does not feel in negotiation is psychologically detrimental to the expressers, as it makes them feel guilty and, as a result, experience a more negative self-perception and overall subjective experience of the negotiation. While the interpersonal effects of fake anger in negotiation rightfully deserve scholarly attention, our findings suggest that

its intrapersonal effects cannot be ignored because negotiators' psychological wellbeing (and likely long-term economic success) is at stake.

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Author Bios

David A. Hunsaker is Assistant Professor of Management and Organizations at NYU Shanghai with a joint appointment in the Department of Management and Organizations at New York University's Stern School of Business. He received his Ph.D. in Business Administration from the University of Utah David Eccles School of Business. His research interests include emotion and cross-cultural negotiation.

Teng Zhang is Assistant Professor of Management at Penn State Harrisburg. He received his Ph.D. in Business Administration from David Eccles School of Business at the University of Utah. His research examines behavioral ethics & morality, conflict management & negotiation, and social hierarchy in organizations.

McKenzie Rees is an Assistant Professor at Brigham Young University. She received her Ph.D. in Business Administration from the University of Utah. Her research focuses on the situational factors that encourage employees to engage in behavior that is inconsistent with their own, and the organization's, values, looking specifically at negotiation contexts and situations that are unique to women at work.

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Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Dual Concerns Model: Need for Dominance, Narcissism, and Emotion Regulation Also Play a Role

Mark H. Davis[1], Jake Duggan[1], Madison Gumprecht[1], Octavia Loll[1], & Brittany Poulo[1]

1 Eckerd College

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Dual concerns model; conflict styles; emotion regulation; self-report; multiple regression

Correspondence
Mark H. Davis, davismh@eckerd.edu

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Abstract

This investigation examines key assumptions underlying the dual concerns model (DCM): that one's conflict style is jointly determined by 1) the degree to which one values attaining one's own goals, and 2) the degree to which one values attaining the other party's goals. It also explores the possibility that conflict styles might result from self- and other-oriented constructs not identified in the DCM, as well as by emotion regulation skills. Undergraduate participants completed a measure of conflict styles, simple concern for self- and other-goals, and several additional measures including narcissism, need for dominance, and emotional regulation. Mixed support for the DCM assumptions was found. Patterns consistent with the model emerged for the dominating and obliging styles, and partially for the Integrating style; no support was found for the avoiding style. In addition, measures of narcissism and need for dominance contributed substantially to the dominating style, above and beyond the effect of simple concern for self-goals and other-goals. Emotional regulation variables (reappraisal, rehearsal, and aggression control) also contributed to four of the five conflict styles above and beyond the effect of simple concern for self-goals and other-goals. Implications for the DCM are discussed.

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The "conflict styles" approach has long been a popular model for studying how people respond during conflict. Derived originally from the work of Blake and Mouton (1964; 1970), and elaborated upon by others (e.g., Rubin et al., 1994; Ruble & Thomas, 1976), this approach is based on the idea that the ways in which people act during conflict are the result of two underlying, independent dimensions: 1) the degree of concern for attaining one's own goals, and 2) the degree of concern for attaining the other person's goals (Van de Vliert, 1997). According to this *dual concerns model* (DCM), one's conflict style results from one's location on these underlying dimensions.

Many investigations of conflict style have been conducted, but the vast majority have not directly evaluated the core assumptions of the DCM: namely, that conflict styles actually result from particular combinations of self- and other-concern. For example, numerous studies have been conducted to compare the conflict styles of groups that are thought to differ in in some way, such as men compared to women (e.g., Chusmir & Mills, 1989), or people from collectivist cultures compared to those from individualistic ones (e.g., Pearson & Stephan, 1998). However, simply finding differences between such groups produces no direct evidence regarding *why* they differ. A handful of studies have directly tested the DCM's assumptions through experimental manipulations (e.g., Sorenson et al. 1999). However, these have yielded very mixed results. Thus, more than 50 years after the DCM's introduction, there is surprisingly little evidence directly supporting its key tenets. In this investigation we carry out such a test, and also evaluate possible explanations for the mixed support that the DCM has received.

The Dual Concerns Model

According to the logic of the DCM, someone high on a concern for both self- and other-outcomes will adopt an *integrative*, problem-solving style of handling conflict, because that style will satisfy both concerns; someone high on a concern for self-outcome, but low on a concern for other-outcome, will likely adopt a competitive style devoted to *dominating*. Similarly, someone low on a concern for self-outcome, but high on a concern for other-outcome, will adopt an *obliging* style characterized by yielding to the other person; someone low on a concern for self-outcome and low on a concern for other-outcome will simply try to *avoid* conflict altogether. Finally, dual-concern models often conceive of a fifth conflict style, *compromise*, which characterizes those at intermediate locations on both underlying dimensions.

It is useful at this point to make a distinction between two components of the DCM: 1) the degree to which the individual wants to achieve self-goals and other-goals (i.e., the dual concerns); and 2) the choice that the individual makes regarding how to act (the chosen conflict style). The concerns can be thought of as motives—varying in strength—directed toward the achievement of particular goals. Based on the relative strengths of these motives, the individual then chooses a course of action that best satisfies these motives. Thus, the model includes both motivational components (the strength of each concern) and cognitive ones (the choice of strategy).

The DCM can also be viewed as operating at two different conceptual levels. The first level reflects how the individual responds to conflict under a particular set of conditions, such as the status of the two parties (e.g., Drory & Ritov, 1997; Slabbert, 2004), or the importance of the issue at stake. At this level, concern for self and concern for other are determined by the particular characteristics of the two parties, the role relationships between them, the specific nature of the current conflict, and any other relevant information. The self-outcomes and other-outcomes in this case result primarily from a *particular* set of circumstances. In a way they represent what might be termed "state" levels of self-concern and other-concern. Research adopting this perspective assesses responses to conflict in situations in which the participants possess information regarding such specific circumstances (e.g., Rahim, 1983; Sorenson et al., 1999).

The second approach is to consider the five conflict styles as individual difference variables reflecting somewhat stable concerns for self and other across situations. Participants are asked to indicate how likely they are to employ various conflict styles in their lives (e.g., Cai & Fink, 2002). Thus, any concern for self-outcomes and other-outcomes that might motivate participants' responses do not refer to specific outcomes from a particular kind of interaction, but represent in general the degree to which one values one's own interests in life and how much one values the interests of interaction partners. This approach is often used when the research question has to do with personality correlates of conflict style preferences (e.g., Tehrani & Yahmini, 2020; Wood & Bell, 2008), or when an investigation is addressing possible group differences in conflict style (e.g., Holt & DeVore, 2005).

Evidence for the Model

Many investigations of conflict style have been conducted, but the vast majority have not directly evaluated the core assumptions of the DCM: namely, that conflict styles actually result from particular combinations of self- and other-concern. For example, numerous studies have been conducted to compare the conflict styles of groups that are thought to differ in in some way. Research has compared the conflict styles of men and women (e.g., Chusmir & Mills, 1989; Korabik et al., 1993), those occupying different status levels (e.g., Lee, 2002; Rahim, 1983) and those from differing cultures (e.g., Cai & Fink 2002; Elsayed-Ekhouly & Buda 1996; Pearson & Stephan, 1998; Rahim et al., 2000). Generally speaking, such investigations have found group differences that appear to support the model—*if* it is assumed that the particular groups under investigation also differ in terms of their general concern for self and concern for other. Thus, the fact that women tend to score higher on obliging and lower on dominating can be taken as supporting the DCM if it is assumed that women are generally higher than men in their concern for other-outcomes. The fact that higher status individuals are more likely to use a dominating style and less likely to oblige can be seen as support if it is assumed that self-outcomes for lower-status people are more at risk during conflict. However, these assumptions are rarely tested.

The relatively few attempts to conduct more direct tests have yielded mixed results. One such attempt is the meta-analysis carried out by DeDreu et al. (2000) on "social motives" research in negotiation. The authors identified 28 studies that had manipulated "prosocial" and "egoistic" motives within a negotiation task, and then focused on one particular prediction of the DCM model: that collaborative problem solving is uniquely associated with high levels of both self- *and* other-concern. Consistent with the model, it was found that those high in other-concern acted less contentiously, engaged in more problem solving, and achieved higher joint outcomes, but only when self-concern (e.g. resistance to yielding) was also high. No other DCM claims were examined in this meta-analysis.

Sorenson et al. (1999) had college students imagine hypothetical conflict scenarios and report: 1) the degree of concern for self and concern for other that they would experience in those scenarios, and 2) their likely responses. Regression analyses were then carried out for each of the five conflict styles using concern for self and concern for other as predictor variables. Consistent with the logic of the DCM, the dominating style was positively associated with concern for self and negatively associated with concern for other; also as predicted, obliging was positively associated with other-concern and negatively associated with self-concern. The integrating style was positively associated with concern for other, but was *negatively* associated with concern for self, which is inconsistent with the model. Neither self- or other-concern were associated with avoiding responses.

Finally, Klusek-Wojciszke and Grodzicki (2018) had Polish adults complete a measure of self- and other-interest (Gerbasi & Prentice, 2013) and a measure of conflict styles based on the DCM. Using regression analyses in which the two concerns were used as simultaneous predictors of each style, limited support for the DCM was found. The dominating style was significantly associated with greater self-concern, as the

model predicts; however, it was also *positively* related to other-concern. The integrating style was positively related to other-concern, as predicted, but was unrelated to self-concern. The obliging style was not significantly associated with either concern, and the avoiding style was *positively* related to self-concern.

Possible Explanations for These Mixed Results

Taken together, the results of research testing the DCM's fundamental assumptions provide limited, and somewhat mixed, support. At least two explanations for this pattern may be advanced. The first possibility is that the core constructs underlying the DCM are too broad. "Concern for self" can be conceived of in a variety of different ways. It might refer to an overall positive estimation of one's competence and abilities (e.g., self-esteem, Rosenberg, 1965), or a desire to overcome challenges and attain goals (need for achievement, McClelland et al., 1976). It might refer to the importance of a particular outcome (e.g., placing a high importance on reaching a specific goal). It might also refer to having a grandiose sense of one's abilities and worth (e.g., narcissism, Ames et al., 2006), or a need to dominate others (need for power; need for dominance; Heckert et al. 2000). Given the many forms that self-regard can take, it seems quite plausible that some forms may be more strongly related to conflict style than others.

"Concern for other" can also be conceived in multiple ways. It might refer to a general concern for others' welfare (e.g., benevolence, Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), or placing a high value on being with others (Need for affiliation; Hill, 1987), or recognizing the importance of a particular outcome for another person (e.g., placing a high importance on a attaining a particular goal). As with narcissism, which is an inflated sense of self, concern for others might take the form of an unrealistic deference toward others (e.g., negative femininity, Spence et al., 1979). Given this variety, it seems plausible that some forms of other-regard may be more strongly related to conflict style than others.

Gerbasi and Prentice (2013) provide evidence for this line of reasoning. To validate their measures of general self- and other-concern, they had participants complete these measures along with a wide variety of instruments potentially relevant to those constructs. Self-concern was significantly correlated with a number of these: achievement motivation (r = .37), materialism (.48), narcissism (.46), and a scale measuring the desire to do well *in comparison to others* (.68). Given this pattern, it seems reasonable to argue that a general measure of "self-concern" may reflect not only a simple desire to reach self-goals, but also a grandiose view of the self, and a motivation to not only succeed but to surpass others. Gerbasi and Prentice also found that other-concern was associated with measures of other-oriented motivations such as benevolence (.36), prosociality (.25), empathic concern (.29), and with holding an interdependent self-construal (.58). Thus, because they are associated with so many more specific constructs, "general" self-concern and other-concern may be too broad to serve as reliable predictors of conflict style.

The second possible reason for the DCM's mixed support is that the model gives little attention to an element that plays a large role in conflict behavior: emotion. The logic of the DCM suggests that responses to conflict are the result of a calculation (implicit or explicit) of the degree to which one cares about one's own and the other's outcomes. This emphasis on calculation—a weighing of two quantitative values—paints a portrait of decision-making during conflict as largely rational (e.g., Bell & Song, 2005). Everyday experience, of course, suggest that this is an incomplete portrait, and that conflicts (including negotiations) can be highly emotional.

Take the case of anger, which often results from the perception that one's goals are being blocked in some way and/or when one is provoked by another person (e.g., Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). Conflict situations, including negotiations, are contexts in which both of those conditions are likely to be present, and as a result anger is the emotional state that seems most likely to play an important role in conflict situations. (Other emotions may also play a role, of course. These would include other negative emotions such as fear, or positive ones as well.) One consequence of anger is to respond with antagonism

toward the other party (e.g., Lerner et al., 2015). Another consequence of anger during conflict is that it can lead to poorer objective outcomes (e.g., Allred et al., 1997; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Thus, anger can be a potent force in determining responses to conflict, yet does not fit neatly within the DCM's framework.

Specifically, how might emotional responses complicate the predictions of the DCM? One possibility is that emotion may moderate the effect of self- and other-concern on conflict behavior. In the absence of anger, a concern for other may have the predicted effect of increasing collaborative or obliging responses. In contrast, if an individual is sufficiently angered by a perceived provocation during the conflict, then the effect of the underlying concern for other may be muted or completely overridden by the impulse to retaliate.

However, although emotion may be inevitable during conflict, its effects on behavior are not. Considerable research supports the proposition that emotions can be regulated, at least to some degree (Gross, 2007). As a result, the ability to effectively regulate one's emotional state is also likely to play a role in determining behavioral responses during conflict. One especially useful emotional regulation strategy is *cognitive reappraisal*, in which the individual changes the meaning of a situation (such as by considering factors that may have influenced the other person's actions), thus altering the emotional response that situation evokes (Gross, 2007). Such reappraisal has been found to be associated with reduced levels of negative emotion (Mauss et al., 2007) and decreased aggression (Barlett & Anderson, 2011). Other forms of emotional regulation also exist, and focus primarily on inhibiting or suppressing emotional experience and/or emotional display. For example, *suppression, aggression control*, and *emotional inhibition* (Gross, 2007; Roger & Najarian, 1989) all refer to various forms of deliberately controlling emotions. Research generally suggests that such strategies are not as beneficial as cognitive reappraisal (e.g., Gross, 2002; Gross & John, 2003), although the effects of suppression may also vary by culture (e.g., Butler et al., 2007). Finally, although it is not really a "strategy", the tendency to replay emotional situations in memory and to *ruminate* over them is also a relatively non-constructive response (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; Grant et al., 2021).

It seems highly plausible that emotion regulation skills (or the lack of same) may help explain conflict style above and beyond the impact of simple self-concern and other-concern. In the example offered earlier, it was argued that high levels of anger might override an underlying concern for the other. Such an occurrence may be especially likely for individuals with poor emotion regulation skills. In contrast, for those with good emotion regulation skills the initial anger response may be modulated enough to allow collaborative responses consistent with an underlying concern for other to still occur.

Research Questions

Given the mixed evidence to date regarding the DCM's core assumptions, this investigation examines the issue anew, and seeks to evaluate two research questions: 1) To what degree are simple self-concern and simple other-concern associated with conflict styles in the manner predicted by the DCM?; 2) To what degree do *additional* measures outside the model explain variation in conflict style above and beyond the effect of simple self- and other-concern?

Method

Participants and Procedure

Between the years 2007 - 2015, 255 undergraduate students recruited from introductory psychology classes at a small liberal arts college in the southeast U.S. (115 males, 130 females, 10 did not specify gender) participated in this study. Data regarding age and ethnicity were not collected from these participants. However, the college is a residential liberal arts college, with the overwhelming number of students falling

into the 18 – 22 age range; its student body is overwhelming European-American. All data were collected in small group testing sessions in which participants completed paper and pencil questionnaires that contained all of the items measuring the key constructs in the investigation, as well as some additional measures unrelated this paper.

First, participants completed a widely used measure of conflict styles (ROCI-II; Rahim 1983) modified for use with a student sample. Participants were asked to report the frequency with which they responded in various ways during "disagreements and conflicts with peers". Second, participants completed a set of items assessing the degree to which they generally valued self-outcomes and other-outcomes during disagreements with others. These items were written narrowly so as to constitute unambiguous measures of "simple self-concern" and "simple other-concern". Third, participants completed a battery of measures assessing different forms of self-concern and other-concern. This battery includes what might be considered both positive (e.g., self-esteem) and negative (e.g., narcissism) forms. Fourth, participants completed measures of emotional regulation.

Measurements

Conflict Measure

The Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory (ROCI-II; Rahim, 1983) is 35-item scale that assesses the degree to which respondents engage in behaviors indicative of five different conflict styles: dominating (sample item: "I am generally firm in pursuing my side of the issue"), integrating ("I try to integrate my ideas with those of my peers to come up with a decision jointly"), avoiding ("I try to avoid an argument with my peers"), obliging ("I usually accommodate the wishes of my peers"), and compromising ("I try to find a middle course to resolve an impasse"). Each scale is made up of seven items, answered using a five-point Likert-type response scale indicating how frequently the participant acts in this way during "disagreements and conflicts with peers" (1 = never; 5 = almost always).

Simple Self- and Other-Concern

We created two four-item scales to measure simple self-concern and other-concern. By "simple" we mean that items were intended to assess only a desire to achieve self- or other-goals, and nothing else. For example, the self-concern items were written so as to not tap one's feelings of self-worth (self-esteem), need for dominance, inflated narcissistic self-image, and so forth. Similarly, the other-concern items were written so as to not tap need for affiliation, dispositional compassion, and so forth. Respondents indicated their agreement with each item using a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Disagree; 5 = Agree). See Appendix for the items making up these scales.

Additional Measures of Self-Concern

In addition to the simple self-concern measure, participants also completed several other measures of self-regard. *Self-esteem* (sample item: "I feel that I have a number of good qualities") was measured via the 10-item Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965); participants responded using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Disagree) to 5 (Agree). Three additional measures were taken from the Manifest Needs Questionnaire (Steers & Braunstein, 1976): *need for achievement (*"I am a hard worker"), *need for dominance (*"I strive to be 'in command' when I am working in a group"), and *need for autonomy (*"In my work projects I try to be my own boss"). Each scale consisted of five items, answered using five-point response scales running from 1 (Disagree) to 5 (Agree).

Finally, *narcissism* was measured via the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-16; Ames et al., 2006). The NPI-16 consists of 16 pairs of items that require participants to choose between a narcissistic or non-narcissistic option (e.g., "I find it easy to manipulate people" and "I don't like it when I find myself manipulating others").

Additional Measures of Other-Concern

In addition to the simple other-concern measure, participants also completed several additional measures of other-concern. Two of these were drawn from the Extended Personal Attributes Questionnaire (EPAQ: Spence et al. 1979). The first of these was the *femininity* scale, made up of socially desirable characteristics typically endorsed more by women than men (e.g., kind). Given this item content, we considered it a measure of "positive" other-concern. The second scale was a *negative femininity* scale, made up of socially undesirable characteristics typically endorsed more by women than men (e.g., servile, gullible, spineless), in which self-concerns are largely abandoned and the needs of the other are given unreasonable weight. Given this item content, we considered it a measure of "negative" other-concern. For each item, respondents describe how well the item describes them using a five-point scale running from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very).

Finally, one subscale from the Manifest Needs Questionnaire was used to measure concern for other: *need for affiliation* ("I am a people person"). This scale consists of five items to which participants responded via a five-point Likert-type format (1 = Disagree; 5 = Agree).

Emotional Regulation

Several forms of emotional regulation were assessed. Participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), which assesses individual differences in the habitual use of two emotion regulation strategies: *cognitive reappraisal* and *expressive suppression*, each measured by five items. (Sample items: "When I'm faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me stay calm" (reappraisal), and "I keep my emotions to myself" (suppression)). Responses are made on seven-point response scales running from 1(disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly.)

Participants also completed the 56-item Emotional Control Questionnaire (ECQ 2; Roger & Najarian, 1989), which assesses four types of emotional regulation*: behavioral control, aggression control, emotional inhibition*, and *rehearsal.* A sample behavioral control item is "Almost everything I do is carefully thought out". An example of an aggression control item is "If someone insults me I try to remain as calm as possible". A sample emotional inhibition item is "I seldom show how I feel about things." A rehearsal item used was "I often day dream about situations where I'm getting back at people". Each scale consists of 14 binary items (True; False) indicating whether the item accurately describes the respondent.

Results

Initial reliability analyses revealed Cronbach alpha values lower than .60 for four scales (negative femininity, need for affiliation, need for autonomy, and behavioral control). As a result, we did not use these scales in the analyses. Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, alpha coefficients, and correlations among the variables included in this investigation.

To address the two research questions at the heart of this investigation, we carried out a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses (see Table 2). For each of the five conflict styles separately, we conducted a hierarchical analysis in which gender was entered on the first step. Gender was included because prior research has found that women and men score differently on measures of conflict style

Table 1

Correlations, Descriptive Statistics, and Internal Reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha) for all Variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Integrating	*.86*																
2. Obliging	.37***	*.82*															
3. Avoiding	-.12	.39***	*.86*														
4. Compromising	.62***	.52***	.29***	*.76*													
5. Dominating	.19**	-.12	-.10	.08	*.85*												
6. Self-Concern	-.04	-.23***	-.09	-.10	.44***	*.64*											
7. Other-Concern	.28***	.28***	.17**	.26***	-.19**	-.05	*.67*										
8. Self-Esteem	.29***	-.13*	-.26***	.02	.10	.10	-.03	*.88*									
9. Need to Achieve	.25***	-.03	-.13*	.09	.29***	.20**	.09	.25***	*.62*								
10. Need for Dominance	.17**	-.10	-.23***	.06	.58***	.30***	-.05	.17**	.49***	*.77*							
11. Narcissism	.03	-.27***	-.30***	-.15*	.54***	.36***	-.21***	.30***	.29***	.54***	*.72*						
12. Positive Femininity	.18**	.21***	.06	.19**	-.27***	-.21**	.27***	.05	.01	-.09	-.15*	*.74*					
13. Reappraisal	.36***	.31***	.07	.33***	.03	-.12	.19**	.25***	.25***	.13	.09	.16*	*.87*				
14. Suppression	-.10	.19**	.33***	.08	-.12	-.16*	-.06	-.26***	-.01	-.23***	-.22***	-.24***	.11	*.73*			
15. Rehearsal	-.25***	-.07	.12	-.16**	.20**	.27***	-.17**	-.33***	-.08	.14*	.15*	-.05	-.12	.03	*.73*		
16. Emotional Inhibition	-.14*	.21***	.44***	.08	-.11	-.09	.03	-.26***	-.08	-.25***	-.27***	-.30***	.06	.70***	.01	*.76*	
17. Aggression Control	.10	.42***	.41***	.26***	-.41***	-.40***	.30***	-.09	-.17**	-.35***	-.49***	.23***	.09	.23***	-.27***	.35***	*.75*
Mean	3.83	3.44	3.31	3.57	3.16	3.64	3.86	3.84	3.60	3.21	.36	3.95	4.88	3.60	.53	.47	.62
Standard Deviation	0.66	0.61	0.88	0.59	0.78	0.73	0.72	0.77	0.63	0.83	.21	0.54	1.21	1.28	.22	.23	.23
Response Scale	1-5	1-5	1-5	1-5	1-5	1-5	1-5	1-5	1-5	1-5	0-1	1-5	1-7	1-7	0-1	0-1	0-1

Note: Cronbach's alpha coefficients appear in the diagonal

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

(Chusmir & Mills, 1989; Korabik et al., 1993). On the second step, simple self-concern, simple other-concern, and an interaction term (created by standardizing simple self- and other-concern scores before multiplying them) were then entered. The interaction term was included because some prior investigations (e.g. Sorenson et al. 1999) have argued that the DCM's predictions about the joint effect of the two concerns imply the presence of an interaction between them. On the third step we entered additional measures of self-concern (self-esteem, need for achievement, need for dominance, and narcissism), other-concern (positive femininity), and measures of emotional regulation strategies (reappraisal, suppression, rehearsal, emotional inhibition, and aggression control).

Gender was significantly associated at Step 1 with only one conflict style (obliging), and when the Step 3 variables were entered it had no significant effects at all. Thus, gender effects are not considered further.

The first research question is whether simple self- and other-concern are associated with conflict styles as predicted by the DCM; Step 2 of these regression analyses most directly addresses this question. The addition of self-concern, other-concern, and the Self x Other interaction term significantly predicted each of the five conflict styles to varying degrees. Importantly, the Self x Other interaction was not significantly associated with any of the conflict styles; any relationship between simple self- and other-concern and conflict style can therefore be interpreted as "main effects". The dominating style was predicted most successfully (R^2 = .20). With regard to the model's specific assumptions regarding how each type of concern is associated with each style, the pattern is mixed. For dominating and obliging, the full pattern of predicted associations was found. For dominating, self-concern was significantly positively related, and other-concern was significantly negatively related. For obliging, the opposite pattern was found; self-concern was significantly negatively associated, and other-concern was significantly positively associated. For integrating, only the predicted positive association with other-concern was significant; there was no significant effect for self-concern. For avoiding, there was no support for the DCM; self-concern was unrelated, and other-concern was significantly related but in a direction opposite to prediction. (The compromising style is difficult to evaluate in terms of DCM predictions, since those choosing this style are said to be neither high nor low on self- and other-concern. The pattern of results found here for compromising most resembles that found for obliging.)

The second research question is whether additional measures of self-concern, other-concern, and emotion regulation explain additional variance in conflict styles beyond the simple measures. The third step of the analyses in Table 2 addresses this question. The entry of the additional variables produced a significant increase in R^2 for every conflict style, with the increase especially striking for the dominating and avoiding styles. Thus, the addition of variables outside the DCM markedly improved the predictability of all five conflict styles.

At Step 3, two categories of variables were entered: alternative forms of self- and other-concern, and measures of emotion regulation. Variables in both categories were significant predictors of conflict style, above and beyond the effects of self-concern and other-concern at Step 2.

The alternative self- and other-concern variables had their largest impact on a single conflict style; substantial and significant associations were found for narcissism and need for dominance in the analysis of the dominating style. In contrast, the emotion regulation variables had significant effects on every style other than dominating. Cognitive reappraisal was positively associated with integrating, obliging, and compromising; aggression control was positively associated with obliging and avoiding. Two other regulation variables (rehearsal and emotion inhibition) displayed an identical pattern—positively associated with avoiding and negatively associated with integrating. Thus, various forms of emotion regulation were substantially associated with conflict styles, above and beyond the effect of simple self- and other-concern.

Table 2

Regression Analyses Using Gender, Simple Self-Concern, Simple Other-Concern, and Additional Measures of Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Emotion Regulation to Predict Conflict Styles

Predictors	Integrating	Dominating	Obliging	Avoiding	Compromising
Step 1					
Gender	-.04	.08	-.14*	-.07	-.12
R^2	.00	.00	.02*	.00	.01
Step 2					
Gender	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.05	-.11
Self-Concern	-.06	.39***	-.24***	-.09	-.13*
Other-Concern	.26***	-.18**	.25***	.17**	.26***
Self x Other	-.05	-.10	-.07	.09	.00
R^2	.06***	.20***	.13***	.03*	.09***
R^2 Change	.06***	.20***	.11***	.03*	.08***
Step 3					
Gender	-.05	.02	-.05	.03	-.06
Self-Concern	-.02	.16**	-.05	.08	.01
Other-Concern	.16*	-.08	.10	.07	.11
Self x Other	.00	-.07	-.07	.06	.01
Self-esteem	.08	-.09	-.12	-.10	-.08
N Achieve	.10	-.01	-.06	-.01	-.02
N Dominance	.13	.39***	.14	-.05	.21*
Narcissism	-.04	.23***	-.08	-.06	-.13
P. Femininity	.07	-.11	.13*	.10	.14
Reappraisal	.24***	.01	.25***	.06	.26***
Suppression	.02	-.05	.09	.04	.05
Rehearsal	-.19**	.01	.01	.18**	-.14*
Emotion Inhibition	-.16	.05	.04	.30***	-.01
Agg. Control	.02	-.08	.26***	.27***	.11
R^2	.25***	.47***	.28***	.32***	.19***
R^2 Change	.19***	.27***	.15***	.29***	.10***

N Achieve = Need for Achievement; N Dominance = Need for Dominance; P. Femininity = Positive Femininity; Agg. Control = Aggression Control

*** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

Discussion

This study provides strong support for the argument that constructs which fall outside of the typical DCM account can explain a significant amount of additional unique variation in conflict styles. This is especially true for the dominating and avoiding styles. The results also suggest that the DCM may not be as powerful an explanation for conflict styles as is often supposed.

Integrating

The DCM offers an intriguing hypothesis: that collaboration is especially likely when both self-concern and other-concern are high. The notion that the same motive (self-concern) that produces a competitive, dominating style is also essential for collaboration is a pleasing, mildly non-intuitive narrative. The fact that this pattern did not appear in the present investigation is therefore noteworthy. Instead, only simple other-concern was associated with an integrative style. Why might we find this pattern when earlier research seemed to support the DCM?

One answer is that earlier research may have found more limited support for this pattern than is typically assumed. For example, the De Dreu et al. (2000) meta-analysis found that high levels of other-concern were associated with more problem solving and higher joint outcomes but only when self-concern was also high, a pattern consistent with the DCM account. However, this review limited itself to studies in which self- and other-concern were directly manipulated, such as through instruction or incentive. For example, one frequently used method for manipulating self-concern in those studies was to directly instruct participants to not yield to the other party until they were assured a certain minimum outcome. This "resistance to yielding" instruction is one way to conceive of self-concern, and probably applies to many situations in which a negotiator feels constraints (either internal or external) in "how far they can go" in settling a dispute.

On the other hand, in situations lacking such clear situational pressures, what effect does a more general valuing of self-outcomes have on behavior? Many investigations take such an approach by choosing not to manipulate self- and other-concern, and instead simply asking respondents to report on how they respond to conflicts—either in general, or with particular categories of people (e.g, co-worker, boss, significant other). In such investigations the DCM does not fare as well. For example, Sorenson et al. (1999) had participants complete the ROCI-II with regard to four hypothetical situations (e.g., a salesman pitching a product to you), thus providing a measure of conflict style for each scenario. In addition, for each scenario participants completed short measures of self-concern and other-concern. Regression analyses using self- and other-concern to predict conflict styles were then conducted. Although self-concern was significantly positively associated with the dominating style, it was significantly *negatively* correlated with the collaborative style. Similarly, Klusek-Wojciszke and Grodzicki (2018) had participants complete a measure of conflict style as well as the Self and Other Interest Inventory (Gerbasi & Prentice, 2013). Self-interest was significantly and positively related to the dominating style, but was not significantly associated with an integrating style.

The pattern found in this investigation is therefore consistent with these prior studies. The finding in each case is that self-concern, when measured rather than manipulated, does not contribute to an integrative style. This pattern is also consistent with earlier work by Janssen and Van de Vliert (1996) which found that other-concern was a stronger predictor of de-escalatory behavior and problem solving than was self-concern. Taken together, these findings suggest a real limitation on the DCM's ability to predict integrating responses. The fact that emotion regulation strategies *do* significantly predict such responses reinforces this view.

Dominating

This investigation provides support for the DCM's predictions concerning the dominating style; self-concern was significantly positively associated with this style, and other-concern was significantly negatively associated. However, entering additional self-concern measures on the third step of the regression analyses increased the model's R^2 substantially. In fact, the addition of these variables more than doubled the amount of variance accounted for—from .20 to .47. Clearly the measure of simple self-concern did not capture some important influences on the dominating style.

Specifically, forms of self-concern that emphasize an outsized sense of self (narcissism) and a need to dominate others (need for dominance) were significantly and positively associated with the dominating style. This pattern therefore suggests that the dominating style results from more than just a desire to achieve goals beneficial to the self; it springs also from motives to prevail even (or especially) at the expense of the other.

Obliging

This investigation also found support for the DCM's predictions concerning the obliging style; self-concern was significantly negatively associated with this style, and other-concern was significantly positively associated. Again, however, entering the additional predictor variables on the third step produced a significant increase in R^2. Aggression control displayed the strongest association with obliging; a greater tendency to tamp down impulsive hostile responses was associated with a more obliging style. The use of cognitive reappraisal strategies displayed a similar pattern. Thus, using the obliging style seems to be as strongly associated with constructive emotional regulation skills as it is with simple concern for self- and other-outcomes.

Avoiding

In contrast to the results described thus far, these analyses provide no support for the DCM's predictions regarding the avoiding style. This style is said to result when concern is low for both self-outcomes other-outcomes; simply avoiding the conflict makes sense when neither concern is operating. Contrary to prediction, in this investigation self-concern was not significantly associated with avoiding, and other-concern was actually significantly *positively* related. This is consistent with the complete absence of support for the DCM's predictions regarding avoidance previously reported by Sorenson et al. (1999) and Klusek-Wojciszke and Grodzicki (2018).

If not self- and other-concern, what accounts for variability in the use of the avoiding style? One answer seems to be emotion regulation skills. One of the largest increases in R^2 in this investigation (from .03 to .32) was found when emotion regulation variables were added to the model. Aggression control, rehearsal, and emotion inhibition were all significantly and positively related to greater avoidance. That is, respondents were more likely to endorse the avoidance style if they are likely to inhibit emotional displays—especially hostile ones—and when they are prone to ruminate about conflict episodes.

How Well Does the DCM Explain the Ways in Which People Respond During Conflict?

A reasonable conclusion to draw from this investigation is that the DCM provides a partial explanation for the use of conflict styles, but one limited by its failure to consider other factors, especially the use of emotion regulation strategies. As noted by Bell and Song (2005), the DCM suggests a view of humans as largely rational decision-makers. The choices we make when engaged in negotiations and other

here, such as the effects that dispositional narcissism and need for dominance had on the use of the dominating style. The problem, in a nutshell, is simple: how would one manipulate "state" levels of narcissism?

It seems likely to us that the expression of any conflict style is interactively determined by both states and traits. Pre-existing personality traits, values, and motives can make individuals prone to employ certain kinds of styles; for example, our results suggest that someone low on trait narcissism may in general be less likely to employ a dominating style. Similarly, characteristics of the situation (e.g., status) may have direct effects on conflict style. Those occupying a lower status role may in general be more prone to display an obliging style (e.g., Rahim, 1983). Importantly, however, states and traits are also likely to have interactive effects on the expression of conflict styles.

One possibility is that the characteristics present in a situation may sometimes be of such potency as to render traits relatively unimportant. For example, all the employees of a powerful and volatile boss may display similar conflict styles, such as obliging, regardless of the variety that exists in their dispositional conflict style preferences. Alternately, interactions with peers of equal status may allow individual preferences in conflict style to more fully manifest themselves. The stronger the situational forces, the less powerful trait characteristics are likely to be; the weaker the situational forces, the more "room" there will be for dispositional factors to shape behavior. Research testing such possibilities would have much value.

It is also possible that personality traits, values, and motives influence conflict responses in ways that are more indirect. In particular, individual predispositions may come into play at the earliest stages of a conflict episode, shaping the way in which the individual interprets the situation, with implications for downstream behavior. For example, someone high in a need for dominance may see another's relatively neutral behavior in a very different way than someone low on such a need. The higher amount of dominating behavior later displayed by the former individual may therefore result from an initially greater perception of the "threat" the other person poses. In essence, personality traits may cause two individuals to experience an "objectively" identical situation in two subjectively different ways.

Conclusion

The DCM provides a useful way to conceive of the forces behind one's choice of conflict style, but not a perfect one. Evidence for the model's core tenets is weaker than one might imagine, and as the current study indicates, factors outside the model play a substantial role in determining conflict style. Efforts to incorporate additional constructs such as these can make the DCM more powerful and comprehensive theoretical account of conflict styles.

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Author Bios

Mark H. Davis, Ph.D., is Professor Emeritus at Eckerd College. His research focuses on empathy, interpersonal conflict, and entrepreneurial mindset.

Jake Duggan, B.S. studied Psychology at Eckerd College from 2017-2020. He recently graduated from Plymouth State University with a degree in Psychology and a focus in Mental Health. He is currently pursuing a career as an Outdoor Therapeutic Guide.

Madison Gumprecht, B.S. graduated from Eckerd College in 2021 with a degree in Psychology and French. She now works as the Employer Relations and Internships Coordinator at Eckerd College.

Octavia Loll, B.S. graduated from Eckerd College in 2020 with a degree in Psychology. She is now completing her Masters degree in Occupational and Organisational Psychology (UK).

Brittany Poulo studied Psychology and Human Development at Eckerd College. Currently she is pursuing a career as veterinary technician, and working for a nonprofit organization, The Page Hill Foundation.

Appendix

Items Making Up the Simple Self- and Other-Concern Scales

Simple Self-Concern

When I am in some kind of negotiation with another person, it is important to me that I am satisfied with the eventual outcome.
During disagreements, it is important to me to come out on top.
During negotiations, it is not all that important that I get the best deal possible. (Reverse)
During a disagreement with another person, I am not all that concerned with winning the battle. (Reverse)

Simple Other-Concern

When I am in some kind of negotiation with another person, it is important to me that the other person be satisfied with the outcome.
When I am in a disagreement with another person, it bothers me if that person's feelings get hurt.
When I am negotiating with another person, it doesn't matter to me whether or not they get a fair value. (Reverse)
During a disagreement with another person, I'm not concerned about meeting their needs. (Reverse)

negotiation and conflict management research

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Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Expectations, Conflict Styles, and Anchors in Negotiation

Colleen Tolan[1], **Deborah A. Cai**[1], & **Edward L. Fink**[1]

1 Media and communication Doctoral Program, Klein College of Media and Communication, Temple University

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Correspondence
Deborah A. Cai, Klein College of Media and Communication, Temple University, 334 Annenberg Hall, 2020 N. 13th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122, U.S.A.; e-mail: debcai@temple.edu

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Abstract

This study examines whether negotiators' expectations about their opponents' conflict style and the anchoring of their initial offers affects their offers and satisfaction with their negotiation partner. Using a multi-round Ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982; *N* = 269), we first measured negotiators' own conflict styles and their expectations about their opponent's use of the accommodating or dominating style, based on Pruitt and Rubin's (1986) dual concern model, using the ROCI-II scale (Rahim, 1983). We found that when negotiators scored higher on the use of the accommodating or dominating style, they generally expected their opponent to match their conflict style. However, negotiators' use of the dominating conflict style also was associated with a high expectation that their opponent would use an accommodating style. But expectations about the opponent's conflict style did not affect offers as much as anchoring: The first round of offers served as an anchor for subsequent offers, which influenced satisfaction with the partner and with the negotiation. In other words, first round offers were a significant predictor of the offers and outcomes of the negotiation.

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Within negotiation, understanding how people respond to others' behaviors and attitudes can lead to more mutually beneficial and satisfactory outcomes (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). One approach to studying negotiation has been to examine the conflict styles that negotiators use (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Another approach has been to look at how negotiators respond to the other party's behavior (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Smith et al., 1982). However, there is little research about whether people make offers based on their expectations about how the other party will behave or what happens when those expectations are not met. Nor is there research that compares expectations about conflict styles to the anchoring of offers as affecting subsequent offers in negotiation. Drawing from expectancy violations theory as a framework, this study examines how expectations about conflict styles and the anchoring of initial offers affect negotiators' subsequent offers and their overall satisfaction with the negotiation.

Expectations and Conflict Styles

Expectations in Negotiation

Negotiation is a decision-making process during which multiple parties decide how to allocate resources (Pruitt, 1983). Among the many social and psychological factors involved in negotiation is the role of expectations (Rubin et al., 1990). How expectations about another party can affect interpersonal interaction has been the subject of investigation in anthropology (e.g., Hall, 1959), sociology (e.g., Berger et al., 1972), psychology (e.g., Bigelow, 1977; Bigelow & la Gaipa, 1975; Epstein & Eidelson, 1981) and communication (e.g., Burgoon, 1983; Burgoon & Jones, 1976). Within negotiation, expectations about the other party and the negotiation itself can influence the process of the negotiation. Early research has shown that a negotiator's expectations can contribute to assumptions about the negotiation, such as confirmation bias and perceptions of others (Darley & Gross, 1983; Rubin et al., 1990; Swann, 1984), but there has been little recent research on the role of expectations about conflict styles in negotiation.

This study uses *expectancy violations theory* (EVT; Burgoon, 1993; Burgoon & Jones, 1976) as a framework for thinking about expectations at the negotiation table. EVT was originally developed to explain the negative attitudes that can arise when another person violates our normative expectations about communication behavior. This theory posits that when a violation of normative behavior occurs, people who experience the violation interpret the behavioral violation as either positive or negative, while also evaluating the person who committed the violation. These two evaluations provide a *violation valence*. For example, if someone accidentally steps on your foot, that would be a negative violation. But if a behavior violates expectations in a way that is desirable, the violation will be evaluated as positive and will result in *more* favorable outcomes.

As part of this violation assessment, EVT proposes that individuals assess their ability to punish or reward the other person who committed the violation; this assessment is called a *reward valence*: The more ability one has to reward or punish the other person for the violation, the more positive the reward valence. For example, if the person who steps on your foot is a good friend, and it happens while dancing, the valence may be negative, but it is likely less negative than if the violator is a stranger who steps on your foot while standing in the checkout line at a store.

Initially, EVT was directed toward violations in nonverbal behavior, but it was later expanded to include expectations about social behavior more broadly, such as message comprehension and persuasive discourse (Burgoon, 2016). However, although expectations can play an important role in negotiation outcomes, there is not much research that looks at expectations about conflict styles in negotiation.

Negotiation Anchors

One way that expectations have been studied within negotiation is through the examination of *anchors*. Anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) are a well-known heuristic that negotiators use to influence decisions (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Klein et al., 2014). Anchors serve as reference points by which offers are evaluated. Anchors can be indiscriminate, such as Ariely et al.'s (2006) example of having participants recall the last digits of their social security number, which influenced how much the participants were willing to pay for a household item. Or anchors can be purposeful, such as comparing a sale price to an original price.

Anchors may serve as the basis for forming and assessing expectations about the other party and the other party's offers. In describing anchors, Ariely (2009) explained *arbitrary coherence* as the process of determining an initial price or position in one's mind against which expectations about future prices or positions are assessed. More specifically, when negotiators determine their own bargaining anchor, this anchor may be more malleable than an anchor that is externally provided, such as an original price for a product.

Examining anchors in combination with expectancy violations theory in a negotiation context is notable because the two perspectives predict slightly different outcomes: EVT suggests that individual expectations about an opponent's conflict style should influence outcomes, whereas research on anchoring suggests that the first offer should provide the strongest expectation around which subsequent offers and outcomes are anchored. This study addresses whether expectations about another person's conflict style affect the offers made in a negotiation and how those expectations hold up once an initial offer is introduced.

The Dual Concern Model

Pruitt and Lewis (1975) proposed a dual concern model that predicts variations in a negotiator's conflict style based on concerns a negotiator has for one's own versus the other party's outcomes (see Figure 1). High concern for both one's own and the other's outcomes should predict the use of a problem-solving style at the negotiation table. High concern for one's own outcomes combined with low concern for the other party's outcomes predicts that a negotiator will use a dominating style. Low concern for one's own outcomes combined with high concern for the other party's outcomes predicts the use of an accommodating style. And low concern for both one's own and the other party's outcomes predicts the use of an avoidant style (although Cai & Fink, 2002, demonstrated that avoidance may represent high concern for the other party's outcomes, and it is more complex than a simple lack of concern; see also Wang et al., 2012).

A number of experiments have tested the dual concern model (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a, 1984b; Pruitt et al., 1983; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Typically, however, these experiments have been designed to predict the behavior of individuals rather than expectations within dyads. Thus, one of the major critiques of the dual concern model has been its inability to predict outcomes when negotiators bring different motivational or stylistic orientations to the table (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, 1990).

To fill this gap, Rhoades and Carnevale (1999) tested what happens when negotiators have different motivations. Findings from their study suggest that the other party's approach and one's own negotiation style affect tactics used in negotiation. Specifically, these researchers found that negotiators who were motivated to use a dominating style were the least affected by their partner's negotiation style, whereas negotiators motivated to use a problem-solving style were most affected by their partner's negotiation style. Additionally, problem solvers indicated a higher likelihood of changing tactics based on their partner's style than did those who reported using other conflict styles.

Figure 1
Dual Concern Model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)



Research Question and Hypothses

We first wanted to know whether it is possible to manipulate expectations of one's own conflict style. Thus, we ask the following research question:

RQ. Does the manipulation of one's own and the partner's conflict styles affect participants' offers?

Our study extends research about the dual concern model as a heuristic for predicting negotiation tactics by examining the role of expectations and anchors on negotiation outcomes. We compare two opposite conflict styles, accommodating and dominating, by first asking participants about their own conflict style and then asking about the conflict style they expect the other party to use, whether accommodating or dominating.

Based on the literature review on expectations and anchors provided above, we predict negotiators will expect the other party to have motivational concerns matching their own (Ireland & Henderson, 2014); for example, someone with an accommodating style will expect the opponent to have an accommodating style. Further, if a negotiator expects the other party to have low concern for the other party's outcomes—to use a dominating style—we expect that the negotiator will make a more distributive offer, one that advantages one's own side over the opponent as opposed to an offer that could achieve mutual gains. We anticipate that when negotiators' expectations about the other party's conflict style are met, they will view the other party more favorably. Overall, we expect negotiators who use a dominating style will be less satisfied with their partner and with the negotiation overall. In contrast, we expect negotiators who use an accommodating style will be more satisfied with their partner, even when their offers are rejected, because they may have a generally more accommodating view of the other party. Thus, the following are the hypotheses to be tested in this study:

H1. Participants who report a more accommodating style will expect the other party in the negotiation to be accommodating (**H1a**), and participants who report a more dominating style will expect the other party in the negotiation to be dominating (**H1b**).

H2. Participants who expect the other party to be accommodating will make initial offers that are less distributive (**H2a**), or participants who expect the other party to be dominating will make initial offers that are more distributive (**H2b**).

H3. Participants who are dominating will be less satisfied with the negotiation.

H4. Participants who expect the other party to be accommodating will be more satisfied with the other party (**H4a**), whereas participants who expect the other party to be dominating will be less satisfied with the other party (**H4b**).

Offer refusal should result in participants being less satisfied with both the other party and the negotiation:

H5. When offers are refused, more distributive offers will result in less satisfaction with the other party (**H5a**) and with the negotiation (**H5b**).

Further, we examine whether first round offers serve as an anchor and whether these anchors are more influential than conflict style expectations. Based on anchoring research, we predict the following:

H6. Initial offers will anchor subsequent offers.

To test these hypotheses, a structural equation model will examine the relationships between the negotiator's style and the negotiator's expectation of the other party's style on offers as well as on satisfaction with the other party and the negotiation. See Figure 2 for the conceptual structural model with the hypotheses indicated.

Method

The hypotheses were tested with an experiment using a 2 × 2 design that examined the participant's own conflict style (accommodating vs. dominating) and expectations about the other party's conflict style (accommodating vs. dominating) as independent variables. Participants' own accommodating and dominating style were first measured. Then the conflict style was manipulated in that participants were randomly assigned to conditions by being told they had an accommodating or dominating conflict style. Similarly, participants' expectations about their partner's conflict style (accommodating vs. dominating) were measured. The reported conflict style of the partner was manipulated, because there was no partner; partner's responses were pre-programmed and computer generated.

A pilot study was conducted to ensure measures and manipulations used in this study were reliable, which was then followed by the main study. The research was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the researchers' university. The study was designed in Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs, 2019), and the data were collected using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). As discussed by Mason and Suri (2012), using MTurk allows for a more externally valid and diverse sample as compared to relying on college campus convenience samples.

Figure 2

Conceptual Model with Hypothesized Relationships



Participants

The study had 269 participants (males = 166 [61.7%]; females = 103 [38.3%]). Ages ranged from 21 to 55 (*M* = 36, *Mdn* = 33). (Due to one missing case, some estimates are based on *N* = 268.) Ethnicities reported were as follows: Caucasian (*n* = 183); Black or African American (*n* = 21); Hispanic (*n* = 8); Asian, Asian American, Pacific Islander (includes Indian from Asia; *n* = 35); more than one ethnicity (*n* = 11); no ethnicity specified (*n* = 10); and Native American (*n* = 1). Note that participants were asked to self-identify their own ethnicity (or more than one ethnicity) by typing in an open text box and were not required to self-disclose.

Procedure

After completing the conflict style scale, participants were provided with the following statement: "We are waiting for a person to randomly be assigned to you for a negotiation. This wait generally takes up to 2 minutes." After a short pause (up to 30 seconds), participants were allowed to proceed with the survey. They were given the following instructions:

> You will be interacting with another person through MTurk to negotiate a situation: Before interacting with the other person, please rate your expectations about how the other person is likely to handle the situation.

Participants then completed a modified version of the ROCI-II scales for accommodating and dominating (11 items in all; the scale ranged from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*) to assess their expectations about how the other party will interact with them. After completing these measures, the participants were provided with the following definitions of the accommodating and dominating conflict styles:

> ***Accommodating:*** An accommodating style is one characterized by concern for the other party's interests and outcomes over your own interests. You are willing to look for a good outcome for the other party at the cost of your own best possible outcome. You are more concerned with working WITH than AGAINST the other person.
>
> ***Dominating:*** A dominating style is one characterized by concern for your own interests and outcomes over the other party's interests. You are willing to look for a good outcome for yourself at the cost of the other party's best possible outcome. You are more concerned with working AGAINST than WITH the other person.

Participants were then asked to respond to the two following questions: (a) "I expect my partner will be more accommodating" (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), and (b) "I expect my partner will be more dominating" (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). They were then asked two versions of the following question using the same scale: "For this negotiation, I would prefer that my partner is more accommodating [dominating]."

After answering these questions, participants received the following information: "The results of your conflict style measure have concluded that you are most likely to use an Accommodating [or a Dominating] style when negotiating with others." Following this information, these two styles were once again defined. Despite having completed the ROCI-II scale, the participants' alleged conflict style was randomly assigned to them as accommodating or dominating.

Next, the negotiation task was described. "The Ultimatum Game" (Güth et al., 1982) was modified for use in this study to make it a three-round ultimatum game so we could assess the anchoring of initial offers. This game randomly pairs participants with a partner. The participants were then asked to make a single offer to the partner, who can either accept it or reject it. Participants were instructed that, if the offer is accepted, both parties would gain the amount offered, but if the offer is rejected, the game would be over. In our study, participants made offers in each of three rounds. Instead of an actual partner responding to the offer, a computer-generated response rejected the participant's offer in the first round and again in the second round. Participants were able to modify their offers in both the second and third rounds. To start, participants were provided with the following instructions:

> Your task is to divide $3 with your partner. Here's how it works: There are $3 that can be split between you and your partner. You must select from one of the following offers: $0 for you and $3 for your partner; $1 for you and $2 for your partner; $2 for you and $1 for your partner; $3 for you and $0 for your partner.

The instructions further described the three rounds of play:

> Round 1: You get to propose which offer you will make to your partner. Your partner can accept your offer or reject it. If your offer is accepted the game will end. If your offer is rejected, you can make another offer.
>
> Round 2: If your offer is accepted, the game will end. If your offer is rejected, you have one more round to propose an offer to your partner.
>
> Round 3: In this round, you can choose any amount, from 0 to $3 that totals $3, to offer to your partner or to keep for yourself. If your partner does not accept the offer in the third round, neither of you get anything. [Round 3 information was not analyzed.]

To examine their comprehension of the instructions, participants were asked, "How much money do you have to split with the other person?" "What happens if you do not come to an agreement with the other side?" and "How many rounds will you have to try to reach an agreement?" After responding to these questions, participants were asked to make their first offer and then to explain their reason for making this offer.

After selecting their first offer (round1a offer), participants were informed that the negotiation style of their partner was now available, presumably based on the partner's completion of the conflict style scale. Participants were told that their partner was either accommodating or dominating, and once again the definitions for these styles were provided. Note, however, that information about the partner's conflict style was a deception; the partner's conflict style was actually assigned randomly, because there was no actual partner.

Before proceeding, participants were asked to verify their own negotiation style and their partner's negotiation style. They were then asked to respond "yes" or "no" to the following question: "Now that you know your partner's negotiation style, do you want to change your opening offer?" They were asked once again to select their round 1 offer (now, round1b), which gave participants an opportunity to modify their initial offer (round1a). They were once again asked to explain the reason for their offer.

After a brief pause, participants received the following response: "Your partner has rejected your offer." They were then instructed to proceed to round two. The same procedure was used for round two, except that participants were given only one opportunity to make the round 2 offer. Once again, participants

received a message that told them that their partner had rejected their offer. The same procedure was used for round three, except instead of selecting from one of four possible offers (e.g., "0 for other, $3 for self"), participants were provided with a sliding scale where they could determine the amount they were willing to offer to the partner and how much the participant would receive based on that offer: The amount offered to both oneself and the partner had to total to $3. (Qualtrics forced the two offers to total $3: e.g., if a participant slid the offer for the partner to $1.43, the slider for own offer would move to $1.57.) Next, participants were asked the same set of questions as in rounds 1 and 2.

After the round 3 offer was made, participants were told, "Unfortunately, your partner has rejected your offer once again. This is the end of the negotiation." Following this response, participants were then asked a series of questions about their satisfaction with the negotiation and its outcome, and with their partner. Finally, participants were asked to respond to demographic questions, including age, sex, and ethnicity.

At the end of the study participants were debriefed, which was important because the study involved two deceptions: First, the participant's own negotiation style and the partner's negotiation style were both randomly assigned rather than based on measured styles, and second, there was no actual partner. The debriefing information is provided in the Appendix. Each participant received $3 for participating in the study, which was the amount for which they were supposedly negotiating.

For analyses that examined round 1 and round 2 offers, the higher the number, the more distributive the offer; in other words, higher numbers represented an offer of more money for oneself and less money for the other party.

Scales

Conflict Styles

The ROCI-II scale was used to measure the five conflict styles: problem solving, compromising, avoiding, accommodating, and dominating. Each style is assessed with either 5 or 6 items (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). A sample item of the accommodating scale is "I give in to the wishes of others with whom I may be in conflict," and a sample item from the dominating scale is "I sometimes use my power to win a competitive situation."

To measure expectations about the other party's conflict style, only the accommodating and dominating scales were used. A sample of how the questions were adapted to measure a participant's expectations about the other party on the accommodating scale is "I expect the other party will accommodate my wishes," and a sample from the dominating scale is "I expect the other party will use his or her power to win a competitive situation."

Each conflict style scale used in this study (own accommodating, own dominating, expectation of other accommodating, and expectation of other dominating) was analyzed using a principal components analysis. For each style, the analyses showed that each scale had only one component with an eigenvalue over 1.0. The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of each scale was also satisfactory. Table 1 provides eigenvalues and reliabilities for each of the four scales. Once each scale was evaluated and found to be satisfactory, the component score for each scale was saved for use in all subsequent analyses.

Satisfaction

Three items measured participants' satisfaction with the other party, and four items measured satisfaction with the negotiation, using a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Example questions included the following: "My partner's response to my offer was fair," and "I perceived my partner

to be honest [trustworthy, or cooperative]" for satisfaction with the other party, and "I was pleased by the negotiation's outcome" and "I think this negotiation was set up fairly" for satisfaction with the negotiation. For each scale, the items were combined to form one scale; a principal component analysis resulted in one component for each scale with an eigenvalue above 1.0, and the scale items were reliable; see Table 1.

Table 1

Principal Component Analysis Results for Conflict Styles, Adapted Other's Accommodating and Dominating Styles, and Satisfaction with Other Party and with the Negotiation

	# of items in scale	Eigenvalue	% variance explained	Cronbach's α
Accommodating (own)	6	3.46	57.66	.85
Dominating (own)	5	3.16	63.28	.85
Accommodating (expectation of other)	6	4.60	76.72	.94
Dominating (expectation of other)	5	3.26	65.22	.87
Satisfaction with other party	3	2.46	82.21	.89
Satisfaction with negotiation	4	2.94	73.52	.87

Note. N = 269.

Evaluating the Structural Equation Model

The research question and hypotheses were tested using a structural equation model (SEM; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2018). The RQ asked whether the manipulation of one's own and the partner's conflict styles affected the participants' offers. We first compared the manipulated styles for both one's own and the partner's styles with the manipulation checks for both assigned styles; see Table 2, which shows that each manipulation was successful. Next, we tested the structural equation model that included the following variables: satisfaction with the negotiation, satisfaction with the other party, round 1a offer, round 1b offer, round 2 offer, manipulated other style (accommodating or dominating), manipulated own style (accommodating or dominating), expectation that the negotiation partner will be accommodating (measured), expectation that the other will be dominating (measured), the participant's accommodating style (measured), and the participant's dominating style (measured). The SEM analyzed the covariance matrix of these eleven variables. Six of these variables used scales that were aggregated using principal component analyses; these six variables had a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Evaluating the Research Question

In the SEM, except for the covariance between own accommodating style and own dominating style, which was not predicted so it was not assessed for significance, all coefficients were significant at $p < .05$, except for the paths from manipulated own style to round 1a offer and from manipulated other style to round 1b offer. (Recall that the own style manipulation was reported to participants prior to their making the round 1a offer, and the other style manipulation was reported to participants prior to their making the round 1b offer.) These two paths were not significant. Further, modification indices did not suggest that any additional paths should be added between these two manipulated variables and other outcome variables in

Figure 3

Structural Equation Model with Unstandardized Coefficients



Note. Except for the covariance between own style accommodating and own style dominating, which was not assessed for significance, all coefficients were significant at *p < .05 (**p < .01). The χ^2 for the model was not significant: χ^2 = 17.67, p = .41. The model had a less than 2:1 ratio between χ^2 and degrees of freedom: relative (normed) $\chi^2(17, N = 268) = 1.04$. RMSEA = .01, goodness of fit index (GFI) = .99, adjusted GFI = .96. The errors of prediction were not allowed to covary.

the model. The errors of prediction were not allowed to covary. That model's χ^2 was not significant, $\chi^2(29, N = 268) = 38.66$, $p = .11$; further, the model had a less than 2:1 ratio between the model's χ^2 and its degrees of freedom: relative (normed) $\chi^2(29, N = 268) = 1.33$, RMSEA = .03, goodness of fit index (GFI) = .98, adjusted GFI = .94. Although the model had reasonable fit, the two manipulated variables did not add anything to the model. Therefore, the answer to the RQ is that the manipulation of own and other conflict style did not affect the offers or other outcomes of the negotiation.

Table 2

Relationship Between Manipulations and Manipulation Checks

	Manipulated Style: Own		
Manipulation Check: Own	Accommodating	Dominating	Total
Accommodating	*n* = 121 (92%)	*n* = 34 (25%)	*n* = 155 (58%)
Dominating	*n* = 11 (8%)	*n* = 103 (75%)	*n* = 114 (42%)
Total	*n* = 132 (100%)	*n* = 137 (100%)	

Note. χ^2 (1, $N = 269$) = 123.03, $p < .01$; φ (phi) = .68, $p < .01$.

	Manipulated Style: Partner		
Manipulation Check: Partner	Accommodating	Dominating	Total
Accommodating	*n* = 132 (87%)	*n* = 11 (9%)	*n* = 143 (53%)
Dominating	*n* = 19 (13%)	*n* = 107 (91%)	*n* = 126 (47%)
Total	*n* = 132 (100%)	*n* = 137 (100%)	*N* = 269

Note. χ^2 (1, $N = 269$) = 162.24, $p < .01$; φ (phi) = .78, $p < .01$.

Retesting the Model

We reran the model, leaving out manipulated conflict styles (see Figure 3). The SEM analyzed the covariance matrix of these nine variables (see Table 3).

In the SEM, except for the covariance between own accommodating style and own dominating style, which was not assessed for significance (see above), all coefficients were significant at $p < .05$. The χ^2 of this model was not significant, χ^2 (27, $N = 268$) = 17.67, $p = .41$, and the model had a less than 2:1 ratio between the model's χ^2 and its degrees of freedom: relative (normed) $\chi^2(17, N = 268) = 1.04$, RMSEA = .01, GFI = .99, adjusted GFI = .96. The errors of prediction were not allowed to covary. The model had excellent fit.

Further, a χ^2 comparison between the retested model and the first model showed a significant improvement when the two manipulated variables were removed (χ^2 difference = 20.99, difference in df = 12, $p < .05$), according to a standard significance table (Timm, 1975, p. 588). Further, the model indicators, such as GFI, RMSEA, the relative χ^2, and the model's probability, were better in the second model over the first. Figure 3 provides the estimated structural model.

Results

Hypothesis 1

H1 predicted that participants who reported a more accommodating style would expect the other party in the negotiation to be accommodating (H1a), and participants who reported a more dominating style would expect the other party in the negotiation to be dominating (H1b). Participants were asked to estimate

Table 3

Means (Standard Deviations) and Correlations (and Covariances) of Conflict Styles, Offers, and Satisfaction

	†Mean (*SD*)	Own accommodate	Own dominate	Expect other to accommodate	Expect other to dominate	Round 1a offer	Round 1b offer	Round 2 offer	Satisfaction w/ partner	Satisfaction w/ negotiation
†Own accomm	0.00 (1.00)	1.00 (1.00)								
†Own domin	0.00 (1.00)	.02 (.02)	1.00 (1.00)							
†Expect other accomm	0.00 (1.00)	.39** (.39)	.49** (.49)	1.00 (1.00)						
†Expect other domin	0.00 (1.00)	.21** (.21)	.37** (.37)	-.06 (-.06)	1.00 (1.00)					
Round 1a offer	2.93 (.66)	.22** (.14)	.09 (.06)	.13* (.08)	.12 (.08)	1.00 (.43)				
Round 1b offer	2.92 (.73)	.27** (.20)	.12 (.09)	.22** (.16)	.09 (.07)	.81** (.39)	1.00 (.54)			
Round 2 offer	2.74 (.74)	.33** (.24)	.09 (.06)	.24** (.17)	.12 (.09)	.37** (.18)	.38** (.21)	1.00 (.55)		
†Satisf w/ partner	0.00 (1.00)	.26** (.26)	.32** (.32)	.47** (.47)	.16** (.16)	.16** (.11)	.25** (.18)	.17** (.13)	1.00 (1.00)	
†Satisf w/ negotiat	0.00 (1.00)	.30** (.30)	.46** (.46)	.48** (.48)	.32** (.32)	.23** (.15)	.30** (.22)	.26** (.20)	.66** (.66)	1.00 (1.00)

†*Note*. *N* = 269. For all multi-item scales, means are 0.00 and standard deviations are 1.00 because component scores were used. *p < .05. **p < .01.

the extent to which the other party was expected to be accommodating or dominating *before* being told the alleged conflict style of the other.

To test Hypothesis 1, we examined the correlation and SEM unstandardized coefficient , represented by a lower-case b, between one's own accommodating style and the expectation of the other's accommodating style; this correlation was significant (r = .39, p < .01; b = 0.46, p < .01), as was the correlation between own dominating style and the expectation of the other's dominating style (r = .37, p < .01; b = 0.36, p < .01). The relationships between own accommodating style and the expectation that the other would be dominating (r = .21, p < .01; b = 0.20, p < .01) and between own dominating style and the expectation that the other would be accommodating (r = .49, p < .01; b = 0.62, p < .01) were also significant.

Although the data supported H1a and H1b, there was more going on in this relationship than just matching one's own style with expectations about the other's style. When participants were accommodating, they expected the other party to be more accommodating than dominating, and when participants were dominating, they also expected the other party to be more accommodating than dominating.

The SEM confirmed what the correlations showed. In addition, the SEM's R^2 for the expectation that the other would be accommodating was .51, but the R^2 for the expectation that the other would be dominating was much smaller (but still significant) at .18. H1a and H1b were both supported.

Hypothesis 2

We predicted that participants who expected the other party to be accommodating would make initial offers that were less distributive (H2a), whereas participants who expected the other party to be dominating would make initial offers that were more distributive (H2b). The correlation between the expectation that the other would be accommodating with the initial offer was significant but in the opposite direction than expected (r = .13, p < .05), suggesting that the expectation that the other would be accommodating led to initial offers that were more distributive. The same relationship was found between the expectation that the other would be dominating; however, this correlation was not significant (r = .12, *ns*). Further, in the SEM, there were no significant coefficients between expectations that the other party would be accommodating or dominating with the initial offer. H2a and H2b were not supported.

Hypothesis 3

We hypothesized that participants who were dominating would be less satisfied with the negotiation. The correlation and SEM unstandardized coefficient between own dominating style and one's satisfaction with the negotiation was positive and significant (r = .46, p < .01; b = 0.14, p < .01). These results suggest that participants who reported a more dominating conflict style were more satisfied, not less satisfied, with the negotiation. Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Hypothesis 4

We predicted that participants who expected the other party to be accommodating would be more satisfied with the other party (H4a), whereas participants who expected the other party to be dominating would be less satisfied with the other party (H4b). Expectation that the other would be accommodating was significantly and positively associated with the participants' satisfaction with the other party (r = .47, p < .01; b = 0.78, p < .01), and expectation that the other would be dominating was also significantly and positively associated with satisfaction with the other party (r = .16, p < .01; b = 0.41, p < .01). Thus, H4a was supported.

Although the relationship between expecting the other to be dominating and satisfaction with the partner was significant, it was inconsistent with the direction of the hypothesis. H4b was not supported.

Hypothesis 5

We expected that, in the context of refused offers, distributive offers should result in less satisfaction (H5a) with the other party and with the negotiation (H5b). Recall that in this experiment, the participants' offers were all refused. And note that a distributive offer involved offering less to the other party and more to oneself. Thus, the refusal of this distributive offer should make participants unhappy with the other party and with the negotiation.

To test H5a, we considered the correlation and SEM unstandardized coefficient between the round 1b offer with satisfaction with the other party, which was positive (r = .25, p < .01; b = 0.35, p < .01). The more distributive the offer, the more satisfaction with the other party, which was in the opposite direction of the prediction in H5a.

To test H5b, we considered the relationship between the round 1b offer and satisfaction with the negotiation; the correlation was positive (r = .30, p < .01); however, in the SEM, the path was not significant, so it was not included in the model. The more distributive the offer, the more satisfaction with the negotiation, which was in the opposite direction of the prediction of H5b. The path from the round 2 offer to satisfaction with negotiation was included in the SEM; however, this path was also positive (b = 0.13, p < .05). Therefore, neither H5a nor H5b were supported.

Hypothesis 6

This hypothesis predicted that initial offers would anchor subsequent offers. To examine this hypothesis, we had two relationships that could be tested: the influence of the round 1a offer on the round 1b offer, and the relationship between the round 1b offer and the round 2 offer. The relationship between round 1a offer and round 1b offer was positive and very strong (r = .81, p < .01; b = 0.88, p < .01). The relationship between the round 1b offer and round 2 offer was also positive (r = .38, p < .01; b = 0.32, p < .01). The first path was remarkably high and supportive of the anchoring effect. Hypothesis 6 was supported.

Discussion

This study tested (1) whether negotiators expect their opponent would use a conflict style similar to their own, (2) how offers were influenced by these expectations, (3) the extent to which initial offers served as anchors, and (4) how negotiators' satisfaction with the negotiator's counterpart and with the negotiation developed when offers were being exchanged. We posited six hypotheses. Although not all the hypotheses were supported, the results provide insight into the effect of expectations and anchoring on negotiation outcomes.

Results showed that negotiators expected their opponent's conflict style would be similar to their own conflict style, and our results support this prediction: Accommodating negotiators expected their opponent to be accommodating, and dominating negotiators expected their opponent to be dominating. This was a *matching effect* (Ireland & Henderson, 2014).

However, we also found an effect that was not predicted, one that suggests greater complexity. Although accommodating negotiators expected that their opponent would be dominating, the largest effect for expectations was that dominating negotiators expected their opponent to be accommodating. This finding suggests that *mismatching* may be more likely than matching.

Further, the expectation that the opponent would use an accommodating style yielded a more, rather than a less, distributive offer. Perhaps participants expected their opponents to be pushovers, resulting in offers that were more distributive. But the expectation that the opponent would be more

dominating had no significant effect on the initial offer; possibly negotiators who expected their opponent would use a dominating style used a wait-and-see mindset about making offers that were more or less distributive.

We also found that dominating participants were quite satisfied with the negotiation. Moreover, although not hypothesized, results showed that accommodating participants were also satisfied with the negotiation (r = .30, p < .01). These results may reflect participants treating the negotiation process more as a computer game, so everyone found the "game" to be, overall, a more positive experience. Maeve Duggan, of the Pew Research Center (December, 2015, p. 13), reported that

> While the public is largely uncertain what to think about video games, within the gaming community there is more consensus. Put simply, people who play video games are more likely to respond to the positive aspects of their pastime while they disagree with certain negative portrayals.

The satisfaction found in our negotiation study may simply reflect an entertainment value of negotiating online. Relatedly, distributive offers—especially those refused by one's partner—resulted in the negotiation being more satisfying, which supports the idea that negotiating online was more like a fun game rather than reflecting a serious disappointment with one's partner.

Relatedly, satisfaction was found regardless of the expectations about one's partner's conflict style. Like soft positional bargaining, accommodating is often associated with being nice, whereas dominating, like hard positional bargaining, is often associated with being tough, or even mean (Fisher & Ury, 1991). Thus, having the expectation that the other will accommodate to one's own needs should be satisfying. But the effect of expecting a negotiation partner to be dominating was weak. That said, this finding was consistent with those of Rhoades and Carnevale (1999), who found that negotiators who use a dominating style were least affected by their partner's negotiation style.

These results also raise an interesting question about expectations: Are expectations more informative for those who presume the other negotiator will use an accommodating style? In other words, do those who expect the other to accommodate find outcomes to be more satisfying simply because they have a rosier expectation? There has been some evidence to suggest that having positive expectations (or no expectations at all) may lead to more positive experiences (see Ariely, 2009). Our findings were far from conclusive on this front. However, further exploration regarding the extent to which initial positive expectations may (or may not) overwhelm offers could help to better determine the ways in which pre-existing expectations affect negotiation.

Finally, support was found for the anchoring effect of initial offers. Once an initial offer was made, it had a strong influence on subsequent offers. In other words, offers were built on the anchor of the initial offer rather than being a process of simple trial and error. The anchoring effect has been supported in previous research (see, for example, Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995), but it was significant here as a replication of the effect in a new context. The current study provides support for the strength of anchors despite having added social information—in this case, one's own and one's partner's conflict style.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

There are several limitations to our study that can be addressed in future research. The manipulations of the negotiator's conflict style and the other party's conflict style did not yield significant results. Further research could eliminate these manipulations. We evaluated the influence of telling negotiators their partner scored high on the accommodating or dominating style, as well as telling the participants they were accommodating or dominating despite how they actually scored on these conflict style scales. Yet the manipulation of conflict styles had no influence on the expectations, offers, or

satisfaction. Instead, the measured versions of participants' own conflict style and their expectations about the other party's style influenced their offers and their satisfaction with the other party and with the negotiation.

We limited our examination of conflict styles to accommodating and dominating. Although we measured additional conflict styles (own problem solving, compromising, and avoiding), we did not consider these styles in this study. These styles, and expectations about the opponent's use of these styles, could be examined in future research.

There are a number of directions for future research based on our model. Overall, it seems that negotiators hoped for or expected their opponent to be accommodating, whether or not they themselves were accommodating. Is this a cultural expectation influenced by American individual norms and expectations around competition? In other words: I expect to win, so I expect you to give in. This question is worth further investigation.

Next, what sources—interpersonal and mediated—have created the norms of acceptable behavior for negotiators? The satisfaction found in our negotiation study may reflect the "game's" entertainment value, and perhaps nothing more. Future research should attempt to disentangle the causes of participant satisfaction.

In the future, examining cross-cultural expectations about accommodating and dominating and what we expect of others, whether they come from intracultural or cross-cultural backgrounds, could extend our theoretical understanding around expectations in negotiation.

Conclusion

We began our discussion focusing on negotiation as a method of resolving conflict. However, our study was limited by implicitly focusing our investigation of negotiation in the realm of gesellschaft—society—rather than gemeinschaft—community (see Bond, 2012). In other words, a negotiation with money or hierarchical success as the primary outcomes is not the same as one with friendship or affection as the primary outcomes.

This very different focus for generalizing our expectations and anchors about negotiation was provided by the comparison that Blau (1964) made using exchange theory. Blau extended our knowledge to negotiation based on romantic relations—in the realm of gemeinschaft, rather than in the realm of gesellschaft. As Blau (1964) explained,

> There are . . . numerous parallels between expressions of affection in love relations and expressions of approval in social associations generally. There are also some contrasts, however. The main source of the difference is that the conditions in a collective structure largely govern the significance of social approval while the conditions established by a pair of lovers themselves primarily govern the significance of their affection for one another . . . . (pp. 86-87; see also Walster et al., 1973)

Thus, Blau's view suggests, or perhaps requires, that future research needs to extend the dynamics of negotiation in terms of interpersonal, informal, and intimate relations; that difference may create a marked change in the predictions we have made here. We hope that our work here will contribute to addressing these future directions.

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Author Bios

Colleen M. Tolan (Ph.D., Temple University) is a recent graduate (May 2023) from the Media and Communication doctoral program at Temple University's Klein College of Media and Communication. She holds a B.S. in Journalism and Mass Communication from the University of Kansas and an M.Div. from Princeton Theological Seminary. Her dissertation studied the role of language framing during decision-making among individuals in conflict. Her research interests include interpersonal communication processes related to decision making, conflict resolution, and theory building.

Deborah A. Cai (Ph.D., Michigan State University) is Professor and Senior Associate Dean in the Klein College of Media and Communication at Temple University, and she is a faculty member in the Media and Communication doctoral program. Deborah is an international researcher with expertise in intercultural communication, persuasion, negotiation, and conflict management. Deborah is a Fellow in the International Academy for Intercultural Research and a Fellow of the International Association for Conflict Management. She is a former editor of *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* and served as editor of the four-volume collection, *Intercultural Communication* (Sage, Benchmark in Communication).

Edward L. Fink (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin) is the Laura H. Carnell Professor of Media and Communication and Affiliate Professor of Sociology at Temple University, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Maryland. He studies attitude change, intercultural communication, and research methods. He has published articles in the major academic scholarly research journals, and has served as editor of *Human Communication Research.* He is a Fellow of the International Communication Association (ICA), of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Honor Society, and of the International Academy for Intercultural Research. He is a recipient of ICA's B. Aubrey Fisher Mentorship Award.