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Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

How US and Chinese Media Cover the US–China Trade Conflict: A Case Study of War and Peace Journalism Practice and the Foreign Policy Equilibrium Hypothesis

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Keywords
trade conflict, United States, China, peace journalism, foreign policy, foreign policy, US-China media comparison, trade war, conflict role, press system.

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Abstract

This article examines the news coverage of a nonmilitary conflict: The US–China trade conflict by major news media outlets in the USA and China using the war and peace journalism framework. Role in the conflict as initiator/responder, medium difference, the press role in each press system, and partisanship of news media were hypothesized to affect the war and peace journalism practice. Moreover, the trade conflict was divided into three stages to test the applicability of the "foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis" by analyzing the changes in the uses of sources and presence of competing frames over time. US news media were found to employ more war journalism and less peace journalism than their Chinese counterpart. They also had much lower coverage of the conflict than their Chinese counterpart. Newspapers were more likely to use war journalism than television. US partisan liberal media selectively supported and opposed the US government trade policy.

Introduction

With its economy growing in double figures and gaining power internationally, China has been being labeled by the Western media as an "enemy" (Stone & Xiao, 2007) and seen as posing a threat to the United States' world superpower status (Casetti, 2003). The 2018 trade conflict between the US and China has been characterized as the biggest trade war in economic history (Li, He, & Lin, 2018; The New York Times, 2018). It presents an ideal setting to study the differences in framing an international conflict by party/partisan and elite news media in a changing digital media landscape because media can escalate a conflict through its representation of the conflict occurrences (Bastiansen, Klimke, & Werenskjold, 2019).

Proposed by peace studies scholar Johan Galtung to highlight the important role of journalists in promoting world peace (Lee & Maslog, 2005), *peace journalism* stresses a nonpartisan coverage of all sides, exposing the lies and untruths, with a focus on common people and aims at finding solutions and promoting peace initiatives. In contrast, *war journalism* escalates the conflict by focusing on violence, siding with the elites, and serves as government propaganda to achieve a "victory" for the home country (Galtung, 2003). This study aimed to explore how war and peace journalism were practiced in a conflict

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between China and the U.S. which have different press systems. We examined how the roles of the U.S. as the initiator of the trade war versus China as the defender of the trade war influenced the use of war and peace journalism framing in news coverage. In addition, we investigated whether media format (TV vs. newspapers) and partisanship of media affected the coverage of government policy and the use of war and peace journalism framing. In China, the increasing commercialization of news media and advocacy of multiplatform news delivery propelled news media to pay more attention to the audience's interest. In the United States, there is animosity between the Trump administration and the press and the rise of the partisan media in the U.S. such as *FoxNews* (conservative) and *MSNBC* (liberal). How did these changes in the media landscape in both countries affect the coverage of trade war? Did the coverage of the trade war change over time?

This article first discussed the significance of this study in explaining the factors that influence the use of war and peace journalism and how the *foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis* could predict the use of news sources and competing frames in the course of an international conflict. Then, we reviewed the common theoretical approaches to the study of news coverage in international conflicts and the journalistic traditions of the United States and China. We showed why peace journalism is a useful approach in analyzing the framing of an international conflict which can facilitate a peaceful solution. The foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis was introduced to help explain news media's impact on foreign policy. We then explained the journalism traditions of each country and how the relationship between countries affected the coverage of international news to develop our research questions and hypotheses.

Significance of the Study

The US-imposed tariffs on China in 2018 have been viewed as both a political confrontation and an economic battle between the U.S., the number one world power, and China, the number two in economy size based on GDP (Bradsher & Myers, 2018). This study, comparing how Chinese and U.S. media covered and presented the conflict to the public, can provide important theoretical and methodological contribution to conflict management research as well as journalism and political science research. Since Galtung (1998) published his first article on peace journalism two decades ago, there has been no study conducted on war or peace journalism practice in communist countries such as China (Gouse et al., 2019). Hence, this study's theoretical contribution to peace journalism research is the testing of the applicability of peace journalism in different press systems and in nonmilitary conflicts, and how different media format and partisanship of media can influence the *peace* and *war journalism* practices. To political science research, we provide the first empirical and cross-national evidence and counter-evidence of the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis, tracking the changes in the use of news sources over time and the dynamics of media partisanship in the support and opposition of government policy. For conflict management research, this study offers explanations of how news about the conflict can be presented with a peace or war journalism framing and the different roles of initiators and responders in a conflict to predict war and peace journalism practices. Methodologically, the tracking of changes of information sources and competing frame presence in the coverage of a conflict by stages can help measure how information and frame changes as the conflict evolves.

Propaganda Model, News Indexing Hypotheses and Cascading Activation as Traditional Approaches to US International News Coverage

Prior research on international news coverage has utilized various theoretical lens, and all of them emphasized how the government and the powerful elites influence the public's understanding of international news through the heavy use of elite sources in the news coverage. Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model in *Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of the mass media* is a useful framework for analyzing and understanding how the mainstream US media worked and why they performed

as they did in covering international news. News media, as elite institutions in society, focused on elite sources and followed their dominant (anti-communist) ideology which essentially made them propaganda tools for the government and the elites (Herman, 2000). Similarly, Bennett's (1990) indexing hypothesis explained news coverage by how news media "index" or reflect the range of voices and viewpoints of the society. International news research applying the indexing hypothesis has found that elites' views carry more influence on news media than others (Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996). In addition, Entman's (2003) cascading activation model demonstrated how interpretative frames were activated and spread from the government top's officials to the network of nongovernment elites, and on to news organizations, their news products, and the public—and how interpretations were moved up from lower to higher levels. Applying the cascading activation model, a study found that journalists could play an active role in international news by providing counterframes on terrorism different from the government during the September 11 attack if they did their own independent research (Valenzano, 2009).

Although these models are useful in explaining the international news coverage behavior of U.S. or Canadian news media, they did not show how news media can actively contribute to escalating or reducing international conflicts through different framing approaches and their news practices. The war and peace journalism framing paradigm provides a useful perspective on the active role played by the news media during the conflict while continuing to recognize the importance of news sources.

War and Peace Journalism

A major theme in international news is conflict (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Peace journalism advocates a more proactive role for the news media while reporting conflicts with an aim to reduce it instead of escalating it or remaining spectators (Colbert, 2009). A review of 41 studies on peace journalism (Gouse et al., 2019) demonstrated its evolution from quantitative analysis of news articles to qualitative and quantitative studies analyzing the attitude of journalism practitioners toward war/peace journalism (Neumann & Fahmy, 2016). These studies illustrated the variations in journalistic norms and values across countries, and how differently war and peace were conceptualized. In reporting violent conflicts, peace journalism practices could set international norms and improve the professional ethical standards (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2015).

Based on peace journalism, Howard (2009) advocated conflict-sensitive reporting by training journalists to contribute to dialogues among communities of the parties in conflict that avoid stereotypes and maintain professionalism with accuracy, fairness, balance, and responsible conduct. Although the peace journalism ideal has received support from many journalism scholars such as Keeble, Tulloch, and Zollman (2010), Lynch and McGoldrick (2013), Youngblood (2017), Demarest and Langer (2018), there are also criticisms of the underlying assumption of peace journalism. Hanitzsch (2004) argued that journalists are not as powerful as peace journalism advocates assumed. Journalists work under many constraints and by promoting peace journalism, it shifted the peace responsibility of the government and the military to the journalists. Instead, he urged for more transparency and reflexivity among the journalists by exposing the conditions of reporting and by applying a critical view on sources. Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch and Nagar (2016) proposed using an alternative conflict narrative framework to replace peace journalism. The theme is still violence (war) versus nonviolence/diplomatic (peace), which is the basic premise of the peace and war journalism dichotomy. We proposed that peace journalism can promote critical thinking and transparency by a journalist's acknowledgment of the limitations of sources and thus attempting to diversify them. Additionally, the dual nature of war and peace journalism measurement implies that news stories may often contain both war and peace attributes, instead of assuming they are mutually exclusive. For example, a story can use primarily elite sources (war journalism) while envisioning a win–win solution (peace journalism). A greater emphasis on "peace" items than "war" items (i.e., "higher peace journalism differential") constitutes peace journalism framing (Lee & Maslog, 2005) and facilitates readers to seek and desire more peaceful resolution of the conflict.

U.S. and China's recent trade conflict provides opportunities for both war and peace journalism framing by journalists. The US government made accusations of unfair trade practices against China on grounds of intellectual property theft, devaluing the currency to boost Chinese exports to the US, and government subsidy. As a punitive measure, the US government announced the imposition of tariffs on Chinese imports and pressurize China to concede to US demands. However, this was seen by China as a direct attack intended to impede its economic growth through false accusations and stall its economic and technological advancement. It was perceived as a survival threat to China (Liu & Woo, 2018). Chinese journalists might arouse nationalist sentiments by megaphoning the government's stance in order to generate favorable public opinion for the government's decisions against the U.S. sanctions. They might also provide a different take on US–China relations by utilizing alternative sources and reflecting on the country's economic and technological development.

News Media's Impact on Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Market Equilibrium Hypothesis

While the war and peace journalism framing is useful for showing how news media cover an international conflict, it overlooks the different stages of a conflict and how it relates to foreign policy making. Studies on the effects of media on foreign policy decision-making have mainly been conducted in western democracies (Baum & Potter, 2008). News media play an important role in increasing the public's understanding of a foreign policy issue, thereby making policy makers more receptive to public opinion. Soroka (2003) demonstrated this by conducting longitudinal studies in the United Kingdom and the United States and comparing the public's salience of foreign policy in both countries as a result of the agenda-setting role of the news media. His subsequent analysis indicating policy changes (defense budget changes) resulted from increased public salience was a strong evidence of the important role of the news media in shaping public opinion and explained how and why the news media's coverage of the issue affected policy makers.

After a review of 46 studies across political science and political communication and borrowing idea from economics, Baum and Potter (2008) proposed the concept of foreign policy market equilibrium. It sought to explain the changing role of media through different stages of a conflict as a result of the changing information gap between foreign policy makers and the public. During the initial stage, media will follow the government's narrative and rally the flag, so to speak, as political leaders are the only source of information on the foreign policy. An equilibrium stage is reached when policy makers do not have an information advantage over the public on the foreign policy issue and the public has sufficient knowledge of the policy. At this stage, policy makers are bound to respond to public needs; thus, the media and public influence foreign policy. This equilibrium hypothesis can be studied by analyzing the media's role in supplying information to the public and public policy through different stages. In the beginning, the common people do not have sufficient information about the foreign policy or are simply disinterested, and the policy makers and elites have an information advantage. Media play a conveyor belt role during this stage by reporting only the government's viewpoint and use elite sources. As the issue develops further, the news media are more likely to incorporate alternative sources and provide competing frames that pique the public's interest in the foreign policy, especially when journalists explain its implications on people's daily lives.

Although the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis explained how the information gap between government and the public can be reduced and illustrated the changing relationship between news media and the government over time, it did not consider the specifics of news framing practice used by journalists such as language use and explaining consequences of the conflict as in peace and war journalism. This study, by examining both the war and peace journalism framing of the US and Chinese news media and the changes in sources and frames over the course of the conflict based on the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis, contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of how news coverage can reduce or increase the information gap between the government and the public over time.

The common foci on the news source and frame in both peace journalism and foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis also make them good complementary perspectives to explain the US–China trade war and other conflicts. This unique and useful combination can shed light on future research on international conflict management by showing how war and peace journalism news framing and the use of sources can reduce the conflict and information gap between the public and the policy makers.

Press System and Journalism Practice Differences Between the US and China

To compare the journalistic practices between China and the United States, we need to understand their journalistic traditions and press systems. While the US media system is often considered as a model of libertarianism, the Chinese press is considered to be a close approximation of the Soviet communist model (Josephi, 2005). However, as indicated by Hallin and Mancini (2004), comparing media systems requires a more nuanced approach.

Although the history of American journalism can be traced as far back as the 17th century, the modern ideals of nonpartisan and objective journalism only came into being in the 20th century (McChesney, 2003). Kaplan (2003) contended that the World Wars provided the foundation for much of modern American journalistic practices by reinforcing a national identity. He argued that in the context of war journalism, partisanship had never quite been replaced by objectivity, only the locus shifted from within the nation to "the actions of the president in confrontation with our national enemies." (p. 215). This was catalyzed by the structure of media ownership in the US which was largely profit-driven and heavy on sensationalism (McChesney, 2003).

China is not the same as in the past when the news media were totally controlled and funded by the Communist party and people had no alternative source to obtain information about the outside world. Journalists in China have been exposed to western journalism skills and knowledge and many took workshops and obtained degrees from western countries or from faculty that were trained in the West. Chinese government encouraged journalism faculty to attend international conferences on journalism and communication research or becoming visiting scholars in western institutions. Although the party media still play a dominant role in promoting government's views and conveying information the government wants to disseminate, one cannot neglect the increasing commercialization of news media, particularly in the past 40 years of economic boom. News media have to consider news audiences' interest to attract advertising, resulting in a new form of professionalism among journalists in China (Simons, Nolan, & Wright, 2017). Cao (2007) classified China's news media into two types: the party press and the market-oriented news press with substantial differences in foreign affairs coverage. The former focuses on the leaders and government with a preaching style while the latter is more lively and provides more contextual information and nongovernmental sources.

In 2014, media convergence was established as a national strategy and most mainstream news media in China have developed an active online presence on multiple platforms including online news sites, mobile news apps, Weibo, and WeChat accounts (Lu, 2017). In 2017, the market share of internet, print media, broadcast, and mobile phones as news media were 15%, 6%, 13%, and 51%, respectively. A majority of media outlets added their presence online as well as offering their own news brand mobile applications (Cui, 2018). Social media in China provides a platform for both individuals and media organizations to release information and attract huge amount of readers. Compared to emerging commercial new media producers, traditional mainstream media have unique advantages as they have inherited professional teams for news production from well-established traditional media and, most importantly, the government licenses to cover major political news and international affairs. So, in examining foreign policy-related matters such as the US–China trade conflict, the role played by the official traditional mainstream media is crucial because of their exclusive access to government information and resources to cover more news on the topic.

Culture and dominant national discourses have great influence on news framing and reporting and adhere to the system of opinions, ideas, and political powers (Krumbein, 2015). The different ideological stands and national interest of U.S. and China shaped how Chinese and US media cover international news. In a study comparing how US media, *Washington Post* and *the New York Times*; and Chinese media, *the China Daily* and *the People's Daily Online*, covered the air strikes carried out by NATO in 1999 in Yugoslavia, different media frames were used in disseminating news about the NATO intervention. Chinese media framed the NATO military action as a military intervention of the former Yugoslavia's territory and sovereignty, while the US media covered the same air strikes by NATO as a humanistic assistance to curtail the Serbians from massacring Albanians in the name of ethnic cleansing (Yang, 2003). Human rights issues in China are one area that has repeatedly come under the lens of the US media and policymakers. Yin (2007) portrayed the discourse in *The New York Times* and *People's Daily* as a struggle for "authority to define this issue" (p. 89).

US Coverage of China and China's Coverage of US

There is quite a bit of literature studying US and China's coverage of each other based on their relationship at the time. Lu (2011), while looking at the dynamics of the US–China relationship facilitated by media discourse, found that the relationship had been constructed from "*military allies*" to "*ideological enemies*" and from "*moral adversaries*" to "*strategic partners*" in responding to environmental and domestic needs. The study concluded that the media framing of the relationship between the US and China was largely influenced by individual country's domestic interests and cultural orientations. A comparative study of broadcast news content between ABC in the US and CCTV in China by Chang, Wang, and Chen (1998) gave further support to the idea that social and cultural norms dictate the framing of news content about domestic and international affairs. Interestingly, CCTV gave more coverage to certain events in the US than ABC. In contrast, there were no reports about China on ABC during the study period, suggesting an unbalanced flow of information.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, China's portrayal in the US has grown increasingly negative (Peng, 2004; Shambaugh, 2003; Xu, 2018; Yang & Liu, 2012). Although it is apparent political relationships affect the news coverage, whether journalists in each country practice war journalism which escalates the conflict, or peace journalism which promotes peaceful relationships and compromises in a direct conflict between the U.S. and China, has not been explored. The conflict escalation or peace promotion effect of war and peace journalism is based on the assumed news framing effect of peace and war journalism. McGoldrick and Lynch's (2016) four-country laboratory experiment on audience responses' to peace journalism on TV found that viewers who were exposed to news presented in the peace journalism framing were more in favor of nonviolent conflict responses and solving structural issues than those who were exposed to news following the war journalism model.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

We hypothesized the following differences in news coverage of the conflict in Chinese and US news media based on (1) the role each country plays in the conflict as initiator or responder in the conflict, (2) the medium difference, (3) the relationship between the press and the government at the time, and (4) the partisanship of the news media outlet. Although responsibilities of conflicts typically involved both parties, there would always be one that took the offensive or initiated the conflict by taking actions against the other party, blaming its wrongdoing and expecting concessions. The U.S. is considered the initiator of the trade war because President Donald Trump, in his tweet dated March 2, 2018, clearly stated, "When a country (USA) is losing many billions of dollars on trade with virtually every country it does business with, trade wars are good, and easy to win." The offensive the U.S. took was by imposing tariffs in 2018 starting with June 15, 2018's declaration by Trump that the United States would impose a

25% tariff on $50 billions of Chinese exports. The initial $34 billions would start July 6, 2018, with a further $16 billion to begin at a later date. The US news media, on the other hand, being in the country initiating the trade war with the high tariffs to reduce the trade deficit with China and have the market pressure and need for drama and sensational news, should play up the conflict and are more likely to practice war journalism than peace journalism. China played a role of defending against the U.S. tariff attack by tariff retaliation. But China had a strong desire for a peaceful solution or trade agreement because it was in the Chinese government's interest to avoid public panic on the consequence of the tariffs. With more state ownership of news media and controlling access to government information, Chinese news media should follow the government's interest and exhibit more peace journalism practices.

Hypothesis 1. US news media are more likely to use war journalism than peace journalism in comparison to Chinese news media in covering the trade conflict.

We expect that apart from country differences, different media types (e.g., TV, elite newspapers) can also exhibit different practice of peace and war journalism. In the second and third hypotheses, we examine the difference in broadcast TV news coverage and newspaper coverage. The higher likelihood to use war journalism should also apply specifically to the broadcast TV news in the United States. CCTV, as China's official party organ and reaching the largest audience in the country at all levels, will be cautious in the reporting and less likely to emphasize differences and confrontation with the United States in the coverage of the conflict. In contrast, US broadcast TV, either commercial (ABC) or noncommercial (PBS), would adopt the position of the US government against the "foreign" rival, China, with more war journalism framing.

Hypothesis 2a. US broadcast TV news media (PBS and ABC) are more likely to use war journalism than Chinese TV news media (CCTV).

Elite newspapers can play a unique role in covering the conflict. Their readers are well-educated and opinion leaders in the society. They have higher expectations of the news in representing their views. U.S. elite newspapers such as the *New York Times (NYT)*, because of the commercial pressure and position of the U.S. as initiator of the trade tariffs, is also likely to use war journalism framing than its Chinese counterpart. Chinese elite newspapers such as *People's Daily* target the strong party followers and serve as the party organ. As China is playing a defender/responder role, *People's Daily* would follow the Chinese government policy and be cautious in the reporting with less war journalism framing in comparison to the *New York Times*.

Hypothesis 2b. US elite newspapers (*NYT*) are more likely to use war journalism than Chinese elite newspapers (*People's Daily*).

In addition to a comparison of US and China's newspaper and TV news coverage, we also examine if the medium itself is the cause of the difference in the use of war and peace *journalism* because newspapers have headlines and long text to frame the news while television newscasts are much shorter without a headline, the opportunity for war and peace journalism framing should be higher than television, regardless of country.

Hypothesis 3. Newspapers are more likely to use war journalism than television.

Chinese news media are not allowed to oppose the government. However, US news media are more likely to have a diverse role because of the watchdog expectation of the media and the pluralism in news media ownership with a spectrum from ultra-left to ultra-right and many in the middle. It is especially

so when currently there is high animosity between the Trump administration and the news media. Hence overall, we hypothesize in H4 that US news media are more likely to oppose the tariffs rather than supporting the tariffs in the trade conflict, while the Chinese news media will only oppose the tariffs.

Hypothesis 4. US news media are more likely to oppose the US tariffs than supporting the US tariffs while Chinese news media will only oppose the US government tariffs in their coverage.

In the US, liberal partisan news media are known to criticize the Trump administration. It is expected that in foreign policy such as trade tariffs, the liberal news media are also likely to oppose the US tariffs, perhaps even more than the Chinese party press. So, we hypothesized in H5 that liberal news media are more likely to oppose the US government's tariffs than Chinese party press such as the *Global Times* and *People's Daily*.

Hypothesis 5. US liberal news media (*MSNBC, PBS, and CNN*) are more likely to challenge/oppose the US government policy/tariff than Chinese party press (*Global Times, People's Daily*).

This study also combined the knowledge of foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis and peace and war journalism practices to examine how US and Chinese news media report the trade conflict, taking into consideration the different stages of the conflict in the coverage. According to Baum and Potter's foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis, based on information supply and demand of the public, the longer the conflict and the later the stage, the more the presence of competing frames and the more nonelite sources will be used by the news media. The use of nonelite source can reduce the advantage of the political leaders and elites in the dominance of information sources. As there were no previous empirical studies employing the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis with news frames and news sources involving the Communist context, we pose the following research question in this setting of the Trade War:

RQ1: Can the *foreign policy market equilibrium* suggested by Baum and Potter (2008) apply in both China and the US where the news media offer more diverse frames and sources as the US–China trade conflict progresses?

Method

Sampling Description and Sampling Procedures

Content analysis was the method we employed to examine the journalism practice and coverage of the U.S.-China trade conflict. Television and newspapers (online version) were the two most prominent news media in both countries. Our selection of media outlets considered the size of followers online, audience ratings, as well as their reputation as elite news media. They represent the most commonly used media on the topic and the current media landscape. Due to the high use of social media as a news source in both China (CNNIC, 2018) and the United States (Shearer, 2018), we selected online articles of newspapers featured on social media for newspaper media coverage. We used "China" or "the United States" depending on the country and "trade" as the keyword for all included media outlets to retrieve news items.

For the Chinese media, we chose one TV channel, online news articles posted by two party newspapers' social media (WeChat) accounts and news articles of one market-oriented news app with original news reports for our content analysis of the China-U.S. trade conflict. WeChat is the largest social media app in China with more than one billion active daily users (Lee, 2019). For the TV channel, we chose China Central Television (CCTV). *CCTV News* has always been the leading news program in China watched by the entire nation and its audience is still growing with increasing penetration of TV in rural

areas. In 2017, the rating of *CCTV News* rose to 44.5%, from 40.7% in 2016, dominating the TV news market in China (Cui, 2018). For CCTV newscast, we used the three keywords in searching the full archive of news videos on the CCTV website. Since the website provides videos for the past year, we searched up to December 20 because there was no major event happened after the truce was announced and the arrest of CFO of Huawei. We found a total of 253 video newscasts related to the U.S.-China trade conflict for the year 2018. A random sample of 100 videos were chosen as the final sample for coding. Coders transcribed the newscast related to the trade conflict, and then, the transcripts were coded.

The WeChat accounts of *People's Daily* and the *Global Times* were chosen because both of them were among the top five WeChat news accounts in 2018. *People's Daily* was the top WeChat news account in 2018. The *Global Times*, though ranked 5th, focuses on international news and China's foreign policy and deemed most relevant to our study (NewsRank, 2018). For mobile news apps, we chose *The Paper*, the top market-oriented news apps based in Shanghai with original news gathering and reporting. Its main users are male (62.7%) and young people aged from 26-35 (47.8%). Wisers, a leading Chinese media database, was employed to retrieve samples of the two WeChat accounts (*People's Daily* and *Global Times*) and *The Paper* from January 1 to December 31, 2018. One hundred news stories were chosen randomly from the search results in each news media outlet, respectively, for coding.

In the United States, for newspapers, two elite newspapers *The New York Times* (on Facebook) and *The Wall Street Journal* (on Twitter) were chosen. CNN is one of the highest used social media news outlets online with its online audience larger than TV audiences and a major global news brand (Boland, 2018; CNN, 2017). We therefore examined its online version featured on Facebook rather than the TV broadcast. For television, we selected TV news outlets to include a complete political ideological spectrum from the conservative, pro-Trump administration partisan Fox News, neutral commercial broadcast news (ABC) which had the highest ratings in 2018 (Battaglio, 2018), public broadcast TV news (PBS), and liberal MSNBC (Engel, 2014). Hence, we used a total of seven news outlets to sample the U.S. news coverage of the trade war (ABC, PBS, Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, *NYT, WSJ*). For TV news, except CNN for the reason explained above, the newscast transcripts during the period of January 1 to December 31, 2018, were downloaded from Nexis Uni, the most popular news database. Because many shows on Fox News and MSNBC are not newscasts but talk shows, we limited the coding to *The Beat with Ari Melber* (MSNBC) and the *Special Report with Bret Baier* (Fox News) to be comparable to other broadcast newscasts. All TV newscasts we analyzed were aired at 6 p.m. or 6:30 p.m. as the main evening newscast.

For social media elite news in the U.S., we located them through the search algorithm of Facebook and Twitter and restricted the time period to January 1 to December 31, 2018, by the most important (relevant) articles of the month. All databases and algorithms ranked the article by relevance. Hence, to build a list of sample articles, coders checked from the most relevant articles in the order listed by Facebook and Twitter until the articles were found not relevant. With this comprehensive approach, we still found a low number of news items covering the trade war. We decided not to sample but instead used all news items we could identify as relevant to the topic of each selected outlet (PBS, $N = 42$; CNN, $N = 48$; ABC, $N = 38$; Fox News, $N = 75$; MSNBC, $N = 18$; *NYT*, $N = 71$, *WSJ*, $N = 47$). With all these seven outlets combined, the total number of U.S. news articles on the topic was 339, which was lower than the number of randomly sampled Chinese news articles ($N = 400$) in the four outlets sampled. So, the unequal sample size between the United States and China reflected the difference in the news media's emphasis in each country on the topic. The higher number of outlets in the U.S. than China was necessitated by the pluralist system to represent the broad political spectrum in mainstream media.

Coding

A total of five graduate students in a coastal university in China, and four graduate students and two faculty members in a Midwest public university in the United States served as coders in this study. The first

author served as the second coder for the U.S. news sample and an additional graduate student was hired in China for double coding 10% of the Chinese news media sample in order to compute the inter-coder reliability. Several training sessions were conducted to make sure the coders understood the coding scheme and employed the coding process as required. The presence of competing frames and the use of nonelite sources both achieved 95.0% agreement. The tone of coverage's coder agreement was 80.0%. The war journalism practices percent agreement was 82.5% (from 70.0% to 95.0% for individual indicators) and the peace journalism practices percent of agreement was 84.4% (from 75.0% to 100.0% for individual indicators).

Measures

War and Peace Journalism Practice

We employed the coding scheme of war and peace journalism practices used by Lee and Maslog (2005) with 13 items each for war and peace journalism, respectively (see Tables 1 and 2), which showed high reliability in analyzing conflicts in four South Asian countries. In addition to listing frequency of war and peace journalism practice indicators as what they did, we computed a score of peace journalism and a score of war journalism by summing up the presence of war and peace journalism indicators (0–13). We also computed a "war-peace journalism differential" to show whether a story is more war journalism dominant or peace journalism dominant by subtracting the war journalism practice indicator score from peace journalism indicator score, similar to the method used by Lynch (2014). A negative differential shows more peace journalism practice.

Use of the Term "Trade War" in the News

To corroborate the war and peace journalism item analysis, we also counted whether the term "trade war" was used in the news story. Because the length of the story and the news media format might affect its frequency, the use and nonuse of the term was a good indicator of the journalist's adoption of the war journalism and frame the conflict as a "war."

Type of Sources

One of the war and peace journalism practice indicator is the type of sources used: elite sources (war journalism) and nonelite sources (peace journalism). Elite sources included political leaders and think tank experts. Nonelite sources were from nongovernment organizations and industry representatives, common people, etc.

Number of Sources

To provide evidence of increase in the sources as in the market equilibrium, we compared the number and type of sources used by each news media outlet as well as the stage of the conflict.

Presence of Competing Frames

An objective and fair reporting should contain competing frames, which are equally persuasive (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017). As the conflict goes on, there should be more competing frame in news stories over time. The coder first determined if there was more than one frame in a story and whether the frames were competing with each other.

Position on the Tariffs

We also examined the news story's position in general from four categories between (1) supportive or mostly supportive of the policy (tariff sanction against China), (2) opposing the policy, (3) neutral, (4) partly supportive and partly opposing the policy.

Trade Conflict Stages

We divided the trade conflict into three stages to test the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis. The beginning stage (Stage 1) started January 22, 2018, when U.S. President Trump imposed tariffs on solar panel and washing machine imports from China, which represent one of China's largest exports to the United States. The stage ended in April 2018 when China responded by imposing tariffs on 128 products it imported from the United States. Stage 2 is the combative stage, which started in May 2018 when China's Vice-Premier visited the United States for trade talks and ended in July when American tariffs on $34 billions of Chinese goods came into effect and China imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods of a similar value. Stage 3 is the truce stage starting on August 8, 2018, when the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative published its list of 279 Chinese goods, worth $16 billion, to be subject to a 25% tariff starting on August 23, 2018, and China responded with its own tariffs of equal value. The stage ended in December 2018 when a summit was held between President Xi and Trump at the G-20 Summit in Argentina with an announcement of a truce in tariffs for three months with further talks and negotiations.

Results

War and Peace Journalism Practices in the US–China Trade Conflict News Coverage

The total number of news articles we analyzed was 739, which included 400 Chinese articles and 339 US articles. The scores for each peace and war journalism practice indicator in US and Chinese news media are shown in Tables 1 and 2. For peace journalism practices, Chinese news media were significantly more likely to use neutral language and reported the damages, causes, and consequences of the conflict, and the areas of agreement that might lead to a solution to the conflicts and win–win orientation than US news media. To test H1 which posited that the war journalism scores of US news media would be higher than Chinese news media, we used an independent sample *t*-test. The hypothesis was supported on both war journalism and peace journalism scores. The mean of war journalism score in the Chinese data was only 3.38 in comparison to the mean in the US data, which was 4.0649, $t(737) = -4.22$, $p < .001$. The

Table 1
Peace Journalism Comparison Between China and U.S. News Media

Peace Journalism Indicator	China, *N* (%)	US, *N* (%)	Total, *N* (%)
1. Reporting on damage to society and culture**	35 (8.8%)	56 (16.5%)	91 (12.3%)
2. Reporting on psychological damages	4 (1.0%)	14 (4.1%)	18 (2.4%)
3. Focusing on nonelite sources	32 (8.0%)	42 (12.4%)	74 (10.0%)
4. Discussing similarities/mutual interests between the countries involved**	107 (26.8%)	79 (23.3%)	186 (25.2%)
5. Report causes and consequences of the conflict**	153 (38.3%)	178 (52.5%)	331 (44.8%)
6. Win–win orientation**	71 (17.8%)	76 (22.4%)	147 (19.9%)
7. Presenting diversity (give voice to many parties in the conflict)**	87 (21.8%)	108 (31.9%)	195 (26.4%)
8. Proactive reporting**	10 (2.5%)	93 (27.4%)	103 (13.9%)
9. Nonpartisan	237 (59.3%)	199 (58.7%)	436 (59.0%)
10. Reports the areas of agreement that might lead to a solution to the conflicts**	38 (9.5%)	73 (21.5%)	111 (15.0%)
11. Avoid victimizing language	326 (81.5%)	241 (71.1%)	567 (76.7%)
12. Avoid demonizing language	376 (94.0%)	264 (77.9%)	640 (86.6%)
13. Objective and moderate wording**	305 (76.3%)	207 (61.1%)	512 (69.3%)

Note. $^{**}p < .01$.

Table 2
War Journalism Comparison between China and US News Media

War Journalism Indicator	China, *N* (%)	US, *N* (%)	Total, *N* (%)
1. Reporting economic damages (visible effects)**	140 (35.0%)	252 (74.3%)	392 (53.0%)
2. Reporting material damages**	44 (11.0%)	76 (22.4%)	120 (16.2%)
3. Focusing on elite sources (leaders and intellectuals)**	271 (67.8%)	229 (67.6%)	500 (67.7%)
4. Focuses on differences that lead to the conflict**	66 (16.5%)	144 (42.5%)	210 (28.4%)
5. Focuses mainly on the here and now (present happenings)**	253 (63.2%)	106 (31.3%)	359 (48.6%)
6. Dichotomies between good and bad guys**	61 (15.3%)	36 (10.6%)	97 (13.1%)
7. Presenting a zero-sum game**	83 (20.8%)	61 (18.0%)	144 (19.5%)
8. Reactive Reporting**	77 (19.3%)	102 (30.1%)	179 (24.2%)
9. Stop reporting after conflict**	125 (31.3%)	90 (26.5%)	215 (29.1%)
10. Loss of voter/public support**	36 (9.0%)	34 (10.0%)	70 (9.5%)
11. Use victimizing language**	73 (18.3%)	57 (16.8%)	130 (17.6%)
12. Use demonizing language on sources	18 (4.5%)	28 (8.3%)	46 (6.2%)
13. Use emotive words**	104 (26.0%)	163 (48.1%)	267 (36.1%)

Note. $^{**}p < .01$.

mean of peace journalism score in the Chinese data was 4.8, higher than the US data, which was 4.44, $t(737) = 2.21$, $p = .03$. The mean differential between war and peace journalism within each story of Chinese news media was −1.075. The mean differential between war and peace journalism in US news media was −.743, which was also higher than Chinese news media's war-peace journalism differential. The higher the value of the differential, the more dominant war journalism in the story is. In addition, US media were more significantly more likely to the term "Trade War" ($M = 0.72$, $SD = 0.45$) than Chinese news media ($M = 0.61$, $SD = 0.49$), $t(729) = -3.08$, $p = .02$. So, the US news media were more likely to use war journalism than peace journalism in comparison to the Chinese news media by all measures.

Then, we moved to the medium type comparison. To test H2a that US broadcast TV news is more likely to employ war journalism than CCTV, we also used an independent sample *t*-test comparison. The mean of war journalism for PBS and ABC was 3.88, $SD = 1.87$ while the mean of war journalism for CCTV was 2.75, $SD = 1.42$ and the difference was statistically significant $t(178) = 4.58$, $p < .001$. So, PBS and ABC were more likely to use war journalism than CCTV. H2a was supported.

To test H2b that elite newspapers in the U.S. are more likely to use war journalism than their Chinese counterpart, we also used an independent sample *t*-test. For the war journalism score, the mean of *the New York Times* was 5.66, $SD = 1.59$, and the mean of *People's Daily* was 4.91, $SD = 2.01$. The difference was statistically significant: $t(169) = 2.62$, $p = .01$. So, H2b that the US elite newspapers significantly use more war journalism than Chinese elite newspapers was supported.

H3 posited that newspapers are more likely to use *war journalism* than television. We compared the *war journalism* score of newspaper and television newscast samples in both countries. We found that indeed there was a significant medium difference. Newspapers, with more text and longer length than television newscasts and have clear headlines for the news reports, scored higher on war journalism. The mean of war journalism of newspapers was 3.70, $SD = 2.31$, and the mean of *war journalism* for television was 3.20, $SD = 1.70$. The difference was statistically significant: $t(662) = 2.98$, $p = .003$. H3 was supported.

To test H4 that US news media are more likely to oppose the US government tariffs policy than support the US government tariffs policy compared to their China counterpart, we cross-tabulated the data. There were 280 articles (70.0%) of Chinese news media opposing the US tariff policy; none of the articles supported the policy, and 120 articles (30.0%) were neutral. For the U.S. media, there were almost the same amount of articles supporting and opposing the policy: 60 articles (17.8%) of US news media

opposing the policy and 61 articles (18.0%) supporting the policy. The majority were neutral (64.2%). Since the U.S. news media did not have more articles opposing to the government policy than supporting the US government policy, H4 was rejected.

To test H5 whether liberal news media in the U.S. are more likely to oppose the U.S. tariffs policy than Chinese party news media, we cross-tabulated the data by each type of news media. Only 21.0% of US liberal news media opposed the government policy. But 82.0% of Chinese party news media opposed the U.S. policy, which was significantly higher than the U.S. liberal news media. So, H5 was rejected.

As the sources of news are the linchpin in both peace journalism and the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis, we first presented the type of sources for U.S. and Chinese news media. As shown in Table 3, except for the dominance of government sources in both countries, the countries differed significantly in the use of nonelite sources. Chinese news media were more likely to use sources from sectors affected by the trade war most such as retail/trade (40.6%), manufacturing (17.5%), and agriculture (13.5%) than the U.S. counterparts. For elite sources, Chinese news media were more likely to use academics (18.5%), while U.S. news media were more likely to use sources from think tanks and consultants (39.0%).

For the research question related to the foreign policy market policy equilibrium hypothesis, we compared the changes in the number of sources, use of nonelite sources, and the presence of competing frames during the three stages of the conflict with a one-way ANOVA. In addition, we compared the scores of peace and war journalism in each stage of the conflict. When analyzing the data, we found great difference between the US and Chinese data on these information diversity indicators and frames. For the U.S., although we found differences between the stages on the number of sources, the highest number of sources was during the first and third stage with a dip in the middle (Table 4). So, this did not correspond to the hypothesis that sources diversify over time. The use of more sources was not related to the use of nonelite source ($r = .01$, $p = .66$). We then looked specifically to nonelite sources, there was no significant difference in different stages on the use of nonelite sources. For the presence of competing frames, we found some differences between the stages approaching statistical significance. Yet the stage with most competing frames was during the second stage and not at the last stage. So, the source did not diversify over time as per the hypothesis but fluctuated by event and stage. Nonetheless, when we examined China and the United States separately, China's news media use of nonelite sources and competing frames increased over time which provides some support for the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis, but the United States did not follow the foreign market policy market equilibrium hypothesis. Finally, we compared the war and peace journalism scores of the U.S. news media and Chinese news media across the three stages. The U.S. news media had higher war journalism score than their Chinese counterpart throughout the three stages. In the initial stage, their war journalism

Table 3
Comparison of Types of Sources Used in US–China Trade War Stories

	US, $N = 339$	China, $N = 400$
Government sources	78.7%	74.3%
Think Tank/Consultant**	39.0%	28.3%
Academic/University*	11.9%	18.5%
Agriculture sector**	7.3%	13.5%
Retail/trade sector**	23.7%	40.6%
Manufacturing sector*	11.9%	17.5%
General public	8.3%	7.8%
Other sources (e.g., other media, commentators, journalists' own interpretation)	11.1%	14.4%

Note. *$p < .05$.
**$p < .01$.

Table 4
Diversity of Sources, Competing Frames, War, and Peace Journalism Scores by Stages of Conflict

	US			China		
	Number of Sources Per News Story					
	M	*SD*	*N*	*M*	*SD*	*N*
Stage 1	4.16	2.24	92	4.79	2.31	200
Stage 2	3.79	2.08	104	4.20	2.22	100
Stage 3	4.32	2.15	143	4.53	2.03	100
Total	4.11	2.16	339	4.58	2.29	400
	$F = 1.79$, $p = .17$, $p = .076$			$F = 2.25$, $p = .11$		
	Use of Nonelite Sources					
	M	*SD*	*N*	*M*	*SD*	*N*
Stage 1	0.16	0.37	92	0.06	0.24	200
Stage 2	0.15	0.36	104	0.04	0.27	100
Stage 3	0.08	0.27	143	0.16	0.35	100
Total	0.12	0.33	339	0.08	0.27	400
	$F = 2.55$, $p = .08$			$F = 6.12$, $p = .02$		
	Presence of Competing Frames					
	M	*SD*	*N*	*M*	*SD*	*N*
Stage 1	0.57	0.50	92	0.13	0.23	200
Stage 2	0.58	0.50	104	0.13	0.34	100
Stage 3	0.35	0.48	143	0.21	0.40	100
Total	0.48	0.50	339	0.15	0.36	400
	$F = 9.12$, $p < .001$			$F = 5.04$, $p = .007$		
	US			China		
	War Journalism Practice					
	M	*SD*	*N*	*M*	*SD*	*N*
Stage 1	4.42	2.15	92	3.27	2.02	200
Stage 2	4.16	2.63	104	3.55	2.06	100
Stage 3	3.76	2.25	143	3.42	2.19	100
Total	4.06	2.35	339	3.38	2.07	400
	$F = 4.61$, $p = .01$			$F = .64$, $p = .53$		
	Peace Journalism Practice					
	M	*SD*	*N*	*M*	*SD*	*N*
Stage 1	5.50	2.53	92	4.55	1.43	200
Stage 2	4.66	2.66	104	4.01	1.73	100
Stage 3	4.47	2.62	143	4.70	2.00	100
Total	4.81	2.63	339	4.45	1.68	400
	$F = 2.36$, $p = .10$			$F = 5.00$, $p = .007$		

score was the highest, showing more combative framing of their news reports than their Chinese counterparts. Yet their peace journalism score was also higher than their Chinese counterpart in the first two stages.

Discussion

This comparative study of trade conflict news coverage between China and the United States shows that overall, the news reports were framed more as peace journalism than war journalism as the score of war journalism was lower than peace journalism. Similar to what Lee and Maslog (2005) found, the *here and now* focus and the *elite orientation* dominated the war journalism practices in both countries. But the proportion of war journalism indicators in the US–China trade conflict was higher than their Asian military conflict articles. However different from what they found, we also found much more peace journalism language used in both countries. As expected, for the United States as the initiator of the tariffs and under commercial pressure, its news media were more eager to have the United States be the victor of the trade war, blaming China for the trade deficit and were more likely to use war journalism practice than its Chinese counterpart. A good example can be seen from a *New York Times*' September 17 report of the additional tariff (Tankersley & Bradsher, 2018) with a war journalism headline: "Trump hits China with tariffs on $200 billion in goods, escalating trade war," and the first few paragraphs justified the action of Trump: "President Trump, emboldened by America's economic strength and China's economic slowdown, escalated his trade war with Beijing on Monday, saying the United States would impose tariffs on $200 billion worth of goods and was prepared to tax all imports." The story began by telling the readers that US was strong and China's position was weak. Hence, we can see that war and peace journalism practice is affected by the position of the country in the conflict as initiator of or responder to the conflict.

This discovery has important implications to the research of peace and war journalism as well as international peace because it highlights the role of conflict initiator and responder as a factor that should be considered in addition to culture, journalistic and institutional constraints in journalism practices. To facilitate conflict resolution, news media in the country initiating the conflict should minimize its war journalism framing and increase its peace journalism framing. The burden of peace journalism should not be only on the news media of the country responding to the conflict. In this study of the trade conflict, the U.S. news media much more often referred it as a trade "war" on China than Chinese media and were highly dependent on elite sources including the government and think tanks and consultants widely available in the U.S. But the views of the sectors most affected by the conflict were largely ignored. In addition, its much higher use of emotive words and demonizing language on China and focus on differences between the two countries were the main cause of its higher score in war journalism. So, the U.S. media were more likely to use combative rhetoric. As a responder to the conflict, Chinese media were more likely to discuss similarities/mutual interests between the countries involved and covered those sectors which were most affected by the tariffs. As a state controlled press, they also followed the government's cautious approach in the trade negotiation and mostly focused on the current happenings as the Chinese style of war journalism.

Although US partisan liberal news media such as MSNBC and CNN are known for opposing the Trump administration, in presenting the news on the US–China trade conflict, sometimes they sided with the administration's policy and sometimes they opposed it or even more often, they took a neutral stance. The proportion of support and opposition is almost the same which shows that when it comes to international conflicts, partisan liberal news media will not one-sidedly criticize their own government, but choose situations to support and situations to oppose the government's foreign policy. This shows that economic arguments and national interest can prevail over political ideology in the news coverage of the trade war. The US news media still had considerable independent judgment on the issue. The pluralism in the U.S. news media allows diverse opinions to exist, both criticizing and supporting the government. In general, we found U.S. news media had mixed support for the U.S. trade tariff policy, instead of overwhelmingly supporting it. More than 30 news articles did not see the trade policy as effective or advancing national interest and saw more harm than benefit to the country. Yet it should be noted that

while U.S. news media showed different opinions about the tariffs, they were in high agreement on U.S. official accusation of China's intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer as discussed in the *Wall Street Journal* article with the headline, "How a History of Discord Fuels Today's U.S.-China Trade Tensions." (Seib, 2018).

Chinese party news media, following their expected role in supporting the government, were overwhelmingly supportive of the Chinese government and were less likely to offer competing frames than US news media. Elite party press such as the *Global Times* and the *People's Daily* were also less likely to use peace journalism as market-oriented media such as *The Paper*. Yet Chinese media especially CCTV's lowest use of the term "Trade War" compared to other Chinese and U.S. news outlets showed that the Chinese government was very cautious in presenting the conflict to its billions of citizens who are watching. The elite party press such as the *Global Times* and the *People's Daily* was the news media outlets that engaged more in war journalism practices.

The most surprising result is that the foreign policy market policy equilibrium hypothesis, which was proposed based on western democratic country experience, was not supported by the U.S. data but by the Chinese data in this trade conflict. We suspected that the unequal proportion of news in each stage between China and the United States may be responsible for the difference, even though the standard deviations of the mean values were rather stable across the stages for the U.S. But after randomly sampling equal amount of news items for each stage and each country, the pattern remained the same. Our analysis of the news sources showed that the overall emphasis of Trump administration in news coverage of the trade war constrained US journalists to government and elite sources. Only when there were big moves by the U.S. and Chinese governments on the tariffs, then more effort and diverse sources were being used (which were the first and the second stage). Despite the U.S. having higher overall use of competing frames across all stages than China, the trend decreased rather than increased over time. Instead of having more varying perspectives, the US news media increasingly focused on one frame such as the unfair trade practices of China rather than looking out for other frames to present the news about the trade war and progress on the trade talks. The overall lower US news media coverage and especially in the first stage than Chinese news media shows that US news media saw the trade dispute as a topic of low interest to the general public. The increasing amount in US news coverage in the third stage seemed to relate to the domestic mid-term election, rather than for showing new perspectives or more competing frames of coverage. Most notably, toward the end of the year in 2018, the U.S. mid-term elections became the top of the news media agenda and trade war coverage became closely tied to the election with an increase of 50.0% more news items on the trade war than earlier in the year. During election time, liberal news media used the negative effects of trade war to attack Trump with a single frame and conservative news media use the single frame of the trade war to show how Trump's tariffs could reverse the trade deficit with the high tariffs on over 200 billions of goods and put pressure on China for a long overdue payback.

But in China, the support of the government and heavy attention by news media on the topic was immediate. When the conflict developed, people wanted to learn beyond what the government told them and news media needed to diversify sources and provide other frames of references to the people such as reflection of China's international position or development in technology. The preliminary support to the hypothesis in China's data is intriguing, but still the change is rather modest, and a majority are using elite sources and noncompeting frames.

As this US–China trade conflict is only one case, more types of conflicts should be examined in future research to test the foreign policy market equilibrium hypothesis. The overall higher war and peace journalism scores in the United States than China showed the higher presence of the different indicators per U.S. story. But the fluctuation over stages was also higher in the United States with the initial stage showed more diversity, and the later stage less diversity. In contrast, the relatively stable low war journalism score and peace journalism score showed only a dip in the second stage but bounced back in the third stage in China.

Despite the contribution of this study to peace journalism research with a comparative setting and the provision of empirical evidence of the foreign policy market equilibrium in the case of China and differences in US–China source and frame diversity over time, there are some limitations. First, Lee and Maslog's (2005) war and peace journalism indicators were heavy on the language use so they may not be the best measure for war and peace journalism especially in economic conflicts. The duality problem was most acute when used as an aggregate average representing different stories. Both peace and war journalism scored high in the U.S. than China in the initial coverage of the trade war. A news story can have both peace and war journalism indicators, the use of differentials may help to determine whether peace or war journalism prevails in the story. Our comparison of the U.S. and Chinese peace and war journalism score in the trade war coverage shows that Chinese news media were more likely to employ peace journalism with its higher use of objective language, avoidance of victimizing language and demonizing language in the coverage the U.S. trade tariffs and the lower use of the term trade war to describe the conflict. But in other peace journalism indicators, Chinese news media scored lower than the U.S. especially on the damage to society and culture, and the causes and consequences of the conflict, and give diverse voices. Language as a factor is present in every article. Other items such as damage to society and culture, may not be applicable to every news story. So, the language can inflate the war and peace journalism score in aggregating news stories.

Hence, there is a need to refine the war and peace journalism measurement to put different weights on different indicators, instead of equal importance. For example, should language be given more importance as it is right now with three of the 13 indicators specifically devoted to language use (avoid victimizing language, avoid demonizing language and objective and moderate wording) and present in every news article? Probability of the item being present in a news story should be taken into consideration. Language and use of source can be present in every story so should form the base calculation. Those items that are more context-specific such as *win–win orientation* and *focus on agreement* may be more useful in talks and negotiation news, but not other routine trade tariffs implementation reports. By separating routine factors (language and source) with context-specific factors such as win–win orientation, reporting on damages, journalists can also be trained on using the proper language and necessary sources in covering a news story under conflict situations as the basic and add on more sophisticated context interpretation and framing. It will help promote the use of peace journalism for journalists.

If language is found to be most significant among all the indicators in influencing the audience's perception, then journalists and editors should be specifically trained on the cautious choice of language in reporting conflicts. For example, the U.S. news media were more often found to use emotive words against China in their news reports as justification for the trade war such as "manipulate the currency," "theft," "unethical", "unfair trade practices," "devastation to the Chinese economy." Chinese news media used words such as "bully," "violating free trade" on U.S. tariffs. These uses of emotive words can influence the public perception of the conflict and the attribution of responsibility of the conflict.

Another limitation of peace journalism as shown in this trade war analysis is the dilemma journalists face with the expectation of advancing national interest versus achieving peace which usually mean giving concessions probably from both sides in the conflict. Journalists' role as a fair global citizen is assumed in peace journalism. But whether journalists and news organizations adopt such transcending "global" role is unclear. For example, a win–win agreement may still be considered as concessions to the other party in conflict by nationalist people who insist on getting all the terms they wanted. Any deviation from the expectation can be considered betraying the country or threatening national interest. Will a journalist dare to ignore the national interest expectation of the audience at large and the government by advocating a win–win solution in the news story? The most recent first phase trade agreement signed between the U.S. and China on January 15, 2020, was hailed as a win–win agreement by both governments in China and the U.S., but was criticized as conceding too much to the other party by analysts in both United States and China. *The New York Times* saw it as "some victories for Trump. . .But text of the accord does not provide enough information to determine how it will work in practice." (Swanson &

Rappeport, 2020, para 2). The Glo*bal Times* also said, "On each side are people that argue their country made too many concessions or did not gain enough from the deal" (Wang, 2020, para 19).

Conclusion

This study shows that peace journalism can be practiced in both western democratic and Chinese communist media in a conflict. In the case of the US–China trade conflict, peace journalism practices were more prevalent than war journalism practices based on the scores of the news items. Whether the truce between US and China in December 2018 has anything to do with the peace journalism practices of Chinese and U.S. news media cannot be determined as of now as many other factors could have contributed to the truce. But at least temporary peace was achieved at that time which aligned with the predominant peace journalism practice during our study period. Although the Chinese government is not elected by the people, the government still has to monitor the public's opinion and manage people's expectations so that they would support the government's policies instead of fostering discontent with the government. The Chinese media's higher use of peace journalism was in line with the Chinese government's tactic of negotiating a better deal for the China during the trade war by creating a vision for common ground and emphasizing the benefit of free trade. The retaliation to the tariffs was positioned by the Chinese government as a defense to the attack by the U.S. whose purpose was to contain China's economic growth and technological advancement. The heavy coverage by the Chinese media helped to create salience of the government's position, shaped the public's understanding of the conflict and facilitated reflection on China's economic and technological development by providing competing frames on the topic as the conflict evolved.

The trade conflict between China and the United States is still going on at the time of writing despite the signing of the first phase agreement on January 15, 2020, and our analysis of news coverage was limited to the year of 2018. The stages of development of the conflict would need to be altered after the truce in December 2018. Nonetheless, this study offers an explanation for the different coverage of an international conflict by the country's role as initiator or responder in the conflict, medium difference, and partisanship: News media in the conflict initiating country tended to use war journalism more than the responding country. Newspapers were more likely to use war journalism than television. Despite the general adversarial relationship between the news media and the president, when it came to international conflict, the liberal U.S. news media selected situations to oppose or even supported the policy or kept neutral in most cases to the trade policy of the government. Our result shows that peace journalism can be practiced in an international trade conflict, which can lead to more world peace through building an atmosphere favoring negotiations and compromise.

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negotiation and conflict management research

Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Displaced and Invisible: Ukrainian Refugee Crisis Coverage in the US, UK, Ukrainian, and Russian Newspapers

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Abstract

The Ukrainian–Russian military conflict that began in 2014 displaced nearly two million people. This study is one of the first to compare the news media coverage of Ukrainian displaced persons in the UK, US, Ukrainian, and Russian elite press as the crisis unfolded. This analysis looks at frames, sources, and demographic characteristics used in the coverage of displaced people. The findings of this study indicate that the coverage of displaced Ukrainians varied from country to country in elite newspapers, and the descriptions did not always point to classic markers of crisis, such as emotional turmoil. English-language newspapers were more likely to focus on statistics, while Ukrainian and Russian press devoted more attention to various aspects of migrants' resettlement. The "security threat" and "crime" frames, which are often used in media coverage of refugees, were nearly non-existent in the articles about displaced Ukrainians.

The undeclared Russian–Ukrainian war is "the greatest security crisis in Europe since the Cold War" (Masters, 2020, para. 2). It began in March 2014 when the Russian military took over Crimea, Ukraine's southern peninsula, and annexed it from Ukraine (Conflict in Ukraine, 2020). A month later, Russian-backed separatists occupied parts of the Eastern Ukraine regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which border Russia (Ukraine profile, 2019). The Ukrainian government fought back by starting a military operation in Eastern Ukraine (Ukraine profile, 2019). The most intense phase of this crisis occurred in 2014–15; however, the occasional fighting between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military still threatens the lives of residents who live next to the contact line in 2020 (Freedom House, 2018; Graham, 2020). Since the beginning of the crisis, nearly 13,000 people, including 3,300 civilians, lost their lives in Eastern Ukraine ("Death toll," 2019).

Nearly two million Ukrainians were forced to leave their homes. Most chose to start a new life in parts of Ukraine not affected by the war, while others moved abroad. According to the Ukrainian government, 1.5 million Ukrainians registered as internally displaced (Ministry of Social Politics, 2018). More than 427,200 Ukrainians sought asylum in Russia, 13,262 in Israel, 11,230 in Italy, 10,495 in Germany, and 8,380 in Spain (UNHCR, 2018). The current study examines news coverage of those who were displaced by the Ukrainian–Russian crisis. The study analyzes news articles published between 2014 and 2017 in four newspapers with national and international reach. These elite dailies have the potential to shape how millions of readers interpret the crisis. The current study employs quantitative content analysis to

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identify and compare the frames in the newspapers' text. Understanding media coverage is particularly important in a crisis because audiences use the daily narrative to make meaning of the situation, assign blame, and choose sides (Perez, 2017). This is particularly important when readers do not have their own experiences with refugees (Parrott et al., 2019), and the coverage fills gaps in the audience's knowledge. The results of this study will add to the body of knowledge related to the media's coverage of conflict and crisis by illuminating patterns and themes that emerge.

Literature Review

The term "crisis" may mean different things to different people, but Fearn-Banks' (1996) classic public relations text defines a crisis as "a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting the organization, company, or industry, as well as its publics, products, services, or good name" (p. 2). One source of crisis is the deteriorating relationships between groups that have been directly at odds, such as customers, suppliers, even governments. These conflicts are prodomes or precursors of crisis (Coombs, 1999). In their study of product development, Lynch, O'Toole, and Biemans (2014) noted that a crisis can erupt when a conflict in one area threatens to consume the entire organization. According to Fearn-Banks (1996), "a crisis can be a strike, terrorism, a fire, a boycott [. . .] the size of the organization is irrelevant" (p. 2). Coombs (1999) expands on that idea, explaining that a crisis is "unpredictable but not unexpected" (p. 2). As a situation deteriorates from a conflict into a crisis, it typically captures intense media coverage. As the need for information becomes more critical, it also becomes more scarce. The complexities and failures during a crisis are amplified by media coverage (Veil & Husted, 2012). Crisis is not limited to organizations, as Cmeciu (2019) noted in the study of refugee portrayals in European media. The influx of refugees throughout Europe was framed as a crisis that could benefit from the input of engaged online citizens as well as European officials.

Many researchers have used framing to examine text and images. Gamson (1989, p. 157) defined "frame" as a "central organizing idea" of a news story that helps to understand the issue or event at hand or explains its meaning (Gamson & Modigliani, 1994). Frames are different from facts (De Vreese, 2005). They only capture "some aspects of a perceived reality" and give them higher prominence (Entman, 1993, p. 52) while less salient facts or characteristics are left in the background (De Vreese & Lecheler, 2012). Frames rely on the repetitions of the same or similar sets of words and symbols (Entman, Matthes, & Pellicano, 2009). They can "set a tone for an event or issue" (Tankard, 2001, p. 98), making it appear as positive, neutral, or negative.

De Vreese (2005) identified two ways of studying frames. One approach relies on studying issue-specific frames, while another uses generic frames (De Vreese, 2005). Issue-specific frames appear in coverage of specific events or subjects, and generally cannot be replicated in other studies (De Vreese, 2005). Generic frames can be used for studying media coverage of different issues and allow multicultural comparisons (De Vreese, 2005).

Framing examines several sites in communication processes, including "the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture" (Entman, 1993, p. 52). News reporters are guided by their own schemata as well as professional routines, norms, and organizational pressures (De Vreese, 2005; Entman, 1993; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), which can vary from country to country. For example, US and UK media organizations have a high degree of press freedom (Freedom House, 2017a, 2017b). US and UK news media are competitive (Freedom House, 2017a, 2017b) and enjoy editorial independence.

In comparison, Ukraine is "partly free," and Russia is "not free" (Freedom House, 2017c, 2017d). Most Ukrainian media are owned by oligarchs who use the outlets to advance their political interests (Orlova & Sydorenko, 2015). As a result, instead of balanced reporting, Ukrainian national media channels do not shy away from taking sides and promoting the views of their owners (Orlova & Sydorenko, 2015). "Violence" and "threats" are some of the major issues affecting the work of Ukrainian journalists (Freedom House, 2017c). Meanwhile, all major Russian media institutions are controlled by the Kremlin

or President Vladimir Putin's loyalists (Freedom House, 2017d). Russian officials can suppress any type of speech that goes against the official narrative through the use of ambiguous laws on extremism (Freedom House, 2017d). The Russian media narrative mimics the rhetoric of the leading party and the president in particular (Freedom House, 2017d).

Such political and organizational differences can influence how journalists select and frame information, which can affect how their respective audiences interpret topics and events (De Vreese, 2005; Entman, 1993). Sometimes, journalists do not acknowledge their own biases or recognize the power of the news-making process to influence an audience's understanding. Hoxha and Hanitzsch (2018), for example, interviewed combat zone journalists and dissected their news constructing process. The researchers found that journalists often relied on their own sense of newsworthiness, which had the effect of reframing the realities of war. This power to determine whether information is discussed is key in shaping political discourse (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001).

Framing of Refugees in News Media

Several studies examined the types of frames that the media created in their reporting of refugees and other migrants. Much of this research focuses on the 2015–2016 European refugee crisis, which was primarily driven by the Syrian conflict and violence in Iraq and Afghanistan (UNHCR, n.d.). During this time more than five million refugees came to European Union in search of safety (UNHCR, n.d.). Berry et al. (2015) focused on the European refugee crisis coverage in Spanish, Italian, German, the UK, and Swedish press. They found that the reporting differed from country to country. Italian media were more likely to employ humanitarian themes than the UK, German, and Spanish media. Economic and cultural threat themes appeared more often in Italian, Spanish, and British media, but less so in German and Swedish press.

Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017) analyzed the European refugee crisis coverage in Austrian newspapers and found that three narratives "administrative aspects of coping with the arrivals," "security threat" and "economization" received the most salience (p. 1749). "Humanitarian" frames and "background information on the refugees' situation" received less attention (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017, p. 1749). Tkaczyk (2017) looked at the online Czech media coverage of the European refugee crisis and found that the crisis was mainly reported through the lens of governance ("burden to the state") or "security threat." At the same time, the humanitarian frame was rare.

Dimitrova, Ozdora-Aksak, and Connolly-Ahern (2018) examined the Syrian refugee crisis in the Turkish and Bulgarian press. They found that Turkish media were more likely to employ the "victim" frame than the Bulgarian media and more likely to focus on topics such as refugees' substandard living conditions, discrimination, and migrants as crime victims. At the same time, Bulgarian media were more likely to use an "administrative" frame and report on issues that dealt with the legal status of refugees and other aspects of local and national bureaucracies. Also, Bulgarian media were slightly more likely to talk about refugees as an economic, cultural, and a security "threat" than Turkish media. The study determined that this frame appeared in nearly 28% of Bulgarian and 19% of Turkish articles.

Lawlor and Tolley (2017) compared the coverage of refugees and other categories of migrants in the Canadian press. The "security" frame was the most salient in the refugee coverage, followed by ethnicity. The two leading frames in the coverage of other migrants were economy and security (Lawlor & Tolley, 2017). The study also found that the "validity" frame, which is based on "deservedness" or "refugee determination process," was more often used in the context of refugees than other migrants (p. 977).

Despite the differences in operationalizations of categories and study approaches, these studies suggest refugees are often portrayed as a security threat, a burden, and an economic challenge. In fact, a large share of media reports is focused on negative aspects of irregular migration. Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) found that more than a half of stories analyzed in their study "employed one of four arguments against refugees: geopolitical (terrorism), economic (economic crisis), cultural (antipathy of Islam) or moral (deceit)" (p. 626). Refugees tended to be portrayed even more negatively than other types of

migrants (Lawlor & Tolley, 2017). At the same time, positive consequences of refugee arrivals were rarely mentioned. Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) found such statements in only less than eight percent of articles. Moreover, Berry et al. (2015) found that tonality of coverage varied by country. Swedish coverage was the most positive and British the most negative (Berry et al., 2015). Similarly, Sulaiman-Hill, Thompson, Afsar, and Hodliffe (2011) found that positive tonality was more prominent in New Zealand than Australian newspapers. Negative coverage of refugees increased in Australian media after 9/11 terrorist attacks (Sulaiman-Hill et al., 2011).

Previous studies also looked at types of sources, which can frame the reporting on refugees. Media relied on various types of authorities as sources such as national and foreign politicians, immigration officers, and police (Berry et al., 2015; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Swert, Schacht, & Masini, 2015; Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016; Tkaczyk, 2017). In addition to authorities, reporters also interviewed ordinary citizens, activists, and NGOs (Berry et al., 2015; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Swert et al., 2015). Migrants represented nine to 23% of sources (Berry et al., 2015; Swert et al., 2015; Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016; Tkaczyk, 2017). Thorbjørnsrud and Ustad Figenschou (2016) compared the framing of articles with irregular migrants' sources to those without them. Articles that used migrants as sources were more likely to portray them as victims and less likely to frame them as a threat (Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016). Meanwhile, articles that did not use migrants as sources were more likely to frame migrants as a problem for authorities (Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016). Additionally, when media featured refugees in their coverage, they were more likely to mention refugees' nationality and less likely to reference their age, gender, name, and profession (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017). Male irregular migrants dominated the migrant sources, appearing in two thirds of quotes (Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016). Also, 90% of quotes were from adults (Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016).

Ukrainian–Russian Military Conflict and Mass Displacement

The plight of the ordinary people caught in the fight between Russia and Ukraine bears the markers of a crisis (Coombs, 1999; Fearn-Banks, 1996): a large-scale, unpredictable event that threatened the lives and livelihood of the displaced. The timeline unfolded as the first wave of refugees fled as a result of Russia's intervention in Crimea. Most of the residents who refused to stay in Russia-occupied Crimea left the peninsula between March and August 2014 (Gorbulin, Vlasyuk, Libanova & Lyashenko, 2015).

The second wave of refugees began moving after Russia-backed separatists took over parts of Donetsk and Luhansk (Donbass) provinces in April 2014 and proclaimed their independence from Ukraine. In the matter of weeks, the Ukrainian government launched anti-terrorist operation against the separatists. Mass evacuations followed. By October 2015, nearly two million people left Donetsk and Luhansk provinces and Crimea (Gorbulin et al., 2015). Most of them settled in nearby Ukrainian towns and regions, and only some moved to more distant parts of Ukraine (Gorbulin et al., 2015).

Ukrainian governmental agencies were unprepared for such massive displacement of people, and the initial aid came from ordinary citizens and volunteers (Gorbulin et al., 2015). The legislative framework that clarified registration processes and rights of displaced individuals was adopted in October 2014, almost five months after the beginning of the crisis (Gorbulin et al., 2015). According to Gorbulin et al. (2015), finding affordable housing was the biggest issue for the displaced. Only 10% of them were provided some form of housing by the Ukrainian government (Gorbulin et al., 2015). Others received government aid that only partially covered rent and necessities (Gorbulin et al., 2015).

Russia was the second most common destination for displaced Ukrainians. By March 2015, the number of Ukrainian migrants in Russia grew by one million (Mukomel, 2017). This number is two times greater than the official United Nations' statistics for Ukrainian refugees in Russia (UNHCR, 2018). The discrepancies in numbers are probably due to the fact that not all of the migrants sought official asylum in Russia.

As they had in Ukraine, the majority of the first-wave refugees settled in regions closest to their homes, near the Russian–Ukrainian border (Russian Federal Government, 2014). However, the Russian government soon intervened and imposed a ban on further resettlement of refugees in these regions as well as in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Mukomel, 2017). Instead, Ukrainian migrants were offered to move to the Far East and other more distant regions (Mukomel, 2017).

The first wave of Ukrainian refugees was wholeheartedly welcomed across the border, but enthusiasm soon waned (Mukomel, 2017). Despite powerful media propaganda efforts, ordinary Russian citizens started to complain about Ukrainian migrants taking their jobs, lowering local salaries, and overcrowding schools and universities. At the same time, Ukrainian migrants had hard time finding housing and jobs (Mukomel, 2017).

These events were recounted in the pages of media around the world. The literature suggests that audiences use the media to make sense of crises, particularly when their own knowledge is lacking (Parrott et al, 2019). Building upon previous studies on refugees (Berry et al., 2015; Bozdag, 2017; Figenschou & Thorbjornsrud, 2015; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017; Lawlor & Tolley, 2017), this study will focus on the frames within the electronic text. It will look at dominant themes, quotes, and refugee characteristics used by each newspaper.

Articles published in *Den,* a Ukrainian paper, *Izvestia,* which is based in Russia, *The New York Times*, which is a US paper, and *The Guardian*, which is based in the UK, will be the units of analysis. These newspapers are some of the most popular and well-respected broadsheets in the referenced countries. They are national papers, and in the cases of *The New York Times* and *The Guardian,* major global agenda-setters (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005; "Who owns the Guardian," 2017). These outlets represent opposing sides of the crisis (Ukraine and Russia) as well as two powerful Western military and economic powers (US and UK) that are among the top five suppliers of military aid to Ukraine (Solodkyy & Bielieskov, 2017). Finally, the US, UK, and Russia are the three countries that in 1994 gave security assurances to Ukraine and pledged to respect the country's territorial integrity in exchange for denuclearization of Ukraine in an agreement known as the Budapest Memorandum. (Goncharenko, 2014; Pifer, 2014). Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine "grossly violated the commitments" under the agreement (Pifer, 2014, para. 1). This study examines issue-specific (refugee/migrant) frames. The news organizations' country of origin is an independent variable, while frames serve as dependent variables. The latter are examined as "the outcome of the production process[es] including organizational pressures, journalistic routines, and elite discourses" (De Vreese, 2005, p. 52) of the Ukrainian, Russian, UK, and US media outlets.

In light of the previous studies, the current study will explore these research questions:

RQ1. Are there differences in the types of frames used by the Ukrainian, Russian, UK, and US newspapers in the coverage of Ukrainian displaced individuals?

RQ2. Are there differences in the types of sources used by the Ukrainian, Russian, the UK, and the US newspapers?

RQ3. What is the share of Ukrainian displaced individuals' quotes in the Ukrainian, Russian, American, and UK newspaper coverage?

RQ4. What characteristics are mentioned in the relation to Ukrainian displaced individuals in the Ukrainian, Russian, UK, and the US press?

Method

This study employed quantitative content analysis. The researchers analyzed articles from four elite daily newspapers: *The New York Times* (US), *The Guardian* (UK), *Den* (Ukraine), and *Izvestia* (Russia). *The*

New York Times (US) and *The Guardian* (UK) are privately owned and reach audiences beyond their national borders. *The New York Times* has "2.33 million paid digital-only news subscribers" with 15% of these people residing outside the US (Wang, 2018, para. 2). Unlike *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* does not protect its articles by paywall. As a result, it has a half-million regular members and subscribers, while 300,000 make contributions on irregular bases (Guardian reaches, n.d.). Overall, *The Guardian* reaches more than five-and-a-half million audience members each day across print and digital platforms (The Guardian, 2019).

Den (*The Day*) is the Ukrainian media outlet analyzed in this study. It is a privately owned daily newspaper. It has been published since 1996 in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages with a circulation of 62,500–90,000 (Den, n.d.). The newspaper is tailored toward a more educated, "elite" audience (Dymytrova, 2010).

Izvestia is one of the oldest Russian newspaper (Amos, 2017). For decades, *Izvestia* was the Soviet government's official newspaper (Amos, 2017). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the newspaper evolved into the "democratic broadsheet" (Amos, 2017, para. 6). Currently, the newspaper follows the "pro-Kremlin editorial line" (Amos, 2017, para. 6). *Izvestia* is privately owned and has a readership of 450,000 (National Media Group, n.d.).

Sample and Procedures

The articles of interest were published between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2017. The final sample consisted of 211 articles: 57 *Den*, 53 *Izvestia*, 40 *The Guardian*, 61 *The New York Times* articles. Such a choice of countries and media organizations enables researchers to compare a range of narratives that media used when discussing the refugee crisis in Ukraine.

The New York Times and *Izvestia* had fully functional searchable archives on their websites; *The Guardian* and *Den* provided limited access to older articles. Google search windows were embedded on websites of *The Guardian* and *The Den*. The searches allowed access to the 100 most recent articles on a subject, and many of these articles were outside of the study timeframe. To ensure the sample's consistency and comprehensiveness, the researchers first retrieved articles through Advanced Google Search, which provided access to all four media organizations' articles. This was the only way to access articles from the *Den*.

Step 1: Keyword Search via Advanced Google Search

The scholars removed the search history and cookies before each search to ensure that previous searches did not affect the subsequent queries. Additionally, the researchers logged out of their Google accounts and checked the consistency of the data on two different computers, an Apple and a PC. Both computers displayed identical data.

Two researchers fluent in Russian, Ukrainian and English examined the text for two sets of keywords: "Ukrainian refugees" and "Ukrainian displaced persons" for English-language searches and their equivalents "українські біженці" and "українські переселенці"/"украинские беженцы" and "украинские переселенцы" for Ukrainian and Russian-language searches, respectively. Articles from *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* were published in English, while stories from *Den* (day.kyiv.ua) and *Izvestia* (iz.ru) stories were in Ukrainian and Russian languages, respectively. The researchers manually checked the relevance of each article. The search produced 57 articles from *Den*, 40 from *The Guardian*, 39 from *The New York Times*, and 28 from *Izvestia*.

Step 2: Keyword Search via Newspaper Websites

The researchers searched *The New York Times* and *Izvestia* websites using the aforementioned keywords. This search revealed 22 additional articles in *The New York Times* and 148 from *Izvestia*. The researchers included all of *The New York Times* articles and every fifth *Izvestia* article (25 total) to the overall sample.

The *Izvestia* articles were organized in a chronological order, ensuring representation of each period of the Ukrainian–Russian military conflict.

A growing number of people access news articles through news aggregate websites rather than going directly to the website of the news outlet (Ulken, 2005). By using both the website search and Google news search to access the articles, the researchers ensured that a full and exhaustive sample was collected.

The researchers manually coded all 211 articles. If an article mentioned Ukrainian displaced individuals only in one paragraph, only that paragraph was coded. If an article mentioned Ukrainian displaced individuals in more than one paragraph, the researchers coded the text of the entire article.

Frames

Issue-specific framing analysis was inspired by the Berry et al. (2015), Bozdag (2017), Figenschou and Thorbjornsrud (2015), Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017), and Lawlor and Tolley (2017) studies. The researchers examined the text for the following frames: migration statistics (articles that mentioned statistics or more than 10 Ukrainian displaced individuals); settlement (which encompassed housing, education, benefits/aid, and paperwork/bureaucracy); security (whether the refugees posed security threats to their new communities or committed crimes in their new destination); economic impact (mentions of displaced individuals finding work in their new destination or opening a business); success stories (which mentioned any types of migrants' successes in the communities); humanitarian/physical and emotional suffering (which focused on physical and emotional sufferings of migrants), and migrants as economic burden. A frame was coded "yes – 1" if this frame was present and "no – 0" if it was not mentioned in texts.

Sources

The researchers used the Berry et al. (2015) categories with some changes for coding sources: displaced individuals, ordinary Ukrainian citizens living on territories controlled by Ukraine, ordinary Ukrainians living in occupied territories of Donetsk/Luhansk/Crimea regions, ordinary citizens from other countries, Ukrainian national politicians/military/local officials, separatists (Donetsk People's Republic/Luhansk People's Republic/Crimea officials and those who fight on the side of militia), foreign politicians, international organizations (United Nations, European Union, NATO, and OSCE), independent experts/think tanks/academic experts, and law/judiciary/police. Each individual/organization was only coded once per story if this article included his/her direct quote. A source was coded "yes – 1" if such source was present and "no – 0" if it was absent in texts.

Displaced Individuals' Characteristics

If a displaced person was quoted in the article, researchers coded for the individual's gender, name, occupation, Ukrainian region of origin, and whether the individual was an adult or a child. This study also examined whether the migrant's destination was Ukraine, Russia, or other country.

Two researchers proficient in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages coded the articles. Intercoder reliability was assessed for 12% of the articles. Krippendorff's alpha values for sources and demographic characteristics of refugees ranged from .993 to 1 and for frames from .84 to 1. One framing category, major economic impact (general economic statistics, job numbers, and unemployment rate), was deleted from the analysis due to insufficient intercoder reliability (.46).

Results

RQ1 examined the differences in the types of frames used by *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *Den*, and *Izvestia* (see Table 1). The country's media organization was an independent variable, while each type of frame served as a dependent variable. The researchers used Chi-Square tests to identify the differences between media organizations.

The four media organizations differed significantly in how they used statistics regarding the displaced individuals ($x^2[3, N = 211] = 10.285$, $p = .016$), settlement ($x^2[3, N = 211] = 22.393$, $p < .001$), and employment ($x^2[3, N = 211] = 12.146$, $p = .007$) frames. However, four cells (50%) had expected count less than five in the employment frame.

A series of post hoc chi-square tests were performed to examine the nature of the differences between the media organizations (Wrench, Thomas-Maddox, Peck Richmond, & McCroskey, 2016). The researchers ran six pairwise comparisons (*The Guardian- The New York Times*, *The Guardian-Den*, *The Guardian-Izvestia*, *The New York Times-Den*, *The New York Times-Izvestia*, and *Den-Izvestia)*. They used the Bonferroni-adjusted procedure to correct for type 1 error. The results of post hoc pairwise comparisons were determined as statistically significant only if their *p*-value was less than .0083 (.05 *p*-value divided by six).

The Guardian (65%) and *The New York Times* (56%) articles mentioned statistics regarding the displaced more often than *Den* (35%) and *Izvestia* (43%), with the differences between *The Guardian* and *Den* $x^2(1, N = 97) = 7.278$, $p = .007$ being statistically significant.

The discussion of settlement appeared in 66% of articles in *Izvestia,* 60% of *Den* articles, 33% of stories in *The New York Times*, and 28% of *The Guardian*'s articles. The differences between *The Guardian* and *Den* $x^2(1, N = 97) = 8.519$, $p = .004$, *The Guardian* and *Izvestia* $x^2(1, N = 93) = 12.046$, $p = .001$, *The New York Times* and *Den* $x^2(1, N = 118) = 7.518$, $p = .006$, and between *The New York Times* and *Izvestia* $x^2(1, N = 114) = 11.261$, $p = .001$ were statistically significant.

Meanwhile, nearly every sixth *Den* article talked about displaced individuals finding a job or opening a business, but this topic was less prominent in *The Guardian* (eight percent), *The New York Times* (two percent), and *Izvestia* (two percent). None of the pairwise comparisons reached statistical significance.

No statistically significant differences were found in reporting the successes of displaced ($x^2[3] = 5.757$, $p = .124$), security threat/crime ($x^2[3] = 2.206$, $p = .531$), economic burden ($x^2[3] = 2.995$, $p = .392$), and physical ($x^2[3] = 5.578$, $p = .134$) and emotional suffering ($x^2[3] = 3.095$, $p = .377$) frames.

The success stories of migrants were rare or non-existent in the media coverage. Such stories appeared in three percent and five percent of *The Guardian* and *Den* stories respectively, while no such stories existed in *The New York Times* and *Izvestia*. The security threat/crime frame was not prominent in the coverage of Ukrainian displaced individuals. This frame appeared in one or two (two-four percent) articles of *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *Izvestia*. No such frames were found in *Den* content. One *Izvestia* article (two percent) talked about Ukrainian refugees being an economic burden for a receiving country, while no such articles appeared in other three media organizations. Finally, very few articles mentioned current emotional and physical suffering of Ukrainian displaced individuals. The mentions of emotional suffering of refugees constituted two-five percent of *The New York Times*, *The Guardian,* and

Table 1
Table Shows Frames used in the Coverage of Ukrainian Displaced Persons in the Four Newspapers

Media/Frame	Guardian	NYT	Den	Izvestia
Migration statistics (>10)*	65% (26)	56% (34)	35% (20)	43% (23)
Settlement (housing, aid, education, bureaucracy)***	28% (11)	33% (20)	60% (34)	66% (35)
Security (threat) for host country/region. Crime (committed by refugees)	3% (1)	2% (1)	0	4% (2)
Finding a job/opening a business in a new destination**	8% (3)	2% (1)	16% (9)	2% (1)
Success story	3% (1)	0	5% (3)	0
Physical suffering/death	5% (2)	5% (3)	0	0
Emotional suffering	3% (1)	5% (3)	2% (1)	0
Immigrants as economic burden	0	0	0	2% (1)
Total articles	100% (40)	100% (61)	100% (57)	100% (53)

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Den stories. Also, five percent of *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* stories talked about deaths and physical suffering of the displaced, while no such articles were featured in *Den* and *Izvestia*.

To sum up, the researchers found that two types of frames (migration statistics and settlement) dominated the texts. International newspapers, *The Guardian* and *The New York Times*, had higher share of statistics frames, while national newspapers (*Den* and *Izvestia)* focused significantly more on various aspects of settlement such as housing, aid, education, and bureaucracy.

RQ2 explored whether there were differences in the types of sources used by the US, UK, Ukrainian, and Russian newspapers. To answer this question, a series of one-way ANOVA and follow-up Tukey's HSD tests were conducted to compare the sources used by the four media organizations (see Table 2). "Media organization" here served as an independent variable and "number of sources" quoted for each category as a dependent variable. Each source was coded only once. If an article mentioned two quotes from the same refugee, it was coded as one refugee source. However, if an article included quotes from three different refugees, they were coded as three refugee sources. *Izvestia* was an outlier in this sample; the Russian paper used three types of sources in their reporting: non-Ukrainian/foreign politicians (mostly Russian), experts, and separatists.

Statistically significant differences were found in how often the four media organizations interviewed Ukrainian displaced individuals ($F[3, 207] = 2.897$, $p = .036$), ordinary citizens from occupied territories ($F[3, 207] = 2.966$, $p = .033$), separatists (pro-Russian militia) ($F[3, 207] = 4.109$, $p = .007$), foreign/non-Ukrainian politicians ($F[3, 207] = 20.56$, $p < .001$), and experts/think tanks ($F[3, 207] = 10.91$, $p < .001$).

The Guardian and *Den* had the most quotes from Ukrainian displaced individuals (20–21%), while *The New York Times* (12%) used fewer such quotes. Also, *Den* and *Izvestia* did not interview any ordinary citizens from the occupied territories, while such sources constituted nearly one fifth of all *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* quotes. Post hoc Tukey's HSD test did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the media organizations in both cases. This possibly happened due to the small and uneven sample sizes across four media outlets.

The Guardian had the highest share of the separatists' quotes (nine percent), followed by *Izvestia* (four percent) and *The New York Times* (one percent), while *Den* did not feature any quotes from separatists. Post hoc Tukey's HSD test revealed that *The Guardian* ($m = 0.18$, $SD = 0.5$) had significantly more of such quotes than *The New York Times* ($m = 0.02$, $SD = 0.13$) and *Den* ($m = 0$, $SD = 0$).

Foreign, non-Ukrainian politicians were the largest *Izvestia* source (57%). With the exception of several quotes, most of these interviews were from Russian political leaders or officials. *The New York Times* featured non-Ukrainian politicians in 14% of quotes, *The Guardian* in nine percent of quotes, while *Den*

Table 2
Table Demonstrates the Percentage of Quotes for Each Newspaper Source Category

Media/#Sources	Guardian	NYT	Den	Izvestia
Ukrainian displaced individuals*	21% (16)	12% (14)	20% (21)	0
Ukrainians living in occupied regions*	22% (17)	17% (19)	0	0
Ordinary Ukrainian citizens (not displaced, not from occupied regions)	12% (9)	10% (12)	53% (56)	0
Ordinary citizens (from other countries)	9% (7)	23% (26)	1% (1)	0
Ukrainian national/local politicians, official or military	7% (5)	12% (14)	13% (14)	0
Separatists**	9% (7)	1% (1)	0	4% (4)
Foreign politicians/officials (non-Ukrainian)***	9% (7)	14% (16)	0	57% (54)
EU/UN/NATO/OSCE/	5% (4)	5% (6)	4% (4)	0
Law enforcement/Judges	0	0	0	0
Experts/Think Tanks/Academics***	5% (4)	6% (7)	9% (10)	39% (37)
Total sources	100% (76)	100% (115)	100% (106)	100% (95)

Note. Each source type was divided by the total quotes (for each media organization).
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

did not interview any foreign politicians for their stories. Post hoc Tukey's HSD test revealed that *Izvestia* ($m = 1.02$, $SD = 1.17$) had significantly more such quotes than *The Guardian* ($m = 0.18$, $SD = 0.59$), *The New York Times* ($m = 0.26$, $SD = 0.63$) and *Den* ($m = 0$, $SD = 0$).

The second most prominent *Izvestia* source was experts/think tanks/academics (39%). *Den* (nine percent) used this category less often, followed by *The New York Times* (six percent) and *The Guardian* (five percent). Post hoc Tukey's HSD test showed that *Izvestia* ($m = 0.70$, $SD = 1.01$) had significantly more of these quotes than *The Guardian* ($m = 0.1$, $SD = 0.3$), *The New York Times* ($m = 0.12$, $SD = 0.49$), and *Den* ($m = 0.18$, $SD = 0.43$).

No statistically significant differences were found in how often the four media organizations interviewed ordinary Ukrainian citizens (not displaced/not from occupied territories) ($F[3, 207] = 2.519$, $p = .059$), ordinary citizens from other countries (non-Ukrainian) ($F[3, 207] = 1.147$, $p = .331$), Ukrainian politicians/officials ($F[3, 207] = 1.98$, $p = .118$), international organizations ($F[3, 207] = 1.138$, $p = .335$), and law enforcement/judges/police.

Den relied heavily on the ordinary Ukrainian citizens, who were not displaced and not from occupied regions as sources. Fifty three percent of *Den* sources were from this category. However, it is worth noting that nearly a half of these quotes came from just one article. *The Guardian* (12%) and *The New York Times* (10%) relied less on such sources.

Nearly every fourth *The New York Times* story featured quotes of ordinary citizens from other countries (non-Ukrainian). However, it is worth noting, that the bulk of such quotes came from just one article, which was rather atypical for the media organization. Without this article, the share of such quotes was rather similar to *The Guardian* (nine percent). *Den* only quoted ordinary non-Ukrainian citizens in one article.

Den featured the highest number of Ukrainian politicians/military sources (13%), followed by *The New York Times* (12%) and *The Guardian* (seven percent).

The share of United Nations/European Union and other international organizations' sources was similar across the board among *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, and *Den*. Such sources accounted for four to five percent of their quotes.

Finally, neither of the organizations interviewed law enforcement, judges, or police for articles about Ukrainian displaced individuals.

To sum up, the researchers found that displaced Ukrainians and other ordinary citizens constituted the majority of sources in all newspapers except for *Izvestia*. They represented 64% of *The Guardian*, 62% of *The New York Times*, 74% of *Den* sources, while no such quotes appeared in *Izvestia*. Meanwhile, the share of politicians, military, and various types of officials constituted 30% of *The Guardian*, 32% of *The New York Times*, 17% of *Den*, and 61% of *Izvestia* sources. Thus, all media except for *Izvestia* relied more heavily on various types of citizens and refugees and less on official sources.

RQ3 and RQ4 findings only include descriptive statistics. It is worth pointing out that small sample sizes (in some instances only 7–8 cases per variable) prevented researchers from using more rigorous data analysis techniques.

RQ3 examined the frequency with which displaced individuals appeared in the examined articles. The four media organizations varied in how often they quoted migrants not only in terms of the share of quotes (see Table 2), but also in regard to the number of articles mentioning them (see Table 3). This study found that nearly every fourth *Den* and fifth *The Guardian* article featured quotes of the displaced individuals, while only every tenth *The New York Times* article had such quotes. *Izvestia* did not provide any quotes of the displaced individuals.

RQ4 examined demographic characteristics of Ukrainian displaced individuals such as gender, age, names, occupation, and regions of origin/destination (see Table 4). The descriptive analysis showed *The New York Times* (64%) and *Den* (67%) relied more heavily on the quotes of female than male displaced individuals, while there was more gender parity in *The Guardian* (56% female and 44% male) quotes.

The Guardian and *The New York Times* only featured adults, while 90% of *Den* refugee quotes were from adults and 10% of children.

All three media organizations, *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, and *Den*, that quoted refugees provided the names of the interviewees. Nearly two-thirds of *The Guardian* and *Den* articles mentioned the occupation of the quoted displaced individuals, while only 43% of *The New York Times* articles did the same.

All of *The Guardian*, 90% *Den*, and nearly 80% of *The New York Times* articles mentioned the region of origin of the quoted displaced individuals. While *Den* (86%) and *The Guardian* (75%) primarily interviewed displaced individuals who relocated to other Ukrainian regions, the share of such quotes was smaller in *The New York Times* coverage (14%). At the same time, a greater share of *The New York Times*' displaced individuals' quotes (36%) were from people who moved to Russia, while only 13% of such quotes appeared in *The Guardian*, and none in *Den* and *Izvestia*. Finally, 43% of *The New York Times* quotes were from displaced Ukrainians who settled in other countries such as Poland and the US, while *The Guardian* featured only 13% of such quotes, and *Den* had no such quotes. To sum up, *The Guardian* and *Den* were more likely to have interviewed Ukrainians who had moved to other parts of Ukraine, while *The New York Times* had a larger share of quotes from displaced individuals in Russia or other countries, but to the less extent from Ukraine.

Discussion

This study focused on the media coverage of Ukrainian displaced persons in the US, UK, Ukrainian and Russian press. It looked at dominant themes, sources, and demographic characteristics used in stories about Ukrainian migrants. Given that the majority of people living outside of Ukraine, as well as some Ukrainians, do not have firsthand experience with Ukrainian refugees, these media narratives can have an impact on how audience members interpret Ukrainian refugee issue, what they think about Ukrainian

Table 3
Table shows the Number of Articles Quoting Ukrainian Displaced Persons

Media	Guardian	NYT	Den	Izvestia
No. of articles quoting Ukrainian refugees/displaced	18% (7)	10% (6)	25% (14)	0
Total # articles	40	61	57	53

Table 4
*Table shows Demographic Characteristics of Quoted Ukrainian Displaced Persons**

Media/Characteristic	Guardian	NYT	Den	Izvestia
Gender (Female)	56 % (9)	64% (9)	67% (14)	0
Gender (Male)	44% (7)	36% (5)	33% (7)	0
Adults	100% (16)	100% (14)	90% (19)	0
Children	0	0	10% (2)	0
Name	100% (16)	100% (14)	100% (21)	0
Occupation	69% (11)	43% (6)	62% (13)	0
#Region of origin (Donbas/Luhansk/Crimea)	100% (16)	79% (11)	90% (19)	0
Country of relocation (Ukraine)	75% (12)	14% (2)	86% (18)	0
Country of relocation (Russia)	13% (2)	36% (5)	0	0
Country of relocation (other)	13% (2)	43% (6)	0	0
Total refugee quotes	100% (16)	100% (14)	100% (21)	0

*The percentages represent a share of each category in the overall number of quotes.

migrants (Parrott et al., 2019) and whether they perceive the situation as a crisis. Also, in an interconnected world, where local issues now often have global implications (Janssens, Maddux, & Nguyen, 2019), the way news stories frame crises can affect other countries' response toward them (Ojala & Panttie, 2017). For example, news media can limit policy options of foreign governments or put pressure on them to intervene (Ojala & Panttie, 2017).

The results of this paper are somewhat different from the previous findings on refugees. It seems that the coverage of Ukrainian displaced persons was rather neutral across the board, while the number of negative or positive stories was rather limited. The neutral coverage could have the impact of making the displaced population's circumstances seem less dire.

Coverage in *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* was more episodic. Many of the articles mentioned the Ukrainian–Russian conflict and refugee statistics without providing additional details about the plight of the displaced. At the same time, *Den* and *Izvestia* spent significantly more time discussing various aspects of the settlement such as housing, education, issues with registration or documents, or receiving aid in a new destination. The share of such stories was nearly two times higher in the Ukrainian and Russian media than in the US and UK. This is not surprising, given that both Ukraine and Russia resettled most of the displaced Ukrainians on their territories. Thus, this frame had more relevance to the aforementioned media organizations and their respective audiences. This coverage also gave Ukrainian and Russian readers more insight into the day-to-day lives of migrants than readers of the Western newspapers.

To our surprise, the articles about displaced persons being a security threat or those that mentioned crimes committed by the refugees were nearly non-existent in the four media organizations analyzed in this study. Such articles represented less than two percent of the overall sample, and all but one of these reports described hypothetical situations or lacked corroboration. *Den* did not have any articles on the security threat or crimes committed by the displaced individuals. This finding is different from previous research on the coverage of refugees in Czech and Canadian media, where security threat frame was one of the most salient in the content (Lawlor & Tolley, 2017; Tkaczyk, 2017). The lack of reporting about a threat also suggests a lack of danger to migrants and to local residents.

This study found there was a lack of articles about the displaced persons being an economic burden to their new regions or countries. This finding also differed from previous research on refugees (Tkaczyk, 2017). Only one *Izvestia* article hinted at this as a potential issue, while this topic did not appear at all in *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, or *Den*. Thus, the relative lack of such framing might lessen the tension between refugees and locals.

The stories of physical suffering of the displaced individuals were also rare, constituting no more than five percent of *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* samples. Several of these articles mentioned the death of refugees during their attempts to escape the war region. No such articles appeared in *Den* and *Izvestia*. The emotional suffering frame appeared only in a little over two percent of the overall sample. This lack of emotional turmoil also undercut the narrative that usually accompanies stories of crisis (Cmeciu, 2017; Kim & Cameron, 2011).

The differences in the coverage of the Ukrainian displaced individuals and other refugees can be explained by several factors. Even though most Ukrainian evacuees went through traumatic experiences and had a hard time finding housing and jobs that would allow them to settle in the new destinations, most of these people relocated to similar cultural environments. They look, dress, and in many instances speak the same or similar languages. They can more easily fit in and adapt at the new destinations than refugees from other more distant countries of disparate cultures.

Secondly, unlike in the European Union during the European refugee crisis, where there was an active debate about the fate of the refugees as some politicians welcomed the newcomers and others opposed their arrival, most Ukrainian and Russian elites were consistently compassionate toward displaced Ukrainians (Mukomel, 2017). In Ukraine, many displaced individuals were perceived as victims of Russian aggression. At the same time in Russia, politicians claimed to have saved Ukrainian refugees from

the atrocities of their own army (Mukomel, 2017). It is possible that the national Russian and Ukrainian media in this study mainly reflected the agendas set by their respective political elites. Also, the level of media freedoms in the respective countries and political agendas of the analyzed newspapers might have had an impact on which issues were discussed and which were not.

In terms of sources, the findings of this study were somewhat different from the previous research on refugees. To our surprise, the largest share of sources came from ordinary citizens. More than 40% of *The Guardian* and 50%-54% of *The New York Times* and *Den* sources were from this category. The numbers for this category were much higher than those reported in the previous research on refugees (Berry et al., 2015). The only outlier was *Izvestia*, which did not use such sources. A quick analysis of other articles revealed that this trend was not unique to Ukrainian refugee coverage.

Politicians and officials represented about a third of *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* sources. *Den* had close to 20% of such sources. Meanwhile, *Izvestia* relied heavily on such sources, with more than 60% of overall quotes coming from various types of politicians, mainly Russian. Thus, aside from *Izvestia* results, the share of political quotes was slightly lower than in the previous research (Berry et al., 2015; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Swert et al., 2015; Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016; Tkaczyk, 2017).

This study also found an interesting pattern in the use of Ukrainian politicians and officials as sources. Similar to previous research (Roman, Wanta & Buniak, 2017), this study showed that while US, UK, and Ukrainian media included quotes from Ukrainian politicians, such quotes did not appear at all in the Russian outlet. At the same time, separatists' (Russian-backed militia) and Russian officials' quotes were not featured in *Den*. Thus, Russian and Ukrainian media organizations continue to ignore the perspective of their military adversaries (Roman et al., 2017). This ability to shape the parameters of discussion (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001) also influence whether readers understand the depth and breadth of situations, which can impact the perception of crisis (Coombs, 1999; Fearn-Banks, 1996).

Interestingly, none of the media organizations quoted law enforcement or judiciary sources. This was another difference between the coverage of displaced Ukrainians and Middle-Eastern/African refugees (Berry et al., 2015; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017).

At the same time, the quotes of displaced Ukrainians were more prominent in *The Guardian* and *Den*, constituting nearly one fifth of the overall quotes, while they represented 12% of *The New York Times* quotes, and did not appear at all in any *Izvestia* articles. Thus, the share of Ukrainian displaced individuals' quotes in all four analyzed newspapers were generally in line with the previous research on refugees (Berry et al., 2015; Swert et al., 2015; Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016; Tkaczyk, 2017).

Another interesting finding is that most displaced Ukrainians who were quoted were identified by name, gender, region of origin, and in many cases profession. Contrary to previous findings (Thorbjørnsrud & Ustad Figenschou, 2016), female migrants were interviewed more frequently than male migrants. Nearly two thirds of *The New York Times* and *Den* and slightly more than a half of *The Guardian* articles quoted women who had been displaced. Such overrepresentation of female sources is surprising as the researchers expected a more even distribution of quotes by gender. One possible explanation is that some males limited their contact with journalists in order to keep a low profile and avoid being drafted by the Ukrainian army to fight in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Since the beginning of Ukrainian–Russian conflict, Ukraine reinstated conscription for 20- to 27-year-old males ("Country policy," n.d.). Also, the maximum age for reservists is 65 years ("Country policy," n.d.).

The overwhelming majority of *The Guardian* and *Den* articles quoted people who had resettled in Ukraine, while nearly 80% of *The New York Times* refugee interviewees were in Russia or other countries. This was a rather expected finding for *Den*, which is a national newspaper with a limited international reach. The differences in *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* need further investigation.

To conclude, this study offers cross-subject, cross-media, and cross-cultural comparisons of news media coverage of displaced Ukrainians in the midst of a crisis. This study found that the portrayals of Ukrainian migrants were rather neutral with very few negative references. The displaced Ukrainians were shown as active members of their respective communities, and in most instances were clearly identified

by name, gender, and profession. These very human descriptions were unlike the threatening descriptions of immigrants in other studies (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017; Tkaczyk, 2017). In this way, and many others, the hostility that marked the international crisis did not seep into the media's coverage of migrants' as they attempted to resettle.

The current study extends framing research to the Eastern European context. Relying on empirical methods, this study demonstrated that the political environment in the country and characteristics of the media organizations determine which frames are used in the coverage of Ukrainian refugees. Also, the current research suggests that the cultural and language proximity between the migrants' countries and regions of origin and destination might have an effect on how they get framed in news and whether the situation is framed as a crisis. The articles in this study did not depict the interactions of citizens and displaced individuals as out-of-control encounters that fuel a crisis, threatening lives or livelihoods. The findings of this study can be useful for national governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work with refugees. NGOs and national governments can promote and articulate frames with higher resonance, they can express those frames in ways consistent with the journalistic standards and get more engaged in reframing the issue (Ryan, Carrage, & Meinhofer, 2010).

Limitations and Future Research

Relatively small and uneven samples across four media organizations restricted researchers in their use of statistical tools and possibly prevented from finding more statistically significant relationships between the variables. Also, using only online versions of the print newspapers certainly limited the results of this study. Thus, future research can look at print versions of the newspapers and analyze social media sites of the respective media organizations. Also, researchers can examine other national and international media outlets with different political agendas in the US, UK, Ukraine, and Russia.

Finally, future research can examine conflict-specific frames within media coverage: assess whether there are disagreements between individuals, groups, or states and identify stakeholders of a crisis (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Such operationalizations and measurements can better explain some of the findings of the current research and enrich the field of conflict management literature in general.

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negotiation and conflict management research

Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Global Transitional Justice Norms and the Framing of Truth Commissions in the Absence of Transition

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Abstract

As global transitional justice norms strengthen, governments face increasingly pressure to enact formal transitional justice mechanisms to resolve domestic conflict. This article examines how Bahrain, Morocco, and Sri Lanka attempted to exploit these norms to appease demands and stave off international transitional justice intervention by employing truth commissions. Governments framed truth commissions and their responses to their investigations as sufficient to address the past. To varying degrees, though, domestic audiences and the international community refused to accept this framing. As such, truth commission investigations and their reports failed to resolve the respective conflicts. Rather, they prolonged attention on governments' past and present misdeeds. For governments, the risk this strategy backfires is higher when human rights violations have been more extensive and extreme, when governments construct a more obviously biased truth-seeking process and display little interest in enacting recommendations, and when governments have failed to cultivate strong ties with Western powers.

Transitional justice commonly refers to measures that societies enact to address histories of violence and repression. Governments face increasing pressure from domestic activists and the international community to establish formal transitional justice mechanisms to address past human rights violations. Truth commissions, nonjudicial bodies established to investigate a pattern of human rights abuses, are a common form of transitional justice. As a truth commission norm has emerged in global politics (Hirsch, 2007, 2014), it has become widely accepted among policymakers and activists that truth commissions are an important conflict resolution tool (Amnesty International, 2007; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006). To be sure, as nonjudicial investigative bodies, some fear truth commissions will exacerbate tensions by threatening perpetrators and failing to provide accountability (Mamdani, 2002; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003). Many, though, argue that truth commissions are critical for resolving deep-rooted conflicts (Hayner, 2000; Minow, 1998). Truth commissions attempt to construct authoritative histories of past violence. They provide a platform from which victims can tell their stories and have their suffering officially acknowledged. In doing so, the conventional wisdom holds that truth commissions can ultimately promote reconciliation and conflict resolution.

This article explores how stable regimes employ truth commissions to appease demands and stave off international transitional justice intervention. Rather than reject the relevance of transitional justice to address abuses, governments in Morocco, Bahrain, and Sri Lanka each attempted to use the truth

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commission model to their advantage. Instead of prosecuting state agents as many demanded, governments sought to pursue transitional justice with what they perceived to be the relatively costless measure of a truth commission. This is consistent with a growing body of scholarship that examines governments' strategic exploitation of transitional justice (Cronin-Furman, 2020; Grodsky, 2010; Loyle & Davenport, 2016; Subotić, 2009). However, I argue that, to varying degrees, employing truth commissions has proven more costly than anticipated.

As I show, in each of these cases, few stakeholders questioned the legitimacy of the truth commission model to promote conflict resolution. Rather, actors sought to frame the truth commission in terms of its sufficiency for the task. Debates centered around the adequacy of truth commissions' mandates, truth commissions' findings and the governments' responses to them, and the sufficiency of the truth commission to address past violations and promote nonrepetition. Governments framed truth commissions as closing discussion of the past. By and large, though, truth commissions prolonged the attention on governments' past and present misdeeds. Domestic audiences and the international community refused to accept governments' framing. Thus, governments became entangled in the norm, giving critics standards against which to assess their human rights and transitional justice practices. Although we lack data on individual perceptions, and reconciliation is a long-term process, at the macro level, there is little evidence truth commissions have promoted reconciliation. At best, truth commissions made the respective conflicts slightly less destructive (Deutsch, 1973).

Organizationally, the article first examines the literature on framing and truth commissions as conflict resolution tools. Next, I examine the truth commission experiences in Morocco, Bahrain, and Sri Lanka. Specifically, I explore the contention over the governments' framing of the truth commission's sufficiency to deal with the past and the adequacy of the government response to the truth commission. Ultimately, few stakeholders, domestic or foreign, accepted governments' claims that the truth commissions significantly advanced conflict resolution. I conclude by outlining several factors that seem to influence the extent to which relatively stable regimes can exploit truth commission norms to effectively make the past "go away." I argue that the risks for abusive regimes in engaging the truth commission norm is higher when human rights violations have been more extensive and extreme, when governments construct a more obviously biased truth-seeking process and display little interest in enacting recommendations, and when governments have failed to cultivate strong ties with major Western powers.

Transitional Justice Choices and Conflict Resolution

There is an extensive literature on whether and how countries pursue transitional justice. One of the most common approaches to understanding the transitional justice choices societies make is to focus on structural conditions domestically, in particular, the balance of forces (Barahona de Brito et al., 2001; Huyse, 1995). The conventional wisdom is that prosecution will be more likely when one side emerges victorious. In such situations, punitive measures are likely to target the losers, who are not in a position to block trials or to cause unrest (Landsman, 1996; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003). Negotiated transitions appear more likely to result in transitional justice policies that are less threatening to perpetrators, such as truth commissions (Huyse, 1995). In the absence of transition, all three governments in the present study were firmly in control when they established their respective commissions. A strict focus on the domestic environment offers no obvious need to offer a truth commission as a concession.

If one considers the global context, however, the behavior makes more sense. Some scholars argue that states feel pressure to comply with global norms due to a desire to be accepted as legitimate members of the international community (Finnemore, 1996). In fact, when governments are uncertain as to how to respond to a situation, adopting policies that possess international legitimacy and are perceived as best practices provide a ready solution (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer et al., 1997). Past research has chronicled how a transnational network of scholars and technical experts propagated a truth commission norm (Hirsch, 2007). According to Priscilla Hayner (2011, p. 11), a truth commission "(1) is focused on

past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report; and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review." Popularized by South Africa, dozens of countries have established truth commissions in recent decades (Bakiner, 2016).

Academics and practitioners have outlined several ways in which truth commissions might contribute to conflict resolution (Hayner, 2000; Minow, 1998; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006). As official bodies, truth commissions challenge communal or government denial of past violations. Their investigations provide the foundation for a definitive history of the period. Through these revelations, truth commissions may prompt the development of a human rights culture and prompt reforms that promote nonrecurrence (Crocker, 2000; Dimitrijevic, 2006). As Ruti Teitel (2000, p. 69) notes, "establishing the 'truth' about the state's past wrongs. . .can serve to lay the foundation of the new political order." Furthermore, their victim-centered nature may promote restorative justice (Llewellyn, 2013). They may restore victims' dignity, promote healing, and advance reconciliation (Tutu, 2003). Finally, they may prompt action to hold perpetrators accountable. Since these are long-term processes, truth commissions cannot end conflicts alone (Hayner, 2000).

Many of these claims are based upon anecdotes (Brahm, 2007; Mendeloff, 2004), and assume transitional contexts in which there is greater opportunity for substantial change. Morocco, Bahrain, and Sri Lanka all had long faced international criticism for their human rights practices, including demands that officials be held accountable for violations. While calls for justice had been largely rebuffed in the past, governments saw an opportunity to frame the truth commissions as consistent with global norms and sufficient to deal with the past. Scholars have long recognized the importance of framing for shaping the prospects for conflict resolution.

Frames are cognitive constructs that, among other things, help people understand the causes of conflict, the appropriate actions to take, and how to interpret the behavior of other parties (Gray, 2003). Actors strategically frame issues to advance their own interests (Kaufman & Smith, 1999). A growing body of research argues that governments exploit global transitional justice norms to advance their own interests (Grodsky, 2010; Loyle & Davenport, 2016; Subotić, 2009). Domestic factors are often critical in shaping whether the goals of transitional justice are perverted. Loyle and Davenport (2016) argue that the risk of transitional *injustice* is higher when participation in the design and implementation of transitional justice processes is constrained, when violence remains prevalent in society, and when governments lack democratic constraints, whether on paper or in practice. All three cases examined here are at heightened risk based upon these criteria. Furthermore, in countries with at least the semblance of democracy, governments need to be attuned to public opinion (Subotić, 2009). It may not be pro-justice though. In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese majority largely accepts the official rhetoric that blames the Tamil Tigers for atrocities and characterizes state violations as unfortunate byproducts of war.

Framing and reframing can make conflicts more or less intractable (Elliott et al., 2003; Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Domestic activists rejected governments' framing of the truth commissions as adequate responses, but lacked the power to mount a serious challenge. More threatening for the regimes was external criticism. When countries face international pressure to address human rights violations, they may seek to embrace the appearance of compliance with global transitional justice norms by adopting the less threatening truth commission model. Through these tactics, Subotić (2009, p. 29) argues, "they are able to make use of international norms and institutional models while at the same time rejecting or ignoring their substance. They violate the norm by complying with its institutional demands." While a global truth commission norm may have been propagated by a growing consensus that they are not a poor substitute for trials (Hirsch, 2014), leaders concerned with accountability recognize commissions still offer a strategy to avoid punishment for themselves or key domestic allies. Moreover, governments may enact such "half-measures" to give sympathetic states the cover to block multilateral action

(Cronin-Furman, 2020). Being firmly in control, the governments examined here were able to shape the mandate of the commission, thereby minimizing the threat to themselves.

However, the obvious subversion of the norm may also serve to perpetuate transitional justice demands. In the wake of the final reports of each of the three truth commissions examined here, national governments, foreign governments, the UN, as well as local and transnational activists engaged in competitive framing of the respective truth commissions along three dimensions: the adequacy of the truth commission's mandate to address past violations; the adequacy of the government's response to the truth commission; and whether the truth commission was sufficient to resolve the conflict. The three governments argued truth commissions provided a just, comprehensive way for the respective countries to put the past to rest. Further, they touted their compliance with truth commission recommendations. Rather than putting an end to debate about the past as governments intended, however, each investigation served to perpetuate domestic and international discussion about the importance of accountability and additional measures to address past human rights violations. Thus, in limited ways, governments that sought to exploit transitional justice rhetoric became entrapped by it. Although the legacies of these truth commissions will become clearer with time, in the short-term, they do not appear to have promoted conflict resolution.

Truth Commissions and Stable Regimes

This section examines three examples of attempted norm cooptation. Whereas existing transitional justice cooptation research focuses on relatively vulnerable postconflict governments in the Balkans and Rwanda (Grodsky, 2010; Loyle & Davenport, 2016; Subotić, 2009), this section provides an overview of three cases in which stable governments established truth commissions to assuage transitional justice pressure. Morocco, Bahrain, and Sri Lanka were selected from the growing list of nontransitional contexts in which truth commissions have been created (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2019). The three have not been randomly selected, nor are they intended to be representative of the broader category of nontransitional contexts. Rather, they are examples of what Gerring (2006) calls influential cases. Each government was quite secure, thus presenting a tougher test of whether exploiting the truth commission norm sustains or curtails transitional justice demands. For each case, I use process tracing to examine regimes' relative success in framing truth commissions as sufficient to their human rights record (George & Bennett, 2005). Given the significant time that has passed since the commissions operated, one can explore the extent to which each helped sustain transitional justice processes in their respective societies.

Morocco

Following King Mohammed VI's 2004 succession to the throne, he accepted his Advisory Council of Human Rights' (CCDH) recommendation to establish the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance Équité et Réconciliation—IER). The commission focused on the reign of his father, King Hassan II, whose four decade-rule was known as the "Years of Lead" for the government's frequent use of arbitrary detention, torture, and disappearances. In focusing on his father, the IER seems meant to build Mohammed's reputation as a modern, progressive monarch. To his credit, Mohammed granted the IER significant resources and appointed a set of credible and capable commissioners to run it. Nonetheless, the IER avoided more recent human rights abuses, particularly violations committed under King Mohammed's rule, and Western Sahara, which is Morocco's thorniest human rights issue (Faramarzi, 2005a). The silence on Western Sahara and the government's lack of interest in holding perpetrators accountable for past human rights violations is suggestive of a regime employing the truth commission model to legitimize itself. In the end, the IER generated significant public discussion about human rights and Morocco's past, facilitating limited sustained engagement with the past, though it arguably contributed little to conflict resolution.

In its mandate, the IER was asked to investigate human rights violations by government forces that occurred between Morocco's independence and Hasan's 1999 creation of the Independent Commission of Arbitration. The IER's mandate charged it with establishing the facts about past human rights abuses. In addition, it was to serve an educational function by helping the country learn from its past. Through its investigation, it also was to facilitate victim healing and reconciliation. Finally, the IER was intended to enable the provision of compensation for victims. The statute establishing the commission defined victims narrowly, limiting its investigation only to forced disappearances and arbitrary detention. The IER's 17 commissioners came from a variety of backgrounds, including several lawyers and journalists, a physician, and a historian. The commissioners were widely respected and included victims and human rights activists among their ranks; most had a history of human rights activism (Loudiy, 2014). The government asked the commissioners to accomplish the ambitious mandate in approximately two years.

As its final report chronicles, to fulfill its mandate, the IER established three separate units: Investigations, Reparations, and Research and Study. The Investigations Unit interviewed witnesses and collected evidence around the country in order to document past human rights violations. During the roughly 45-year period subject to its investigation, the IER concluded in its final report that government forces killed over 300 people during anti-government protests, arbitrarily detained 174 individuals who died in government custody, and disappeared nearly 600 others. The commission's final report states that government officials were less than full cooperative with their investigation.

The IER was a high-profile institution in Morocco. According to the final report, the commission held seven public hearings in different locations around the country, which were broadcast on television and radio. Among other things, the government forbids those testifying at the hearings to name alleged perpetrators. Individuals who spoke at the public hearings received psychological support both before and after their appearance. Aside from the hearings, the IER organized several televised discussions of Morocco's future political, legal, economic, and cultural development. Overall, observers credited the IER's public programing with generating significant public discussion regarding human rights and Morocco's past (Khalleej Times, 2005).

The Research and Study Unit conducted several studies that enhanced and provided context to the stories victims relayed to the Investigations Unit. It worked closely with civil society organizations, which boosted the commission's credibility and gave it access to their databases of human rights abuses (Arabic News, 2004). In addition, the Research and Study Unit consulted with global transitional justice experts, including the International Center for Transitional Justice and veterans of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), to learn from other countries' experiences.

The Reparations Unit was responsible for developing measures to repair the harm suffered by victims. According to the IER's report, the Reparations Unit heard approximately 17,000 claims; the IER recommended monetary compensation for almost 10,000 individuals. It established a unit to provide medical and psychological care for victims while the IER was in operation and recommended the government set up a long-term medical program. Moreover, the Reparations Unit identified nearly 2,000 victims who had lost their jobs for political reasons. The IER called upon the government to restore them to their positions with compensation.

On November 30, 2005, the IER submitted its final report to the government. In a speech two weeks later, the King ordered the report's public release. He further pledged to implement the recommendations. Two months prior to the IER's conclusion, the commission held a three day public National Forum to discuss its draft reparations program with hundreds of government officials and civil society representatives (Khalleej Times, 2005). Ultimately, the government gave IER reparations a budget of between USD 50–70 million to be split among the victims (Hazan, 2006). In early 2007, the government began making payments to victims through the CCDH.

The IER's final report put forward several other recommendations. For instance, it urged significant economic development assistance for regions most affected by past abuses. Second, the IER called for decommissioning former detention centers, which began shortly afterward. Third, the commission

recommended constitutional reforms to delineate Moroccans' fundamental rights and freedoms. Fourth, it suggested institutional reforms to help prevent future human rights abuses. In particular, the IER recommended a stronger, more independent judiciary and greater oversight of the military. Fifth, it called on the government to investigate unresolved cases. Finally, it pointed to the need to ensure that the commission's records remain accessible to encourage ongoing public discussion.

Overall, the IER is viewed in different ways by observers, either as a positive initiative, whether intentional or not, or as a public relations exercise for the new king (Hazan, 2005). Some criticisms focused on the mandate. For instance, the government gave victims only one month in which to apply for reparations, and this happened early in the commission's work when it may have been less well known. At the same time, the government funded over 100 temporary staff for the Reparations Unit to manage the flood of cases (Khalleej Times, 2005). Human rights groups were critical of the prohibition on identifying perpetrators. One group actually published its own list of alleged torturers to fill the void. Civil society groups also disliked the fact that the IER was empowered to investigate only a narrow range of human rights abuses, which resulted in an overly rosy picture of the history of human rights violations in Morocco (BBC, 2005; Faramarzi, 2005b). Other criticisms focused on the government's reaction to the IER's work. For example, the government was accused of acting slowly on recommendations (Thorne, 2006). Although the reparations program was up and running quickly, following a June 2009 visit, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances concluded that, while some IER recommendations had been implemented, many remained unaddressed (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009). Progress in implementing IER recommendations continued slowly. In early 2010, CCDH president Ahmed Herzenni stated that all IER recommendations were either implemented or in the process of being implemented (Libération, 2010). Yet, at roughly the same time, Amnesty International issued a report that was much more pessimistic about the future of IER recommendations and the ability of the Moroccan government to improve its human rights practices (Amnesty International, 2010).

In the end, the Moroccan government seems to have been successful in framing the IER to stave off demands for accountability. Although the IER has faded from public view, its work sustained attention on Morocco's past. As one observer put it, by "revealing a narrative of past abuses, distributing reparations, and outlining structural recommendations for change, the IER succeeded in fulfilling the terms of its mandate, and acting as a catalyst for reforms. . ." (Fakhro, 2017, p. 170). The government was drawn into taking additional measures to deal with past abuses. Moreover, domestic activists and the international community brought sustained pressure on the government in part because of the IER. The government's attempt to frame the truth commission as closing a stage of Morocco's history has been unsuccessful.

While Morocco has made strides domestically in human rights since the IER was established, including the expansion of women's rights, the regime also remains committed to old traditions and the assertion of authority over the political and religious aspects of daily life (Associated Press, 2012). Security forces maintain the authority to violently suppress protests and curtail freedom of speech. In fact, government failure to address the root causes of the conflict causes continued tension (Rhani et al., 2020). As such, from the vantage point of 2020, the IER has not substantially advanced the resolution of the conflict.

Bahrain

The protests that began in February 2011 were inspired by pro-democracy activism around the region, but grew out of longstanding grievances of Bahrain's Shia majority. Although they make up 65–75% of Bahrain's population (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2009), Shia view themselves as ruled by a foreign occupier after the Sunni Al-Khalifa family invaded the island in the eighteenth century (Fuller & Francke, 1999). Particularly since the 1979 Iranian revolution, Bahrain's Shia population has periodically

risen up to demand greater political participation. The government has typically responded by imprisoning opposition leaders and violently suppressing protests (Nasr, 2007). Thus, the 2011 demonstrations were part of a decades-long fight for greater economic and political power.

Following protestors in Cairo's Tahrir Square, Bahrainis began camping out in Manama's Pearl Roundabout to demand genuine democracy on February 14, 2011. The date was significant as it was the tenth anniversary of a referendum on the National Action Charter, which implemented limited political reforms. At its peak, an estimated 200,000 people, approximately 25% of Bahrain's adult population, were at Pearl Roundabout (Humphreys, 2011). Security forces unsuccessfully attempted to put down the demonstrations. Then, the government offered some modest concessions. Circumstances changed dramatically when, on March 2, the government staged a counter-demonstration that sparked sectarian violence. As tensions escalated, on March 14, the Gulf Cooperation Council agreed to send 1,500 security personnel from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to quell the unrest. The invasion succeeded in suppressing protests, but assistance from other Sunni monarchies exacerbated underlying tensions.

The government succeeded in curtailing the protests through violence and repression. According to the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI; 2011), security forces used excessive force to end the protests. Thirty-five people were killed in the protests, including five security personnel. Five others died as a result of torture in government custody. After declaring a three-month state of emergency, the government created special National Security Courts to convict scores of demonstrators. The government even targeted hospital personnel, prosecuting several doctors who provided medical treatment to protesters. In total, BICI found that 2,075 state employees and 2,464 private sector employees lost their jobs for participating in the protests. More than 500 students were expelled, suspended, or subjected to disciplinary action for joining the demonstrations.

The international outcry over the Bahraini government's crackdown was muted. Sunni Arab autocrats are loathed to criticize one of their own. For its part, the United States was relatively silent on the behavior of a close ally that hosts the US Navy's Fifth Fleet. Nonetheless, global interest in the so-called Arab Spring put the government in an unflattering light and it felt compelled to address the human rights violations that occurred during the protests. It sought to do so with BICI. The commission was established by royal decree on June 29, 2011. Nonetheless, the timing of BICI's creation, when a government-sponsored national dialogue had barely gotten off the ground, was odd. Shehabi (2011) suggests it was part of the King's strategy to sideline conservatives in the royal family.

The Bahraini government staffed BICI with prominent international legal experts to boost its credibility. It was chaired by Cherif Bassiouni, an internationally renowned international criminal justice lawyer and scholar who was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. The four other commissioners were selected in consultation among the Bahraini government, international organizations, and Professor Bassiouni: former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Sir Nigel Rodley; the International Criminal Court's first president, Philippe Kirsch; Kuwaiti international and Sharia law expert Badria Alawadhi; and Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, an Iranian international lawyer and veteran of the UN's legal office. The commissioners formally began their work on July 24, 2011.

The royal decree establishing BICI gave it broad powers. It had access to government files, agencies, and officials as well as any site it wanted to visit. Individuals could contact the commission via telephone or email, and BICI could meet witnesses in secret. Bassiouni reports having complete freedom to travel to sites and to talk with witnesses and detainees at any time (Personal communication). Nonetheless, Bassiouni had to request an extension to complete the commission's final report due to a lack of cooperation from government agencies. In approximately four months, BICI collected about 9,000 testimonies related to abuses. The commission hired its own staff and directed the use of its budget, which was provided entirely by the Bahraini government.

BICI worked to cultivate a reputation of even-handedness, but, in the tense environment, was not always successful. For example, opposition groups interpreted several of Bassiouni's statements as pro-government. The most dramatic incident occurred in July, when, in a media interview, Bassiouni

described the government's response to the protests as "manageable" compared to the violence in the early 1990s former Yugoslavia (Shehabi, 2011). In response, protestors stormed BICI's offices. Afterward, the commission issued a statement denying its investigation had a predetermined outcome. For government critics, the statement appeared to set a high standard through which government actions could be vindicated. Furthermore, Alawadhi's publication of an op-ed justifying the Gulf monarchies' military intervention led the opposition to question her neutrality.

Given that, many were surprised by how critical the BICI report was of government handling of the demonstrations. It documented the mass arrest of peaceful demonstrators, frequent use of torture on detainees, and a reliance on National Security Courts to punish protestors. It found that 2,929 people were detained under the state of emergency, 2,178 of whom were eventually released without charge. Frequently, the whereabouts of detainees were concealed for days or weeks. BICI received 559 complaints of mistreatment while in government custody. The commission's conclusion that human rights abuses were not official policy did not sit well with many. Nonetheless, it did find evidence of a plan to terrorize protesters that could not have been implemented without high-level authorization. The Shia opposition's reaction to the BICI report was relatively dismissive, with "some saying it did not go far enough while others complained that those responsible for the abuses remained in office" (Hammond, 2011).

To its credit, the government broadcast Bassiouni's summary of the report nationwide and the report itself was publicly released. The report outlined several recommendations to further address past abuses and prevent future violations. First, it urged the government to establish an independent body to further investigate allegations of abuse and punish those responsible for human rights abuses. Second, it recommended that the government have ordinary courts review the sentences handed down by National Security Courts. Third, it called upon the Bahraini government to align its laws with international human rights standards. Fourth, it recommended that the Inspector General of the Ministry of the Interior be transformed into an independent ombudsman. Fifth, with respect to security forces, BICI called for the creation of a training program based upon UN best practices and for its ranks to better reflect the country's sectarian make-up. Sixth, it recommended a training program for judicial and prosecutorial officials to combat torture and ill-treatment. Seventh, it suggested the government use the National Fund for the Reparation of Victims, which was established by royal decree in September 2011, to provide remedies for victims. Eighth, the commission recommended the development of a national reconciliation and education program to promote tolerance, human rights, and the rule of law. Finally, it urged the government to create an independent body made up of representatives of government, opposition, and civil society to monitor the implementation of BICI recommendations.

In the ceremony in which BICI's report was unveiled, the King pledged to enact the commission's recommendations. Bahrain's cabinet admitted that security forces committed abuses. The government quickly announced that alleged abuse by government forces would be prosecuted and that victims would be compensated. It announced that it would criminalize torture and set up an independent human rights ombudsman's office. It also established a 19-person commission to oversee implementation of BICI recommendations (the Follow-Up Body). In a further bid for transparency, it also set up a website (http://www.govactions.bh/) to catalog implementation.

The government was anxious to show results prior to its February 29, 2012, self-appointed deadline to implement the recommendations. Nonetheless, over the years, there has been disagreement as to what has been implemented. The government-run Bahrain News Agency reported on February 4, 2012, that Bassiouni confirmed that the government had fully complied with BICI recommendations. Yet, contradicting its earlier press release, two years later, Bahrain's Human Rights Affairs Minister asserted that 19 recommendations had been *fully* implemented, with work continuing on the rest (Grewal, 2014). However, the US State Department concluded at roughly the same time that only five BICI recommendations have been fully implemented (Lynch, 2014).

The investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses have not progressed much. In early 2012, the government announced that 48 members of the security forces had been investigated for their role in

the repression, but only eight have been charged in what was a secretive investigation (Sahraoui, 2012). Bassiouni cited the lack of perpetrator accountability as a major failing of the government's response (Issa, 2014). The record of providing remedies is mixed. Protestors who were charged before National Security Courts saw their cases transferred to civilian courts. Although many had been reinstated, approximately 400 people dismissed from their public sector jobs remained out of work after the BICI report's publication. Many who returned to their jobs were reportedly asked to pledge not to protest again (Amnesty International, 2012). According to the Follow-Up Body's November 2013 report, 99% of dismissed workers and all but twelve students were reinstated (Grewal, 2013). In early February 2012, the commission charged with implementing BICI recommendations announced that a special chamber would soon be established in the civil courts to expedite compensation cases. In the end, the government failed to reach its self-appointed deadline for implementation. The Follow-Up Body eventually stopped releasing periodic reports on implementation progress.

BICI's legacy is mixed. To its credit, Bahrain's government made efforts to ensure fairness by appointing foreign commissioners and keeping the process relatively transparent. The commission's report provided standards against which government action could be assessed years afterward. Nonetheless, the impact on the state's behavior has been limited and the conflict is no closer to resolution (O'Loughlin, 2016). Opposition figures criticize the fact that the broader history of government repression beyond 2011 remains unaddressed, and that perpetrators have not been held accountable (Fakhro, 2017). Moreover, the positive steps achieved in implementing some recommendations are hard to reconcile with continued government repression of opposition groups. Hundreds of political prisoners remain in custody and torture continues to be practiced. Until there is real democratic reform in Bahrain, demands for transitional justice are unlikely to be satisfied. The monarchy's position is secure, and there is little prospect of a broader transitional justice process beginning. Thus, the government's framing of the truth commission largely succeeded.

Sri Lanka

After twenty-six years of conflict, the civil war between the Sri Lankan government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in 2009. The LTTE sought an independent state for the Tamil minority, who account for approximately 15% of Sri Lanka's population, after having been subject to widespread repression and discrimination for decades. Unlike Morocco and Bahrain, from its origins in the late 1970s, the Sri Lankan conflict escalated to a full-scale civil war. While varying in intensity over time, the war was characterized by massive casualties and widespread violations of humanitarian law on both sides (Bhattacharji, 2009). Most significantly, after the government officially withdrew from a ceasefire agreement in 2008, it launched a massive assault on the LTTE. Reports of the final stages of the war indicate an increased level of brutality amid allegations government forces targeted civilians (Ganguly, 2009). The UN estimates that approximately 100,000 people were killed during the civil war, nearly 40,000 of whom died in the final five months of the conflict (Dominguez, 2014).

Although militarily victorious, Sri Lanka's government faced strong domestic and international pressure for an investigation into human rights violations, the final months of the war in particular. As a result, President Mahinda Rajapaksa established the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in May 2010. Critics accused the government of establishing the commission for a variety of self-interested reasons (Anonymous, 2011). First, it was timed to undermine international efforts to investigate human rights abuses, the UN Panel of Experts in particular, which was being established in Colombo. In the end, though, creating the LLRC would prove costly for Sri Lanka, Rajapaksa in particular.

The LLRC was created without input from stakeholders. The commission was charged with investigating the circumstances that led to the collapse of the 2002 ceasefire agreement and human rights violations up to the war's end in 2009. As such, the mandate was framed to avoid the conflict's origins. The

LLRC also was charged with prescribing methods of compensation for victims and prevention measures. The eight commissioners, who were appointed by Rajapaksa, were former government officials and prominent lawyers. None were opposition figures.

Nonetheless, significant effort was put into the commission's work. From its beginning in August 2010, the LLRC held 57 public sessions and undertook 12 field visits to over 40 locations to collect evidence and testimony (LLRC, 2011). It visited battle zones in Sri Lanka's north and east to clarify details of the civil war's final months. To encourage participation, the commission gave witnesses a variety of options for submitting their testimonies (Wickramasinghe, n.d.). As the final report documents, it received over 1,000 oral submissions and over 5,000 written submissions. Nonetheless, critics argue that state coverage of LLRC proceedings was often selective, journalists forced to self-sensor, and thousands of witnesses failed to participate due to security concerns (Anonymous, 2011). Global civil society organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Crisis Group rejected the LLRC and refused to appear before it (Keenan, 2012).

The LLRC submitted its final report to the government in November 2011. Its characterization of the conflict was largely sympathetic to the government. For example, it concluded that the government's military strategy had been designed to avoid civilian casualties. Moreover, it asserted that humanitarian aid provided during the conflict had been sufficient. The report essentially cleared the state's security apparatus of allegations that it deliberately targeted civilians and justified government actions under the logic that it had no other choice. It is also worth noting that the report failed to mention that doctors detained under anti-terrorism laws at the war's conclusion were forced to publicly recant statements that many civilians died from government shelling (International Crisis Group, 2011). By contrast, the report focused on the LTTE's grave violations of international humanitarian law and recommended appropriate legal action be taken against perpetrators. In short, its conclusions shifted principal blame for civilian casualties to the LTTE, which, given damning reports on government actions by the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other independent sources widely noted in the media, undermined the LLRC's credibility.

The LLRC promoted its recommendations as steps to advance peace and to ensure that terrorism and violence would not resume. The report encouraged the Sri Lankan government to implement its recommendations in a way that promoted tolerance and compromise. Some recommendations did ask more of the state than many observers had expected. For example, the LLRC recommended that the state take responsibility for cases of missing persons and child soldiers, issuing death certificates where necessary, and treating detainees on a case-by-case basis. In addition, it made a series of recommendations regarding the relocation of displaced citizens and the provision of monetary compensation for those who suffered as a result of the conflict.

In order to promote reconciliation and peace-building, the LLRC recommended increased power sharing for minorities and political decentralization. It also encouraged the government to accommodate cultural, religious, and linguistic differences by ensuring equal opportunities for minorities, especially in education. It further urged revising the national anthem to allow that it be sung in both Sinhalese and Tamil in order to promote unity. Finally, it advised modifying school curriculum to promote peace and reconciliation. However, well-meaning the recommendations, restricting the investigation to the period of 2002–2009 and clearly laying the blame on the LTTE limited the potential for future reconciliation, given that it excluded a thorough investigation of the conflict and its root causes.

The government's response to these recommendations suggested that it was more concerned about maintaining a façade than genuinely pursuing transitional justice (Keenan, 2012). While the report did mention unresolved Tamils grievances, the government response indicated that significant political reform, including power sharing, was unlikely. Overall, the government was slow to respond to LLRC recommendations. The military, in consultation with the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security, continued to maintain control over virtually all aspects of life in the Tamil-majority north and east. The military imposed restrictions on humanitarian, social, and recovery work,

but denied allegations of mistreatment, asserting they were "helping them (the Tamils) renovate and reconstruct their homes so the people are very happy" (Manikavasagam, 2012, p. 13). Yet, as the same report indicates, of the nearly 300,000 civilians (primarily ethnic Tamils) displaced during the final months of the conflict, thousands were denied permission to return to their homes and were not provided with adequate shelter long after the war's end. Tamils did not see a decline in disappearances and arrests, as vocal critics of Rajapaksa continued to be targeted. Prosecutions of civil war-era crimes have been largely directed against LTTE members; only a few low-ranking members of state agencies have been convicted (Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2019).

International pressure on Sri Lanka to enact LLR recommendations and to pursue accountability and reparations has been persistent, however. The UN released a March 2011 report that documented approximately 40,000 casualties in the war's final months, for which it argued both the government and LTTE should be held accountable under international humanitarian law. It concluded that both the LTTE and government forces had conducted operations "with flagrant disregard for the protection, rights, welfare, and lives of civilians and failed to respect the norms of international law" (Office of the UN Secretary General, 2011, p. 115). Sri Lanka vociferously rejected the panel's characterization of the government's conduct. Nonetheless, the government responded by creating a national action plan that consisted of pledges to implement LLRC recommendations and to have the police and military further examine war crimes and other serious violations (Keenan, 2012).

In fact, compared to Morocco and Bahrain, the international pressure on Sri Lanka has not abated with time to the same extent. The government failed to formally respond to the UN's 2011 report, especially with regard to establishing an independent mechanism to monitor and assess how the government was carrying out an effective accountability process. States and global civil society continue to closely scrutinize the government's behavior. International human rights groups have cataloged new violations of international humanitarian law since 2009, especially disappearances and political assassinations. In its annual human rights reports since 2010, the United States Department of State kept pressure on the regime by cataloging unlawful killings by the state's security apparatus, a lack of accountability for disappearances, torture of detainees, poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention of citizens, and the denial of fair trials.

For its part, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) repeatedly urged Sri Lanka to implement an independent inquiry into alleged war crimes, with condemnation rising with each year that the government failed to act. In 2013, the Sri Lankan government argued that the LLRC sufficed and that a UNHRC resolution would jeopardize reconciliation. Yet, frustrated by inaction, the UNHRC approved the resolution. Following another year of inaction, the pressure ramped up further. The late 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo became an opportunity for states to diplomatically isolate Sri Lanka, as India, Canada, and Mauritius boycotted the meeting. At the meeting, British Prime Minister David Cameron gave the Sri Lankan government a four-month ultimatum, at which time the UNHRC would next meet to discuss next steps in investigating civil war-era war crimes (Quinn, 2014).

As the meeting approached, in early 2014, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Nisha Biswaland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay separately accused the Sri Lankan government of ignoring the LLRC's conclusions (Dominguez, 2014; Nebehay, 2014). Citing a lack of political will to launch "independent or credible investigations," Pillay called upon the international community to conduct its own inquiry into war crimes (Nelson, 2014). Anticipating further criticism, shortly before the release of the High Commissioner's report, the Sri Lankan government announced it was considering a South African-style TRC to address human rights violations during the civil war (Dominguez, 2014). However, global human rights organizations rejected the TRC proposal as a cynical attempt to avoid genuine accountability. Ultimately, in March 2014, the UNHRC voted to launch an international investigation of war crimes allegedly committed during the latter stages of the war.

Ultimately, Rajapaksa's defiance of international pressure proved personally costly, at least in the short-term. International isolation led to the factionalization of Sri Lanka's ruling party. Maithripala

Sirisena unseated Rajapaksa in 2015 presidential elections, in part based upon pledges to mend fences with the international community and to address transitional justice in Sri Lanka. Sirisena's softer rhetoric on transitional justice won him a temporary reprieve from international pressure. The military slowly began scaling back its presence in the north and east. In most other respects, though, there was more talk than action on transitional justice under Sirisena. Early on, his administration pledged to establish an Office of Missing Persons, a reparations office, a new truth commission, and a special court. Sirisena stalled setting up the Office, which ultimately was approved by parliament in August 2016; action on the other measures was repeatedly delayed. The prime minister's office established a civil society-led Consultations Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms in early 2016, which is highly regarded, but then ignored its findings (Keenan, 2017). It was not until May 2017 that the government produced a policy document on reconciliation (Imtiaz, 2017).

In the face of a politically resurgent Rajapaksa, Sirisena failed to follow through on his transitional justice promises and critics lost patience (Keenan, 2017). While the 2018 Sirisena-Rajapaksa alliance and the 2019 election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the defense minister during the war's end, as Sri Lanka's president has observers worried about the future of transitional justice in Sri Lanka, successive governments' truth commission dalliance has helped ensure continued domestic and international transitional justice pressure. The government's framing of the LLRC has been too baldly self-serving. It ignored many of the LLRC's recommendations and continues to resist calls to hold government forces accountable for gross human rights violations. Although a return to war is unlikely in the near term, the underlying conflict is unresolved and opposition figures remain targets of oppression.

Conclusion

The three cases suggest several factors that appear to influence the extent to which global norms can be (re)framed to effectively evade accountability. First, increasing the credibility of truth commissions can paradoxically reduce pressure for accountability. The Moroccan and Bahraini governments took a risk in appointing neutral, independent commissioners and in granting them significant power. This lent their recommendations greater legitimacy. This legitimacy may at least partially transfer to the government. The international community seems more likely to give governments the benefit of the doubt on implementation in such circumstances. By contrast, the obvious bias in the LLRC's construction left outside observers cynical from the start. That the LLRC's findings exonerated the government surprised no one. Even the mild rebukes in the final report were rejected by Rajapaksa's administration.

Thus, a second factor shaping the success of using truth commissions as an avoidance strategy is a willingness to engage in some reform. The greater legitimacy of IER and BICI allowed the respective governments to enact the least threatening recommendations. By providing reparations and enacting modest reforms, the monarchies partially overshadowed the lack of action on accountability. In Sri Lanka, Rajapaksa's government was reticent to deal seriously with the LLRC's mildest recommendations. Rather, it rejected any suggestion of wrongdoing on its part. For governments, appearing magnanimous and conciliatory seems to be a better strategy for avoiding accountability. Note, however, that this may require some mild concessions on human rights.

Third, major power support helps significantly. As important allies of the West, Morocco and Bahrain faced more mild criticism. The international community has commended King Mohammad VI for his efforts to improve domestic policy, while violent suppression continued (Schemm & El Yaakoubi, 2012). Similarly, Bahrain's strategic location in the Persian Gulf gained it the goodwill of the US. Meanwhile, three years after the protests began, Bahrain's national dialogue had gone nowhere, and the government faced limited pressure to prolong it (Law, 2014). Amid the tumult of the post-2011 Middle East, stability is preferred over human rights. By contrast, Sri Lanka has faced far greater diplomatic criticism, much of it very public. It managed to alienate one-time defender India, and Sri Lanka lacks the relative geostrategic importance to entice major powers to expend much political capital to defend it. Perhaps

unsurprisingly, when embarking on a policy of transitional justice norm cooptation, it is useful to have major power support.

Finally, particular characteristics of the country and conflict seem relevant. For instance, the scope of human rights violations must be taken into account. The scale and severity of human rights abuses in Sri Lanka far exceeds that of the other two countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that demands for accountability have been louder in that case. Pressure may rise in proportion to the death toll, in part because the international community's inaction appears increasingly egregious. The scope of violence also matters in the sense that the effects of more widespread human rights abuses are more likely to be felt beyond the country's borders. The Tamil diaspora, which has grown over decades of violence, is much larger and a vocal political force in some Western countries.

Time also is a factor. Morocco's IER occurred furthest in the past. As such, Morocco faces the least pressure to follow-up on the commission. One lesson governments can take from this is that they just need to weather the storm and pressure will eventually subside. Where other factors work in favor of avoiding accountability, as in Bahrain, time will undoubtedly work in governments' favor. Likely, this will be true for Sri Lanka as well. However, at least in the short-term, belligerence and intransigence isolated it diplomatically, whereas a more conciliatory posture placated external demands for accountability at relatively low cost.

In many ways, though, the truth commission as deflection strategy has backfired. Governments in Morocco, Bahrain, and Sri Lanka attempted to exploit transitional justice norms to alleviate pressure for political liberalization and accountability for human rights violations by employing truth commissions. To date, those with command responsibility have evaded accountability in each case. In this sense, government transitional justice strategies have been successful. Nonetheless, the investigations forced governments to reframe their depictions of the past and of the commissions themselves. Officials rarely deny past atrocities. However, they often justify violence or write it off as the actions of rogue agents. The three truth commissions produced a wealth of information, but many critics charge the record is incomplete and acontextual.

Clearly, though, truth commissions have not satisfied demands for justice and accountability. Domestic and international NGOs, as well as the UN, have issued numerous reports contradicting government claims of compliance with commission recommendations. The investigations raised expectations and served to rally further domestic and international pressure. Commission reports have created benchmarks, to which the international community and domestic activists attempt to hold the governments accountable. While the prospect of widespread prosecution is remote, that was never a realistic possibility with or without the commissions. We lack individual-level data as to whether these bodies promoted healing or restored dignity to victims. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that reconciliation advanced because of the investigation. While keeping demands for justice alive, the truth commissions failed to achieve many of the things that proponents see as their conflict resolution potential.

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negotiation and conflict management research

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Globalization and the Prevention of Ethnic Wars at the Local Level: A Cross-Country Analysis

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Keywords
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Abstract

This study seeks to investigate how economic globalization and the rule of law affect the onset of ethnic war at the local level. While several empirical studies have explored the roles of globalization and the rule of law on large-scale civil war, most ethnic wars do not reach the intensity of civil war. As a consequence, we have a weak understanding of how globalization and rule of law affect the risk of ethnic war. This study links the literatures on ethnic war, globalization, and the rule of law, and examines the concomitant effects of economic globalization and rule of law on low-intensity ethnic war onsets. It is expected that both can reduce the risk of ethnic war because each constrains state power and, at the same time, enhances opportunities for ethnic inclusion. Analyses of 140 countries from 1997 to 2010 show that both economic globalization and the rule of law significantly lower the risk of low-intensity ethnic war, and the discrimination of ethnic populations increases this risk. To facilitate peace at local levels, international policy makers and states should promote global economic integration, the rule of law, and ethnic inclusion.

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This study examines the potentially transforming effects of *economic globalization* and *the rule of law* on the onset of low-intensity *ethnic wars*. A large number of studies have investigated the factors associated with civil wars, conventionally defined as events that result in over 1,000 battlefield-related deaths (Choi, 2018; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates & Gleditsch, 2001). However, most conflicts in the post-Cold War era have not been large-scale civil wars, but have been low-intensity ethnic wars, conventionally defined as years with over 25 battlefield-related deaths (Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Fearon, 2010). Low-intensity ethnic wars have been defined as clashes between ethnic rebel groups and government forces. Given their frequency, low intensity ethnic wars arguably pose great threat to the security and development of local communities and states today (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Wucherpfennig, 2017; Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Cederman, Hunziker, & Girardin, 2015).

The ethnic competition and rent-seeking perspectives in the conflict literature have produced the most supported findings on the determinants of ethnic conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Easterly, 2001; Esman & Herring, 2001). These perspectives place competition for state power at the center of ethno-nationalist conflicts and group grievances (Tang, 2015). Drawing on these perspectives, this study argues that economic globalization and rule of law should be expected to reduce the risk of low-intensity ethnic war, because both constrain state power and create opportunities for ethnic inclusion.

Economic globalization means in part economic openness, which facilitates the growth and proliferation of business and technology transfers, providing more socioeconomic opportunities to different ethnic communities at local levels (Dreher, 2006; Mason & Griffin, 2003). The rule of law means supremacy of law with an impartial judicial system, equality before the law, transparency, and legal protections for individual rights in a society (Kaufman & Kraay, 2015). While a few studies have examined globalization and rule of law in analyses of large scale wars (see for example, Choi, 2018; Olzak, 2011), these factors have not been examined together or in analyses of low-intensity ethnic wars.

Cases from Sub-Saharan African countries give credence to the theoretical expectations of this study. South Africa and Namibia had relatively high levels of ethnic conflict in the 1990s. Since then, both countries have implemented more open economic policies that have encouraged trade and foreign investment, and both have adopted regulatory laws at international standards. With these changes, the levels of conflict significantly decreased in both countries, especially when compared with other countries in the neighborhood, such as Chad, Ethiopia, and Sudan, which have had closed economies and weak rule of law (Dreher, 2006; Kaufman & Kraay, 2015; Krause & Suzuki, 2005).

This study proceeds by reviewing the extant literature on ethnic war. Then, the theoretical argument and expectations are discussed, tying together the literatures on ethnic war, globalization, and the rule of law. Following that, the methods, measures, and data sources are explained, and then the results of the regression analyses are presented. The study concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for research and policymaking aimed at reducing the specter of ethnic wars.

Preventing Ethnic Wars at Local Levels

The distinguishing characteristic of ethnic war from other types of internal war (i.e. civil war) is its emphasis on collectivist group identity. *Ethno-nationalism* describes a collectivist identity, which is a belief that all members of an ethnic group "should seek to work together economically and politically to advance their ethnic group (collectivist) interests against other nations" (Szymanski, 1983, p. 430). Such a collectivist identity can politicize and sometimes can give birth to terrorist or armed group activities, as well as wars (Connor, 1994). Ethnic diversity in a society has been generally considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ethnic war (Tang, 2015). An ethnic war involves armed actions and attacks by members of one or more ethnic groups targeted at the state, in order to achieve ethnicity-related goals such as capturing the

power of the state, controlling resources, or demanding legal recognition or rights for their ethnic groups. Ethnic wars are generally defined as clashes between ethnic rebel groups and government forces, as they are usually initiated by mobilized ethnic groups against the state (Cederman et al., 2017; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gurr, 2000).

As one of the most influential explanations for ethnic war, *ethnic competition and rent-seeking theory* (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Connor, 1994; Esman & Herring, 2001) offers the idea that power competition along ethnic lines nurtures rent-seeking behavior among ethnic groups. In a vicious circle, rent seeking—the pursuit of special favors and privileges from state authorities—hinders economic growth, which in turn reduces the capacity of states to prevent war. The zero-sum-like competition for state rents and poor economic conditions intensify grievances among discriminated groups. Poverty also aids rebel recruitment by guerilla leaders (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Esman & Herring, 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

The ethnic competition and rent-seeking view has inspired a myriad of empirical studies that have investigated the determinants of different types of internal wars, including large scale civil and ethnic wars, with different focuses. However, what is less understood in this literature is the effects of economic globalization and the rule of law on low-intensity ethnic wars. As economic globalization and the rule of law seem to be penetrating into various countries around the world, the analysis of these factors for ethnic war prevention deserves particular attention. For example, developing countries, such as the Gambia, Namibia, and Mongolia, have been economically globalizing through trade and foreign investments, and have adopted certain aspects of rule of law in their business relations (Dreher, 2006). Drawing insights from the literatures on ethnic war, globalization, and rule of law, the next two sections present the theoretical argument and expectations of this study regarding the roles of economic globalization and rule of law in ethnic war prevention.

Economic Globalization and Ethnic War Prevention

Is there a relationship between economic globalization and local ethnic wars? Economic globalization can be generally defined as economic openness and an increasing volume of economic relations among countries (Dreher, 2006; Mason & Griffin, 2003). In the post-Cold War era, many governments and international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have promoted liberal and open market policies designed to facilitate and increase foreign economic relations, including trade, foreign investments, and technology and skill transfers (Fioretos & Heldt, 2019; IMF, 2002; World Bank, 2019a). What has been the impact of increasing levels of states' foreign economic relations on ethnic communities and ethnic wars at the local level?

According to the liberal perspective, open markets and liberalization promote economic development and growth, and thus should have increased the opportunity costs of political violence in the post-Cold War era (Dreher, 2006; Sachs & Warner, 2000). Economic growth with globalization can strengthen governments by providing them with more revenue to fight off rebels and insurgents (Barbieri & Reuveny, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Mason & Griffin, 2003**)**. While there can be winners and losers with globalization, citizens of lower economic statuses still reap the benefits of economic globalization, and thus globalization should reduce the incentive to support and join rebel groups (Bussman & Schneider, 2007).

Another way economic globalization might promote peace is that states with open economies are less able to affect domestic economic performance. Since the penetration of foreign investors and multinational corporations (MNCs) can constrain governments' control over internal revenues, globalization should make a state less of a prize for rebels (Snyder, 1999). For example, Botswana is an ethnically diverse country with little or no ethnic conflict in its recent history. While among the poorest countries in the 1960s, it successfully transitioned to an upper middle-income economy in the past two decades. Starting in the 1970s the government pursued open and liberal policies, and invited foreign investment and technology to build

business and the economy (World Bank, 2019b). In addition to being a diamond-rich country, a condition conducive to rent-seeking politics and conflict, the Botswanian state also developed diverse global interactions (i.e. trade and exports) in multiple productive sectors such as beef, manufacturing, and tourism. This may have been a key factor in their successful avoidance of intense political competition over their rich diamond resources. Many scholars attribute Botswana's economic success and social stability to its integration with the global economy and institutions (Robinson, Acemoglu, & Johnson, 2003).

A few earlier studies found some evidence supportive of the pacifying effects of globalization, focusing on large-scale civil war. Bussman and Schneider (2007) reported that higher levels of trade openness decreased the likelihood of civil war onset on a sample of 127 countries between 1950 and 2000. Flaten and Soysa (2012) found that globalization significantly decreased the chances of civil war onset. Krause and Suzuki (2005) also reported that countries in both Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa were less likely to experience civil war when there was an increase in trade openness. Whereas all of these studies reported the effect of trade on large scale civil wars, the impact of economic globalization on the onset of low-intensity ethnic war has not been investigated. Consequently, drawing on the above literature, this study suggests the following hypothesis:

> ***H1.*** *States with higher levels of economic globalization have a lower risk of low-intensity ethnic war onset than states with lower levels of economic globalization.*

The next section discusses the relationship between the rule of law and ethnic war in light of the relevant literature, suggesting also the rule of law as an important factor for curbing the risk of ethnic war.

The Rule of Law and Ethnic War Prevention

Broadly defined, the rule of law in this study refers to the supremacy of law above the state and society and its equal application to all individuals, including officials in governing institutions (Boies, 2006; Kaufman & Kraay, 2015; North, 1990). Thus, the rule of law concept here emphasizes the existence of institutional-legal constraints on state power to prevent outright favoritism and corruption by public officials in their political and economic dealings, and to promote equality before the law as well as the impartiality of the state. A great number of political economists have contended or reported that a rule of law that promotes impartiality of the state and imposes checks on government aids economic growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Kaufman & Kraay, 2015; North, 1990; Olson, 2000). International economic institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO have also often encouraged these components of the rule of law in business and economic relations, suggesting that they are crucial for economic growth and development (Fioretos & Heldt, 2019; IMF, 2002; Kaufman & Kraay, 2015).

Does the rule of law that advances the principles of supremacy of law and equality before the law work as a preventive mechanism for ethnic wars? This study develops the idea that the rule of law that regulates political and business environment not only facilitates economic development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North, 1990; Olson, 2000), but can also prevent the occurrence of ethnic war. A system of rule of law can lower the risk of an ethnic war by elevating at least three legal conflict preventive mechanisms in a society: an independent judiciary; legal protections for individuals and group rights, including property rights and physical rights; and compliance with international law and treaties. All these factors constrain the state from arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of individuals. Limiting state power through an impartial judiciary, equal rights for individuals and groups, and international law and treaties, a system of rule of law can advance justice and opportunities for all individuals beyond ethnic group ties. It can also diminish the role of the state as a center of power and rent-seeking.

The first dimension of the rule of law in this study, an independent or impartial judicial system, is highly crucial in conflict prevention. An independent judicial system can elevate justice and equal treatment before the law, allowing means such as courts and due processes to address and solve ethnic and individual problems in accordance with law (Boies, 2006; Gould & Mukendi, 1989; Mauro, 1995; Ratner, 2000). The regulation of the political and business environment under the rule of law with an impartial judiciary warrants particular attention in ethnically divided societies to prevent favoritism and corruption in public offices on the basis of ethnicity. As discussed in the literature above, ethnic competition and rent-seeking for state power and resources can foster a conducive environment for ethnic exclusion and ethnic war. Corruption and lack of transparency can reinforce the distribution of resources and public spending on the basis of ethnic ties, putting vulnerable ethnic groups at a disadvantage (Easterly, 2001; Gould & Mukendi, 1989; Mauro, 1995; Ratner, 2000).

Numerous studies have documented that in the absence of constraints and checks on states, ethnic leaders and politicians frequently adopt rent-seeking behavior in political and business relations, giving favors to their ethnic groups (Esman & Herring, 2001; Maddox, 2001). In many African countries, poor economic growth has often been associated with weak institutions, poor governance, and rent-seeking (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Barro, 1991; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Mauro, 1995). With weak or no judicial means to address their problems, disadvantaged individuals and communities may turn to their closest ethnic organizations for favors, showing loyalty to prominent group leaders (i.e. political, clan, rebel and so on) (Gen, 2003; Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 1999).

For example, Maddox (2001) showed that in the Ivory Coast, politicians often used their regional extended-family and corporate kin ties in government to repress other ethnic groups as they competed for economic and political resources. Baylis and Robert (2004) reported that where formal institutions and legal structures were poorly developed, in particular in new democracies, political leaders often prioritized ethnic ties in the distribution of resources. In their case study, Easterly and Levine (1997) showed that rent-seeking along ethnic lines hindered the adoption of growth-promoting public policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. They also found that ethnic conflict seemed to decrease as the quality of institutions, in terms of rule of law, improved.

The second important dimension of the rule of law for conflict prevention is the availability of legal rights for individuals to be able to address and defend their problems through court procedures (Boies, 2006). This provides an additional check on the state's power for arbitrary treatment or discrimination of individuals and groups in political and business affairs. Among individual rights that need to be protected by laws against the state's arbitrary discrimination, civil and physical rights are especially crucial. These are the subset of personal rights that enable individuals to protect their private property and be free from arbitrary actions by governments on the basis of religious, ethnic, or other identity reasons, such as extrajudicial killing and imprisonment without due process (Gibney & Dalton, 1996).

Recent studies have found significant correlations between states' rule of law traditions and their respect for individual rights, in particular, civil and physical rights (Mitchell, Ring, & Spellman, 2013). A number of studies report that states with strong rule of law traditions with independent judiciaries have had better individual rights and liberties than other states (Joireman, 2001; Mitchell, Ring, & Spellman, 2013; Scully, 1987). For example, Joireman (2001) showed that common law countries with strong judicial systems in Africa demonstrated superior records in maintaining the rule of law and protecting individual rights and liberties.

The third important conflict-preventive dynamic that a rule of law system can promote in a state is the compliance with international law (Boies, 2006; Koh, 1997). If a rule of law in a state is based on the idea of the supremacy of law, then it is likely to foster norms of compliance with international laws and treaties (Boies, 2006; Koh, 1997; Mitchell, Ring, & Spellman, 2013). Although it has not been clear in empirical research if and how states comply with international law, a few studies have indicated that there is a relationship

between the rule of law traditions of states and their willingness to sign and comply with international laws and treaties, especially regarding the protection of individual rights (Boies, 2006; Koh, 1997; Simmons, 2009). Simmons (2009) demonstrated with empirical analyses and case studies that the ratification of treaties led to better practices of civil and individual rights in states.

Thus, the compliance of states with international law can aid ethnic conflict prevention at the state level through the advancement of individual and group rights with international treaties. For example, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are a set of global guidelines for states and companies that are designed to address group rights in business operations. These principles are based on UN human rights and labor standards as set by the Human Rights Council, and endorsed by 193 member states of the UN. One part of the Guiding Principles is the corporate responsibility to respect ethnic and minority rights (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2011). These kinds of internationally adopted human rights obligations and policies towards ethnic groups can be extended to state and local levels with legal provisions in the regulation of business and corporations. There is an increasing acceptance that corporate responsibility should include measures against discrimination of ethnic minorities.

Examples of international policies that promote opportunities with a rule of law can be seen in the United Nation's Development Programme (UNDP). For instance, following the armed rebellion in Mali in 2012, the UNDP started a project aimed at institution building to provide justice, jobs, and security. In multiple countries the UNDP projects have been helping to build courts, security, and infrastructure, and delivering training programs in order to restore justice, particularly for the protection of women among disadvantaged groups (UNDP, 2017).

In summary, a system of law that promotes equal opportunities with an impartial justice system and individual rights is likely to work against the formation of organizational sectarian and armed activity based on ethnicity. It would also make it harder for ethnic leaders to recruit combatants and mobilize people around an in-group identity. Thus, this study's second central hypothesis is summarized as follows:

> ***H2.*** *States with stronger rule of law have a lower risk of low-intensity ethnic war onset than states with weaker rule of law.*

Beyond this study's main variables of economic globalization and the rule of law, a number of factors have been shown to affect the risk of war in states. Following the theoretical arguments and the hypotheses to be tested, the article proceeds with a brief discussion of these factors affecting ethnic war.

Other Factors Influencing Ethnic War

Democracy

A number of scholars in the ethnicity literature have offered that electoral democracy can contribute to politicizing ethnicity by reinforcing power competition over state resources along ethnic lines (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Snyder, 1999). Others have argued that political freedoms can facilitate the mobilization of ethnicity because it is easier to organize in a free and open society (Horowitz, 1985; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). Several studies have showed that ethnic outbidding has been a common phenomenon in ethnically divided democracies, where politicians tend to compete for the support of certain groups at the expense of others. It has been argued that ethnic diversity in democracies may intensify competition for policy favors, thus causing more state resources to be wasted on rent seeking rather than expended on public goods (Bluedorn, 2001; Heckelman & Wilson, 2013; Horowitz, 1985; Posen, 1993).

Overall, the findings in empirical research on the impact of regime type on ethnic conflict have not been clear-cut, but there is some evidence that democracy increases the risk of ethnic conflict. For example, Hegre

et al. (2001) found an inverted-U shape relationship between democracy and civil war, indicating that countries with medium levels of democracy were the most likely to experience wars. Similarly, a few studies reported that democracy increased the risk of ethnic war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Snyder, 1999). In fact, there are some countries that have had democratic institutions for many years yet seem to have had prolonged ethnic conflicts, such as India (Singh, 2000). Thus, democracy appears to contribute to ethnic conflicts depending on its length and its interaction with other political factors in a specific nation.

State Capacity Factors: Income, Oil Resources, Geography, and Population

Studies that have focused on state capacity in the conflict literature have explored a number of state capacity related variables as possibly influential in the emergence of different types of internal war. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggested that the factors that put countries at risk for a civil war were poverty, terrain type, population size, and political stability. Economic capacity and the resources of states were particularly emphasized as crucial factors for influencing civil and ethnic wars.

Many empirical studies in this line of research have reported low levels of economic development, and the existence of oil resources, as among the most robust correlates of ethnic war (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Brancati, 2006; Brown & Boswell, 1997; Choi, 2018; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fish & Kroenig, 2006). According to the general findings in this literature, poor economic conditions, indicated by low income levels, refer to a weak state capacity and increase the risk of ethnic war. Mountainous geography is also conceived as an indicator of weak state capacity, and has been shown to increase the likelihood of ethnic war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Compatible with this literature, this study controls for income (a proxy of economic development), oil production, mountainous terrain, and population size.

Ethnic Discrimination and Accommodation

Following Ted Gurr's grievance and relative deprivation theory (2000), a newer line of research emerged focusing on the analysis of ethnic discrimination and exclusion from state power in explaining the onset of ethnic wars (Cederman et al., 2017; Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Regan & Norton, 2005). These scholars emphasized ethnic accommodation and political inclusion as crucial mechanisms in averting ethnic wars. Among the prominent studies in this wave of scholarship, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) argued that the state itself has been at the center of ethnic conflict, and power distribution and sharing within the state have played a crucial role in the outbreak of ethnic war. They suggested that state institutions were usually captured by certain ethnic groups, leaving others out, and ethnic wars have resulted from the competing ethno-nationalist claims over state power.

Consistent with this argument, Regan and Norton (2005) found empirical evidence that political discrimination increased the risk of ethnic wars. In a similar manner, a number of recent studies have showed that group accommodation and inclusion in state power reduce the likelihood of the onset of ethnic war (Cederman et al., 2017; Vogt et al., 2015; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009). For example, Cederman et al. (2017) demonstrated that ethnic wars have declined since the mid-1990s, due to increasing levels of democratic power-sharing arrangements in developing countries.

Since prior studies found ethnic discrimination to be a contributing factor to ethnic war, this study includes this variable in its empirical models. The section on methods below describes the measures and data sources for all the variables to be tested.

Method

This study examined the effects of economic globalization and the rule of law on the onset of ethnic war with large-*N* data analyses. In testing the hypotheses, compatible with most studies of civil war, this study constructed a dataset of all sovereign member-states as identified by the Correlates of War (COW) project, aggregated annually. The section below explains the measures and data sources for the variables. The subsequent section reports the analyses of a sample of 140 countries between 1997 and 2010.

Measures and Data Sources

Ethnic War

The dependent variable, the onset of *Ethnic War*, was assessed drawing on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset version 2014 (Vogt et al., 2015). Data are available for all 151 countries with population sizes greater than one million that existed over the temporal domain of this study. The EPR data identify armed conflicts utilizing the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, & Sollenberg, 2002), and recodes these conflicts in consideration of ethnic groups' involvement in them. Thus, ethnic war is defined as any armed and organized confrontation between government troops and rebel organizations that reaches in any year 25 or more battle deaths. This threshold thus includes the rarer large scale civil wars as well as the far more common low-intensity conflicts. It includes armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s), with or without intervention from other states (Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 619). The variable *Ethnic War* is coded 1 in a year a new ethnic war starts; otherwise 0. In standard form, years of on-going ethnic wars were dropped from the analysis (Wimmer et al., 2009).

Economic Globalization

To gauge the first main independent variable *Economic Globalization*, this study used the Swiss Economic Institute's Globalization Index (KOF), which includes a large sample of countries across time and in different regions (Dreher, 2006). The KOF index is constructed as a weighted average of two sub-indexes measuring, respectively, actual economic flows and existing restrictions on trade and capital. The first index accounts for trade (percent of GDP), foreign direct investment, stocks (percent of GDP), portfolio investment (percent of GDP), and income payments to foreign nationals (percent of GDP). The second index accounts for economic restrictions, such as hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue), and capital account restrictions.

Rule of law

The second main independent variable is the Rule of Law. The rule of law implies a number of factors in the legal system, including effective law enforcement with a human rights approach, strong legal protections for individuals, contract enforcement, effective bureaucracy that includes measures against corruption, independence of judicial systems, and government regulation over business, especially in the areas of employment and labor with consideration of equal opportunities for individuals. The best proximate measure and data that capture or include these dimensions of rule of law is offered by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset of the World Bank. These data are widely utilized, especially in the political economy literatures, to assess the levels of rule of law in nations (Fearon, 2010; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2015).

The variable *Rule of Law* in the WGI dataset is constructed as an aggregate indicator drawing on multiple surveys in developed and developing countries, with data sources from over 30 non-governmental and international organizations and private sector firms. It captures perceptions of how people follow the rules of society, including contract enforcement, human rights, property rights, the police, and the degree of judicial independence. Data are available for every country in the EPR dataset, but start only in the year 1996, thus setting the lower temporal domain of this study. The variable Rule of Law is in units of a standard normal distribution with higher values indicating higher rule of law.

Control Variables

To test the effect of *Democracy* on the onset of ethnic war, the widely used Polity IV dataset from the Center for Systematic Peace was used (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2012). These data code democratic and autocratic authority and regime characteristics in all countries with a population greater than 500,000 in 2015. The measure is drawn from the *Polity 2* variable and ranges from −10 (the lowest level of democracy) and +10 (the highest level of democracy).

To measure *Ethnic Discrimination,* this study followed Cederman et al. (2017) and used the group discrimination data in the EPR dataset. This variable indicates the percent of the population subjected to any targeted discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal, but always refers to the domain of public politics and thus excludes discrimination in the socio-economic sphere. Cederman et al. (2017) also test other measures of ethnic accommodation, including the level of power-sharing arrangements among groups, the monopoly or dominant status of ruling elites, and the territorial autonomy of groups. In this study's preliminary analyses, none of these were significant in bivariate tests, thus leaving the Ethnic Discrimination measure as the seemingly best gauge of ethnic discrimination for the analyses. To gauge economic development, data on gross domestic product (*GDP)* per capita from the Penn World Tables were utilized (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2012).

In addition to the above factors, there were five variables included in every model; *Oil, Ethnic Fractionalization, Mountainous Terrain, Population*, and ongoing *Civil War*. All of these are prominent factors in the literature on civil and ethnic conflict. This article therefore includes these in all models as a precaution against reporting spurious results (Blalock, 1979, p. 468-474).

For the *Oil* variable, oil production per capita data are utilized from the EPR dataset. Some suggest that it is better to gauge oil production rather than exports, since the latter is dependent on other economic sectors (Wimmer & Min, 2006). Data for the *Ethnic Fractionalization* and *Mountainous Terrain* variables were also adopted from the EPR dataset. The ethnic fractionalization data originate with Fearon and Laitin (2003). This is a commonly employed ethnic fractionalization index based on data from Atlas Narodov Mira (1964). The mountainous terrain variable is the difference between the highest and lowest point of elevation in each country. *Population* data were obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2012).

The data for *Civil War* were taken from the EPR dataset and include all civil wars, not only ethnic ones. As discussed above, civil war is defined as conflicts with 1,000 or more battlefield-related deaths, far more than the 25-death threshold of *Ethnic War*, and is thus relatively rare. The dataset assigns an ongoing war to equal 1 in all years in which a war was fought, and 0 for years of peace (Wimmer et al., 2009). Ongoing civil war is controlled, because it could affect the odds of an ethnic war onset, unrelated to the larger ongoing war.

Summary definitions of all independent variables, along with their data sources, can be viewed in Table 1. In addition, peace years and cubic spline variables were included in all models to control for temporal dependence in the binary dependent variable, as recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

Because causes should occur before effects, in standard form all independent variables were lagged one year before the dependent variable. In the EPR data over the period of 1997 and 2010, eight countries were in ethnic war throughout the temporal domain, and thus could have no ethnic war onsets. These countries were dropped, reducing the sample to 140 countries (these eight countries are: Ethiopia, India, Israel, Myanmar, Philippines, Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda). These data are available for replication purposes at https://sciences.ucf.edu/politics/person/demet-mousseau/.

Table 1

Variable Definitions and Data Sources

Independent Variables	Definitions	Data Sources
Economic Globalization	% GDP flows from trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign nationals	KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006)
Rule of law	Index drawn from multiple sources. Confidence in rule of law, in particular contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts.	World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufman & Kraay, 2015)
Democracy	Ordinal 21-point	Polity IV (Marshall *et al*., 2012)
Ethnic Discrimination	% group population subject to discrimination from political power by the state (political exclusion)	EPR version 2014 (Vogt *et al*., 2015)
GDP	Real gross domestic product per capita, ppp	Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston *et al*., 2012)
Oil production$_{\text{Logged t-1}}$	Oil Production per capita	EPR version 2014 (Vogt *et al*., 2015)
Ethnic fractionalization	Ethno-linguistic differences among groups	EPR (Cederman *et al*., 2010); (Fearon & Laitin, 2003)
Mountainous terrain	Proportion of the country that is mountainous	EPR version 2014 (Vogt *et al*., 2015)
Population$_{\text{Logged}}$	Population, logged	Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston *et al*., 2012)
Civil War	Dummy indication of ongoing armed civil conflict or internationalized armed civil conflict between the government and at least one other party that led to at least 25 battle-related fatalities in the year	EPR (EPR utilizes PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset); (Gleditsch *et al*., 2002)

Results

Considering that ethnic war onsets are rare events that occur in less than 2% of the data-points, the probability of these events was estimated using rare events multivariate logistic regression (Tomz, King, & Zeng, 2003). When drawing inferences in econometric analyses it is important to be sensitive to potential flows of causation among the independent variables (Blalock, 1979, p. 473-474). Accordingly, the analyses start with the base model of control variables reported significant in prior studies, as discussed above. To be highly cautious in our inferences, the key variables Economic Globalization and Rule of Law were then added separately to this base model, one at a time, to see if each would have an effect on the risk of ethnic war above and beyond the base model. Then, Economic Globalization and Rule of Law were tested together with the base models, to see if each would have an independent effect above and beyond the base variables and each other. Finally, insignificant control variables that may be caused by Economic Globalization and Rule of Law were removed from the estimate. As explained by Blalock (1979), in econometric estimations any factors that could be consequents of the independent variables of interest should be omitted in order to estimate the theorized impact of these variables on the dependent variable.

Model 1 in Table 2 provided the base model of factors reported significant in prior conflict studies. In this model, the coefficients for Democracy (-0.03), Oil (-0.04) and Population (0.04) were not significant at usual thresholds. All remaining control variables in Model 1 were significant and in their expected directions. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient for Ethnic Discrimination (4.32) indicated that countries with larger percentages of their populations subjected to discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power, were significantly more likely than other countries to have ethnic wars. Also expected, countries with lower GDP (-0.51), greater Ethic Fractionalization (2.40), more Mountainous Terrain (0.23), and with ongoing Civil War (1.68), were at significantly greater risk than others of ethnic war.

With the base model established (Model 1), Model 2 was structured by adding consideration of Economic Globalization. The negative and significant coefficient for this variable (-0.04) supports the expectations of H1 that states with higher levels of economic globalization appear to have a lower risk of low-intensity ethnic war onset than states with lower levels of economic globalization. Regarding the base model (Model 1) variables, the coefficient for GDP (-0.26) became insignificant, suggesting that Economic Globalization may account for prior findings that GDP reduces the risk of ethnic war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Model 3 was created by adding the Rule of Law to base Model 1. In this model the negative and significant coefficient for the Rule of Law (-0.82) supports the expectations of H2 that states with stronger rule of law appear to have a lower risk of low-intensity ethnic war onset than states with weaker rule of law. Considering the base model variables, the coefficient for GDP (-0.18) was insignificant, indicating that, like Economic Globalization in Model 2, the Rule of Law may also account for prior findings that GDP reduces the risk of ethnic war.

Models 2 and 3 corroborated H1 and H2 that economic globalization and the rule of law, respectively, reduce the risk of ethnic war in countries. As discussed above, these variables were examined separately in Models 2 and 3, in order to observe their independent effects on the risk of ethnic war. However, it is also useful to assess both factors in the same model. Accordingly, Model 4 was estimated with both economic globalization and the rule of law in the same model. The coefficients reflect the impact of each on ethnic war independent of any possible relationship with the other. In Model 4, each coefficient retained its significance at usual thresholds. Economic Globalization (-0.03) and Rule of Law (-1.28) each appear to independently reduce the risk of ethnic war.

Table 2

*Factors in the Onset of Ethnic War, 1997-2010**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Ethnic War	β	β	β	β	β
Economic globalization $_{t-1}$	-	-0.04 *	-	-0.03 *	-0.04 **
	-	0.02	-	0.02	0.02
Rule of law$_{t-1}$	-	-	-0.82 *	-1.28 **	-1.34 **
	-	-	0.63	0.68	0.70
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	0.00	-
	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.06	-
Ethnic discrimination (%) $_{t-1}$	4.32 ***	4.13 ***	4.17 ***	3.88 ***	4.05 ***
	1.38	1.33	1.51	1.34	1.42
GDP $_{\text{per capita, logged t-1}}$	-0.51 **	-0.26	-0.18	0.04	-
	0.30	0.42	0.38	0.43	-
Oil $_{\text{logged t-1}}$	-0.04	0.27	-0.34	0.03	-
	0.60	0.60	0.66	0.61	-
Ethnic fractionalization	2.40 ***	2.06 ***	2.38 **	2.37 ***	2.44 ***
	1.01	0.78	1.04	0.80	0.80
Mountainous terrain	0.23 *	0.16	0.17	0.10	0.08
	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.13
Population $_{\text{logged}}$	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.07
	0.22	0.32	0.23	0.29	0.29
Civil war $_{t-1}$	1.68 **	1.90 **	1.74 **	2.26 ***	2.39 ***
	0.85	1.01	0.87	0.96	1.00
Constant	-3.42	-2.80	-6.78 *	-6.79 **	-7.03 **
	3.89	4.29	4.82	4.05	3.60
N	1,767	1,578	1,767	1,578	1,593
Clusters	140	123	140	123	124
R-square	.24	.26	.25	.29	.28
Mean VIF	1.38	1.83	1.80	2.11	1.46

* Rare event logistic coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by country. Peace years with three cubic splines included but not shown (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998). *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$, one-tailed tests.

The insignificant coefficients for GDP with the introduction of Economic Globalization and Rule of Law in Models 2, 3, and 4 indicate that level of economic development may not be sufficient for explaining the onset of low-intensity war. Examples of countries in the data with below median levels of GDP and above median levels of both Globalization and Rule of Law included the Gambia, Namibia, Jordan, and Mongolia. These developing countries also appeared with few or no ethnic wars between 1997 and 2010, the period in which they were globalizing and becoming more rule of law oriented countries.

Final Model 5 was designed to estimate the independent effects of globalization and rule of law apart from any causation of these factors on the insignificant control variables (Blalock, 1979). An additional

consideration was the high collinearity of GDP with Globalization and Rule of Law: as can be seen in Table 3, Globalization, Rule of Law, and GDP correlated moderately, between 0.74 and 0.78. These correlations did not pose a risk to our estimates, as they were below the rule-of-thumb risk zone for multicollinearity of 0.85. Also, the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for Model 4 was only 2.11, which was far below the VIF rule-of-thumb risk zone for multicollinearity of 10 or above. This indicates that there were enough countries in the sample with low levels of GDP but high levels of economic globalization and rule of law to draw confident inferences, including those with relatively less ethnic conflict, such as the Gambia, Namibia, Jordan, and Mongolia as noted.

Nevertheless, the correlation of GDP with Globalization and Rule of Law suggested some causation among these variables. That the inclusion of Globalization and Rule of Law in Models 2-4 caused GDP to become insignificant indicated that GDP has no independent impact on ethnic war apart from whatever relationship it has with Globalization and Rule of Law, suggesting that the relationship of GDP with ethnic war was spurious and accounted for by these factors. Accordingly, Model 5 dropped GDP, along with the two other insignificant factors that could possibly be caused by globalization or the rule of law; Democracy and Oil. As can be seen, both Economic Globalization (-0.04) and Rule of Law (-1.34) remained significant and in their expected negative directions.

Finally, as an added precaution, Models 2-4 were re-estimated (unreported) with all control variables that could possibly be caused by Globalization and Rule of Law removed (these are Democracy, Ethnic Discrimination, GDP, Oil, and Civil War). Identical results were obtained, showing that globalization and rule of law have robust independent impacts on the risk of ethnic war.

Because Model 5 excluded the insignificant factors that could possibly be caused by globalization or the rule of law (GDP, Democracy, and Oil), the coefficients for Economic Globalization and the Rule of Law in Model 5 were used to assess the impacts of these factors on the risk of ethnic war. The effect of each was calculated with all other factors assumed to have the value of zero. The coefficient for Economic Globalization (-0.04) indicated that a one standard deviation boost in this factor decreased the odds of ethnic war onset a substantial 53%. The coefficient for Rule of Law (-1.34) suggested that a one standard deviation increase in this factor decreased the odds of ethnic war onset a substantial 78%. The coefficient for Ethnic Discrimination (4.05) indicated that a one standard deviation boost in this factor increased the odds of the onset of ethnic war a substantial 59%.

Overall, the analyses here implied that the globalization of the economy, the rule of law, and the ending of ethnic discrimination and exclusion have been the most important factors in lowering the risk of the onset of ethnic war in the period between 1997 and 2010. These results have been consistent with the expectations of this study, which highlights the possible transforming effects of economic globalization and rule of law for the prevention of ethnic wars. Many countries, including developing ones, have been integrating with the global economy and adopting regulations and laws at international standards in conducting economic, business, and legal relations in the post-Cold War era (Dreher, 2006; Kaufman & Kraay, 2015). International and global forces might have created opportunities at local and state levels and constrained states' control of resources and revenues. While the forces involved in globalization can diffuse economic resources and production into local areas, making the state a less worthy prize to compete over, a system of rule of law can provide justice and legal protections for all individuals and groups in political and business relations. In this way, both economic globalization and rule of law can work together to alleviate ethnic tensions and reduce the risk of the onset of ethnic war.

Table 3

Summary Statistics and Correlations with Globalization and Rule of Law

						Correlations	
Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Glob-lization**	**Rule of Law**
Economic globalization $_{t-1}$	1,599	58.19	17.75	8.57	96.58	----	.74
Rule of law $_{t-1}$	1,810	-0.16	1.01	-2.67	2.00	.74	----
Democracy $_{t-1}$	1,775	3.74	6.46	-10.00	10.00	.47	.51
Ethnic discrimination (%) $_{t-1}$	1,802	0.03	0.09	0.00	0.84	-.03	-.06
GDP $_{\text{per capita, logged t-1}}$	1,810	8.52	1.35	5.18	11.10	.78	.78
Oil $_{\text{logged t-1}}$	1,806	0.39	0.82	0.00	4.18	.15	.12
Ethnic fractionalization	1,810	0.39	0.27	0.00	0.93	-.33	-.36
Mountainous terrain	1,810	2.08	1.43	0.00	4.42	-.08	-.13
Population $_{\text{logged}}$	1,810	9.31	1.30	6.50	14.10	-.16	.03
Civil war $_{t-1}$	1,810	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00	.05	.05

Discussion

Ethnic war as a form of internal war has been prevalent in the post-Cold War era, leading to violence and deaths, and threatening the security and development of populations. Conflict prevention in ethically divided states deserves great attention, as factors preventing low-intensity ethnic wars have not been broadly investigated in empirical conflict research. This study offered an ethnic war prevention framework, suggesting that economic globalization and rule of law concomitantly reduce the risk of ethnic war. Building on the ethnic competition and rent-seeking approaches to conflict and drawing insights from the globalization and rule of law interdisciplinary literatures, this study argued that economic globalization and rule of law can alleviate ethnic war because they both constrain the state's power and control over resources, and increase socioeconomic opportunities at local levels for communities.

The empirical analyses here have provided support for this argument. Economic globalization and the rule of law had significant and negative effects on the onset of low-intensity ethnic war across all the models tested. The findings on democracy and oil resources were insignificant, indicating that neither factor is an influential trigger of low-intensity ethnic wars. The empirical results in this study also indicated that ethnic discrimination and exclusion from political power has been a significant factor increasing the risk of ethnic war. This finding was consistent with prior studies that found that ethnic discrimination or exclusion from political power has increased the likelihood of ethnic war (Cederman et al., 2017; Gurr, 2000). Accordingly, this study has implications across multiple research areas in several ways, since it provided interdisciplinary bridges among the ethnic war, globalization, and rule of law literatures.

First, the finding on economic globalization supported the liberal arguments, that states' integration with the global economy through external relations such as foreign investment and trade has had pacifying effects on ethnic war. Second, the findings here also supported the role of the rule of law as a form of governance in ethnic war prevention, showing in a large sample that countries with stronger rule of law have had less risk of ethnic war than countries with weak rule of law. These findings were supportive of earlier studies that investigated this question with small cases and found some evidence that poor institutions and weak rule of law were associated with rent-seeking and ethnic conflict (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Maddox,

2001). Third, this study advanced the conceptualization of rule of law as a conflict preventive mechanism. Defined as the supremacy of law and checks on governments through an independent judiciary and legal protections for individuals and group rights, the rule of law would diminish the role of the state as the center of power and rent-seeking and reduce ethnic discrimination and favors in states' political and business affairs. When the rule of law was weak, individuals were less able to utilize protections and opportunities through legitimized legal means to advance their conditions, and thus they were more likely to turn to group-level securities and leaders to meet their needs.

The essential components of these laws discussed and proposed here for conflict prevention are compatible with internationally adopted treaties and standards, and can be worked on by states to promote justice, rights, equal opportunity, and inclusion for all individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. While economic globalization expands socioeconomic opportunities, a rule of law can promote justice and transparency in the political and business environment. Thus, both factors can create cross-cutting advantages to individuals and groups, moderating ethnic tensions and loyalty to ethnic leaders. In this way, both factors can facilitate ethnic war prevention by states.

Limitations and Direction for Future Research

This study suggests that further examinations of globalization and rule of law for the prevention of ethnic war are in order. As with all empirical studies, the analyses do not perfectly isolate causation. This study relied on standard popular measures for all variables, but there is no way to know that every measure validly reflects the theorized causation associated with it. Nor we can be certain that the data do not have some unknown systematic error. Thus, regression analyses of panel data are best treated as tentative, with the potential to inspire follow-on investigations. That the results here are highly robust suggests that further investigation on different aspects of globalization and states' governing laws is warranted. For example, qualitative research with single or comparative cases can advance our understanding of which aspects of economic globalization and rule of law work better in specific contexts. Another promising direction is to disaggregate the globalization and rule of law variables, to test more directly the specific paths of causation of exactly how globalization and rule of law reduce the risk of ethnic war.

Conclusion

This study concludes with the policy implications for reducing local ethnic tensions and rebel fighting: international policymakers and states should promote international economic and business relations and rule of law among states. International policy should advance global economic integration and a rule of law that emphasizes justice with an impartial judiciary, legal rights for individuals such as property rights and civil rights (i.e., right to due process), and compliance with international law and treaties especially regarding the protection of individual and group rights in business operations. In this way, by helping the establishment of globalization and the rule of law, policymakers can work to aid political and business connections among local, state, and global communities, and strengthen the foundation for ethnic peace.

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Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

The Impact of Economic Uncertainty and Trust on Cooperation in Environmental Dilemmas Across Cultures

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Abstract

Climate change has resulted in frequent and intense droughts and floods–experienced respectively as contexts of certain loss and uncertainty–by farmers and agribusinesses. Such extreme water events, along with normal rainfall–experienced as certain gain-pose environmental dilemmas. In three studies across five countries, we examined the impact of outcome uncertainty on choices in environmental dilemmas. Cooperation was lowest in certain loss (droughts) and higher in certain gain (normal rainfall) in Study 1, a qualitative field study in Argentina. These results were experimentally replicated in the U.S. in Study 2. Study 3 empirically examined cooperative choice in India, Japan, Spain, and the U.S., replicating patterns for drought and normal rainfall. When the outcome was uncertain (floods), however, culture appeared to moderate cooperation. Two levels of trust (global and local) were also considered. Local trust was a significant predictor of cooperation. Potential mechanisms, and implications are discussed.

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Extreme weather events like large scale floods and severe droughts are frequently regional or even global in scope, but their management and impact is typically local, based on choices made by individuals grounded in their local context. These events, which can also be thought of as extreme water events, where there is too much (floods) or too little (droughts) rainfall, can have dire consequences (Damerau et al., 2016; de Fraiture & Wichelns, 2010; Zhang & Vesselinov, 2017) for agriculture and groundwater (García et al., 2018). Although choices to mitigate and modulate the impact of floods and droughts are made independently, whether by an individual farmer or an agribusiness, the consequences are interdependent. Furthermore, local contexts strongly constrain individual choices and ultimately determine the potential impact of water extremes on food production and food security (Golub et al., 2013).

Groundwater, defined here as water in the soil and underground that is collectively available to spatially connected farms, is one such example of a local environmental resource whose use essentially poses two separate *social dilemmas*, or situations where maximizing individual gain in the short-term reduces collective benefit in the long run (Dawes, 1980). Our dilemmas are locally *contextualized social dilemmas*, where perceptions of situational parameters directly influence outcomes beyond the structure of the dilemma itself. The first dilemma stems from the overuse of shared groundwater by one of many spatially connected farms to maximize individual crop yield, particularly during times of water scarcity or droughts, which reduces collective yields by reducing total water availability. Comparatively, the second dilemma emerges during times of excess water or floods, when individual choices to remove standing water from parts of one's land that is best for farming results in excess water on spatially connected land that may be entirely or partially farmed by another.

Profit is a function of crop yield, so maximizing yield is an important economic goal. These groundwater dilemmas under conditions of drought and floods present water-management choices that provide either greater short-term individual or long-term collective benefit, a central characteristic of social and environmental dilemmas. Ostrom et al., (1994) suggest groundwater dilemmas are essentially resource or commons (not contribution or public goods) dilemmas, and in this research, we treat them as such.

In this paper we explore cooperation in real-world environmental dilemmas characterized by outcome uncertainty derived from their broader socio-economic context. We begin with an exploratory qualitative field study in the Argentine Pampas with agribusinesses that actually face groundwater related environmental dilemmas (Study 1), empirically replicate findings from Study 1 with non-agribusiness participants in a controlled setting (Study 2), and finally extend our findings across cultures by collecting data in four countries (Study 3).

While prior research has indicated the relevance of gains and losses for understanding cooperation, these phenomena have not been investigated in real-world environmental dilemmas where outcomes have varying certainty, often derived from the context. In this research, we capture the previously understudied uncertainty that arises in real-world dilemmas when the amounts and directionality of economic outcomes are undefined. Second, bridging the gap between scientific literature and real-world dilemmas, our research supports the creation of more meaningful policies and nudges capable of achieving targeted responses in the field. Third, we offer a potential path to examining real-world dilemmas: By starting with real-world settings and practitioner expertise in the field and then successfully testing the same dilemmas in controlled settings across four cultures, our methodology suggests that we can gain a deeper understanding of potential underlying mechanisms even for complex real-world dilemmas. In the literature review below, we discuss previously identified psychological factors that impact cooperative choice and also provide background on our contextualized dilemmas.

Role of Contextualized Choice in Social Dilemmas

Collective gains in an interdependent situation are best realized via cooperation (Arora et al., 2012; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2004; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000); and context can greatly influence the choice to cooperate (see Dawes & Messick, 2000 and Weber et al., 2004 for complete reviews). For example, social factors, including social norms (Akerlof, 1980; Chen et al., 2009) and uncertainty regarding others in the dilemma (Messick et al., 1988; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1988) have been shown to influence cooperative choice. Similarly, environmental uncertainty, whether regarding the size (Budescu et al., 1997; Rapoport et al., 1993) or replenishment rate of the resource (Budescu & Au, 2002; Budescu et al., 1990), also influences cooperation in environmental dilemmas. In all cases, reduction of the underlying uncertainty increases cooperation.

Choices with Outcome Certainty and Uncertainty

There has been little work directly exploring the impact of outcome uncertainty on cooperative choice. Köke, Lange, and Nicklisch (2014) found that cooperation rates are higher when cooperative action can ensure certainty of a positive outcome. Similarly, cooperative action increases when structural mechanisms, such as punishment (Xiao & Kunreuther, 2016), reduce the uncertainty of a negative outcome. However, uncertainty in amount and directionality of outcome (positive or negative) have not been studied in social dilemmas, even as such uncertainty characterizes and contextualizes real-world dilemmas.

Droughts and floods, our contextualized dilemmas, can signify two disparate economic outcomes (Arora et al., 2016). Farmers often view droughts as land ceasing to be productive, leaving no feasible path to breakeven or achieve profitability, effectively resulting in a certain loss. Contrarily, although floods restrict movement of the farmers more than droughts, they offer the potential to break even or attain an economic gain as the higher elevated areas of a farm might not get flooded and may even benefit from the higher groundwater level, making otherwise dry land more productive. Thus, while a drought means a certain loss of some uncertain amount, a flood is characterized as an unknown amount of either loss or gain.

As droughts and floods have increased in frequency and intensity due to climate change (Peterson et al., 2013; Wuebbles et al., 2017), the certainty (droughts) or uncertainty (floods) of loss associated with these events has also become more salient. Arkes (1991) finds certainty can act as a salient reference point, and then influence subsequent actions (Dickhaut et al., 2003). Moreover, decision makers overweigh outcomes that are certain compared with outcomes that are only probable (Li & Chapman, 2009). Although well understood as a decision-making bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the certainty effect has not been studied in social dilemmas.

Independently, since losses loom larger (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), as the possibility of a drought (certain loss) or flood (uncertainty) increases, so should their salience in the decision process. There is some evidence suggesting that when decision makers face a loss, they may prefer to minimize it through defection (Katz & Halevy, 2015). In contrast, when there is certain gain, ensuring those gains are fully realized becomes a priority (Suleiman et al., 2015), suggesting cooperative action.

Real-World Dilemmas in Argentine Agriculture: Contextualizing the Current Research

Argentina is a major contributor to global food security and has some of the most fertile land in the world, which produces amounts of grain sufficient to feed over five times its current population and has potential to increase production even more (Merlos et al., 2015). It is the leading world

exporter of soybean oil and meal, and the third largest exporter of soybeans as beans. Nevertheless, climate variability as well as global and local economic and social contexts have significantly influenced agriculture in the Argentine Pampas over the last few decades (Bert et al., 2011). Argentine agriculture is not a subsidized sector: Farmers take on the risks inherent in global commodity markets such that their economic incentive is the potential profit based on the actual crop price (Senesi et al., 2013). Additionally, recent structural changes have increased unpredictability due to environmental and social consequences for export crops in the region.

One such change that has been documented is an increase in the probability of floods over the last twenty years (Aragón et al., 2011). Both floods and droughts cause environmental as well as social and economic hardship. Farmers are typically loss averse (Bocquého et al., 2014; Tanaka et al., 2010), and that is particularly true of farmers in the Argentine Pampas where they assign two and a half times more weight to losses than gains (Gonzalez et al., 2018) in their decision processes. Taken together with the overweighting of the certainty of loss, a focus on loss prevention in the short-term can be expected.

Overview of Dilemmas in This Research

Drawing on environmental dilemmas encountered in the Argentine Pampas, we examined the impact of outcome certainty and uncertainty contextualized as droughts and floods on cooperative choices. Based on the advice from four agricultural experts who advise and/or manage a substantial portion of the cropped land in the Pampas (Arora et al., 2015), we added a third dilemma as a control for normal years where a certain gain is typically recorded. All four experts strongly agreed on the real-world accuracy and contextual validity of the three resulting dilemmas in our questionnaire. These are described below.

Table 1

Agricultural Dilemmas Presented to Participants, Including Action Choices

For lower levels of rainfall (droughts) participants had the option to:	Cooperate:	Plant regular seeds and make groundwater evenly available to neighbors, which increases collective yields.
	Defect:	Plant drought-resistant seeds with roots that reach twice the depth and reduce groundwater available to neighbors, which increases individual yield and reduces collective yields.
For higher levels of rainfall (floods) participants had the option to:	Cooperate:	Let the water accumulate on the land and allow flood water to be distributed evenly to neighbors, which increases collective yields.
	Defect:	Dig a channel to neighbor farm to reduce water accumulation on the land and increase flood water for others, which increases individual yield and reduces collective yields.
In regular levels of rainfall (normal) participants had the option to:	Cooperate:	Plant regular seeds and enable a uniform distribution of insects, which increases collective yields.
	Defect:	Plant insect resistant seeds and make it more likely that insects would go to neighboring farms, which increases individual yield and reduces collective yields.

Our contexts, reflecting the reality of farmers and agribusiness owners, began with assumptions for forecasted rainfall levels for the coming year [lower; higher; normal], the state of the soil [quite dry; quite wet; neither too wet nor too dry], and groundwater levels [low; high; normal] due to [little; excess; normal] rainfall in the past. The resulting three dilemmas offered choices between cooperation and defection as presented in Table 1, allowing for a systematic examination of the impact of certain loss, uncertainty, and certain gain across all three studies and corresponding with our research question. This paper asks: How is cooperative choice in environmental dilemmas influenced by uncertainty in amount and directionality of outcome across cultures?

Study 1

A major goal for this field study was to gain insight into the local decision processes for coping with the environmental dilemmas presented by floods, droughts, and normal years of rainfall. Specifically, we sought to examine the perception of outcome uncertainty associated with varying levels of rainfall, the resulting influence on cooperation in groundwater dilemmas, and possible motivators of the decision to cooperate.

Participants

Fifteen male CEOs (over 99% of agribusiness CEOs in Argentina are male) between the ages of 32 and 60 who employ between 2 and 20 people in family agribusinesses in the Argentine Pampas participated in this study. The participants were either owners or owner-managers of their agribusiness, making them either the only or the primary decision maker. All agribusinesses have been in the family for multiple generations. The CEOs were contacted as part of a random sample of approximately 100 members by AACREA (www.aacrea.org.ar), Asociación Argentina de Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola, a non-profit farmers association that supports farm efforts through dissemination of information and technology. All but two CEOs were current members of AACREA. Typically, AACREA farmers own medium to large farms and agribusinesses as smaller farms tend not to be sustainable in the Argentine Pampas (Bert et al., 2011) and are involved in agricultural activities ranging from growing and processing cash crops to ranching and dairy enterprises. The average land farmed by participants in our study was 1,000 hectares and the agribusiness values were estimated to be between US$20-200 million. AACREA staff was the point of contact for potential participants. Our interviewees had no prior knowledge of, or information about, the interview questions, project research goals, or authors on this paper.

Design

All interviews were conducted in-person with each CEO in Spanish or English at their choice, typically at their place of work or on their farm. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interviews began by asking the CEOs to share their decision processes for land-use allocation and water management made in years when a drought is likely (local scarcity of water), when a flood is likely (local excess of water), and when normal rainfall is expected. All participants responded to all dilemmas (a within-subjects study design) described above in random order. They were asked three follow-up questions: (i) What would you do in a situation like this? This was followed by: Why would you do what you decided to do? (ii) Do you think your choice is selfish? (iii) What would you think if your neighbor were to defect? All participants responded to all questions. Since the CEOs were the

primary (if not only) decision maker for their agribusiness, their responses represented their individual and organizational choice.

Results

Participants experienced droughts as contexts of certain loss where the best action was the one most likely to maximize immediate economic outcomes and minimize the loss, or defection. In fact, 87% (13 out of 15) of the CEOs chose to defect or plant drought resistant seeds in the dilemma, and many made comments similar to: "I fear droughts because the loss is total. You feel you have some control over the floods, but none over the droughts." Additionally, they did not think of that action as selfish. Another concern mentioned was that globally determined commodity prices would not be sufficiently impacted by a local Argentine drought. Any defection by the neighbor was seen as "allowing him to earn a good living" rather than as a selfish action. Nearly half of the CEOs also pointed out that if they had a relationship with (trusted) the neighbor, they would discuss the drought and the new seed variety with him.

Normal rainfall levels were experienced as years of certain gain, where the farm would make some profit. All participants (100%) chose to cooperate by planting regular seeds. They mentioned the need for relationships with neighbors to ensure everyone cooperated ("I would coordinate with the neighbor to buy regular seeds together. That is better for everyone."), suggesting a focus on the collective good. Additionally, participants mentioned the importance of ensuring savings for years when there might be a loss. When asked about their response to a defecting neighbor, a common response was: "If I know (like, trust, have a relationship with) my neighbor, I would talk to him."

Floods were thought of as uncertain situations–they could result in a small loss, allow for breakeven, or even result in a small gain depending upon the topography of the land on the farm. Here 87% (13 out of 15) of the CEOs cooperated, choosing not to construct a channel to move the excess water. Perhaps interdependence is obvious as spatial farm boundaries are not a deterrent to flowing water. Nearly all (14 out of 15) participants mentioned the importance of cooperation (adopting a cooperative attitude, considering the relationship with neighbors, openly communicating with neighbors to find optimal solutions) when faced with uncertainty. There was also less expressed concern with the possibility of a loss as uncertainty meant there was some chance of breaking even or even generating a small gain (as illustrated by: "Flooding produces loss of some productive land, but also leaves yield.").

In Study 1, the contextualized dilemmas indeed translated into experiences of certainty and uncertainty: Droughts were experienced as certain loss, floods were experienced as uncertainty (where the economic outcome was an unknown, ranging from a small loss to breakeven to a small gain), and normal rainfall levels were experienced as certain gain. The majority of interviewees defected when faced with certain loss, cooperated in certain gain, and also under uncertainty. Collectively, and as a preliminary response to the research question, these three contexts translated into different experiences resulting in varying levels of cooperation. They provide some initial support for the influence of outcome certainty and uncertainty on choices in real-world environmental dilemmas. As predicted, cooperation is higher when experiencing certain gain compared with certain loss, while decision makers experiencing the uncertainty of floods tend to cooperate and behave similarly to when experiencing certain gain.

This study was performed without anonymity and with a small sample, however the findings of this qualitative study were informative and provided real-world validity. The next study places these contextualized environmental dilemmas in an experimental research design to explore generalizability and test for causality.

Study 2

Rationale and Hypotheses

Study 1, a field study grounded in real-world dilemmas, provided some preliminary evidence for a main effect of outcome uncertainty on likelihood of cooperation in environmental dilemmas. To ensure that this main effect was not just due to a small sample size in a qualitative (interview) study, and to control for any agricultural domain-specific effects, data were collected with a larger non-agricultural sample. Thus, Study 2 tested the replicability and generalizability of these findings with a bigger U.S. sample in a controlled setting. Participants were provided with the same real-world environmental dilemmas from Study 1 and were paid for their participation. Additionally, while Study 1 participants stated that they saw floods as offering the opportunity for a gain and thus cooperated, previously-discussed literature suggests the opposite where increased environmental uncertainty leads to a greater concern for individual outcomes and increased defection. Possibly, this contradiction existed as the uncertainty also encompassed the potential for gain during floods, unlike in previous studies where uncertainty was linked only to losses. Specifically, for Study 2, we predicted the following:

> ***H1A.*** *The percentage of cooperators will be higher in the normal rainfall condition, which is experienced as a certain gain, than in the drought condition, which is experienced as a certain loss.*
>
> ***H1B.*** *The percentage of cooperators will be higher in the flood condition, which is experienced as uncertainty, than in the drought condition, which is experienced as a certain loss.*

Participants

Three hundred participants (aged 18 to 69) from the United States were recruited through Amazon MTurk to participate. No other demographic data was collected. Restrictions were placed to only allow master workers to ensure higher quality responses. As a quality measure, time taken to complete the questionnaire was scrutinized to identify any unreasonable outliers (less than 10 minutes to complete the experiment), and none were identified.

Design

The same three dilemmas were used as in Study 1 but with a between-subjects design: Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (drought, normal rainfall, and flood), which, as shown in Study 1, are experienced as certain loss, certain gain, and uncertainty. The actions for defection and cooperation were, as shown in Table 1, identical to Study 1. Reflecting the nature of groundwater dilemmas, these choices follow patterns observed in other social and environmental dilemmas that are commons dilemmas. A complete text of the dilemmas used in Study 2 can be found in the Appendix.

Participants read the dilemmas and responded to two comprehension questions. Comprehension questions could be attempted three times before participants were terminated for any incorrect responses. Upon first attempt, 287 participants correctly answered the comprehension questions. The 13 participants who did not were asked to re-read the scenario and reattempt the comprehension questions. All comprehension questions were answered correctly in the second

attempt; thus, we were able to use data from all 300 participants. Individual participants in Study 2 were told they were the CEOs and primary decision makers for their farms.

The participants were not provided with an actual amount of the payoff in order to maintain real-world conditions. This was also done to replicate the difference between the certainty of loss, gain, and uncertainty of knowing whether a loss or gain was likely rather than make this a numerical calculation about the actual payoff itself. Thus, we chose to systematically vary what is uncertain by having an unknown amount of a certain negative payoff (drought condition), unknown amount of a certain positive payoff (normal rainfall condition), and a third condition where the amount and direction of outcome – whether a possible loss or gain – were both uncertain (flood condition). The amounts are unknown across all conditions allowing for direct comparison. The unknown amounts are also more accurate representations of the actual impact of extreme weather/water events, where the final outcomes are not predictable in advance, though their directionality may be known in advance (Mearns, 2010).

Results

As shown in Figure 1, the percent of participants who cooperated by condition was comparable to those observed in Study 1, and in both cases, the percent of participants who cooperated was the lowest in the drought condition (experience of certain loss) and substantially higher in the normal rainfall condition (experience of certain gain). Since cooperation is a dichotomous dependent variable, chi-square tests and binary logistic regressions were used to test for H1A and H1B. We began by considering the percent of people who cooperated by condition. Specifically, 34% of the people in the drought condition cooperated compared with 61% in the normal rainfall condition ($\chi^2(1, N=200) = 14.62$; $p < .001$), providing initial support for H1A. In contrast, 71% of the participants cooperated in the flood condition, which was comparable to the normal rainfall condition ($\chi^2(1, N=200) = 2.23$; $p = .136$), but significantly higher than in the drought condition ($\chi^2(1, N=200) = 27.45$; $p < .001$), providing initial support for H1B.

In a binary logistic regression, condition was entered as our categorical independent variable with normal rainfall as the base case (*-2 Log Likelihood* = 382.39, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .13$). Cooperation in drought condition was predicted by a significant negative deviation ($\beta = -1.11$, $p < .001$), further supporting H1A. There was, however, no difference in the likelihood of cooperation predicted in the flood ($\beta = 0.45$, $p = .137$) and the normal rainfall conditions.

The overall pattern of cooperation was similar between Studies 1 and 2: Percent of participants who cooperated was higher in the normal rainfall and in the flood conditions compared to the drought condition. Additionally, as in Study 1, these results also reflected the spectrum of outcome uncertainty, from certain gain (normal rainfall) to uncertainty (floods) to certain loss (droughts) experienced across the contexts by participants. Expanding on Study 1, Study 2 replicated the findings in a controlled setting where participants were not expected to have any agricultural knowledge, providing further support for H1A, H1B, and some basis for the generalizability of these results as the answer to our research question.

Figure 1

Percentage of Cooperation by Economic Condition in Study 1 and Study 2. Error Bars are 95% CI.



Study 3

Hypothesis and Rationale

Study 2 replicated the findings from a real-world groundwater dilemma in a lab setting with a large number of participants, but there remain questions about generalizability, underlying motivations, and mechanisms. As noted in the result in Study 1, participants frequently mentioned the importance of a relationship and communication with their neighbor in their decision process. Strong relationships that result in mutual cooperation are often based upon trust (Buchan, 1998). Furthermore, a distinct characteristic of AACREA, the association from which all but two CEOs in Study 1 were current members, is the strong bond of trust among members in general, and particularly with those in the same geographic area (see Orlove et al., 2011 for a detailed review of member characteristics). This is relevant as trust has been shown to significantly influence cooperation in social dilemmas (De Cremer et al., 2001; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Parks et al., 1996).

Trust has been defined as an expectation and willingness of mutual vulnerability between parties (Brett, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). In social dilemma research, it is defined as a behavior between trustor and trustee (Fehr, 2009) where the trustee is willing to be vulnerable based on positive expectations or beliefs regarding the trustee (van Lange, 2015). Trust is built on the assumption that others in an interdependent decision will behave honestly with the intent to cooperate (Parks et al., 2013). Thus, high trust results in a greater willingness to cooperate (Parks, 1994; Yamagishi, 1986), while low trust leads to greater support of punishing noncooperators (Yamagishi, 1986). Trust is typically operationalized as the belief in others involved in the interdependent decision who may be known, such as members of an in-group. In addition to manifesting within a local context for specific others (Fukuyama, 1995; Uslaner, 2010), trust can also be a global variable as seen in high (low) trust cultures that are characterized by a general overall willingness to believe in and cooperate (or not cooperate) with another (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). These cultural attributes, if internalized by the decision maker (Olivola, et al., 2018), are likely to profoundly influence trust between individuals

(Dinesen, 2012). Currently, it is unknown whether farmer decision making is influenced by the global trust observed at the level of a culture, or the more local contextualization of the concept seen as greater trust in others involved in the decision. In our dilemmas, local trust is trust in the neighbor.

Both the AACREA CEOs and U.S. participants in Study 2 responded to the environmental dilemmas in a high-trust context–AACREA has very high levels of trust among its members while the U.S. is a high-trust culture (Brett, 2007)–and higher levels of trust have been associated with higher levels of cooperation as previously noted. Environmental dilemmas, however, are local in nature and may not be entirely influenced by a general level of trust. The specific trust in the neighbor could also be the relevant factor in such choices. Thus, there remains the question of whether it is the overall level of trust of others in a culture (global trust) or the trust of the other in a local context (local trust) that influences cooperation in environmental dilemmas. We investigate the potential effect of both local and global trust variables on cooperative choice. Building on extant research (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Gunia et al., 2011; Kong et al., 2014; Rothstein, 2000; Van Lange et al., 1998), we posit that beyond condition, trust should predict cooperation. Furthermore, since interdependence in contextualized dilemmas is fundamentally local, arguably it is local trust that should matter.

In Study 3, we replicated and extended the findings from Study 2 across cultures with varied levels of global trust. To extend the findings from Study 2 to contexts that were not necessarily high trust like AACREA or the U.S., we considered natural cultural variations in global trust. The World Values Survey (Wave 6: 2010-2014) suggests cultures vary in their overall levels of global trust and can be thought of as generally high-trust or low-trust. These descriptions further impact choices made in mixed motive situations (Gunia et al., 2011). The World Values Survey results show Japan and the U.S. as having a much higher level of global trust compared with India and Spain. Nearly 36% and 35% of people in Japan and the U.S. respectively agreed with the statement, "generally speaking most people can be trusted," while only 19% and 17% agreed with the same statement in Spain and India respectively (India 2012, Japan 2010, Spain 2011, United States 2011). Johnson and Mislin (2012) empirically show that trust as measured by the World Values Survey is positively correlated with experimentally measured global trust.

Conducting Study 3 in four cultures with natural variations in trust we propose Hypothesis 2 regarding local trust. Additionally, we explore differences in cooperation based on global trust levels, acknowledging that global trust may provide additional insights into cooperative choice.

> ***H2.*** *Context-specific local trust, which is operationalized as trust in a neighbor, will predict cooperation in environmental dilemmas.*

Participants

For Study 3, 362 participants from the United States, 369 participants from India were recruited via MTurk and 397 participants from Spain were recruited via Prolific. Since online recruitment was not available to us for Japan, 142 individuals, who were mostly students in the executive MBA program at Tokyo University, were recruited. Data were collected in India and the U.S. prior to their collection in Spain and Japan. This time lag was mainly due to an initial lack of funding.

Design

Study 3 was identical to Study 2 in all respects except, prior to making their choice in the dilemma but after reading the scenario to which they were randomly assigned, participants agreed or disagreed with a statement about whether or not they could trust their neighbor (local trust) on a

scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree. Also, participants from the U.S. and India responded to a questionnaire in English[1], those from Japan responded to a questionnaire in Japanese, and those from Spain received a Spanish version. The questionnaires were translated by native speakers and tested for conceptual accuracy.

Results

Comparing Cooperation in the U.S. Across Studies 2 and 3

To ensure replicability of results, the percent of participants who cooperated by condition for the U.S. only were compared across Studies 2 and 3. Specifically, the percent of people who cooperated in the normal rainfall ($\chi^2(1, 219) = 0.03$; $p = .86$), flood ($\chi^2[1, 216] = 0.11$; $p = .75$), and drought ($\chi^2[1, 225] = 0.004$; $p = .95$) conditions showed no statistical difference across the two studies. Furthermore, these results suggest that independent of country and as in previous studies, participants in Study 3 may also have experienced the drought condition as one of certain loss, the normal rainfall condition as one of certain gain, and the flood condition as one of uncertainty.

Testing for H1A and H1B

We began by testing whether H1A and H1B were true independent of country. On average, 39% of the participants in the drought (certain loss) condition and 65% in the normal rainfall (certain gain) condition cooperated, which was a significant difference ($\chi^2(1, 853) = 54.65$; $p < .001$) that supports H1A. Subsequently, whether or not a participant cooperated was regressed on condition (as a categorical variable with base = normal rainfall) using a binary logistic regression (*-2 Log Likelihood* = 1699.40, *Nagelkerke* $R^2 = .06$), and the flood ($\beta = -0.52$, $p < .001$) as well as drought ($\beta = -1.04$, $p < .001$) conditions were both significant negative predictors of cooperation, further supporting H1A.

Additionally, and as shown in Figure 2, the percent of participants who cooperated were not significantly different by country ($\chi^2[3, 416] = 5.67$; $p = .129$) in the normal rainfall condition, but they were different by country in the drought condition ($\chi^2[3, 437] = 21.42$; $p < .001$), with Spain driving that difference, which we return to later. There were also significant differences in the percent of participants who cooperated by country in the flood condition ($\chi^2[3, 414] = 35.47$; $p < .001$). Further exploration of the flood condition revealed that the percent of participants who cooperated were similar in the U.S. and Japan, but different in India and Spain. Specifically, cooperation in the flood condition were similar to that in the normal rainfall condition in Japan ($\chi^2[1, 88] = 2.55$; $p = .110$) and the U.S. ($\chi^2[1, 235] = 1.20$; $p = .27$). However, percent of people who cooperated were similar in the flood and drought conditions in India ($\chi^2[1, 242] = 18.40$; $p < .001$) and Spain ($\chi^2[1, 265] = 6.62$; $p = .010$). Thus, the experience of uncertainty (flood) appears to result in similar choices as the experience of a certain gain (normal rainfall) in the U.S. and Japan, while in India and Spain it results in choices similar to those made when a certain loss (droughts) is experienced.

Collectively, cooperation patterns support H1A independent of country such that cooperation levels are always higher in the normal rainfall condition compared to the drought condition. H1B, however, is only partially supported by these results (for the U.S. and Japan), which further suggests that H1B may have a culture-specific component. We return to the implications of this pattern of results in the general discussion.

[1] Participants from India answered the questionnaire after completing English fluency questions as has been previously used with considerable success (Boyles & Arora, 2015).

Figure 2

Percentage of Cooperation by Economic Condition in Study 3. Error Bars are 95% CI.



The Influence of Local vs. Global Trust

Data were also collected on local trust. An ANOVA with local trust as the dependent variable (DV) and country as the independent variable (IV) revealed a significant difference [F[3, 1266] = 27.60, p < .001] in the average level of local trust by country: U.S. (M = 3.68, SD = 0.87); Spain (M = 3.41, SD = 0.83); Japan (M = 3.33, SD = 0.77); and India (M = 3.11, SD = 0.87). These self-reported results follow the general pattern of global trust in the World Values Survey for the U.S., Japan, and India, but not for Spain. We discuss this difference later.

Since differences in trust are being considered post-hoc, we test for these accordingly. As a first step we conducted a Levene's test of variance, which revealed unequal variances of local trust (F[3,1266] = 1.26, p = .288) (Shingala & Rajyaguru, 2015). The suggested post hoc analysis to assess differences amongst countries for unequal differences in variance is the Games-Howell test (Field, 2013). Pairwise comparisons among the four countries (see Table 2), showed significantly higher levels of local trust in the U.S. compared with Spain (p < .001), India (p < .001), and Japan (p < .001). Both Spain and Japan reported significantly higher levels of local trust than India (p < .001) but there was no significant difference between Spain and Japan (p = .682).

Interestingly, self-reports of local trust levels in Spain among our participants were consistently higher than those reported by the World Values Survey. This may have been due to the nature of the question–participants were asked about trust in a neighbor. World Values Survey data regarding trust in neighbors in Spain is much higher than overall global trust and similar to levels observed in this study (79% of participants responded they completely or somewhat trust people in their neighborhood in Spain, compared with 72% in the U.S. and 56% in Japan). Thus, this self-reported trust measure appeared to replicate the trend for neighbors in Spain, which may also explain the

higher percentage of cooperation in the certain loss condition. Similarly, trust levels in Japan were lower than global trust but consistent with reported values for trust in neighbor based on the World Values Survey. This might also be due in part to the comparatively smaller sample size for Japan (*N* = 142).

Table 2

ANOVA Comparisons of Local Trust Across Four Countries

				Games-Howell Comparison		
Country	*N*	*M*	*SD*	Spain	India	Japan
Spain	397	3.413	0.832			
India	369	3.112	0.872	.000		
Japan	142	3.327	0.770	.682	.034	
United States	362	3.680	0.874	.000	.000	.000

The role of local trust as a possible influence and mechanism for cooperation was tested using a binary logistic regression (*-2 Log Likelihood* = 493.22, *Nagelkerke* R^2 = .23) where global trust (coded as a dichotomous variable – high- or low-trust) and trust in the neighbor (local or specific trust) were used to predict cooperation. Global trust was not a significant predictor (β = -0.07, p = .59) while local trust was a significant predictor (β = 0.98, p < .001). Replacing the dichotomous variable for global trust with the exact data from the World Values Survey yielded the same results. Interestingly, although trust influences cooperation independent of the condition (drought, flood, normal rainfall) or country, local trust directly predicts cooperation in our Study.

To better examine the collective model, we ran a binary logistic regression with local trust, condition, and country as our predictors of cooperation. Both condition (base = normal rainfall) and country (base = U.S.) were included as categorical variables. As shown in Table 3, the resulting model was highly significant (*-2 Log Likelihood* = 1489.03, *Nagelkerke* R^2 = .25). Notably and in support of H2, there is a strong main effect for local trust. Furthermore, also as expected, there is a main effect of condition (supporting H1) where cooperation is always lower in the drought condition than in the normal rainfall condition independent of country or local trust (supporting H1A).

Table 3

Logistic Regression with Specific Trust, Country Code, and Economic Condition

Variable	β	SE β	*p*
Constant	-2.870	0.330	.000
Specific Trust	1.025	0.086	.000
Country Code {United States}	NA	NA	.000
Country Code (1) {Japan vs. United States}	0.454	0.219	.038
Country Code (2) {India vs. United States}	-0.179	0.169	.290
Country Code (3) {Spain vs. United States}	0.486	0.163	.003
Condition {Certain Gain}	NA	NA	.000
Condition (1) {Uncertain vs. Certain Gain}	-0.791	0.157	.000
Condition (2) {Certain Loss vs. Certain Gain}	-1.219	0.156	.000

Exploratory Analysis

Cross-cultural differences in cooperation were explored while controlling for individual differences in trust. To allow for direct comparisons, we considered cooperation at three standardized levels of local trust (mean and ± 1 SD). Figure 3 shows the percent of participants who cooperated as a function of country and level of local trust. Although the percent of people who cooperated varied by level of local trust, they appeared to follow similar patterns for droughts and normal years independent of country. Cooperation in the flood condition, however, appeared to vary by country. Specifically, H1B, or cooperation should be higher during floods than during droughts, is supported for the U.S. and Japan, but not for India and Spain. Perhaps cooperation under uncertainty is influenced by country/culture. To further explore this possible interaction, we used Model 1 (a standard moderation model) in PROCESS macro version 3.4 in SPSS 26 (Hayes, 2013), with condition as the predictor, country as the moderator, cooperation as the DV, and local trust as a covariate variable (*-2 Log Likelihood* = 1461.96, *Nagelkerke* R^2 = .28, $p < .001$). This allowed an examination of the impact of culture on condition while controlling for the main effect of local trust. Both country and condition were entered as categorial variables with the U.S. and certain gain as the base case.

Figure 3

Predicted Percentage of Cooperation by Country and Level of Specific Trust in Study 3.



General Discussion and Limitations

The structure of social dilemmas incentivizes individuals to act non-cooperatively, valuing short-term self-interest over long-term collective benefit. The context of a dilemma in the real-world, however, can exert considerable influence on an individual's cooperative choice, especially when the outcome itself is uncertain. While there is some research on environmental dilemmas showing uncertainty of resource reduces cooperation rates (Anderson, 1981; Budescu et al., 1990; Messick et al., 1988), there is little to no prior work that directly addresses choices given the certainty effect or when the outcome itself is uncertain. We investigated this in the context of real-world dilemmas where droughts, floods, and normal rainfall levels effectively result in the experience of certain loss, uncertain outcome, and certain gain.

Our findings show, independent of country, the percent of participants who cooperate are always higher in the normal rainfall condition compared to the drought condition. Thus, the experience of a certain gain results in more cooperation than the experience of a certain loss. Cooperation in the flood condition, however, is similar to the normal rainfall condition for the U.S. and Japan, and to the drought condition for India and Spain. Thus, there is a cultural element to the cooperative choice when it is made under the experience of uncertainty. This is further supported by the observed moderation of cooperation by culture in the flood condition only. Finally, we find local trust predicts cooperation, independent of culture.

Results in the normal rainfall and drought conditions (certain gain and loss) may be explained through the theoretical lens of the logic of appropriateness, wherein choices are derived from the answer to the question "what does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recognition) given culture (group)?" (Kopelman, 2009; Kopelman et al., 2016). In the certain loss condition for example, the participants are highly concerned with reducing the certainty of a loss and ensuring survival, thereby showing increased self-interested focus. Conversely, in the certain gain condition there is limited environmental or economic uncertainty where the participants are willing to consider maximizing collective gain, suggesting perhaps it is the nature of the outcome that influences the framing and therefore what is seen as "appropriate" (Aaldering & Bohm, 2020).

The flood or uncertain condition, however, presents an interesting dynamic where culture moderates choice. When faced with uncertainty, participants appear to look beyond the frame of the situation for additional information to help them make a choice. Specifically, we find a moderation of cooperation by culture in this condition, controlling for local trust. Perhaps participants are seeking information beyond trust in interdependent others to inform their choice to cooperate under conditions of uncertainty.

The Globe Project (2004) suggests nine cultural dimensions of which we believe three may be relevant and should be further explored – collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and future orientation. Past research has shown that there is a main effect of collectivism on cooperation (Parks & Vu, 1994). Furthermore, cultural differences in group identity, accountability, and communication can also be moderators of the effect of collectivism on cooperation (Chen et al., 1998). Irwin and Berigan (2013) have made the case that the influence of trust on cooperation also varies between individualist and collectivist societies.

There is also strong cultural variation in dealing with uncertainty. Ladbury and Hinsz (2009) find that uncertainty avoidance influences choices in potential gains but not losses. Uncertainty avoidance has been studied in negotiations, where uncertainty avoidant negotiators look to rules and seek out structure to help guide them. Future orientation may be even more relevant than the individual social value orientation in predicting cooperative behavior in social dilemmas (Hernandez

et al., 2006; Joireman et al., 2004), and is another factor whose influence under uncertainty is not well understood. India and Spain have a lower future orientation (as per the Globe Project). Therefore, they are more likely to defect and maximize gain in the short-term, suggesting this may be one of the variables influencing the lower rate of cooperation in the uncertain condition. Future studies need to unpack the true influence of these cultural variables on cooperation in social dilemmas and its interaction with local trust.

In our studies we distinguish between local trust in the neighbor, which is relevant to our dilemmas and is a strong predictor of cooperation, and general trust measured as a global cultural construct. Trust, however, manifests at multiple levels (Delhey et al., 2011; Fukuyama, 1999; Goertz, 2006) that have not been studied in an interdependent context. The level of trust measured in our study in Spain is higher than what would be expected when the global or cultural level is considered but is consistent with what is expected at the neighborhood or communal level. These differences are meaningful when local actions need to be nested within a global context: Farmers are more likely to follow water management strategies or plant specific seed varieties that may be globally prescribed by scientists and agricultural experts if those strategies account for short-term local constraints (Gonzalez et al., 2018) and their day-to-day survival, further necessitating that choices are understood in context (Arora et al., 2016).

Future research might especially focus on extended group sizes and repetition of the dilemma. Extending the group of decision makers to more than two might have an effect on the local trust between decision makers and therefore on the decision to cooperate. Additionally, repeated games would allow us to better understand decision makers' timeframes and potential discounting of future payoffs under conditions of uncertainty. With increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, this becomes especially relevant. Our findings have policy implications for issues involving environmental dilemmas and negotiation ramifications for global environmental treaties whose implementation is steeped in cultural nuances. As uncertainty and economic risk increases with climate change, our findings ask for a stronger local and contextualized focus when studying decision making in environmental dilemmas.

Conclusion and Future Directions

Though the impacts of climate change and resulting weather patterns are global, their manifestation as extreme droughts and floods is local. It is these local responses to the resulting environmental dilemmas at the farm level that influence global issues of food and agricultural sustainability and conflict. For there to be good policies and responses to environmental dilemmas, such issues need to be better understood at the level at which they occur so that interventions and nudges are developed within a local context.

In this research, we began with real-world dilemmas posed by droughts, floods, and normal rainfall levels, which were then brought into a controlled environment to gain insight into underlying motivational mechanisms across four cultures. Our unusual methodological approach provided a realistic account of why people cooperate in varying contexts. Furthermore, it gave some insight into how contextualized dilemmas can be approached to develop the necessary knowledge for more effective designs of policies that promote cooperation. We show that across cultures, policymakers can increase cooperation by guaranteeing a certain minimum gain, e.g., through climate insurances, pooling of resources, or guaranteed subventions in years with climate extremes. Through this, long-term sustainability of groundwater resources can be ensured supporting a stable food supply. However, while these groundwater dilemmas are global in scope, choices are made locally and a grasp

of the cultural variables that matter in the local context becomes essential, particularly when uncertainty is central to the dilemma, as is the case with most wicked problems humanity faces today.

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Appendix
Prompts for Each Condition

Uncertain Condition (Flood) Scenario

Please read the scenario below and put yourself in the role of the CEO of an agribusiness – a business that owns farms, grows crops like soybeans and corn on that land and then sells the crops on the world commodity markets.

You are the owner of an agribusiness that owns a large amount of farmland in a very fertile area of the country. Your land borders along one edge with a single neighbor who has a similar farm. Your farm has been in your family for three generations and is a very profitable enterprise. Currently, you employ 15 individuals full-time ranging from agricultural experts to farm workers. The farm and agribusiness have managed to support these 15 individuals, as well as your family for many years now. You generally grow some combination of soybean, corn, and wheat and given growing global demand for these grains, have no trouble selling all you grow. In fact, you could probably sell a lot more, if you could grow it.

Every year, before planting season you look at the weather forecasts for the upcoming growing season to get an idea of what crops you should plant as the temperature and rain will determine how well the plants grow, and thus the overall profit made by your farm. The average level of rainfall over the past few years has been higher than normal. In five of the last ten years your farm was flooded due to excessive rain. Floods in your region destroy part of your harvest but rarely all of it. This year it has been raining a lot so far and the ground is already quite wet. Since your farm is not entirely flat, during a flood the lower-lying areas have standing water, while the higher areas are fine. Although you lose the crop from the lower areas due to flooding, you can come close to break-even or even break-even from the crop that survives in the higher-lying areas of the farm. The neighboring farm that borders your land is a lot like yours, and also has lower-lying and higher-lying areas with similar outcomes.

At the start of the planting season, you can choose to dig a channel that will drain excessive water from the lower-lying areas of your farm. Once you plant, you cannot dig a channel. Digging a channel could help any standing water due to flooding in your lower-lying areas to flow out, but it can also result in underground water that is very close to the surface. Thus, a channel could worsen the flood this year, and may increase the chances of flooding in the following years. Participants were asked to choose whether or not they would dig a channel.

Certain Loss Condition (Drought) Scenario

Please read the scenario below and put yourself in the role of the CEO of an agribusiness – a business that owns farms, grows crops like soybeans and corn on that land and then sells the crops on the world commodity markets.

You are the owner of an agribusiness that owns a large amount of farmland in a very fertile area of the country. Your land borders along one edge with a single neighbor who has a similar farm. Your farm has been in your family for three generations and is a very profitable enterprise. Currently, you employ 15 individuals ranging from agricultural experts to farm workers full time. The farm and agribusiness have managed to support these 15 individuals, as well as your family for many years now. You generally grow some combination of soybean, corn, and wheat and given growing global demand for these grains, have no trouble selling all you grow. In fact, you could probably sell a lot more, if you could grow it.

Every year, before planting season you look at the weather forecasts for the upcoming growing season to get an idea of what crops you should plant as the temperature and rain will determine how well the plants grow, and thus the overall profit made by your farm. The average level of rainfall over the past few years has been lower than normal. In five of the last ten years your farm experienced drought due to minimal rain. Drought in your region destroys almost all of your entire harvest. This year it has not rained much so far, and the ground is already quite dry. Since your farm is not entirely flat, during a drought the lower-lying areas have some moisture, while the higher areas are very dry. Therefore, you lose the crop from the higher areas due to the drought but can harvest a little from the lower-lying areas. However, it is never enough to allow you to cover your costs, thus you end up with a substantial loss. The neighboring farm that borders your land is a lot like yours, and also has lower-lying and higher-lying areas with similar outcomes.

At the start of the planting season, you can choose to plant drought resistant seeds. These seeds have deeper roots allowing them to reach lower levels of groundwater. Groundwater is water that is available deep under the soil and if plants are able to reach it, they can use it even in times of drought. Drought resistant seeds will grow and provide a regular harvest despite even extremely dry

conditions, but they will lower the water level available underground. Thus, they will worsen the drought this year and may increase the chances of drought in the following years.
Participants were asked to choose whether or not they would plant drought resistant seeds.

Certain Gain Condition (Normal Rainfall) Scenario

Please read the scenario below and put yourself in the role of the CEO of an agribusiness – a business that owns farms, grows crops like soybeans and corn on that land and then sells the crops on the world commodity markets.

You are the owner of an agribusiness that owns a large amount of farmland in a very fertile area of the country. Your land borders along one edge with a single neighbor who has a similar farm. Your farm has been in your family for three generations and is a very profitable enterprise. Currently, you employ 15 individuals ranging from agricultural experts to farm workers full time. The farm and agribusiness have managed to support these 15 individuals, as well as your family for many years now. You generally grow some combination of soybean, corn, and wheat and given growing global demand for these grains, have no trouble selling all you grow. In fact, you could probably sell a lot more, if you could grow it.

Every year, before planting season you look at the global demand for crops. You use this to decide which crops to plant and in what quantity. What you plant will determine the overall profit made by your farm. This year the U.S. changed its subsidy for corn and as a result there will be less farmers growing corn in the US. Because of this, financial experts are predicting that corn prices will be substantially higher than normal for the next years while the supply and demand readjust to a new equilibrium. You are considering growing corn during the next few cropping cycles to benefit from the forecasted high prices. Given the price forecast you could end up with a substantial profit if you plant corn. However, corn is particularly prone to certain insects local to your area that tend to attack the young plants and reduce yield. This could reduce your total profit, though it is not likely that you won't have some profit.

At the start of planting season, you can choose to plant an insect resistant variety of corn called BT corn, which will increase the yield despite the presence of local insects. In this case the insects will attack other corn plants that are not of the BT resistant variety. The downside is that the more BT corn you grown, the more resistant the insects become. Insect resistance can develop very quickly and may occur within one season. Thus, it will increase your profits this year, but it might lower profits in the future. Participants were asked to choose whether or not they would plant insect resistant seeds.