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EDITOR'S NOTE

This issue, NCMR 15(4), features the last two out of six articles that belong to a special issue, ***Lessons for Practice: Extensions to Current Negotiation Theory and Research*.** The other four special issue articles appeared in NCMR 15(3). The guest editors are Dr. Jimena Ramirez-Marin, Dr. Daniel Druckman, and Dr. William Donohue. The collection of the six special issue articles is listed below:

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Ramirez-Marin, J., Druckman, D., & Donohue, W. A. (2022). Lessons from practice: Extensions of current negotiation theory and research. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 15*(3).

Cai, D. A. (2022). From theory to practice and back again: Lessons from hostage negotiation for conflict management. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 15*(3), https://doi.org/10.34891/20220406-433

Druckman, D., & Donohue, W. (2022). Working together: Bridging the researcher-practitioner gap. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 15*(3), https://doi.org/10.34891/20220406-435

Rana, Y. S., Druckman, D., & Canduela, J. (2022). A turning points analysis of cross-boarder merger and acquisition negotiations. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 15*(3), https://doi.org/10.34891/20220406-397

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Kern, M. A., & Murphy, A. G. (2022). What do you expect? Assessing whether a situation is "ripe" for collaborative governance. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 15*(4), https://doi.org/10.34891/20220406-429

Mann, M., Warsitzka, M., Zhang, H., Hüffmeier, J., & Trötschel, R. (2022). When control does not pay off: The dilemma between trade-off opportunities and budget restrictions in B2B negotiations. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 15*(4), https://doi.org/10.34891/20220406-431

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What Do You Expect?: Assessing Whether a Situation is "Ripe" for Collaborative Governance

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Abstract
"Collaborative governance" has emerged as a ubiquitous term in the United States and elsewhere, in both the public and private sectors. It has recently received more specific definition from scholars as it applies to multiparty, consensus-seeking processes, often facilitated or mediated by a third party, that are intended to resolve particular public policy challenges. But both theory and practice have shown it is not appropriate in all situations. So, practitioners have identified conditions they look for in assessing the likelihood of initiating and sustaining a successful collaborative process. Borrowing from international relations, they often refer to this assessment as "ripeness." Building from experience gained during practice, we propose an additional condition for assessing ripeness—whether initiators and supporters are open to the proposed process resulting in a range of outcomes and solution sets. We provide a question that can be asked of those who are interested in initiating the process, to help practitioners assess this new condition: *"Do you expect that the result of the collaborative process you are interested in initiating will be that others realize the solution you currently favor is the correct one?"* We explain why this simple question about expectations can shorten lengthy lines of inquiry; make explicit the differences between partnerships, coalitions, and collaborations; and help parties better understand their priorities and process needs. The intent of this article is to encourage practitioners to experiment with this new question and condition, and researchers to formally evaluate its utility.

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Considerable attention has been given in both academic literature and practice in the United States (US) and elsewhere to the use of collaborative governance processes to prevent, manage, and resolve complex public policy issues. Such processes seek the active engagement of all affected parties – public, private, non-governmental, and others – to address public policy challenges that cannot be easily addressed by any one entity on its own (Amsler, 2016; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Carlson, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham, 2003; Weber, 2006).

The term "collaboration" has become ubiquitous in discussions of public policy, management, and governance in the US. While calling for a broad range of initiatives, efforts, projects, and programs to be conducted as a collaboration is increasingly popular in both the public and private sectors, evidence from both research and practice has shown this is not appropriate in all situations (Agranoff, 2004; Margerum, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 2003; Weber, 2006).

Therefore, practitioners trained in collaborative policy processes often conduct a situation assessment, to gauge whether circumstances are indeed "ripe" for collaboration (Murphy & Page, 2019; Susskind et al., 1999). This concept of "ripeness" is borrowed from international relations, where it is described as, "a second and equally necessary key" to settling disputes, alongside the substance of proposed solutions: "Parties resolve their conflicts only when they are ready to do so—when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament" (Zartman, 2008, p 1). This recognition is what Zartman refers to as "a mutually hurting stalemate and shared willingness to explore a joint way out" and is one of the necessary conditions for parties to consider acceptance of a third-party practitioner (Zartman, 1989, 2000, 2008, 2015).

Practitioners have identified conditions to be explored in order to assess the likelihood of a successful collaborative public policy process. This article proposes an additional condition, as well as a question that collaborative governance practitioners, policy makers, involved parties, and academics can ask to help assess this new condition. This condition and question can help establish whether the involved parties have in mind collaboration in any of its more general senses—such as a partnership, or a like-minded coalition—versus a collaborative governance process as defined below. The intent of this article is to encourage practitioners to experiment with this new question and condition, and researchers to formally evaluate its utility.

Collaborative Governance

Defining Collaborative Governance

Governance involves the processes of managing the delivery of public goods and services. Historically, approaches to governance in western democracies have largely been command and control, and regulatory (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). However, as public policy challenges have increased in complexity, they have often exceeded the level of expertise and resources available solely within government, and therefore, to successfully implement public policy, have required capabilities that are outside the scope of individual agencies (Gray & Purdy, 2018). Therefore, government actors have been increasingly turning to collaboration with other sectors to help solve public policy problems and implement solutions (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray & Purdy, 2018; Sorensen & Torfing, 2011), which has transformed the way policy making and implementation is done (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

There are many terms used in the literature to describe different types of collaborative processes. These include partnerships, coalitions, and networks (Agranoff, 2006; Bidwell & Ryan, 2006; Himmelman, 2001; Leach et al., 2002; Poocharoen & Ting, 2015), collaborative rationality (Susskind, 2010), collaborative public policy (Carlson, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2018), co-management (Borrini & Jaireth, 2007; Singleton, 2000), collaborative public management (Agranoff, 2004; O'Leary et al., 2006), cross-sector collaboration (Page et al., 2015), public-private partnerships (Minow, 2003; Forrer et al., 2010), and environmental conflict resolution (Dukes, 2004; Fisher & Sablan, 2018), to name a few. Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary (2005) say, "Practitioners have developed a rich diversity of processes that use negotiation, mediation, facilitation, citizen and stakeholder engagement, deliberation, collaboration, and consensus-building," and describe these processes as "the new governance" (p. 552). Scholars in public administration, political science, and other fields (particularly in the US, but also elsewhere) increasingly use "collaborative governance" as a term to describe these processes (Amsler, 2016).

Collaborative governance efforts include several different kinds of structures, the most common being one that is predominantly led by a government agency (Gray & Purdy, 2018). Other examples include shared leadership structure (such as a steering committee); organizing an entirely new entity, (such as a stewardship council); public-private partnerships; and mandated collaboration (Gray & Purdy, 2018). Over the last decade, collaborative governance has received more specific definition as it applies to multiparty, consensus-seeking processes, facilitated or mediated by a third party, that are intended to resolve a particular public policy challenge. This is helping to distinguish this type of collaborative governance from the other types of collaboration mentioned above.

In 2008, collaborative governance was defined by Ansell and Gash as, "A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets" (p. 544).

In 2012, Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh defined collaborative governance more broadly, as "The processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished" (p. 2). In 2015, Emerson and Nabatchi built a conceptual framework around that definition, describing the "collaborative governance regimes" under which parties engage in this type of governance. They borrowed the term "regime" from international political theory, where it refers to "sustained cooperation between state and nonstate actors" and features "explicit and implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures." Their collaborative governance regime definition includes "different interests and/or jurisdictions (as opposed to like-minded coalitions)" and "repeated interactions … over some period of time, usually greater than one year." (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18-19).

In 2018, the University Network for Collaborative Governance (UNCG) added the idea that participants engage in collaborative governance to "enhance their communities and shape sustainable public policy decisions," as well as to "leverage the unique attributes and resources of (the public, private and civic sectors) for the greatest impact" (p. 2).

Justifications, Merits and Critiques of Collaborative Governance

Both research and practice have explored the benefits and drawbacks of collaborative governance. Proponents have argued that collaborative governance processes allow participation by all interested and affected parties (Susskind et al., 1999); are a healthy response to policy gridlock and litigation (Kemmis, 1990); result in more informed, creative, and adaptive solutions (Susskind et al., 1999; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000); are more democratic, transparent, and inclusive, leading to the likelihood of more effective and equitable solutions (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Fung & Wright, 2001); can provide resources needed to accomplish what cannot be accomplished by any one single party or smaller coalition (Dukes, 2001); and can reduce future conflict among stakeholders (Bernard & Young, 1997).

While much of the focus in research and practice has been on the benefits of collaborative governance processes, there is also scholarship describing potential or observed drawbacks and adverse effects (Hileman & Bodin, 2019; Kallis et al., 2009; McGuire, 2006; Purdy, 2012; Scott & Thomas, 2017). Critics have argued that collaborative governance processes have been shown to delegitimize conflict (Kenney, 2000); can lead to government policymaking being co-opted by special interests (Koontz, 2004); can exclude or disempower indigenous communities and minority groups (Scott & Thomas, 2017; Singleton, 2009); can lead to environmental outcomes that are less protective of natural resources (Coglianese, 1999); and can lead to "lowest common denominator" solutions (Kenney, 2000). Provan and Kenis (2008) observe three tensions that exist in collaborative governance processes: efficiency versus inclusiveness, flexibility versus stability, and internal versus external legitimacy.

We mention both the many types of collaborative processes, and these merits and critiques, in order to establish the importance of assessing "ripeness." It may be that these merits rise to the fore when a process is initiated and sustained under a favorable set of conditions, and that the critiques become warranted when this is not the case. Therefore, it is imperative to carefully explore and evaluate current conditions before initiating a collaborative governance process. Scholars are inclined, understandably, to seek definitive answers to questions such as, "Do collaborative governance processes lead to better policy outcomes?" If they must resign themselves to living in a world where the answers to those questions are most typically, "It depends," we at least hope to shine light upon one of the areas upon which those outcomes may depend.

Conditions Favorable to Initiate and Sustain a Collaborative Governance Process

In general, researchers and practitioners agree there are conditions that, if present at the onset of a collaborative governance process, will influence the success of that process. Ansell and Gash (2008) narrowed the starting conditions down to three variables: *(1) imbalances between the resources or power of different stakeholders, (2) incentives that stakeholders have to collaborate, and (3) past history of conflict or cooperation among stakeholders* (p. 550-551). Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) identified four conditions (which they refer to as drivers) that are necessary for a collaborative governance regime to come to fruition*: (1) uncertainty, (2) interdependence, (3) consequential incentives, and (4) initiating leadership* (p. 44).

Moving beyond initiation, the literature on collaboration identifies several conditions that are essential in determining whether the collaborative process will be successfully sustained. For example, Mattessich et al. (2001) identify 20 factors that influence the success of a collaborative process, based on a review of 281 studies. These factors are grouped into six categories: *(1) Environment, (2) Membership characteristics, (3) Process and structure, (4) Communication, (5) Purpose,* and *(6) Resources (*Mattessich et al., 2001)*.* Ansell and Gash (2008) reviewed 137 studies of collaborative governance, identifying a number of features necessary for successful collaborations including trust-building, participant commitment to the process, developing shared understanding, face-to-face dialogue, and intermediate outcomes. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) discuss how the surrounding political, legal, socioeconomic, and environmental "system context" influences the formation and performance of collaborative governance regimes, and identify six key conditions: *(1) public service or resource conditions, (2) policy and legal frameworks, (3) socioeconomic and cultural characteristics, (4) network characteristics, (5) political dynamics and power relations,* and *(6) history of conflict.* Other commonly-cited conditions include a broad representation of stakeholders, shared and open decision-making processes, well-defined and agreed-upon goals and objectives, and open communication and sharing of information throughout the process (Bryson et al., 2006; Cestero, 1999; Emerson et al., 2012; Gray, 1985; Mattessich et al., 2001).

The "ripe moment" is a crucial concept in the study of peace and conflict. Ripeness theory seeks to explain why and when parties in a conflict will decide that an attempt at resolution (e.g., negotiation) is a better option than continued conflict. According to Zartman (2001), "parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament" (p. 8). Specifically, the parties in conflict must reach a point where they recognize a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and a way out (WO) through negotiation (Zartman, 2000).

However, ripeness theory has been critiqued by several scholars and does have its limitations (Coleman et al., 2008; Druckman, 2001; Lederach, 1997; Mooradian & Druckman, 1999; Pruitt, 2007; Walsh, 2016). According to Walsh (2016), such critiques have largely focused on three areas: (1) low predictability or alleged tautology, (2) inability to explain why parties *stay* at the negotiation table, and (3) the micro-foundations of the theory or limited consideration of non-rational factors (p. 78-79) For instance, the basic reasoning of MHS lies in cost-benefit analysis (Zartman, 2000), which may be accurate when describing economic forms of decision making in conflict, but does not account for other types of decisions (Coleman et al., 2008). According to Coleman et al. (2008), "(D)ecisions related to maintaining group cohesiveness and solidarity typically use a very different set of criteria from decisions to maximize outcomes or achieve goals efficiently" (p. 6). In addition, the elements of ripeness theory (MHS, perceived way out, impending catastrophe, enticing opportunity, and valid spokesperson) (Zartman, 1996) are joint states that concurrently affect both parties. But this does not consider uneven states of ripeness amongst the parties (Pruitt, 1997). According to Pruitt (1997), "(T)he theory is more flexible if these components are viewed as perceptions by each party separately rather than as joint perceptions, though overall ripeness must be a joint phenomenon" (p. 248).

Readiness theory addresses some of the limitations of ripeness theory. According to Pruitt (1997), "It differs from ripeness theory in that it uses the language of variables rather than necessary states and focuses on the thinking within a single party rather than on the joint thinking of both parties to a conflict" (p. 1524-1525). This revision to ripeness theory makes it possible to examine factors that lead to changes in degrees of readiness, and to make predictions about conflict outcomes such as third-party intervention (Coleman et al., 2008). As Pruitt (2005) explains, "Readiness theory allows some parties to be motivated mainly by a belief that they cannot win, others mainly by the cost of the conflict, and still others mainly by the risk of a future catastrophe or pressure from a powerful third party. Such a model fits reality better than ripeness theory, which requires a uniform hurting stalemate for all cases" (p. 9).

Because readiness theory allows for different parties to be driven by these different motivations, "readiness" may actually be a better fit as a term to describe conditions favorable for initiating a collaborative public policy process, despite the fact that "ripeness" is the term more likely to be borrowed and employed as a metaphor by collaborative governance practitioners.

Assessing the Likelihood for Success of a Collaborative Governance Process

As the paradigm of collaborative governance has emerged, so has a field of process experts. These practitioners (working from private, public, and non-governmental settings) serve as professional neutrals, specializing in multi-party public policy dispute resolution, and designing collaborative processes (Susskind et al., 1999). They often work under contract with public agencies or other sponsoring entities, serving as third-party facilitators for collaborative governance processes (Weber, 2006).

Practitioners will often begin by assessing the situation, to determine if the requisite conditions exist for a collaborative governance process to succeed (Susskind et al., 1999). This is referred to as a "situation assessment" or "conflict assessment," and derives from a standard practice in two-party mediations in which the mediator meets with each party separately, before meeting with them together (Herrman, 2009; Keir & Ali, 2014; Susskind, et al., 1999). The purpose is to better understand key issues, identify involved parties, and assess the prospects for collaboration (Murphy & Page, 2019; Susskind et al., 1999). Before initiating a situation assessment, practitioners will often hold preliminary, informal conversations with key entities involved in the situation (sometimes referred to as a "pre-assessment"), to gauge whether a formal situation assessment would be productive (Murphy & Page, 2019). Together, pre-assessment and situation assessment form a typical first stage of the collaborative governance process. Later stages include planning, organizing, educating, negotiating, resolving, and implementing (Carlson, 2007).

Both pre-assessments and situation assessments focus on whether conditions are favorable (or "ripe") for a collaborative governance process. The Center for Collaborative Policy (CCP) at California State University, Sacramento identified eleven conditions, phrased as questions, for practitioners to use to assess the favorability for a successful collaborative process (Weber, 2006):

1) Do issues focus on fundamental legal rights or societal values?
2) Are there potential areas for agreement, preferably with multiple issues for tradeoffs?
3) Are the primary parties identifiable and willing to participate?
4) Does each party have a legitimate spokesperson?
5) Are any potential "deal-breakers" at the table?
6) Does any party have assurance of a much better deal elsewhere?
7) Do the parties anticipate future dealings with each other?
8) Is there a relative balance of power among the parties?
9) Are there external pressures to reach agreement?
10) Is there a realistic timetable for completion?
11) Are there adequate resources and funding to support the negotiation?

Note that while a "yes" is an indication of favorability for most of these questions, that is not the case for questions one, five and six. At times, it is apparent to the practitioner during the pre-assessment that conditions are not favorable to initiate a collaborative governance process. At other times, this only becomes clear when a full situation assessment is completed. If that conclusion is reached at either point, the practitioner works with the parties to discuss what other approaches can be taken to make progress on the issues involved and/or to shift the conditions to a place where they are more favorable. But, if the conclusion is that conditions are indeed favorable, the assessment will likely recommend proceeding with a collaborative process, and will provide guidance on how to design and conduct that process in order to maximize the chances for successful outcomes (Murphy & Page, 2019; Susskind et al., 1999).

An example can help illustrate how this assessment process functions in practice. In 2012, university-based practitioners in the states of Washington and Oregon conducted a collaborative engagement assessment at the request of the Columbia River Gorge Commission (Commission). The Commission is an interstate compact agency authorized by the National Scenic Area Act with the dual purposes of protecting and enhancing the scenic, natural, cultural, and recreational resources of the Columbia River Gorge, while encouraging growth and allowing development consistent with resource protection (Oregon Consensus National Policy Center [OCNPC] & The William D. Ruckelshaus Center [WDRC], 2012). The purpose of the collaborative engagement assessment was to assess the potential for collaborative approaches to the management of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area (NSA). The practitioner team conducted interviews with individuals representing a wide range of interests, to better understand what issues needed to be addressed in managing the NSA, the positions and interests of those affected by management decisions, and the likelihood that collaborative approaches to managing these issues would be successful (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012).

As described throughout the assessment report, the practitioner team considered many of the eleven conditions (identified below via italics) in determining whether the situation and the relevant interests were amenable to collaborative processes. For example, in relation to whether there were *potential areas for* *agreement,* the parties' *willingness to participate,* and whether they *believed they had a better alternative*, the assessment identified ten key scenic area issues (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 4-13) for which interviewees offered support for developing a collaborative process. The assessment found that many believed a collaborative process was either the best or only feasible option to successfully address those key issues (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 13). As to whether the parties *anticipated future dealings with each other* and the existence of *external pressures to address the issues*, the assessment found that interviewees believed a collaborative process would help parties achieve a better understanding of each other's interests and improve working relationships, which they, in turn, thought may help those divergent parties find solutions that would meet their collective needs (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 14). The assessment paraphrases one interviewee who captured a sentiment expressed by others, "As one interviewee suggested, there are 30 years of divergent and entrenched positions that might be beneficially impacted by a process to build the trust needed to solve complex problems by providing the parties with an opportunity to meet each other as equals, learn about each other's points of view, and get to know each other as people, not as opponents" (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 14).

The assessment also identified barriers to collaboration and what interviewees saw as challenges to successful collaboration (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 16-18). For example, it was unclear whether there were *adequate resources and funding to support a collaborative process* (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 16). In assessing *the condition of good faith participation and whether there were preferred alternative forums*, the assessment identified concern among interviewees that some parties would not be willing to seek compromise or had any *incentive to participate* in a collaborative process because the status quo, particularly current regulations, worked in their favor (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p .17). Other interviewees were concerned that some parties may agree to participate in a collaborative process, but if the outcome wasn't everything they wanted, they would then later file lawsuits (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 17). This situation affected the *relative balance of power among the parties.*

Ultimately, the assessment concluded there was potential for successful collaboration, but upfront work was needed to address some of the identified barriers. This upfront work included the Commission first engaging in internal development work, and then convening parties to development a common base of information before launching into a more formal collaboration process. This phased approach is referred to as building collaborative capacity, involving developing of a habit of collaboration and trust building among the various interests, and working together in situations of reduced risk, prior to attempting to reach consensus on more challenging topics (OCNPC & WDRC, 2012, p. 23). These recommendations moved the process toward a more *realistic timetable for completion* of collaborative agreement-seeking.

In considering the first condition (whether issues focus on *fundamental legal rights or societal values*), it is important to note that there is no such thing as a public policy challenge that in no way, shape or form affects *legal rights or societal values.* That is, in fact, what makes them public policy issues. So, in applying this condition, practitioners need to be on the lookout for situations where the impact is so large that it becomes *fundamental.* In those situations, the clarity of a judicial, legislative, or executive decision may be necessary, rather than a collaborative governance approach. For example, in this case study, the Gorge Commission's decisions often affect individual property rights, which are a legal right and a societal value. In many cases, the impacts of these decisions are at a scale where a collaborative approach is appropriate. But the Commission may be called upon to make certain decisions affecting property rights that are at a size or scale beyond which a collaborative governance approach would be effective; what we might call *fundamental* decisions, and where the Commission may be advised to seek judicial review, rather than a multiparty negotiation.

A Question of Expectations

The William D. Ruckelshaus Center (Ruckelshaus Center or Center), a joint effort of Washington State University and the University of Washington, is an example of a practitioner organization working from the public and academic settings (Hall & Kern, 2017). Its mission is to help parties involved in complex public policy challenges in the State of Washington and the Pacific Northwest tap university expertise to develop collaborative, durable, and effective solutions. Practitioners at the Center use the CCP conditions, as well as the Center's own set of project criteria (William D. Ruckelshaus Center, 2020), to help identify the appropriateness of the Center's involvement in a given policy situation, and the "ripeness" of the issues involved for a collaborative governance approach (using the Ansell and Gash 2008, Emerson and Nabatchi 2015, and UNCG 2018 definitions of the term collaborative governance).

Practitioners at the Center have learned from over 15 years of practice that it is not uncommon to determine through pre-assessments and situation assessments that, while the initiating parties have interest in participating in a collaborative process, they have in mind the more general definitions of collaboration mentioned earlier. They are seeking to develop a new, or strengthen an existing, advocacy-based *partnership*, working together to share responsibilities and tasks. Or they wish to develop a *like-minded coalition*, pursuing a common aim in the belief unity will make each member stronger, more effective, and more likely to achieve a mutually agreed-upon solution. In either case, the goal is to gain allies for, and reduce opposition to, the adoption and implementation of a *specific* policy prescription, often one they have already thought through and adopted as their preferred outcome. Another way to think about this is in terms of the dual concerns model, which "makes the following predictions about (strategies available to negotiators): concern about both own and other party's outcomes encourages a problem-solving strategy; concern about only one's own outcomes encourages contending." (Pruitt, 1983, p. 172).

For these reasons, practitioners at the Center have come to believe that it is important to determine if this is the case, and therefore propose to extend current negotiation/mediation theory by adding a twelfth condition to the current CCP list of eleven conditions practitioners explore in assessing favorability for a successful collaborative process. That new condition is this: *whether initiators and supporters are open to the process resulting in a range of outcomes and solution sets*. To help practitioners assess this new condition, the Center proposes a question that can be asked of those who are interested in initiating the process:

> *"Do you expect that the result of the collaborative process you are interested in initiating will be that others realize the solution you currently favor is the correct one?"*

This simple question about expectations can shorten potentially lengthy lines of inquiry, make explicit the differences between partnerships, coalitions, and collaborations, and help the parties better understand their priorities and process needs. Practitioners can get valuable information both from the parties' answers, and from their own inferences and interpretations of those answers. They can learn where the parties stand in the dual concern model (Pruitt, 1983), whether they yet have concern for the other parties' interests and needs.

For example, if a party answers yes to the question (or if the practitioner comes to believe that there is really a "yes" behind one or more parties' "no," "maybe," or more complex/nuanced answers), it can indicate that those parties have a set position on policy outcomes they wish to pursue, via gaining allies to "sign on" to their view. Put another way, they are seeking a partnership or like-minded coalition, not a collaborative governance process as defined above. In the latter, one anticipates, expects, or hopes that the result will be a solution that meets one's and other parties' needs and interests. But one does not enter this type of collaborative governance process *believing one already knows what that solution will be*. Rather, it emerges from the process. This is similar to how a "ripe moment" is described by Zartman (2008): "Parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too" (p. 2).

This is an extremely important point to explain to the parties because it represents the fundamental value of this type of collaborative process. Out of the myriad possible solutions to a complex, multifaceted public policy challenge, the participants do not remain fixed on the solutions they have developed over weeks, months, years, or even decades of thinking about, working on and/or fighting over the issue(s) prior to the collaborative governance process. Those solutions were likely based mostly or solely on what they, or the interest(s) they represent, want, and need. Instead, they work not just with other like-minded parties, but with parties whose wants and needs are often very different from their own, to identify a solution set that harmonizes all interests and addresses all needs. It is this search for a mutually-beneficial solution set that distinguishes the type of collaboration intended in these collaborative governance processes from partnerships, coalitions, networks, etc.

This type of collaboration has value because there is often a collective creativity in a collaborative governance process that exceeds what any interest, partnership or coalition is likely to achieve on its own. There is also the advantage that all parties to a collaborative policy solution have the incentive to work together toward its implementation, versus the "active opposition" that is created when a solution is implemented via traditional governance processes, especially one adopted via a narrow approval margin. (Dukes, 1993; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Imperial, 2005; Innes & Booher, 1999).

Practitioners at the Ruckelshaus Center have over the past few years asked this question about expectations during informal pre-assessment and assessment conversations, on policy challenges ranging from natural resource management to education. For example, they used it to frame conversations about an expert commission that state and county officials were forming to create consensus recommendations in the wake of a natural disaster. They employed it to help a state legislator realize he was already invested in a specific outcome for a collaborative process he envisioned relating to education governance, and would be better served by initially investing in a situation assessment. And they used it to help advocates of flood prevention and fish restoration in one of the state's largest watersheds realize that the "collaborative" processes they had been involved in for years were not making progress because they were not focusing on comprehensive solution sets that take into account these and other important goals.

While the Center's practitioners have not gathered empirical data on the results of asking this additional question, their anecdotal experience has been that answering this question has the benefit of leading potential process sponsors, participants, and decision-makers to engage in valuable introspection and come to one of several conclusions, each of which is useful for productively proceeding. In some cases, respondents can authentically say no, they are not entering the potential policy process with a preconceived sense of the "correct" solution. This bodes well for a collaborative governance approach, for the reasons discussed above.

More often, they realize that they are in fact entering the process with a specific solution set in mind. If they are truly wedded to that solution, the parties (and the practitioner) can know that they are unlikely to benefit from a collaborative governance process. But it is not uncommon that this realization, and subsequent conversations with the practitioner, help parties to understand the potential value of a collaborative process, and the need to reset their expectations, and open themselves to other possible solution sets, before engaging in a such a collaboration. Or that they may want to consider leading or participating in a like-minded coalition on some (perhaps short-term) aspect of the issue, while also supporting a (perhaps longer-term) collaboration on a larger element, or different aspect, of the issue.

The question also has the value of helping to dispel the notion that the reason others do not yet agree with the solution one favors is that they have not yet been exposed to it (and the logic behind it) properly, thoroughly, slowly (or even loudly) enough. As such, it is a good starting point for preparing the parties in a collaborative governance process for the need to be open to new information (establishing a shared set of facts or common information base), see the issues from other perspectives, and (while holding firm to their underlying interests), loosen up their thinking about particular positions and solutions (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Susskind et al., 1999). For these reasons, practitioners at the Center intend to add this question about expectations to the questions they ask during formal situation assessments as well, and are proposing that the corresponding condition be added to the set of criteria practitioners use for evaluating the "ripeness" of a collaborative process.

As it becomes a more widespread part of the thinking among practitioners, this condition and question should also help inform the thinking of researchers and scholars, as they explore under what circumstances collaborative governance leads to favorable outcomes, and results in better public policy. The purpose of authoring this article is to present the Ruckelshaus Center's experience with and observations about including this "question of expectations" in its practice, in order to encourage other practitioners to experiment with this new condition, and researchers to formally evaluate its utility.

Conclusion

It is important to recognize that there is not a value judgment implied in this question about expectations for the outcomes of a process. As mentioned before, the type of collaborative governance discussed in this article is not inherently "better" than partnering, coalition-building, or other ways of resolving policy challenges. It is not a failing to determine that one is seeking these other approaches. Though some of the potential advantages of collaborative governance have been articulated above, those advantages are likely to disappear if collaborative governance is applied to situations where it is not appropriate. So, all these means of resolving conflicts and addressing policy challenges should be seen as different tools in the public policy toolbox that are appropriate, and likely to be successful, under different circumstances. The goal should be to deploy the right tool for the situation. The "twelfth condition" and "question about expectations" presented in this article can be important additions to the standard set of conditions and questions practitioners currently use to identify when collaborative governance is the correct tool, and that researchers use to evaluate and understand those collaborative governance processes.

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When Control Does Not Pay Off: The Dilemma Between Trade-off Opportunities and Budget Restrictions in B2B Negotiations

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Abstract

Practitioners in business-to-business (B2B) organizations often report difficulties to reach mutually beneficial outcomes in their buyer-seller negotiations—a finding that contrasts with researchers' expectations based on the favorable preconditions B2B negotiations provide. In this conceptual article, we argue that this researcher-practitioner gap is due to a structural dilemma: On the one hand, B2B negotiations offer specific trade-off opportunities across multiple dimensions (i.e., issues, time periods, markets, and business partners). On the other hand, rigid financial budgets resulting from management control systems constrain negotiators' necessary flexibility to exploit these opportunities. We propose that negotiators translate financial budgets into negotiation limits. Depending on the structure of these budgets, negotiators set one *super*ordinate limit or multiple *sub*ordinate limits, which either maximize or restrain their ability to realize tradeoffs. We outline future-research opportunities for extending the negotiation literature by investigating multidimensional tradeoffs and different types of limits. We conclude with recommendations on how B2B negotiators can overcome their dilemma.

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"The concept of 'win-win' has been around for decades. It sounds good. Sounds fair. Sounds like a good business. [...] Do people actually reach 'win-win' outcomes in business [...]? Unfortunately, the answer is most often 'no'" (Thompson, 2020, p. xii).

In this quotation, Thompson articulates a widely shared concern with respect to the gulf between the desired, optimal outcomes in negotiation research and the suboptimal results that are regularly accepted in practice (De Dreu et al., 2000; Gates, 2016; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007).[1] This issue is also echoed in the field of business-to-business (B2B) negotiations: In a recent study, B2B managers reported outcomes of insufficient quality in nearly one-third of their negotiations, which they partly attributed to (structural) constraints that prevented them from exploiting the integrative potential (Voeth et al., 2020; see also Sebenius, 1992; Thompson, 2012). These observations contrast with what negotiation scholars would expect, as B2B settings often provide favorable preconditions for reaching integrative agreements across multiple issues well-documented in the extant literature (e.g., Bazerman & Gillespie, 1999; Geiger & Hüffmeier, 2020; Trötschel et al., 2011). We believe that this contrast between scholarly expectations and practical experiences indicates a science-practitioner gap. Specifically, negotiation research has yet to develop a better understanding of B2B negotiations in order to produce practically relevant knowledge for this important field (i.e., a knowledge production problem; see Hüffmeier et al., 2011; see also Shapiro et al., 2007). So far, negotiation research has widely neglected important characteristics of B2B negotiations (with few exceptions, e.g., negotiating in relationships; Mannix et al., 1995; or negotiating in competitive markets; Bazerman et al., 1985) and is "criticized for decontextualizing bargaining" (Curhan et al., 2010, p. 692). Therefore, Hüffmeier et al. (2011) identified the need to validate the robustness of empirical evidence under more challenging conditions (e.g., repeated negotiations over time) to ensure the generalizability of research findings to different real-world contexts and strengthen their acceptance by practitioners. Systematically closing the science-practitioner gap in this domain requires negotiation research to produce knowledge that gives B2B negotiators valuable insight into how to achieve better outcomes in real-world negotiations (Hüffmeier et al., 2011; see also Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Shapiro et al., 2007).

In the present conceptual article, we seek to provide a starting point for systematically closing this science-practitioner gap in the realm of B2B negotiations by studying the following overarching research question: How do the unique characteristics of B2B negotiations impact negotiators' perceptions, behaviors, and negotiated outcomes? By addressing this research question, we intend to offer a detailed analysis of the specific characteristics of buyer-seller negotiations in the B2B context, thereby laying the groundwork for future studies. We conduct this analysis from two perspectives: First, we examine the specific trade-off opportunities provided by B2B negotiations. We argue that the context of B2B negotiations offers opportunities to create value that go even beyond the classical logrolling opportunities between issues that have been studied extensively in the literature on buyer-seller negotiations (i.e., systematic exchange of concessions on issues the parties value differently; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Thompson, 2015). Based on B2B and negotiation research, we illustrate that negotiations in B2B industries provide trade-off potential not only across multiple issues (e.g., product groups) but also across time (e.g., quarterly sales periods), market segments (e.g., sales regions), and/or negotiation partners (e.g., customers).

Second, we investigate how structural restrictions of financial budgets may impede practitioners' abilities to exploit these trade-off opportunities. We propose that part of the constraints reported by B2B negotiators (e.g., Voeth et al., 2020) can be explained by rigid financial budgets that are defined and assigned

[1] 'Win-win' refers to agreements that leave parties better off compared to other potential solutions in the focal negotiation (Thompson, 2012). In this sense, we use the term 'win-win' to refer to agreements that provide higher joint outcomes compared to compromise agreements (Kong et al., 2014; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

by the companies' management control systems (e.g., financial budgets for specific product groups, time periods, market segments, and business partners). We further posit that these financial budgets result in a structural dilemma for B2B negotiators: On the one hand, B2B negotiators may be motivated to explore the manifold opportunities to craft tradeoffs across different negotiation issues as well as across other dimensions provided by the specific characteristics of B2B negotiations (e.g., tradeoffs across sales periods, sales markets, or business partners). On the other hand, B2B negotiators are required to adhere to their financial budgets, thus impeding the flexibility necessary to exploit these rich trade-off potentials (e.g., Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007).

We seek to make several contributions to both negotiation research and practice: First, from a theoretical perspective, we apply the concept of *outcome potential* (Brett & Thompson, 2016) to the field of B2B negotiations to illustrate that beneficial tradeoffs can be achieved not only across issues (i.e., integrative potential; e.g., DeRue et al., 2009; Kong et al., 2014; Thompson, 2015), but also across time periods, markets, or business partners. We further analyze structural restrictions from the real-world B2B context that may constrain negotiators' flexibility to exploit the outcome potential across the different dimensions. Second, from a research perspective, we offer directions for future studies that go beyond the social-psychological perspective on negotiations, which focuses primarily on the ongoing social interaction at the bargaining table. Extending this perspective, our theoretical considerations are based on the perspective that negotiations are a recursive and multiphase process (Zartman & Berman, 1983) rather than a one-shot interaction between the involved parties. This conception may assist researchers in producing beneficial knowledge for the context of B2B negotiations that covers all phases of the negotiation process (including the pre-negotiation and post-negotiation periods; Jang et al., 2018; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Third, from an applied perspective, we provide recommendations on how to solve the dilemma between trade-off opportunities and trade-off restrictions in B2B negotiations. Thus, our analysis may help B2B practitioners better exploit the manifold trade-off opportunities in real-world negotiations and—in combination with insights from future studies—ultimately narrow the gap between research and practice (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Hüffmeier et al., 2011).

In the following, we will provide a brief overview of how organizations seek to attain their corporate goals through financial planning and budgeting (performance management)—two structural features that often determine the opportunities and restrictions of B2B negotiations. On that basis, we will illustrate the specific characteristics of B2B negotiations and identify important differences to the classic conceptualization of buyer-seller negotiations in the existing literature. Drawing on the concept of outcome potential (Brett & Thompson, 2016), we will then introduce different types of trade-off opportunities that allow parties to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes in B2B negotiations. Subsequently, we will elaborate on the impact of restrictions resulting from financial budgets on B2B negotiators' flexibility to exploit the outcome potential. Finally, based on our theoretical considerations, we will outline directions for future research and conclude with a discussion of practical implications.

Performance Management in B2B Organizations

Financial performance lies at the core of almost all for-profit organizations (e.g., shareholder value; Rappaport, 1988). Therefore, many companies set corporate goals (e.g., return on investment) and support the achievement of these goals through formal planning processes (Atkinson et al., 2012). Notably, organizational planning is supervised by the finance department (i.e., internal or management accounting) and typically leads to a business plan and a corresponding financial budget that links the company's objectives with its strategies, activity programs, and the available resources (Mintzberg, 1994; see also Atkinson et al., 2012; Neely et al., 2003).

Business plans in B2B organizations represent the comprehensive frameworks that specify the companies' programs or business activities intended to lead to the attainment of general objectives (Otley, 1999). They define the financial scope of business activities and transactions for a certain time period, within certain markets, and with certain business partners (Buttkus, 2019). A business plan consolidates all business programs (i.e., a set of activities such as launching a new product group or expanding into a new market) that are planned, along with the organization's hierarchical structure (Mintzberg, 1994).

Many B2B organizations also engage in *financial budgeting*—often interpreted as an integral element of the planning process and an essential part of the management control system (Hansen et al., 2003). Budgets provide the financial performance standards within the organization (Otley, 1999) and thereby support "the management task of leading the business towards its goals" (Hofstede, 1968, p. 22). Budgets quantify the goals and the activity programs linked to them within the formal planning process (Hofstede, 1968; Mintzberg, 1994). In other words, a financial budget represents "a series of goals with price tags attached" (Wildavsky, 1964, p. 2) and "a plan expressed in quantitative terms" (Anthony, 1970, p. 356). Budgets impose rigid constraints on what can be spent (i.e., input measures like expenses and investments) and set obligations on what needs to be accomplished (i.e., output measures like profits and revenues) by an organization's various business activities such as negotiations (cf. Mintzberg, 1994; see also Atkinson et al., 2012; Jensen, 2001; Otley, 1999).[2]

Business planning and financial budgeting share a similar hierarchical structure. To enable the attainment of the overall corporate objectives, programs and budgets are broken down vertically along the lines of the organization's hierarchical structure (Mintzberg, 1994). Accordingly, the company's master budget is further broken down into sub-budgets for different organizational decision units (e.g., business units, markets, functions, departments, product groups, business partners; Atkinson et al., 2012; Blumentritt 2006; Mintzberg, 1994). Budgets define the financial guidelines (i.e., authorization; Hofstede, 1968) at the different layers within the organization. They refer to the allocation of responsibilities (i.e., what needs to be achieved) and resources (i.e., by what means) to a specific B2B professional in charge of particular business activities within a certain period of time (Covaleski et al., 2003; Jensen, 2003). Consequently, managers in B2B organizations need to consider diverse financial budgets (Jensen, 2001; Rickards, 2008) that are often highly relevant as these budgets affect not only their business activities but are also used as the basis for performance evaluations and remuneration (Libby & Lindsay, 2010; Murphy, 2001).

Planning and budgeting play vital roles in organizational performance management as they support the coordination and control of business activities (Jensen, 2003; Otley, 1999). In addition, financial budgets may also be employed as a tool to affect the workforce's motivation to achieve the performance standards set by them (e.g., Otley, 2016; Ronen & Livingstone, 1975). The use of budgetary control is ubiquitous and even appears to be indispensable to many managers (Hansen et al., 2003; Jensen, 2003; Rickards, 2008).[3] Thus, B2B practitioners need to align their business activities, including their negotiations and the outcomes linked to them, to the company's business plans and the assigned financial budgets.

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[2] We use the term 'financial budget' to refer to financial standards directly expressed in monetary units and pre-financial standards (e.g., sales quantities; Hofstede, 1968) that cause monetary impacts (Covaleski et al., 2003). The level of rigidness of financial budgets varies in theory and practice (Covaleski et al., 2003). In this article, we interpret them as rigid or strict standards which are not changed within the fiscal year ("budget constrained style"; Hopwood, 1972). Libby and Lindsay (2010) report that 51% of the surveyed US companies use budgets in line with this interpretation. The terms 'financial budgeting' and 'budgeting' refer to both the financial budgets and the organizational budgeting process and are used interchangeably within this article.

[3] Illustrating this view, 92% of the small and medium-sized automotive suppliers surveyed in four big European countries (i.e., Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Poland) use budgeting as a standard controlling tool (Dressler, 2006). Moreover, Libby and Lindsay (2010) reported that 79% of the 558 North-American companies that participated in their study use budgets for control purposes (i.e., managerial motivation and performance evaluation). In addition, 94% of the companies which participated did not plan to abandon the use of budgets for control.

Characteristics of B2B Negotiations

Many business activities in B2B contexts within the scope of a business plan involve transactions between organizations. Accordingly, social interactions between different business stakeholders, such as B2B negotiations, lie at the core of B2B companies' business models (Brooks & Rose, 2004; Herbst et al., 2011). Noteworthy, most of the terms and conditions of these transactions are negotiated between managers as part of B2B negotiations (Eliashberg et al., 1995; Fang, 2006). Thus, successful negotiations represent a cornerstone for the performance and financial prosperity of B2B organizations (Huthwaite International, 2009; Martin & Larsen, 1999; Prilepok & Chivukula, 2021).

Although not all B2B negotiations are necessarily buyer-seller negotiations, the majority of negotiations in B2B industries are over transactions dealing with the exchange of monetary or other financially relevant issues such as commodities, raw materials, components, or services (e.g., Eliashberg et al., 1995; Herbst et al., 2011; Sigurdardottir et al., 2019). In contrast to other contexts such as B2C (i.e., business-to-consumer; e.g., a negotiation between a car dealer and a consumer about the price of a new car) or C2C (i.e., consumer-to-consumer; e.g., a negotiation between consumers about the price of a used car), buyer-seller negotiations in B2B markets have several unique characteristics: First, B2B negotiations rarely only revolve around a single negotiation issue. Instead, they often include a larger number of issues that exceed those in B2C or C2C negotiations (e.g., Dwyer et al., 1987; Eliashberg et al., 1995; Geiger & Hüffmeier, 2020). In this regard, B2B negotiations often involve multi-faceted economic outcomes across various issues or even sets of issues. For the remainder of this article, we refer to economic outcomes as financial indicators measured in monetary units, such as profits, revenues, and costs.[4] Second, B2B negotiations often take place within long-term relationships, thus involving recurring negotiations with the same business partners on a regular basis across time (e.g., the rise of international cooperation as a result of a fivefold increase in global transactions between 2003 and 2019; World Trade Organization [WTO], 2020; or working partnerships between distributors and manufacturers, Anderson & Narus, 1990). Accordingly, B2B negotiations commonly involve outcomes across long periods of time. Third, B2B negotiations are rarely limited to one single sales market but often affect the business of the negotiating partners in different markets (e.g., Sigurdardottir et al., 2019; Sturgeon, 2001; Weiss, 2006). In other words, B2B negotiations frequently encompass multiple economic outcomes across different markets. Fourth and finally, B2B negotiations are commonly embedded in a broader network of business relationships involving various business partners negotiating with each other about the same commodities, raw materials, components, or services (Cachon, 2003; Kranton & Minehart, 2001). Thus, B2B negotiations may involve multiple possible economic outcomes with different partners.

Based on these unique characteristics, we conceptualize B2B negotiations as (a) a specific type of transaction negotiation, (b) between buyers and sellers, (c) about multiple monetary or market-relevant negotiation issues (e.g., products, services), (d) which are embedded in long-term relationships, (e) refer to different business markets, and (f) may affect various business partnerships. Their outcomes determine the B2B companies' economic success across time periods, market segments, and partnerships. Particularly, the specific characteristics of B2B negotiations provide unique opportunities to achieve mutually beneficial agreements.

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[4] We follow the terminology of Thompson (1990) who differentiated two categories to measure the outcomes in negotiations: economic measures (i.e., profit, utility) and social-psychological measures. Because of the specific focus in the current article (i.e., financial budgeting), we concentrate on financial key performance indicators (e.g., profits) rather than utilities to quantify economic outcomes in B2B negotiations.

Multidimensional Trade-off Opportunities in B2B Negotiations

The *multidimensional* trade-off opportunities in recurring B2B negotiations go beyond conceptualizing the integrative potential in one-shot buyer-seller negotiations. Whereas parties can exploit the integrative potential within a one-shot negotiation, for instance, through tradeoffs across high- versus low-priority issues (Thompson, 2015), B2B negotiations provide richer opportunities for making tradeoffs that go beyond the mere exchange of concessions on the issue dimension. To systematically capture the distinct categories of integrative trade-off opportunities in B2B negotiations, we introduce the concept of outcome potential originally established by Brett and Thompson (2016; see also Brett, 2000). In the current work, we define the outcome potential as the total amount of economic profit that can be created within the scope of the predefined business plans, for instance, through integrative tradeoffs regarding different issues, periods of time, market segments, and business partners. In that sense, the integrative potential—defined as possibilities for enlarging the pie beyond mere compromises in one-shot negotiations (e.g., DeRue et al., 2009; Kong et al., 2014)—represents a subset of the outcome potential in B2B negotiations. In the following, we will illustrate in detail how B2B parties can increase their economic outcomes across the other three trade-off dimensions.

Tradeoffs Across Different Periods of Time

B2B negotiators can increase their economic profit by trading off inferior outcomes in negotiations from one period of time against superior outcomes in another period of time (cf. Mannix et al., 1995; cf. pie-expansion; Jap, 1999). Trade-off opportunities across different time periods commonly emerge through long-term relations between business partners (Dabholkar et al., 1994). As part of their enduring business relationship, B2B parties negotiate with each other repeatedly at regular time intervals (e.g., quarterly sales negotiations). Across these recurring negotiations, parties' economic outcomes resulting from a negotiated agreement may vary. Variations in profits across time periods can result from changing production costs, varying market requirements, or seasonal consumer preferences, thus affecting demand and product prices across the entire value chain (i.e., temporal price discrimination; Stokey, 1979; see also Grennan, 2013). Ultimately, these variations may result in different profit margins at different times. The variations of profit margins across different points in time allow B2B negotiators to create value by accepting inferior outcomes at a given time point in order to realize disproportionately superior outcomes at another point in time. By trading off lower against higher economic outcomes across time, parties may exploit the outcome potential of recurring B2B negotiations on the temporal dimension.

As an example illustrating this type of tradeoff, a distributor may negotiate with a retailer over a single sales promotion with disinfectant sprays. In summer, there is only a small risk of catching the flu. Thus, consumer demand and willingness to pay are low. Consequently, the retailer may offer the distributor a relatively low price, limiting the transaction's joint profit. By contrast, in winter, consumer demand increases as the flu is widespread. This allows both partners to generate more profit based on a higher price and quantity. However, realizing these higher overall profits would require the distributor to accept losses in the summer term (e.g., storage costs). In other words, the distributor can create value based on differences in the valuation of time. By overcoming short-term thinking (Mannix et al., 1995), trading off profit losses in the summer term against larger profit gains in winter can increase profitability from a comprehensive perspective on both time periods.

Tradeoffs Across Different Market Segments

B2B companies often cooperate with the same business partners in different markets within or across national borders (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Sturgeon, 2001). Accordingly, B2B negotiations frequently relate to different market segments with different profit margins. Depending on the specific conditions, the profit margin of each business partner can significantly vary across the different market segments. Business partners may thus negotiate mutually beneficial agreements by trading off inferior outcomes in a negotiation relating to one specific market segment against superior, disproportionately higher outcomes in a negotiation concerning another market segment (e.g., sales regions, distribution channels). By trading off lower against higher economic profits across different market segments, parties can create additional value and exploit the outcome potential of B2B negotiations on the market segment dimension.

Building on our above example, the distributor now aims to add a range of disinfectant products to the retailer's assortment. The retailer has agreed to test the products in region A, which provides the greatest potential. Both parties have made initial investments (e.g., logistics). Right before the launch, however, the demand for disinfectant products in another region (B) substantially increases (e.g., due to a virus hotspot). Thus, the expected profits for region B now exceed those for region A. In this situation, the retailer may agree to relocate the test to region B, thus accepting the loss of initial investments in region A for even higher profits in region B. Put differently, the retailer can create value based on differences in the valuation of market segments (e.g., regions). By exploiting the greater outcome potential in region B compared to region A, the retailer benefits from trading off losses in region A against larger gains in region B, thus making higher overall profits.

Tradeoffs Across Different Business Partners

Due to the complex network of business relationships, B2B negotiators may also explore the outcome potential across different business partners. Specifically, B2B companies commonly offer their products to multiple business partners (e.g., suppliers in the electronics industry; Sturgeon, 2001; industrial supply networks; Kranton & Minehart, 2001). In these transactions, the profitability with respect to a certain product can vary substantially between different partners (cf. Dwyer et al., 1987; Grennan, 2013). Importantly, the overall profitability of a product may not solely depend on the profit generated by the separate transactions with each business partner but may also be impacted by synergy effects across these transactions that arise on an overarching level (Watkins & Passow, 1986; see also practical examples in the private label business; Hyman et al., 2010; and the electronics industry; McGrath & Hoole, 1992).

Consider the following example as an illustration of this tradeoff: A supplier (i.e., the seller) may only negotiate with the two key customers (i.e., potential buyers) in the market for the transaction of a new product. While customer A offers the seller an unprofitable selling price per unit for a high sales volume, customer B is willing to pay a premium price but is only interested in a moderate sales volume. Although the transaction with customer A results in a loss for the supplier with the respective sales volume when considered in isolation, it may be the key to exploiting the synergy potential across *both* transactions (e.g., economies of scale; cf. Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Leuthesser, 1997). Capitalizing on such synergies can lower the costs per unit for the entire sales volume. The sales volume for both transactions enables the supplier to exploit existing synergy potential and increase the overall profit with the new product. Thus, reaching an agreement with both customers by trading off the losses with customer A (i.e., providing volume) against overcompensating gains with customer B (i.e., providing profit) improves the profitability at the overarching level (i.e., total quantity).[5] B2B negotiators can thus exploit the outcome potential on the dimension of the business network by trading off lower against higher economic outcomes across different business partners.

Taking the entire scope of outcome potential of B2B negotiations into consideration, negotiators may explore various opportunities for mutually beneficial solutions, including tradeoffs across time, market segments, and business partners. In other words, B2B negotiations provide parties with rich opportunities to create profitable tradeoffs that go beyond the well-known exchange of concessions in view of high- and low-value issues being investigated in classical buyer-seller paradigms (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985; Brett et al., 1998; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Therefore, we propose the following:

> ***Proposition 1.*** The outcome potential in B2B negotiations can be exploited not only through tradeoffs between negotiation issues but also across other dimensions, including different periods of time, different market segments, or different business partners.

Restrictions in B2B Negotiations

Although B2B contexts offer various opportunities to create value, the exploration and exploitation of the outcome potential may be restricted by rigid financial budgets imposed on negotiators as part of their companies' management controlling system (Covaleski et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 2003). Based on the general scope of the companies' business plans, overall financial budgets (e.g., defining an expected return on investment) are subdivided into budgets for different organizational decision units (e.g., business units, functions) and time periods (e.g., quarters; Atkinson et al., 2012). For instance, the overall budget of a manufacturing company may be broken down into quarterly budgets for each sales representative responsible for a certain sales region. Financial budgets provide B2B negotiators with specific and obligatory guidelines (i.e., performance standards) on how to comply with the company's business plan across different negotiations (cf. Otley, 1999). As a result, B2B practitioners may be confronted with financial restrictions regarding negotiation issues (e.g., products), periods of time (e.g., quarters), markets (e.g., regions), and partners (e.g., customers). They may have to consider all of these restrictions, which can severely limit the parties' necessary flexibility to capitalize on the multiple trade-off opportunities in B2B negotiations (cf. Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; see also Dalbholkar et al., 1994). Thus, B2B negotiators face a structural dilemma: On the one hand, in theory, the specific characteristics of B2B negotiations offer rich outcome potential. On the other hand, in practice, the multiple financial constraints imposed on negotiators may prevent them from exploiting that potential.

Financial Budgets and Limits in B2B Negotiations

Financial budgets define minimum profit levels B2B negotiators have to achieve, which consequently limit the concessions they can make in their negotiations (cf. Dabholkar et al., 1994). Budgets are intended to establish a proper balance between the negotiators' autonomy, the control over their behavior, and the quality of their agreements (cf. Hofstede, 1968; see also Bazerman et al., 1985). Thus, financial budgets provide orientation on what negotiators must accomplish in B2B negotiations to fulfill their budget standards (cf. Kumar, 1997).

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[5] A reduction in costs per unit with increased quantity can be realized through various ways (e.g., fixed cost degression; economies of scale; see Leuthesser, 1997; experience curve effect; Wright, 1936). The key point in our example lies in the exploitation of synergy potential through reaching agreement with both customers. The additional volume of the transaction with customer A enables the supplier to produce at lower cost per unit. These synergies affect the volume of both transactions, while the unprofitable transaction with customer A only refers to the respective, partial volume. In sum, the positive effect of the synergies (i.e., reducing losses with customer A and increasing gains with B) overcompensate the losses resulting from the single transaction with customer B.

We propose that parties translate these budgets into concrete limits for their negotiations to adhere to their multiple financial budgets. A negotiation limit specifies a party's least favorable (but still acceptable) outcome (also referred to as reservation values or reservation prices; see Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2015). In buyer-seller negotiations, limits are typically quantified in economic terms like euros, dollars, or profits (White & Neale, 1991; see also Bazerman et al., 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). As financial budgets and negotiation limits both refer to economic outcomes and represent rigid requirements (cf. Fisher & Ury, 1981; Hopwood, 1972; van der Stede, 2000; Walton & McKersie, 1965), they are conceptually related in the context of negotiations. Thus, translating their multiple financial budgets into concrete negotiation limits can help negotiators orient their aspirations and behaviors towards potential negotiation outcomes that do not violate their budgets (cf. the impact of financial budgets on motivation; Hofstede, 1968; see also Kirk et al., 2013, for the self-regulation of the negotiator's concession behavior by contrasting the aspirations with current outcomes). We accordingly propose the following:

Proposition 2. B2B negotiators translate their assigned financial budgets into several discrete and concrete negotiation limits.

Various research studies have investigated the impact of limits on negotiators' behavior and the quality of negotiation outcomes. Several experimental studies demonstrate that ambitious limits (vs. less ambitious or no limits) generate positive impacts in negotiations, such as leading to higher individual profits (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; White et al., 1994) and higher joint profits in buyer-seller negotiations (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; see also the meta-analysis by De Dreu et al., 2000). However, other studies found that limits may also harm negotiators by increasing the risk of impasses, even though the bargaining range in principal allowed both parties to reach mutually acceptable and beneficial agreements (e.g., Brett et al., 1996; Galinsky et al., 2002; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

Although empirical research has examined the influence of limits in negotiations, previous studies have neglected important characteristics of B2B negotiations. Specifically, as delineated earlier, B2B negotiations feature multiple financial budgets that are translated into negotiation limits regarding issues, time periods, market segments, or business partners. Therefore, limits imposed on B2B negotiators cannot simply be understood from a unidimensional perspective concerning the negotiation issues. These specific features make the limits in B2B negotiations different from those examined in previous studies on buyer-seller negotiations (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Importantly, B2B negotiators need to consider and implement the multidimensionality of their assigned budgets when setting negotiation limits.

Superordinate Versus Subordinate Limits in B2B Negotiations

Financial budgets may not only vary with respect to different dimensions of a companies' business plan (e.g., product groups vs. time periods vs. market segments vs. business partners) but may also differ concerning the level of their restrictions (i.e., superordinate vs. subordinate limits; see also Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). For instance, financial budgets can be defined comprehensively for an entire product group or at a more fine-grained level for each product separately. Similarly, financial budgets can also be defined for a broader period of time covering a whole fiscal year or a narrower period of time referring to each quarter of a fiscal year. Finally, financial budgets can also set restrictions at different levels regarding the range of market segments or the scope of business networks (e.g., a budget for a group of partners vs. budgets for each partner).

We assume that the level of restrictions imposed by budgets determines the extent to which negotiators are constrained by the resulting limits (see Mintzberg, 1994; Rickards, 2008). For instance, comprehensive financial budgets referring to all issues within a negotiation are likely to be translated into an overall limit across all issues by the negotiator (i.e., a *super*ordinate limit; see Bazerman et al., 1985;

Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). In contrast, when negotiators are required to adhere to multiple budgets that each refers to separate (subsets of) issues within a negotiation, they can be assumed to translate their budgets into multiple separate limits for each of these (subsets of) issues (*sub*ordinate limits; cf. Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). Noteworthy, previous research has largely neglected this structural difference between limits and has solely examined the effects of an overall limit across all issues in buyer-seller negotiations (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985). A superordinate limit provides negotiators with sufficient flexibility to realize integrative tradeoffs that generate outcomes beyond their overall limit. In these studies, participants were not restricted by subordinate limits on single or subsets of issues that would have constrained their flexibility to a greater extent (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

As financial budgets in B2B practice often concern *multiple dimensions* (Mintzberg, 1994), they should also influence negotiators' setting of limits for each of these dimensions. Notably, a financial budget for a specific time period may affect negotiators' setting of limits for all negotiations within that time period. For instance, a financial budget for a whole fiscal year may lead a B2B negotiator to set a superordinate limit for all negotiations that impact that fiscal year. By contrast, separate budgets for each quarter of a year may lead to setting separate, subordinate limits for each quarter. The same logic applies to setting limits for negotiations with respect to different market segments or business partners.[6]

Proposition 3a. B2B negotiators translate financial budgets that define restrictions on a broader level into superordinate negotiation limits. Superordinate limits specify performance standards on overall outcomes concerning (i) entire sets of negotiation issues, (ii) total periods of time, (iii) whole market segments, and (iv) a comprehensive scope of business partners.

Proposition 3b. B2B negotiators translate financial budgets that define restrictions on a narrower level into subordinate limits. Subordinate limits specify performance standards on partial outcomes concerning (i) segregated sets of issues, (ii) specific periods of time, (iii) narrow market segments, or (iv) a partial scope of business partners.

The Effects of B2B Negotiators' Limits on Outcomes and Perceptions

We argue that setting limits based on restrictive financial budgets may explain the difficulties in achieving mutually beneficial agreements in real-world B2B negotiations (Voeth et al., 2020; see also Thompson, 2020). Reaching high-quality outcomes requires negotiators to have a certain level of flexibility, such as making systematic tradeoffs (creating value through logrolling; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; see also Dabholkar, 1994). Importantly, the distinct types of limits delineated above may affect negotiators' flexibility and their abilities to fully exploit the outcome potential across issues, time, markets, and business partners in B2B negotiations. Their budgets and concomitant limits can leave negotiators in a dilemmatic position between the rich outcome potential in B2B negotiations and their impaired flexibility to exploit it. In the following, we will first outline the impact of the different types of limits with respect to tradeoffs across negotiation issues. We will then elaborate on the effect of superordinate versus subordinate limits with regard to the other integrative trade-off dimensions (i.e., time periods, markets, and partners) in more detail. Finally, we will work out how the different types of limits affect negotiators' perceptions.

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[6] We acknowledge that a superordinate limit based on an overall budget (e.g., for a whole fiscal year) may be further broken down into limits for single negotiations (e.g., each negotiation within that year) by negotiators themselves. However, the limits that result from such a mental dividing process are far less rigid than the subordinate limits determined by the structure of the final budgets because violations of one lower-level limit can be compensated by exceeding another lower-level limit within the range of the superordinate limit. Thus, the crucial point is on which level rigid, strict limits are set on the basis of a financial budget but not if negotiators decide to further subdivide these limits based on their own preferences.

The Impact of Different Types of Limits on Negotiation Outcomes

Constraints on the Outcome Potential Across Negotiation Issues

A superordinate limit in terms of a minimum overall requirement across all issues does not considerably impact negotiators' flexibility because it does not eliminate trade-off opportunities that are necessary to exploit the outcome potential; unless the underlying aspiration level of the parties does not allow for an agreement at all (Thompson, 2015). With a superordinate limit, B2B negotiators have a relatively high (i.e., sufficient) degree of flexibility to make systematic tradeoffs among issues, as long as the overall profits do not violate their limit (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985; Kimmel et al., 1980; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

By contrast, subordinate limits for individual issues or subsets of issues may prevent negotiators from optimally exploiting the outcome potential in B2B negotiations by restricting the necessary exchange of systematic concessions. When rigid subordinate limits are set for issues that would, in principle, provide trade-off potential, negotiators may not be able to make sufficient concessions on these issues to realize integrative agreements. Instead, they have to ensure that the agreement does not violate their limits on each and every issue and thus accept deals of lower overall quality (i.e., deals that are more compromise-like but less integrative; cf. Polzer & Neale, 1995). Compared with superordinate limits, subordinate limits may lead negotiators to psychologically rule out agreement options that fall outside their specific limits, although they would provide trade-off potential. To a large extent, such situations reduce negotiators' flexibility necessary to exploit the outcome potential in negotiations fully.

Proposition 4. Subordinate (vs. superordinate) limits impede the exploitation of the outcome potential in B2B negotiations that can be leveraged by tradeoffs across issues.[7]

Constraints on the Outcome Potential Across Time, Markets, and Partners

The two distinct types of limits may also affect B2B negotiators' flexibility to capitalize on the outcome potential in recurring negotiations across different time periods with the same counterpart (cf. Dabholkar et al., 1994). When exploiting the available outcome potential requires B2B negotiators to accept inferior outcomes in one time period in order to achieve disproportionately higher gains in a later period (e.g., current quarter vs. next quarter), a superordinate limit across all involved time periods enables parties to make such tradeoffs as long as that the overall limit is not violated (cf. Jap, 1999). By contrast, (multiple) subordinate limits for each time period may adversely constrain negotiators' flexibility. As a result, negotiators may refrain from making systematic intertemporal tradeoffs that create additional value but at the same time require violating any of these subordinate limits.

Proposition 5a. Subordinate (vs. superordinate) limits impede the exploitation of the outcome potential in B2B negotiations that can be leveraged by tradeoffs across different periods of time.

B2B negotiations between the same parties can also relate to market segments in different regions (e.g., sales regions). If B2B negotiators can exploit the outcome potential by trading off inferior outcomes in one market segment to obtain disproportionately higher gains in another market segment (e.g., one European country vs. another European country), a superordinate limit for the entire market (e.g., Europe)

[7] Proposition 4 and the following propositions are intended to describe the potential consequences of financial restrictions on behavior and outcomes in B2B negotiations. Although they are based on the assumption that negotiators strive to exploit the outcome potential in their negotiations, they are not intended to prescribe what negotiation practitioners should do in a normative sense. By outlining our propositions, we aim to provide researchers with directions for future research avenues that extend negotiation theory and support practitioners (e.g., how to set limits) to better exploit the outcome potential in their B2B negotiations.

enables them to do so. However, subordinate limits that set minimum profit requirements for each market segment can restrict negotiators' flexibility to realize such integrative tradeoffs.

Proposition 5b. Subordinate (vs. superordinate) limits impede the exploitation of the outcome potential in B2B negotiations that can be leveraged by tradeoffs across different market segments.

Finally, B2B negotiators are often engaged in separate negotiations regarding the same issues with multiple counterparts. With a superordinate limit across multiple business partners, B2B negotiators may benefit from integrative tradeoffs across business partners that would not have been realized in isolation (e.g., synergy potential that requires to accept losses with one partner in order to achieve disproportionately higher gains with another partner; cf. Leuthesser, 1997). By contrast, subordinate limits for each partner may prevent these tradeoffs by constraining negotiators' flexibility. Thus, subordinate limits on each business partner can impede the exploitation of the outcome potential from an overall perspective.

Proposition 5c. Subordinate (vs. superordinate) limits impede the exploitation of the outcome potential in B2B negotiations that can be leveraged by tradeoffs across different business partners.

The Impact of Different Types of Limits on Negotiators' Perceptions

Beyond their impact on negotiators' trade-off behaviors delineated above, the two types of limits may also distinctly affect negotiators' perceptions. First, the different degrees of flexibility to make concessions induced by a superordinate versus subordinate limit(s) might affect parties' perceptions of the task structure of the negotiation. A superordinate limit and the corresponding high degree of flexibility to compensate concessions across multiple issues and dimensions may lead negotiators to perceive the negotiation pie as relatively large. By contrast, the multiple restrictions of negotiators' flexibility due to subordinate limits can lead parties to underestimate the size of the pie (e.g., small-pie bias; Larrick & Wu, 2007) or even amplify their fixed-pie bias (e.g., Thompson & Hastie, 1990; see also Polzer & Neale, 1995).

Proposition 6. Negotiators with subordinate limits perceive the negotiation pie as smaller than negotiators with a superordinate limit.

Moreover, as the two types of limits specify performance standards on different levels, they can influence how parties cognitively process (preliminary) outcomes in B2B negotiations (cf. Brett et al., 1999; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). A superordinate limit sets a performance standard on a broader level (e.g., for an entire negotiation), whereas subordinate limits set multiple performance standards on lower levels (e.g., for single issues within a negotiation). Thus, a superordinate limit may cause negotiators to consider their outcomes in a comprehensive, aggregated way (e.g., they may focus on the overall profitability of an entire agreement). By contrast, subordinate limits may lead to process negotiation outcomes in isolated, segregated ways (e.g., negotiators' focus on the profits achieved for single issues; cf. simultaneous vs. sequential agenda; e.g., Mannix et al., 1989; Thompson et al., 1988; Weingart et al., 1993; cf. issue packaging; e.g., Polzer & Neale, 1995; Pruitt, 1981; see also Trötschel et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2019).

Proposition 7. Subordinate (vs. superordinate) limits lead negotiators to process potential negotiation outcomes in an isolated and segregated (vs. comprehensive, integrated) way.

Directions for Future Research

The phenomena outlined in the present work have not yet been sufficiently considered in previous negotiation research, thus limiting the generalizability of existing empirical findings to the context of B2B negotiations (cf. Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Hüffmeier et al., 2011). To provide a first impression of the size of this gap between research and practice, we conducted a systematic literature review on integrative buyer-seller paradigms that have been used in previous experimental negotiation studies. Our review indicates that in 36% of the 360 retrieved studies,[8] participants were engaged in buyer-seller negotiations embedded in a B2B context. Among these studies, all negotiation tasks provided parties with opportunities to make tradeoffs among negotiation issues. However, in none of these studies did participants have additional opportunities to create value across different markets or business partners. Only one study employed a task that allowed buyers and sellers to benefit from tradeoffs across different periods of time (Mannix et al., 1995). These findings indicate that previous empirical studies on buyer-seller negotiations have largely neglected the rich outcome potential of real-world B2B negotiations, pointing to a blind spot in negotiation research (i.e., a knowledge production problem; Hüffmeier et al., 2011; Shapiro et al., 2007).

Moreover, we also analyzed whether the specific financial restrictions of B2B negotiations were integrated into the B2B buyer-seller negotiation tasks employed in previous studies. In only 24% of the buyer-seller B2B tasks (32 studies), financial restrictions were imposed on negotiators in terms of limits or reservation values. Further, in 17 of the related 32 studies, participants were assigned only a single limit on a superordinate level regarding the overall profitability of a potential agreement. Participants in the remaining studies received subordinate limits for every single issue (this was only the case for a study by Gettinger et al., 2012) or a few single issues (all other studies; e.g., Brett & Okumura, 1998; Gunia et al., 2013; Kray et al., 2008).[9] Importantly, however, in none of these studies did researchers systematically investigate the effects of different types of negotiation limits (subordinate vs. superordinate) on negotiation outcomes. Thus, neither the manifold opportunities to achieve high-quality outcomes nor the complex financial restrictions for B2B negotiation practitioners are adequately reflected in the current state of empirical negotiation research.

To systematically close the gap between previous empirical research on buyer-seller negotiations and B2B negotiation practice, we propose five directions for future research based on our theoretical analysis: (a) exploring the outcome potential in B2B negotiations in terms of multidimensional trade-off opportunities; (b) developing innovative buyer-seller negotiation paradigms that allow for systematic investigations of the characteristics of B2B negotiations; (c) examining the impact of superordinate versus subordinate limits on negotiators' perceptions, behaviors, and outcomes across different trade-off dimensions; (d) extending this investigation to other integrative strategies besides logrolling; and (e) clarifying the impact of culture on negotiator behavior and outcomes in B2B negotiations.

First and foremost, we suggest that future studies should explore the outcome potential in real-world B2B negotiations in terms of integrative trade-off opportunities across different dimensions (e.g., temporal, spatial, social dimensions) that go beyond the immediate negotiated issues. To this end, *inductive* methodologies (e.g., semi-structured interviews) can offer a starting point for an empirical exploration of tradeoffs in B2B practice (cf. Jang et al., 2018). Semi-structured interviews with negotiation practitioners may generate useful insights on how tradeoffs are realized in B2B negotiations. Specifically, such interviews can provide initial clues about the relevance of each trade-off dimension in terms of their economic contributions

[8] In 2019, we conducted a literature search using multiple databases (e.g., PsycINFO, PsyARTICLES, PSYNDEX, Business Source Complete) from three online database providers (EBSCO, IsI Web of Science, ProQuest) and multiple search terms such as (integrative OR win-win OR multi-issue) AND (negotiat* OR bargain*) NOT electronic NOT software NOT agent NOT algorithm. We systematically searched for simulated, interactive studies on integrative negotiations in which economic outcomes were measured. We updated our search in 2020 and yielded 360 studies published between 1975 and 2020 in 293 articles.

[9] The study of Gettinger et al. (2012) provided participants with "minimum goals" for each negotiation issue (i.e., reservation level, worst case outcomes). All other 14 studies used the original tasks or adaptions of Cartoon (Brett & Okumura, 1998), Moms.com (Tenbrunsel & Bazerman, 2006), or Working Women (Tenbrunsel & Bazerman, 1997), which provide a limit for a single issue (e.g., price per episode for the main cartoon 'Ultra Rangers' in Cartoon task) and a reservation price for another issue (e.g., the optional cartoon 'Strums' in Cartoon task).

or indicate the need for extensions and/or modifications of the trade-off dimensions described in this article. Based on these qualitative insights, survey studies may enable researchers to examine the relevance of each trade-off dimension in relation to different negotiation situations (e.g., company size, industry), the negotiator's role (e.g., buyer vs. seller), experience (i.e., seniority), and the negotiator's hierarchy level within their organization. Moreover, this research could be conducted across different B2B sectors to investigate potential differences between sectors (e.g., retail and wholesale, manufacturing, construction; Sigurdardottir et al., 2018). The generated insights from this research could provide important implications for B2B negotiators and narrow the gap between research and practice (Hüffmeier et al., 2011; see also Bendersky & McGinn, 2010).

Second, we suggest developing new experimental buyer-seller *paradigms* that more accurately reflect the specific characteristics of B2B negotiations. These paradigms would open various avenues for future research: Future research could systematically investigate (i) the impact of the presence (vs. absence) of the distinct types of trade-off opportunities beyond the immediate negotiation issues on negotiators' perceptions (e.g., fixed-pie perceptions; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), (ii) the differences in negotiators' abilities to explore each type of trade-off opportunities (e.g., logrolling behavior; Froman & Cohen, 1970), and (iii) the resulting outcomes for negotiators on an individual and joint level.

Paradigms that incorporate trade-off opportunities across time could employ B2B settings in which participants engage in repeated negotiations (Lawler & Yoon, 1995) with the same counterpart that require temporal tradeoffs to maximize outcomes. To be able to examine tradeoffs across markets, paradigms can be constructed analogously with the exception that trade-off opportunities would have to be located across the spatial dimension(s) (e.g., countries, sales channels, or product groups). Paradigms investigating tradeoffs across negotiation partners could involve a series of negotiations with different business partners (i.e., counterparts). This design could be realized in paradigms with multiple partners, similar to the "Free Market Simulation" (Bazerman et al., 1985). Specifically, in this paradigm, negotiators conduct multiple, successive negotiations with different partners and maximize profits by making tradeoffs within each negotiation. In contrast to this approach, an investigation of tradeoffs across business partners requires paradigms in which the single negotiations are linked to each other, for instance, based on potential scale economies.

Third, future research should systematically examine the impact of different types of limits (i.e., superordinate vs. subordinate limits) on negotiators' perceptions, behaviors, and outcomes in B2B negotiations (cf. Polzer & Neale, 1995). This would expand the negotiation literature by adding a new and relevant characteristic of limits to the existing characteristics that have been extensively investigated in previous research (i.e., presence and ambitiousness of limits; e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; White et al., 1994). As the first step for this line of research, studies could systematically vary the limit type with respect to the negotiation issues (i.e., assign parties one superordinate limit for all issues vs. subordinate limits for subsets of issues within a negotiation) and measure the resulting effects on negotiators' perceptions (e.g., fixed-pie bias), trade-off behaviors, and the quality of joint outcomes. In a further step, this approach could be extended to limits and trade-off opportunities across multiple dimensions. For instance, to investigate the impact of subordinate limits on tradeoffs across time, subordinate limits should be imposed on each negotiation at a specific time period in one condition. In contrast, a superordinate limit should be set for the entire time horizon of the negotiations in the other condition. Insights generated by this line of research may then support practitioners (i.e., managers and negotiators) to reach more beneficial outcomes in their B2B negotiations (see Voeth et al., 2020).

Fourth, future research studies may consider the impact of financial budgets on *integrative strategies* other than logrolling for exploiting the outcome potential in B2B negotiations, particularly solving parties' underlying concerns and expanding the negotiation pie (e.g., Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Whereas the former strategy addresses identifying the bargainers' interests and needs (Fisher & Ury, 1981), the latter aims to effectively manage the resources in the negotiation (i.e., adding or unbundling issues; De Dreu, 2014; Geiger, 2017). Importantly, the two strategies are associated with developing *creative solutions* on how to resolve parties' conflicting interests, as both require parties to creatively think beyond the obvious features of the negotiation at hand (e.g., the negotiation issues, parties' positions). We assume that subordinate limits affect negotiators' ability to identify such creative agreements differently than superordinate limits. Specifically, the manifold restrictions and obligations negotiators have to consider when they (have to) adopt subordinate limits may promote rigid thinking, which is known to impede the identification of creative solutions (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Such barriers might not occur for negotiators with a comprehensive, superordinate limit because they possess greater flexibility to satisfy their interests in integrative negotiations. Thus, the effects of limits delineated in the present work may also affect other integrative strategies.

Fifth and finally, future studies may investigate the impact of *culture* on negotiators' behavior and the ensuing outcomes in B2B practice. Previous empirical negotiation research indicates that cultural aspects may greatly affect negotiations (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005; Adler & Graham, 1989; Aslani et al., 2016; Brett et al., 1998). For instance, business practices that vary across cultures can influence parties' behavior during and after the negotiation process (e.g., the interpretation of contracts as fixed vs. fluid agreements; Friedman et al., 2020). When contracts are seen as "living documents" or incomplete agreements (Hart, 2017), negotiators are more likely to anticipate renegotiations (Friedman et al., 2020). Thus, they may not feel the need to exploit the full potential in every single negotiation.

Consequently, these negotiators may interpret future negotiations and the implementation phase as opportunities to further improve the parties' outcomes (cf. Jang et al., 2018). This possibility could be explored in future research. A further example in accounting research illustrates how cultural values can affect the managers' interpretation of financial budgets: Douglas and Wier (2005) reported that conceptions of budget rigidity differ across cultures (US vs. Chinese managers). One may conclude that less rigid conceptions of budgets may leave practitioners with higher degrees of flexibility to exploit the outcome potential in their B2B negotiations (cf. Brett et al., 1999). Thus, extending the theoretical considerations of the present work, future research may examine the impact of different cultural settings and values on the process and outcomes of B2B negotiations.

The present work and future research that builds upon it have the potential to allow negotiation research to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the specific characteristics of B2B negotiations affect negotiators' perceptions, behaviors, and negotiated outcomes. Such future studies could help to examine which extant findings from negotiation research can (vs. cannot) be applied to the context of B2B negotiations. Thus, this line of research may produce knowledge that is highly relevant to practitioners and may, thus, bridge the gap between science and practice (Hüffmeier et al., 2011; see also Bendersky & McGinn).

Implications for B2B Practice

To overcome the detrimental effects of budgeting and limit setting in negotiations, we derive recommendations for two different target groups in B2B practice: (i) for management and executives of B2B companies and (ii) for B2B negotiators.

Managers and executives should consider the significant impacts of financial budgets imposed on negotiating representatives when making budgetary decisions. Specifically, managers and executives are well-advised to carefully balance the necessary control over their employees achieved by financial budgets against the flexibility that allows these employees to exploit the outcome potential in B2B negotiations optimally, thereby maximizing the economic contributions for their organizations (cf. Heath & Soll, 1996; optimal level between the individual's autonomy and organizational control; Hofstede, 1968).

In light of this notion, we propose four approaches: First, management might choose more comprehensive performance standards when defining financial budgets (cf. higher-level standards; Brett et al., 1999), especially for the operating management, for which organizational goals and plans are mostly broken down (cf. Mintzberg, 1994). For instance, a sales manager could be assigned a comprehensive budget specifying an annual gross margin obligation for multiple customers instead of setting subordinate budgets that cover each customer's quarterly revenues and expenses separately. Second, the organization may prioritize the different financial budgets assigned to an employee. Management could, for instance, prioritize a sales representative's profit budget for a certain group of customers over price budgets that specify minimum transaction prices on the level of single products. With this priority-related information, negotiators may have greater flexibility as long as their decisions align with the high-priority budgets (e.g., the profit budget). They are, therefore, more likely to discover a greater number of integrative trade-off opportunities across dimensions, even if this requires violating relatively less important budgets (e.g., the price budgets). Third, management can provide negotiating representatives with a fast-track approval process and a contingency fund for attractive business opportunities that arise in the course of negotiations and require additional, unbudgeted financial resources (cf. Libby & Lindsay, 2010). With such extensions of their authorization (i.e., increased negotiator flexibility), negotiators can maximize economic profits when higher expenses or investments are necessary to generate more beneficial outcomes on a superordinate level. Fourth and finally, executives can take care that crucial negotiations are conducted at a higher management level (i.e., negotiations involving top executives on each side) to ensure those budget constraints are not as tight as they are on a more operational level (cf. Brett et al., 1999).

In addition to practical implications for managers and executives, our analysis also suggests different recommendations for B2B *negotiators*. Specifically, we encourage practitioners to examine the appropriateness of their negotiation limits on a regular basis during the bargaining process. When negotiators set their limits with a high level of detail (e.g., subordinate price limits for each product), they run the risk of getting stuck in relatively inflexible positions, which consequently reduces the range for potential agreements undermining the company's overall interests (cf. Brett et al., 1999; see also Fisher & Ury, 1981). In this context, practitioners may be better off when engaging in calculations or financial simulations of entire business cases. In doing so, B2B negotiators focus more on the overall negotiation profits by examining the impacts of different agreement options under consideration (cf. sensitivity analysis; Atkinson et al., 2012). In addition, negotiators could proactively consult their superiors, discuss potential negotiation outcomes on a superordinate level, and propose to adjust their mandates (i.e., increase their flexibility).

Limitations

Our considerations concerning the dilemma between the manifold trade-off opportunities and the rigid financial restrictions focus on buyer-seller interactions in B2B negotiations. This raises questions as to what extent our analysis is also applicable to other bargaining contexts or to negotiations that revolve less strongly around economic aspects. We want to address both aspects in the following paragraphs.

First, this research focuses on buyer-seller negotiations conducted between B2B organizations and may not (fully) generalize to certain business negotiations that do not meet all the characteristics of B2B negotiations defined in the present work. For instance, in negotiations of mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, or litigation, restrictions other than financial budgets may play a more central role (e.g., legal aspects in takeovers; Subramanian, 2003). Although our considerations focus on B2B buyer-seller negotiations, they may also be relevant in other contexts beyond B2B negotiations (e.g., political or private negotiations; Eliashberg et al., 1995). With respect to the opportunities, one may argue that all contexts in which negotiations take place on a recurring basis with the same and/or multiple counterparts provide manifold opportunities that parallel those outlined in the present work (e.g., political negotiations between neighboring countries). Regarding the restrictions, it is important to note that planning and budgeting processes are not exclusively applied in for-profit organizations but also in public and non-governmental organizations (Atkinson et al., 2012; Johansson & Siverbo, 2014). In addition, many private companies also negotiate the terms and conditions of their transactions with public sector organizations (i.e., business-to-administration) or consumers (business-to-consumers; Dwyer et al., 1987). Thus, we assume that the detrimental effects of financial restrictions may also play vital roles in other contexts.

Second, our reflections on B2B negotiations mainly focus on economic outcomes. However, we acknowledge that negotiated agreements in practice also contain non-financial outcomes (e.g., general terms and conditions, intangibles; Lewicki et al., 1999). These aspects may also affect contractual agreements between the B2B parties involved. Based on findings in the domain of contract theory (Cachon, 2003; Hart, 2017; Mayer & Arygyres, 2004), one could argue that the parties need time to learn to cooperate and may improve agreements continuously rather than fully exploiting the outcome potential in each and every negotiation. As a result, B2B practitioners are likely to consider how to further improve existing contracts through negotiations. In B2B practice, financial budgets are typically the ultimate performance evaluation measure (see Murphy, 2001; Sigurdardottir et al., 2019). Therefore, this article focuses on economic outcomes and views contracts as legally binding documentation of negotiated agreements rather than the actual negotiated outcomes in B2B negotiations.

Conclusion

Negotiations represent important determinants for the economic performance of B2B organizations. Despite their high relevance, however, B2B practitioners and researchers alike report that negotiators in business often leave money at the table (Thompson 2012; Voeth et al., 2020). Based on practice insights on organizational budgeting processes, this article suggests a potential explanation for this state of affairs by identifying a structural dilemma between the manifold opportunities in B2B practice and negotiators' restrictions imposed by financial budgets. We introduce directions for future research that aim at deepening our understanding of the unique characteristics of B2B negotiations and ultimately generating practically relevant knowledge that may help to narrow the science-practitioner divide (Hüffmeier et al., 2011; see also Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). In addition, we outline first recommendations on how to overcome the detrimental effects of financial budgeting in practice to assist B2B negotiators in maximizing economic outcomes in future negotiations.

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Gender Differences in Motives for Initiating and Avoiding Negotiations

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Abstract

Research on gender and negotiation initiation has largely focused on difficulties women face in negotiations due to gender role inconsistency. However, men, too, face a gender role risk in negotiations. Taking an intrapsychic perspective, we explored women's and men's motives for initiating and avoiding negotiations in two sequential studies ($N_{\text{Study 1}}$ = 1119, survey with open-ended responses; $N_{\text{Study 2}}$ = 200, online questionnaire). Men and women reported different relational and regulatory foci in negotiation initiation and avoidance motives, but similar modes of motives when legitimizing role-(in)consistent behaviors: Men avoiding and women initiating negotiations (i.e., role-inconsistent behavior) reported cybernetic motives (discrepancy, affect). Men initiating and women avoiding negotiations (i.e., role-consistent behavior) reported cognitive motives with different relational and regulatory foci (independent, promotion focus for men; inter- and independent prevention focus for women). We discuss how our research contributes to gender-in-negotiation research, but also research on human motivation in general.

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Probably everyone has faced the decision at one time or another whether to initiate a negotiation – or rather not. Eventually, more men than women decide to initiate (Kugler et al., 2018). To explain why men have a higher propensity to initiate negotiations compared to women (Kugler et al., 2018), theory and research have largely focused on difficulties *women* face in negotiation situations due to the incompatibility of the female gender[1] role, which is associated with communal characteristics, and the negotiator role, which is associated with agentic characteristics and better matches the male gender role (Eagly & Wood, 2012; Haselhuhn & Kray, 2012; Olekalns & Kennedy, 2020; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Thus, women violate their gender role when they negotiate, especially when they negotiate successfully. As a consequence, women compared to men have lower perceived expectancy to negotiate successfully (Miles & LaSalle, 2008; Reif, Kugler, & Brodbeck, 2019), anticipate lower benefits (Reif, Kunz, et al., 2019), less frequently recognize negotiation opportunities (Babcock et al., 2012, Stevens & Whelan, 2019), are more nervous in negotiation situations (Bowles et al., 2007), and fear backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010).

However, *men*, too, face a risk in negotiation situations – a perspective that is largely neglected by theory and research (for an exception see Mazei et al., 2021): Not negotiating (successfully) violates the male gender role and could potentially cause negative social reactions and self-evaluations for men (Mazei et al., 2021). Contributing to a more global view on motives underlying the decision to (not) initiate negotiations, this paper presents studies exploring men's and women's perspective.

Besides looking at the overall gender difference in initiating negotiations, theory and research has identified conditions that reinforce or reduce the gender difference (cf., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear, 2011; Bear & Babcock, 2012, 2017; Bowles et al., 2005; Kugler et al., 2018; Leibbrandt & List, 2015; Miles & LaSalle, 2008; Reif, Kunz, et al., 2019; Small et al., 2007). Characteristics of the context moderate gender differences in initiating negotiations, because they alter the gender role (in)consistency or the degree of gender role salience (Kugler et al., 2018). The negotiation situation's content or framing can influence the degree to which the gender roles and the negotiator role are *(in)consistent*. A female negotiation topic, for instance, reduces women's perception of role violation and facilitates their negotiation initiation (Bear & Babcock, 2012). The negotiation situation's ambiguity can influence the degree to which gender roles are *salient* and drawn upon as a behavior-guiding script. Strong situations (cf. Mischel, 1977), such as situations with an overt discrepancy (cf. Kugler et al., 2018), provide a clear script for how to act, and women can engage in agentic behavior without having to fear negative reactions (Bowels & McGinn, 2008; Bowles et al., 2005, 2007). Weak situations, by contrast, do not provide a clear script for how to behave "correctly", and people usually apply a fallback behavioral script, such as their gender role (Kugler et al., 2018).

In this manuscript, we take an *intrapsychic* rather than contextual perspective on gender role consistency and explore both men's and women's motives for initiating and avoiding negotiations in specific situations (Study 1) and across a broad range of situations (Study 2) to gain a more

Author Note. Data for Study 1 were collected in the course of a dissertation completed by Julia A. M. Reif at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen. Parts of the dataset for Study 1 were also used in Reif and Brodbeck (2017), Reif, Kunz, Kugler, & Brodbeck (2019), and Reif, Kugler & Brodbeck (2019).
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[1] We use the term "gender" because we focus on men's and women's culturally assigned roles rather than biological sex differences (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 2011).

comprehensive understanding of gender differences in the initiation of negotiations. We build on a theoretical model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021), social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012), self-construal theory (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997), and regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) to propose: When considering to initiate or avoid a negotiation, men and women have different relational and regulatory foci in cognitive motives but similar modes of motives when legitimizing role-(in)consistent behaviors. With our study we want to highlight the importance of social cognition in gender-in-negotiation research, demonstrate the dual-process nature of the model of negotiation initiation and show that there are actually also gender similarities in the research on gender differences in negotiation initiation.

Theoretical Background and Propositions

Negotiations, which can be defined as communication processes used to exchange, plan, or solve disputes and complex problems by mutual agreement (Jang et al., 2018), must first and foremost be initiated. A theoretical model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021) proposes different initiation and avoidance motives which can be classified in two modes of operating: cybernetic motives in the sense of an experiential mode of operating, and cognitive motives in the sense of a rational mode of operating. In order to further distinguish cognitive motives on a theoretical basis, we incorporated self-construal theory (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997) and regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) to cover both the relationality and regulation of motivated behavior. We drew on social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012) to bridge the gap between negotiation theory, motivational theories and research on gender differences, and to explain gender role-(in)consistent behavior in the negotiation initiation context.

A Model of Negotiation Initiation: The Mode of Motives

The model of negotiation initiation we apply (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021) not only provides an answer to the question of how the initiation proceeds, but also to the question of what motives make people initiate negotiations. In this work, we define the term *motives* as "various factors which incite and direct an individual's actions" (Atkinson, 1964, p. 1). Taking a look at the model components, two modes of motives can be distinguished: basic cybernetic motives on the one hand and cognitive motives on the other. We refer to this distinction as different *modes* because cybernetic motives correspond to an experiential operating mode which is rather intuitive and relies on salient information. In contrast, cognitive motives correspond to a rational operating mode that is deliberate and analytical, based on logic and rules (e.g., Carver et al., 2008; Epstein, 1994).

Basic Cybernetic Motivational Mechanisms

In the model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021), the central path leading to the decision of whether or not to negotiate starts with the perception of a discrepancy, which leads to an affective response that depends on the kind of discrepancy perceived. Discrepancies are detected by comparing a current state against a desired reference criterion, which is the basic idea of cybernetic, homeostatic or experiential systems (cf. Carver & Scheier, 2019). In general, cybernetics, which is a technical term also used in the context of mechanical or electronic systems, concerns the functioning of self-regulating systems (Edwards, 1992) and is applied to the human, for example, in the contexts of motivation or stress management (Edwards, 1992).

In a negotiation context, people experiencing a negative discrepancy accompanied by negative affect try to solve the discrepancy by initiating a negotiation (for a review of basic cybernetic approaches to motivation, see Carver & Scheier, 2019). In a work context, discrepancies can occur across a broad range of topics, including work procedures, compensation, promotion opportunities, the work environment, vacation, task responsibilities, teamwork, or leadership issues (Reif & Brodbeck, 2021).

Cognitive-Motivational Mechanisms

However, basic cybernetic motivational mechanisms do not automatically lead to initiating behaviors. In a kind of control system, people cognitively weigh the valence of the issue to be negotiated in terms of attractiveness or desirability, the instrumentality of initiating a negotiation with respect to self-related, relational, and economic benefits and costs, as well as their expectancy or likelihood of success if they were to start a negotiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014). These cognitive-motivational considerations are shaped by social and contextual influences, such as the negotiation partner (e.g., willingness to talk, power, status) and the negotiation situation (opportunity to talk, general economic situation), as well as the negotiator's states (e.g., standing, social support) and dispositions (e.g., general attitude towards negotiating, personality) (Reif & Brodbeck, 2021).

Social Role Theory: Producing and Maintaining Role Consistency

Social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2012) draws on gender role beliefs, representing "people's perceptions of men's and women's social roles in the society in which they live" (Eagly & Wood, 2012, p. 459), to explain men's and women's behavioral differences and similarities. Due to evolved biosocial sex differences, men and women "are differently distributed into social roles" (Eagly & Wood, 2012, p. 459). People form gender role beliefs by observing men and women in these social roles and inferring corresponding dispositions, which are further associated with certain expectations about how they and others should behave. Gender roles thus have both a descriptive and prescriptive character.

Building on the notion that gender-role-inconsistent behavior is both socially penalized and internally avoided to maintain a consistent self, people exhibiting *gender-role-inconsistent* behavior should try to legitimize it by (retrospectively) reducing situational ambiguity (that is, they should argue that they had to behave the way they did due to the strong situational setting). In terms of the motives specified in the model of negotiation initiation, they should justify their role-inconsistent behavior with basic cybernetic motives such as discrepancy and affect. By contrast, people showing *gender-role-consistent* behavior do not risk (internal and external) negative evaluations and thus do not have to reduce situational ambiguity, but rather have the opportunity to emphasize their role consistency by underpinning their behavior with cognitive motives, such as instrumentality and expectancy considerations, which further underscore their role consistency. Therefore, we propose that men and women resemble each other in the *mode* of motives they draw on to legitimate role-(in)consistent behavior:

> ***Proposition 1.*** Men and women explain role-inconsistent behavior (men avoiding negotiations and women initiating negotiations) with basic cybernetic motivational mechanisms in order to reduce situational ambiguity, whereas they explain role-consistent behavior (men initiating negotiations and women avoiding negotiations) with cognitive-motivational mechanisms to further underscore their role consistency.

Self-Construal Theory: The Relational Focus of Motives

Having reasoned which modes of motives (basic cybernetic vs. cognitive-motivational) men and women draw on to explain why they initiated or avoided negotiations, we now want to more closely examine the *relational focus* of the cognitive motives men and women refer to when explaining negotiation initiation or avoidance, because negotiations are an inherently relational activity (Gelfand et al., 2006). Self-construal theory provides our argumentative basis in this respect.

Self-construal theory (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997) conceptualizes how separate or connected people see themselves in relationship to others, which is why we refer to this focus as “relational” focus. The theory considers the “self as a powerful regulator of many aspects of human behavior (…) [which] (…) continually and dynamically takes form through one’s interactions with close others and the social world” (Cross & Madson, 1997, p. 6). The theory proposes that individuals differ in the structure of their selves. Whereas some people hold an independent self-construal in which others are represented separately from the self, other people hold an interdependent self-construal in which others are considered a part of the self. People with an independent self-construal strive for autonomy and to remain true to their preferences and goals. People with an interdependent self-construal strive to develop and maintain relationships and connectedness (Cross & Madson, 1997).

Due to their gender roles, “men and women live within contexts of independence or interdependence, respectively (…). Consequently, their (…) self-systems are continually shaped by these contexts (…) [which] may channel the creation and maintenance of divergent self-construals by men and women” (Cross & Madson, 1997, p. 8). Women thus tend to score higher on interdependent self-construal, whereas men score higher on independent self-construal (Cross et al., 2000; Cross & Madson, 1997; Gelfand et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2020).

In the negotiation context (see also Cheng et al., 2017), self-construal theory can explain why men tend to focus more on their own outcomes and achieving greater benefits to themselves, thus exhibiting more competitive behavior, while women tend to be more concerned about their relationship with the negotiation partner, thus exhibiting more cooperative behavior (cf. Curhan et al., 2008; Stuhlmacher et al., 2007). Women’s cognitive reasons for initiating or avoiding negotiations should thus primarily concern relationships, while men’s cognitive reasons for initiating or avoiding negotiations should primarily concern themselves. Therefore, we propose that men and women differ in the *relational focus* of their cognitive motives to initiate or avoid negotiations:

> ***Proposition 2.*** Men’s cognitive motives are self-focused due to their independent self-construal, whereas women’s cognitive motives are more focused on relationships with others due to their interdependent self-construal.

With regard to the model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021), the relational focus of motives manifests especially in the categories “negotiation partner”, which represents an interdependent focus on one’s negotiation partner, and in the category “negotiator”, which represents an independent focus on one’s own states and dispositions. In the category “instrumentality”, relational elements appear in economic and self-related instrumentality (which are directed towards individual outcomes and therefore represent an independent focus) and relational instrumentality (which is directed towards the other and therefore represents an interdependent focus) (cf. Table 1).

Regulatory Focus Theory: The Regulatory Focus of Motives

Besides the mode of motives and the relational focus of motives, we now want to introduce a third dimension, the *regulatory focus* of motives, which refers to approach and avoidance, two fundamental principles of motivated behavior (Diefendorff & Chandler, 2010). Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998; for a review, see Scholer et al., 2019) explains motivated goal pursuit with two coexisting motivational systems, promotion and prevention. Promotion is driven by a need for growth and advancement, while prevention is driven by a need for security and safety (Scholer et al., 2019). Consequently, individuals with a promotion focus strive to achieve positive outcomes, while individuals with a prevention focus strive to avoid negative outcomes (see also Galinksy et al., 2005).

According to social role theory and the already described behavioral consequences of gender roles, which imply sensitive and caring behavior for women, and competitive and ambitious behavior for men (Oswald & Lindstedt, 2006), women are supposed to be prevention-oriented, whereas men are supposed to be promotion-oriented (Sassenberg et al., 2013). This was also empirically demonstrated by McKay-Nesbitt et al. (2013) for chronic regulatory focus (which goes along with findings showing that women have a stronger avoidance motivation system than men, see Ma-Kellams & Wu, 2020). Argued from a self-construal perspective, independent goals (focus on achievement, positive distinctiveness, and autonomy, often held by men) are more consistent with a promotion orientation because these goals focus on potential gains and positive features of the self. Interdependent goals (focus on maintaining connections and harmoniously fitting in with others, often held by women) are more consistent with a prevention orientation because these goals focus on relationships, fulfilling obligations, and avoiding mistakes (Lee et al., 2000).

In the negotiation context, research has shown that prevention-focused individuals preferred vigilant strategies that minimize losses. Promotion-oriented individuals preferred eager strategies that maximize gains (Appelt & Higgins, 2010). Promotion-oriented individuals achieved better outcomes in dyadic negotiations than negotiators with a prevention orientation because they staked claims (e.g., made more extreme opening offers) and created more resources at the negotiating table (Galinsky et al., 2005; see also Trötschel et al., 2013). Consequently, women's cognitive motives for initiating or avoiding negotiations should be more prevention-focused, while men's cognitive motives should be more promotion-focused. Therefore, we propose that men and women differ in the *regulatory focus* of their cognitive motives to initiate or avoid negotiations:

> ***Proposition 3.*** Men's cognitive motives are more focused on achieving gains due to their promotion focus, whereas women's cognitive motives are more focused on preventing losses due to their prevention focus.

With regard to the model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021), the regulatory focus of motives manifests especially in the categories "negotiation partner", "negotiation situation" and "negotiator" which are either facilitating or inhibiting. The inhibiting aspects can be interpreted as a prevention focus and the facilitating aspects can be interpreted as a promotion focus. In the category "instrumentality", "avoiding costs" and the assumption of "no instrumentality" represent a prevention focus whereas "achieving benefits" represents a promotion focus (cf. Table 1).

Overview of Studies

We tested our propositions about gender differences in motives for initiating and avoiding negotiations in terms of the *mode* (Proposition 1), the *relational focus* (Proposition 2) and the *regulatory focus* (Proposition 3) of motives in two sequential studies in which participants retrospectively reported their motives for having initiated or avoided negotiations. In Study 1 we coded and counted initiation and avoidance motives reported in open-ended statements by men and women in a specific situation (negotiating grades at university), and then further quantitatively explored gender differences in these motives across a broad range of initiation and avoidance situations in Study 2.

Study 1

Study 1 was part of a larger project on negotiation initiation. The project comprised an online questionnaire administered to students at a large university in Germany. The *first* part of the questionnaire concerned why students negotiated grades with their instructors and encompassed both quantitative and qualitative sections. The quantitative section was used by Reif and Brodbeck (2017) to examine the moderation effect of subjective initiation ability on the link between satisfaction and initiation of negotiation and by Reif, Kugler and Brodbeck (2019) to examine the link between gender and initiation intentions, mediated by expectancy. The qualitative section will be used in this study. The *second* part of the questionnaire examined negotiation contexts in general and was used in Reif, Kunz, et al.'s (2019) paper. The data and analyses presented here were not addressed by these publications.

Method

In Study 1, men's and women's motives for initiating or avoiding negotiations were explored. A qualitative approach to data collection was chosen, as it gave participants an opportunity to freely write about their motives in a familiar and meaningful context.

Data Collection

In the questionnaire, we first asked students whether they had negotiated their grade with an instructor at least once because they disagreed with their initially assigned grade. Students who reported that they had never initiated a negotiation about a grade were categorized as avoiders and students who had negotiated at least one grade were categorized as initiators. Initiators were then asked to recall a concrete situation in which they had negotiated a grade with their instructor. Then, they were prompted to answer the following open-ended question: "For what reason did you negotiate your grade in this specific instance with your instructor? What encouraged you to do so?" Avoiders were asked to think about a concrete situation in which they had not negotiated their grade with their instructor, even though they did not agree with their assigned grade. They were then asked to answer the following question: "For what reason did you not negotiate your grade in this specific instance with your instructor? What inhibited you from doing so?"

Sample

For the larger project, we recruited 1,306 students (60.1% female, mean age = 23.97 years, *SD* = 3.94) with different educational backgrounds. The majority of subjects were of German nationality (90.9%) and the remaining subjects were mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe. As an incentive to participate, three students were selected to win 100 Euro. Students who did not specify their gender or who did not answer the open-ended question that formed the basis for Study 1 were excluded from the analysis, as these were the key variables in Study 1. A total of 1,119 participants (61.6% female, mean age 23.87 years, *SD* = 5.86) were included in the analysis.

Data Analysis

Standard practices for qualitative data analysis (cf. Miles et al., 2014) were applied. Data were analyzed with a deductive approach: Main categories were derived from Reif and Brodbeck's (2014, 2021) theoretical model. We first read the data material to gain an overview of and a sense for the motives that led students to initiate a negotiation or inhibited them from doing so. We then identified statements to be coded and labelled these statements according to the deductive categories. We established a categorization system to define which statements belonged to which category. In doing so, we referred to existing definitions of our deductive categories (cf. Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021). In the next step, we made a second complete run through the data, checking our categorization. Re-reading helped to ensure correct categorization. Each statement was coded by two independent coders (one author of this paper and one research assistant who was trained in the categorization system). The two codings were compared and disagreements were discussed until they were resolved. Interrater reliability, calculated according to the percentage of agreement (cf. Miles et al., 2014), was high (κ = .97). The frequencies of motives in the different categories for initiating or avoiding a negotiation were then counted and compared with χ^2 tests for men versus women. When interpreting the results, we focused on effect sizes rather than on statistical significance due to the exploratory nature of Study 1.

Results

Motives for Initiating or Avoiding Negotiations

Table 1 describes the deductive categories assigned in Study 1. The right column indicates the categories' mode and focus.

Table 1

Motives for Initiating or Avoiding Negotiations, their Modes, and Foci

Category description	Mode and focus
Discrepancy: Result of comparison between current state and individual standard for this state	
Negative discrepancy	cybernetic
• students were graded worse compared to own performance or fellow students; grading schema was not comprehensible • objective errors in the grading, errors in the formulation of exam questions • students' performance was close to a better grade; students had failed the exam	
No discrepancy	cybernetic
• grade was acceptable compared to students' aspirations and fellow students' grades; grading was transparent, plausible and objective • students had passed the exam	
Affect: Students' emotional reactions to their grade	
Negative affect	cybernetic
• feelings of unfairness, anger • disappointment, embarrassment	
Positive affect	cybernetic
• fairness • happiness, satisfaction	
Valence: Significance students attached to the grade	
High valance	cognitive
• grade was very important to students (e.g., because it was their final grade or they needed a good grade to continue on with their studies or career plans)	
Low valance	cognitive

• grade was irrelevant, or passing the exam was all that mattered (no matter what grade the student ultimately received)	
Instrumentality: Costs and benefits students associated with initiating / avoiding a negotiation	
Positive instrumentality of initiating a negotiation	cognitive
• achieve benefits regarding grade (improve grade, pass the exam)	independent, promotion
• avoid self-related costs (effort and expense associated with repeating an exam)	independent, prevention
Positive instrumentality of avoiding a negotiation	cognitive
• avoid relational costs (e.g., students did not want to annoy the instructor, leave a bad impression, or risk a loss of good will that would affect future interactions)	interdependent, prevention
• avoid self-related costs (emotional and temporal effort associated with preparing for the negotiation)	independent, prevention
• avoid costs regarding grade (grade could be further reduced if the student negotiated it)	independent, prevention
No instrumentality of initiating a negotiation	cognitive
• negotiating is not instrumental regarding the grade (grade is fixed and can no longer be changed)	independent, prevention
Expectancy: Assumed probability of successfully initiating a negotiation or negotiating	
No expectancy due to low negotiation ability	cognitive
• feeling that one does not know how to argue, not having good arguments • being too shy or insecure to negotiate	
No expectancy due to low likelihood of success	cognitive
• feeling that the situation seems relatively hopeless • feeling that negotiating is not really possible	
Positive expectancy due to high negotiation ability	cognitive
• having good arguments and objective facts	
Negotiator: Students' general attitude towards initiating negotiations	
Positive general attitude	cognitive
• negotiating as a matter of principle	independent, promotion
Negative general attitude	cognitive
• perceived lack of appropriateness of negotiating	independent, prevention
Negotiation situation: Facilitating and inhibiting aspects of the negotiation situation	
Facilitating aspects regarding negotiation situation	cognitive
• opportunities to talk (opportunity for a personal dialogue with the instructor, fixed appointment for reviewing one's exam results)	promotion
Inhibiting aspects regarding negotiation situation	cognitive
• no opportunities to talk (no contact with the instructor, not being able to attend office hours)	prevention
Negotiation partner: Facilitating and inhibiting aspects of the negotiation partner	
Facilitating aspects regarding negotiation partner	cognitive
• negotiation partner's low power position • poor/high quality of previous interactions	interdependent, promotion
Inhibiting aspects regarding negotiation partner	cognitive

• expectation of future interaction with negotiation partner • negotiation partner's high power position • negotiation partner's unwillingness to negotiate • poor/high quality of previous interactions	interdependent, prevention

Note. A poor/high quality of previous interactions was mentioned both as a facilitating and inhibiting aspect regarding the initiation of negotiation. Reif and Brodbeck (2021) explain these ambiguous effects by different consequential cognitive considerations triggered by respective contexts. The contextual variables negotiator, negotiation partner and negotiation situation are considered as cognitive variables because they are antecedent to the cognitions expectancy and instrumentality, according to Reif and Brodbeck (2021).

Gender Differences in Motives for Initiating a Negotiation

Comparing the percentages of male and female initiators who mentioned each respective motive for initiating a negotiation (how many men vs. how many women mentioned each motive) showed that women mentioned negative affect significantly more often than men. Men mentioned significantly more often than women positive instrumentality regarding their grade (achieving benefits, that is, a better grade) and recognizing an opportunity to talk (Figure 1a).

Gender Differences in Motives for Avoiding a Negotiation

Comparing the percentages of men and women who mentioned each respective motive for avoiding a negotiation (how many men vs. how many women mentioned each motive) showed that women mentioned they had no expectancy (low negotiation ability), inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiation partner, the avoidance of relational costs, and a lack of instrumentality regarding the grade significantly more often than men. The motive "no discrepancy" was mentioned slightly more often by men than by women (Figure 1b).

Summary

According to Study 1, when considering initiating a negotiation, women more than men were driven by basic cybernetic motivational mechanisms (negative affect), whereas men more than women were driven by cognitive-motivational considerations (achieving economic benefits, using negotiation opportunities). When deciding to avoid a negotiation, women more than men were driven by cognitive-motivational considerations (inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiation partner, avoidance of relational costs) and doubts about their efficacy (low negotiation ability, negotiating will not improve the outcome), whereas men's motives for avoiding negotiating were rooted in basic cybernetic mechanisms (no discrepancy).

Thus, both men and women seemed to explain role-inconsistent behavior (i.e., men avoiding and women initiating a negotiation) with basic motivational mechanisms related to discrepancy and affect. By contrast, both men and women explained role-consistent behavior (i.e., men initiating and women avoiding a negotiation) with cognitive-motivational mechanisms, which is in line with Proposition 1. Regarding the motives' foci, women focused on prevention and relationships (e.g., inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiation partner, avoidance of relational costs), but also on self-related issues (no economic instrumentality). Men focused more on promotion (using opportunities to talk) and themselves (achieving benefits), which supports Proposition 3 and in parts Proposition 2.

Figures 1a and 1b

Study 1: Differences in the Percentage of Men and Women Who Mentioned the Respective Motives for Initiating (1a) or Avoiding (1b) a Negotiation



Note. $n_{\text{male initiators}} = 274$, $n_{\text{male avoiders}} = 156$, $n_{\text{female initiators}} = 366$, $n_{\text{female avoiders}} = 323$; Multiple mentions of motives per person were possible. Negative values in the figures indicate that the motive was mentioned more often by women than by men. Positive values indicate that the motive was mentioned more often by men than by women. φ indicates the effect size; results with φ > 0.1 are bolded. ° *p* values were calculated with Fisher's exact test when expected values in cells were below 5. For total percentages, see Appendix A.

Study 2

Method

In Study 2, the qualitative categories of motives for initiating and avoiding a negotiation were translated into items to quantitatively investigate gender differences. We conducted an online questionnaire, which was distributed via social media platforms (LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram) and via the private network of a student research assistant. Participation was voluntary and participants were informed about their right to terminate participation at any time. Student participants could get extra credit for participation.

Sample

All in all, 201 persons participated. We excluded one person due to missing values throughout. The final sample consisted of 200 persons (56.5% women, mean age = 30.5 years, *SD* = 15.0; 41.0% were employed, 59.0% were full-time students or other).

Procedure

After giving their informed consent, participants read a short introduction to the topic of negotiations in which we referred to negotiations as discussions with the aim of improving results. They were then asked to remember the most recent situation in which they had initiated a negotiation. To help participants remember this situation even better, they were asked to indicate how long ago the negotiation was and what it was about in an open format. They were then asked to indicate *why* they had *initiated* the negotiation by answering standardized items. Following these items, participants had the option to indicate further motives for initiation in an open format. We did not include these open-ended answers in the analyses but used them to check whether our theoretically derived items (Reif & Brodbeck, 2021) adequately covered people's initiation motives. (This section was followed by 14 items on the chosen negotiation strategy which were not analyzed in the scope of this study).

Afterwards, participants were asked to remember the most recent situation in which they could have initiated a negotiation but had finally avoided it. Again, they had to indicate how long ago this situation was and what it had been about in an open format. They were then asked to indicate *why* they had *avoided* the negotiation by answering the same standardized items as in the negotiation situation, but in a negated version. Following the items, participants had the option to indicate further reasons in an open format. We did not include these open-ended answers in the analyses but used them to check whether our theoretically derived items (Reif & Brodbeck, 2021) adequately covered people's avoidance motives. Finally, demographic data was collected.

Measurement

All items measuring initiation and avoidance motives and respective information on internal consistency are listed in Appendix B. With exception of 'positive expectancy' (initiation situation) and 'no expectancy' (avoidance situation) which were measured with items, partially adapted from Reif, Kugler, and Brodbeck (2019), all other items were developed for the purpose of this study. The items for the initiation and avoidance situations were formulated based on the results of Study 1. Items in the initiation situation were introduced with the sentence "I initiated this negotiation because…". Items in the avoidance situation were introduced with the sentence "I did not initiate this negotiation because…". Items were presented in randomized order and answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 =

completely disagree; 7 = *completely agree*). All materials were provided in German. Appendix C provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables measured in Study 2, separately for the initiation and avoidance situation.

To test the factor structure of the items, two confirmatory factor analyses were calculated (one for initiation items, one for avoidance items). Although both models showed significant p values, further indices showed good model fit, for the initiation model: $\chi^2(394) = 511.0$, $p < .001$, SRMR = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.04; for the avoidance model: $\chi^2(376) = 487.7$, $p < .001$, SRMR = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.04; error correlations were allowed. Items marked with an asterisk in Appendix B were not included in the models.

Results

Participants mentioned a variety of different negotiation situations covering all categories of negotiation contexts suggested by Reif, Kunz, et al. (2019).

Gender Differences in Motives for Initiating a Negotiation

We tested differences between men and women with a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Results showed that men were more likely than women to indicate facilitating aspects related to the negotiator, self-related benefits, and positive expectancy as motives for initiating a negotiation. Women were more likely than men to indicate negative affect, high valence, and negative discrepancy as motives for initiating a negotiation (see Table 2a, Figure 2a). Further motives (open-ended question) were mentioned by 43 participants and did not go beyond the motives covered by our quantitative items.

Gender Differences in Motives for Avoiding a Negotiation

We tested differences between men and women with a MANOVA. Women were more likely than men to indicate self-related costs, inhibiting aspects related to the negotiation partner, no expectancy, inhibiting aspects related to the negotiator, inhibiting aspects related to the negotiation situation, and relational costs as motives for avoiding a negotiation (see Table 2b, Figure 2b). Men more than women tended to report positive affect and perception of no discrepancy as motives for avoiding negotiations. Further motives (open-ended question) were mentioned by 48 participants and did not go beyond the motives covered by our items.

Summary

According to Study 2, women more than men initiated negotiations due to basic cybernetic motives (negative affect, negative discrepancies), but also cognitive-motivational perceptions (high valence). Men more than women were driven by cognitive-motivational thoughts (self-related benefits, positive expectancy, facilitating aspects regarding negotiator). When deciding against a negotiation, women did so more than men due to cognitive-motivational considerations (no expectancy, inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiator, self-related costs, inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiation partner, relational costs, inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiation situation). By contrast, men more than women tended to avoid negotiations for basic cybernetic motives (no discrepancy, positive affect).

Table 2a

Gender Differences in Motives for Initiating a Negotiation (MANOVA)

	Men	Women			
Variables	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*	*F*	*p*	η^2
1 Negative discrepancy	4.07 (1.64)	4.55 (1.67)	4.01	**.046**	0.02
2 Negative affect	3.28 (1.60)	4.21 (1.91)	13.3	**.000**	0.06
3 High valence	5.93 (0.98)	6.28 (1.00)	6.31	**.013**	0.03
4 Self-related benefits	4.29 (1.54)	3.72 (1.44)	7.29	**.008**	0.04
5 Relational benefits	3.00 (1.43)	3.12 (1.38)	0.38	.536	0.00
6 Economic benefits	5.55 (1.19)	5.29 (1.38)	1.91	.169	0.01
7 Positive expectancy	5.47 (1.10)	5.17 (1.00)	4.24	**.041**	0.02
8 Negotiation partner (facilitating)	4.43 (1.42)	4.75 (1.42)	2.51	.114	0.01
9 Negotiation situation (facilitating)	4.97 (1.85)	5.16 (1.61)	0.63	.429	0.00
10 Negotiator aspects (facilitating)	4.99 (1.69)	4.04 (1.65)	16.1	**.000**	0.08

Note. N = 200 (n_{men} = 87, n_{women} = 113). Items were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *completely disagree*; 7 = *completely agree*). *df* = 1, 198. Significant results (p < .05) are bolded.

Table 2b

Gender Differences in Motives for Avoiding a Negotiation (MANOVA)

	Men	Women			
Variables	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*	*F*	*p*	η^2
1 No discrepancy	3.46 (1.74)	3.05 (1.66)	2.78	.097	0.01
2 Positive affect	3.53 (1.69)	3.13 (1.63)	2.87	.092	0.01
3 Low valence	3.54 (1.71)	3.50 (1.40)	0.03	.870	0.00
4 Self-related costs	3.73 (2.06)	5.20 (1.54)	32.9	**.000**	0.14
5 Relational costs	3.34 (1.67)	3.88 (1.65)	5.21	**.023**	0.03
6 Economic costs	3.13 (1.80)	3.54 (1.78)	2.56	.111	0.01
7 No expectancy	3.21 (1.61)	4.20 (1.42)	21.0	**.000**	0.10
8 Negotiation partner (inhibiting)	2.67 (1.55)	3.85 (1.60)	27.1	**.000**	0.12
9 Negotiation situation (inhibiting)	2.95 (1.87)	3.59 (1.74)	6.09	**.014**	0.03
10 Negotiator aspects (inhibiting)	2.23 (1.54)	3.22 (1.74)	17.4	**.000**	0.08

Note. *N* = 198 (n_{men} = 86, n_{women} = 112). Items were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *completely disagree*; 7 = *completely agree*). *df* = 1, 196. Significant results (p < .05) are bolded.

Figures 2a and 2b

Study 2: Differences Between Men's and Women's Mean Values Regarding the Respective Initiation (2a) or Avoidance (2b) Motives



Note. Negative values indicate that women more strongly agreed to the motive than men. Positive values indicate that men more strongly agreed to the motive than women. Significant results ($p < .05$) are bolded.

Thus, both men and women explained role-inconsistent behavior (i.e., men avoiding and women initiating a negotiation) with basic cybernetic mechanisms related to discrepancy and affect, whereas they explained role-consistent behavior (i.e., men initiating and women avoiding a negotiation) with cognitive-motivational mechanisms, again underpinning Proposition 1. Regarding the motives' foci, women focused on prevention and relationships (e.g., inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiation partner, avoidance of relational costs), but also on self-related issues (inhibiting attitudes towards negotiation, self-related costs). Men focused more on promotion (achievement of benefits) and themselves (facilitating attitudes, positive expectancy), which underpins Proposition 3 and in parts Proposition 2.

Table 3

Summary of Men's and Women's Negotiation Initiation and Avoidance Motives

Motive for	Gender									
	Men					Women				
	Study	Motive	Mode	Regulatory focus	Relational focus	Study	Motive	Mode	Regulatory focus	Relational focus
Initiation	1	Benefits regarding grade	cognitive	promotion	independent	1, 2	Negative affect	cybernetic		
	2	Self-related benefits	cognitive	promotion	independent	2	Negative discrepancy	cybernetic		
	2	Facilitating aspects regarding negotiator	cognitive	promotion	independent	2	High valence	cognitive		
	1	Opportunity to talk	cognitive	promotion						
	2	Positive expectancy	cognitive							
Avoidance	1, 2	No discrepancy	cybernetic			1, 2	Inhibiting aspects regarding negotiation partner	cognitive	prevention	interdependent
	2	Positive affect	cybernetic			1, 2	Relational costs	cognitive	prevention	interdependent
						2	Inhibiting aspects regarding negotiation situation	cognitive	prevention	
						1, 2	No expectancy	cognitive		
						2	Self-related costs	cognitive	prevention	independent
						2	Inhibiting aspects regarding negotiator	cognitive	prevention	independent
						1	No instrumentality regarding grade	cognitive	prevention	independent

General Discussion

Building on a model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021), we explored in two sequential studies why men and women initiated or avoided negotiations, guided by three theoretically derived propositions. Table 3 summarizes the results. Men initiated negotiations mainly due to cognitive-motivational considerations related to themselves (e.g., positive expectancy) and their expected benefits. Women initiated negotiations mainly due to basic cybernetic motivational mechanisms (e.g., negative discrepancy, negative affect) and high valence (which will be discussed below). Men avoided negotiations mainly due to a lack of cybernetic motivators (no discrepancy, positive affect). Women avoided negotiations mainly due to cognitive considerations related to their potential losses, their relationships and themselves.

The Mode, Relational Focus, and Regulatory Focus of Initiation and Avoidance Motives

With these results, we showed that the *mode* of motives reported by men and women to legitimize role-(in)consistent behavior was similar: Both men and women explained role-inconsistent behavior (i.e., men avoiding and women initiating a negotiation) with basic cybernetic mechanisms related to discrepancy and affect. By contrast, both men and women explained role-consistent behavior (i.e., men initiating and women avoiding a negotiation) with cognitive-motivational mechanisms, which is in line with Proposition 1.

Men explaining negotiation avoidance and women explaining negotiation initiation with basic cybernetic motivational mechanisms might have aimed to reduce situational ambiguity and thereby legitimize their gender role inconsistency, which might otherwise be followed by shame, regret, and gender status instability in the case of men (cf. Mazei et al., 2021) or social backlash in the case of women (cf. Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Men explaining negotiation initiation and women explaining negotiation avoidance with cognitive-motivational arguments might have aimed to maintain and emphasize their gender role consistency, which might be followed by relief, pride, and a stabilization of gender status in the case of men (cf. Mazei et al., 2021) and an avoidance of negative evaluations by others in the case of women (cf. Kugler et al., 2018). However, the specific cognitive-motivational motives at play were different for men and women.

This is where the motives' *relational focus* and *regulatory focus* come into play: For men, cognitive-motivational mechanisms were focused on promotion (e.g., recognition of opportunities) and independence (e.g., achievement of benefits, self-confidence). For women, the cognitive-motivational mechanisms explaining role-consistent behavior were focused on prevention. However, the prevention focus was mentioned both in combination with an interdependent focus as proposed (e.g., avoiding relational costs) and an independent focus (e.g., self-related costs, self-doubts), whereby all independent issues referred to negative aspects of the self. These independent issues can be explained by the misfit between the female gender role and the negotiator role, which might cause lower expectancy and economic instrumentality among women (due to their less frequent exposure to negotiation situations, women have fewer opportunities to gather negotiation experience, cf. Reif, Kugler, & Brodbeck, 2019) and higher self-related costs due to backlash (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Thus, results were in line with Proposition 3 and in parts in line with Proposition 2: We showed that men's cognitive motives were self-focused whereas women's cognitive motives were focused on relationships with others *and* negative aspects of the self.

Apart from these results, we would also like to discuss a result which seems to deviate from our propositions: Women explained their initiation of negotiation (i.e., role-inconsistent behavior) with the high valence they attached to the issue at stake. In this case, valence could be less of a cognitive-motivational motive, but rather serve to further underline the basic cybernetic motives of negative discrepancy and negative affect. In addition to articulating these basic motives to legitimize role-inconsistent behavior, which might be directly observable to their social environment, women might have stressed high valence in order to reduce internal inconsistencies in their self-identity arising from their initiating behavior.

Taking a closer look at effect sizes, we found that effect sizes of gender effects regarding the initiation of negotiation in Study 2 were smaller than effect sizes in Study 1. This might be due to the fact that in Study 1, we focused on one specific context which was rather masculine (cf. Reif, Kunz, et al., 2019) and which might have pronounced gender differences. In Study 2, participants referred to a negotiation situation of their choice which resulted in broad range of different negotiation situations across which extreme responses might have balanced out.

Implications and Future Research

Theoretical Contributions

First, we contributed to *negotiation theory and research*. We did not focus on either the initiation or the avoidance of negotiations but investigated them in combination. In this way, we showed that the motives suggested in the model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021) were applicable to both negotiation initiation and avoidance. By contrasting initiation and avoidance situations, we were also able to provide insights into motives that trigger activation and inhibition in negotiation situations. By demonstrating the different relational and regulatory foci of these motives, we contributed to research on relationality (Cheng & Huang, 2017) and regulatory focus (e.g., Trötschel et al., 2013) in negotiations. These insights can be built upon in future negotiation research investigating differential effects of these motives on the further course of the negotiation (in the case of initiation) or the further course of a conflict (in the case of avoidance). Moreover, by delving more deeply into different motive modes (cybernetic-experiential vs. cognitive-rational), we elaborated on the dual-process nature of the model of negotiation initiation. We also showed that, on the whole, avoidance motives were the inverse of initiation motives (e.g., no discrepancy vs. negative discrepancy; no expectancy vs. positive expectancy). However, if gender effects were taken into account, this dualistic nature no longer appeared: instead, structural differences in male and female initiation and avoidance motives became apparent with regard to their mode, relationality and regulatory focus, bringing us to our next point.

Second, we contributed to *gender research*. We showed similarities in men's and women's strategies to underpin gender-role consistency (emphasizing cognitive motives) and legitimize gender-role inconsistency (emphasizing basic cybernetic motives to reduce situational ambiguity). In this way, we contributed to research taking an intrapsychic perspective on gender role consistency (see also Bear & Babcock, 2017).

Third, we contributed to *gender-in-negotiation-research*. We demonstrated that the model of negotiation initiation (Reif & Brodbeck, 2014, 2021) was applicable to explaining both men's and women's initiation and avoidance behavior. We did not only focus on explaining women's negotiation behavior (cf. Bowles et al., 2019) or on masculinity effects in negotiations (cf. Mazei et al., 2021), but rather on both men's and women's behavior in initiation and avoidance situations. In this way, we were able to describe how men *and* women tried to legitimize *role-inconsistent* behavior in negotiation situations by falling back on basic motivational, cybernetic mechanisms to reduce situational ambiguity and therefore decrease potential negative social evaluations and effects on their self-identities. We also showed how men and women tried to maintain and reinforce *role-consistent* behavior by referring to cognitive-motivational motives which stress their gender role consistency. These findings underscore the importance of social cognition ("self-schemas that are dynamically accessible and are context dependent", Gelfand et al., 2006, p. 444) in gender-in-negotiation research. In our research, we did not focus on contexts moderating gender effects. Future research could thus investigate which motives men and women draw on to legitimize negotiation initiation and avoidance in gender-role (in)consistent negotiation contexts, that is, whether men's and women's motives differ in male, female or neutral negotiation contexts (cf. Reif, Kunz, et al., 2019).

Building on our findings and the idea that men have "'more to gain' but also 'more to lose'" (Mazei et al., 2021, p. 110; see also Bosson et al., 2009; Vandello et al., 2008) due to the fragile structure of the male gender status (Mazei et al., 2021) and their traditional activities in society, which were associated with higher social status and higher risks (Croft et al., 2015; Gilmore, 1990), future research could also investigate the following: Do men have more to gain than women when initiating a negotiation, because men may have more at stake (in terms of the male gender status) and thus potentially greater benefits? Accordingly, do men have more to lose than women when avoiding a negotiation?

Given the negotiation context of Study 1 included hierarchies (negotiating with a lecturer) which is also often found in organizations when negotiating with superiors, our results can offer further insights into gender differences in career-related issues. Meta-analyses concluded that women were less prone to initiate negotiations than men (Kugler et al., 2018) and were less effective and successful negotiators than men (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998), which illustrates women's two-fold disadvantage in negotiation situations: women are more hesitant to ask, and women who actually ask, receive less (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Artz et al., 2018). We showed that men and women differ in how they argue to enhance the legitimacy of their behavior within their gender role. The gendered order of organizations (cf. Kolb, 2013) thus might depend on gender dynamics which are socially constructed but maintained individually.

Fourth, we contributed to *research on human motivation*. Building on the model of negotiation initiation, we showed that people fall back on different modes of motives with different relational and regulatory foci to explain their behavior in a way that was consistent with their self-identities (for details, see above). In this sense, we integrated different perspectives on motivation (cybernetic principles, self-construal, regulatory focus) and showed that human motivation must be considered and interpreted in the context of self- and social identity. Research on identity-based motivation (e.g., Oyserman, 2007, 2015), for example, "highlights the role of broad social factors, such as gender (…) on identity activation and the role of identity-congruence in behavioral choice and action" (Kanfer & Chen, 2016, p. 15). Our findings are in line with these new directions in motivation research and extend them to the negotiation context.

Practical Implications

Men and women could reflect on how to *transfer* their habitual attribution patterns in negotiation situations: Women could reflect on how to transfer the relational self-construal they draw on in avoidance situations to initiation situations. Combined with their interpersonal communication skills, this may aid women "in their ability to understand the interests of their negotiating counterparts, thereby ultimately being more able to create greater value in integrative negotiations" (Roberts, 2016, p. 79, see also Kray & Thompson, 2004) in a way that is consistent with their self-identities. Men could reflect on how to transfer the independent self-construal they draw on in initiation situations to avoidance situations. In this way, they might be able to integrate avoidance situations more into their self-identities and avoid corresponding shame or regret.

Men and women should also reflect on how to *supplement* their attribution patterns in negotiation situations. Both men and women could reflect on how motives that are not yet present in their motive repertoire could have influenced their decision on whether to initiate or avoid a negotiation and thus consciously *supplement* their initiation and avoidance attributions. In this way – in the long run – the negotiator role could be supplemented (not shifted towards one gender) to make it more androgynous and equally applicable for men and women without social and self-related sanctions.

Limitations

In our work, we investigated retrospectively self-reported motives for negotiation initiation and avoidance, which might bias our results, because people are not very accurate at reporting on their own mental processes or the causes of their own behavior (Ross, 1977). Future research should apply triangulation, that is, different research methods such as behavioral observation or implicit motive tests, to investigate whether men and women really differ regarding their initiation and avoidance motives, or whether they rather attribute their behaviors to different motives to legitimize them post hoc.

In Study 1, the wording we used in our questionnaire (asking students whether they had negotiated about a grade with an instructor at least once because they disagreed with that grade) could have led to biased results. The term “negotiate” may have led female students to classify themselves as avoiders, while they might have been just as likely as male students to “inquire” or “ask” about a grade (cf. Small et al., 2007). Moreover, one could argue that the scenario more closely resembled a conflict rather than a negotiation. To account for these biases and limitations, we replicated initiation and avoidance motives in negotiation situations across a broad range of situations in Study 2, in which we defined negotiations as discussions with the aim of improving results, which should have reduced gender bias in recall probabilities. However, in Study 2, we can neither fully exclude the possibility that participants differed (maybe even systematically along gender lines) in what they considered a negotiation situation nor whether they considered situations in which they negotiated on behalf of someone else. Thus, future research could investigate whether women’s motives to ask or inquire are similar to men’s motives to negotiate. Or, vice versa, whether men’s motives to avoid asking or inquiring are similar to women’s motives to avoid negotiating (same action, different label). Future research could also investigate whether men and women systematically differ in their interpretations of situations as negotiations, disputes or conflicts and whether motives differ when negotiating on behalf of oneself or someone else.

In our attempt to examine the intrapsychic mechanisms behind the well-replicated main effect of gender on the initiation of negotiation, we looked into single initiation and avoidance motives in relative isolation. The complex interplay of motives and their procedural sequence (as suggested by Reif & Brodbeck, 2014 and examined in Reif & Brodbeck, 2021) was not the focus of this work. However, despite not showing motives’ procedural sequence, we untangled their structural differences in terms of modes, relationality and regulatory focus.

Conclusion

Besides women, men, too, face difficulties in negotiation situations due to the specific content and structure of the male gender role and gender status. Taking an intrapsychic perspective, we showed how men and women fall back on different modes, relational and regulatory foci of motives to explain their behaviors in a way that is consistent with their gender roles. With our findings we not only contribute to gender research, negotiation research, and gender-in-negotiation research, but also to research on human motivation in general.

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Appendix A

Percentages of Men and Women Who Mentioned the Respective Motives for Initiating or Avoiding a Negotiation



Note. Study 1; Percentages represent the ratio between frequencies of female (male) mentions of motives and the total number of women (men) in the sample. Multiple mentions of motives per person were possible. Participants most often mentioned negative discrepancy, negative affect, high valance, an opportunity to talk, positive instrumentality (achieve benefits regarding grade), and facilitating aspects regarding the negotiation partner as motives for initiating a negotiation (left side). Participants most often mentioned inhibiting aspects regarding the negotiation partner, no discrepancy, low valance, no opportunity to talk, negative general attitude, no expectancy (low negotiation ability), and no expectancy in terms of low likelihood of success as motives for avoiding a negotiation (right side).

Appendix B

Items Used in Study 2 and Internal Consistencies (α)

Items for initiation situation *I initiated this negotiation because…*	**Items for avoidance situation** *I did not initiate this negotiation because…*
Negative discrepancy (α = .798)	No discrepancy (α = .802)
– how the situation turned out or rather my result was worse than expected. – how the situation turned out or rather my result could have been better. – how the situation turned out or rather my result did not meet my expectations.	– how the situation turned out or rather my result was better than expected. – how the situation turned out or rather my result could have been worse.* – how the situation turned out or rather my result met my expectations.
Negative affect (α = .905)	Positive affect (α = .885)
– I perceived how the situation turned out or rather my result to be unfair. – I was unsatisfied with how the situation turned out or rather my result. – I was angry about how the situation turned out or rather my result. – I was disappointed with how the situation turned out or rather my result.	– I perceived how the situation turned out or rather my result to be fair. – I was satisfied with how the situation turned out or rather my result. – I was happy about how the situation turned out or rather my result. – I was pleasantly surprised by how the situation turned out or rather my result.
High valence (α = .690)	Low valence (α = .792)
– a satisfactory solution in this situation was very important to me. – a better solution in this situation was very attractive for me.* – I considered it worthwhile to come out of this situation with a satisfactory solution. – I was dependent upon a satisfactory solution in this situation.*	– a satisfactory solution in this situation was not important to me. – a better solution in this situation was not very attractive for me.* – I did not consider it worthwhile to come out of this situation with a satisfactory solution. – I was not dependent upon a satisfactory solution in this situation.*
Self-related benefits (α = .701)	Self-related costs (α = .901)
– I thought I would enjoy initiating the negotiation. – I thought initiating the negotiation would evoke positive feelings in me. – I saw initiating the negotiation as a positive challenge for myself.	– I though initiating the negotiation would cost me time and energy. – I thought initiating the negotiation would stress me out. – I thought initiating the negotiation would fray my nerves.
Relational benefits (α = .645)	Relational costs (α = .754)
– I thought I could position myself towards my negotiation partner by initiating the negotiation. – I thought I could make myself heard by my negotiation partner by initiating the negotiation. – I thought I could impress my negotiation partner by initiating the negotiation.	– I thought initiating the negotiation would threaten my relationship with my negotiation partner. – I thought I would embarrass myself in front of my negotiation partner by initiating the negotiation. – I thought initiating the negotiation would leave a bad impression on my negotiation partner.
Economic benefits (α = .675)	Economic costs (α = .857)

– I thought I would improve my result by initiating the negotiation. – I thought I would achieve a more lucrative solution for myself by initiating the negotiation. – I thought initiating the negotiation would affirm my result.	– I thought I would worsen my result by initiating the negotiation. – I thought I would achieve a worse solution for myself by initiating the negotiation. – I thought initiating the negotiation would jeopardize my result.
Positive expectancy (α = .848)	No expectancy (α = .912)
– I thought this issue was negotiable. – I was certain I would do well in this negotiation. – I thought I would have good chances in this negotiation. – I thought I would be able to carry my point in this negotiation. – I was convinced I would be a good negotiator in this situation. – I assumed I would be successful if I negotiated in this situation. – I felt capable of initiating this negotiation. – I had no problem with initiating this negotiation. – it was easy for me to initiate this negotiation.	– I thought this issue was not negotiable. – I was certain I would not do well in this negotiation. – I thought I would not have good chances in this negotiation. – I thought I would not be able to carry my point in this negotiation. – I was convinced I would not be a good negotiator in this situation. – I assumed I would not be successful if I negotiated in this situation. – I felt incapable of initiating this negotiation. – I had a problem with initiating this negotiation. – it was difficult for me to initiate this negotiation.
Facilitating aspects related to the negotiation partner (α = .666)	Inhibiting aspects related to the negotiation partner (α = .804)
– my negotiation partner was easy to reach. – my negotiation partner was generally open to negotiations. – ġfound my negotiation partner likable. – ġwas on equal footing with my negotiation partner.*	– my negotiation partner was not easy to reach. – my negotiation partner was generally not open to negotiations. – ġfound my negotiation partner unlikable. – ġfelt inferior to my negotiation partner.
Facilitating aspects related to the negotiation situation	Inhibiting aspects related to the negotiation situation
– the situation made it easy to negotiate.	– it was not possible to negotiate in this situation.
Facilitating aspects related to the negotiator (α = .816)	Inhibiting aspects related to the negotiator (α = .849)
– I generally enjoy negotiating – I think it's a good idea to initiate negotiations.	– I generally dislike negotiating – I think it's a bad idea to initiate negotiations.

Note. * item was excluded in the analyses because doing so led to improved internal consistency.

Appendix C

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in Study 2

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 Discrepancy	{.798} [.802]	.807**	.091	-.100	.102	.268**	-.028	-.189**	-.025	-.141*	.141*
2 Affect	.894**	{.905} [.885]	.115	-.169*	.143*	.120	-.086	-.191**	-.057	-.146*	.251**
3 Valence	.288**	.307**	{.690} [.792]	.137	.197**	.223**	.305**	.053	.112	.151*	.176*
4 Self-related instrumentality	-.165*	-.207**	.261**	{.701} [.901]	.337**	.284**	.502**	.201**	.208**	.513**	-.188**
5 Relational instrumentality	.073	.003	.202**	.316**	{.645} [.754]	.122	.268**	.195**	.077	.218**	.044
6 Economic instrumentality	.193**	.170*	.193**	.148*	.350**	{.675} [.857]	.475**	-.007	.258**	.095	-.098
7 Expectancy	-.123	-.187**	.137	.547**	.610**	.400**	{.848} [.912]	.211**	.504**	.579**	-.145*
8 Negotiation partner	-.212**	-.304**	.083	.508**	.458**	.345**	.747**	{.666} [.804]	.421**	.025	.112
9 Negotiation situation	-.067	-.093	.087	.228**	.208**	.351**	.415**	.410**	{-} [-]	.231**	.056
10 Negotiator	-.017	-.022	.245**	.448**	.342**	.021	.522**	.291**	.041	{.816} [.849]	-.274**
11 Gender (1=male, 2=female)	-.118	-.120	-.012	.379**	.161*	.114	.311**	.349**	.174*	.286**	{-} [-]
M (SD) initiation situation	4.34 (1.67)	3.81 (1.84)	6.13 (1.00)	3.97 (1.51)	3.07 (1.40)	5.41 (1.31)	5.30 (1.05)	4.61 (1.43)	5.08 (1.71)	4.45 (1.73)	1.57 (0.50)
M (SD) avoidance situation	3.23 (1.70)	3.30 (1.66)	3.52 (1.54)	4.56 (1.92)	3.64 (1.68)	3.36 (1.80)	3.77 (1.58)	3.34 (1.68)	3.31 (1.82)	2.79 (1.73)	1.57 (0.50)

Note. Numbers in diagonal show Cronbach's alphas for {initiation situations} and [avoidance situations]. Correlations for initiation situations (N = 200) are shown above the diagonal. Correlations for avoidance situations (N = 198) are shown below the diagonal. Items were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *completely disagree*; 7 = *completely agree*). ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed).

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Getting off to a "Hot" Start: How the Timing of Expressed Anger Influences Relational Outcomes in Negotiation

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Abstract

While expressing anger during a negotiation can have positive effects on expressers' economic outcomes (e.g., larger concessions from their counterparts), it can also have adverse effects on their relational outcomes (e.g., decreased trust and a damaged relationship). However, little is known about whether and how the timing of expressed anger may affect expressers' relational outcomes. Because negotiation is a dynamic social interaction that consists of various stages or phases, anger expressed at early vs. late stages of a negotiation may lead to different responses from a counterpart. Drawing on research on the temporal effects of negotiation strategies and tactics, we hypothesized that anger expression (vs. no anger) in negotiation will hurt expressers' relational outcomes, and anger expressed at a late (vs. early) stage will be especially detrimental. Two studies provided consistent empirical support for our hypotheses. Practical implications and directions for future research are discussed.

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* Asterisk denotes equal contribution.

> Anybody can become angry, that is easy; but to be angry with the right person, and to the right degree, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way, that is not within everybody's power, that is not easy.
>
> —Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*

Over the past few decades, scholars of negotiation have sought to understand the role that emotion plays in negotiation (see Van Kleef & Côté, 2018). Anger has been of particular interest because it tends to occur during the negotiation process (Fisher et al., 1990; Olekalns & Druckman, 2014). Research has shown that expressing anger in negotiation can yield economic or financial benefits for the expressers (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004), suggesting that showing anger may be a good strategy for negotiators who are looking to elicit greater concessions from their counterparts. However, more recent research has also found that anger can have adverse effects on the expressers' relationship with their counterparts (e.g., Campagna et al., 2016; Pietroni et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012), which means that anger is at best a double-edged sword that needs to be wielded with caution in negotiation, if at all.

In light of these findings, one is left to wonder, 'should negotiators express anger in negotiation?' Is it possible for negotiators to show their frustration and dismay, which tend to arise in a conflict situation, without jeopardizing their long-term relationship with their counterparts? To answer these questions, we propose that scholars ask the question of *when*, as opposed to *whether*, negotiators should express anger during a negotiation. Because negotiators are typically expected to transition from a competitive orientation to a more cooperative one in negotiation (Lytle et al., 1999; Pruitt, 1981), we argue that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages of a negotiation or those who express no anger at all.

Anger and Negotiation

Negotiation is a give-and-take decision-making process that commonly evokes negative emotions, especially anger, which may explain why so much research has been conducted on the effects of anger in negotiation (Olekalns & Druckman, 2014; Van Kleef & Côté, 2018). Whereas some scholars focus on the causes of anger in negotiation (e.g., Butt & Choi, 2006; Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999; Johnson et al., 2009; Pillutla & Murnigham, 1996), a large majority of research seeks to explain the effects of anger on the economic and relational outcomes (e.g., Allred, 2000; Filipowicz et al., 2011; Lelieveld et al., 2012; Overbeck et al., 2010; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004).

Regarding the economic outcomes of a negotiation, anger has been shown to benefit the expresser because of its effects on the recipient's concession-making behavior (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004). For example, Van Kleef et al. (2004) found that in a computer-mediated negotiation, negotiators lowered their demands and made larger concessions to an angry counterpart than to a happy one because they inferred that an angry negotiator had a higher limit or resistance point. Similarly, Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) reported empirical evidence that compared to those who displayed no emotion, negotiators who expressed anger were able to claim more value because they were viewed by their counterparts as tougher. The positive effects of expressed anger on economic outcomes can carry over to future negotiations as the recipients of anger continue to perceive their angry counterparts to be tough and, as a result, lower their demands in subsequent negotiations (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010).

While anger can help the expressers improve their economic outcomes in both the current and subsequent negotiations, it can also create negative repercussions including retaliation from the counterpart (Allred, 1999, 2000; Wang et al., 2012), the reciprocation of anger (Friedman et al., 2004), the introduction of deceptive behavior into the negotiation (Olekalns & Smith, 2009), and the increased likelihood of a badly damaged relationship (Allred et al., 1997; Pietroni et al., 2009; Van Beest & Scheepers, 2013). Essentially, research shows what many could have guessed intuitively—that expressing anger does not bode well for long-term relationships. For instance, anger can lower the recipient's impression of the expresser (Côté et al., 2013; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010), cause the recipient to exclude the expresser from coalitions (Van Beest et al., 2008), reduce the desire to work with the expresser in the future (Allred et al., 1997; Van Beest & Scheepers, 2013), and decrease trust between the parties (Liu & Wang, 2010).

The Importance of Timing in Negotiation

Prior research in the negotiation literature has demonstrated the important role of timing on the effectiveness of various negotiation strategies and tactics. For instance, Swaab et al. (2011) examined the effects of linguistic mimicry on negotiation outcomes and found that linguistic mimicry was more effective at early (vs. late) stages of a negotiation. In one study, mimicking a counterpart's language in the first 10 minutes of an online negotiation improved a negotiator's individual outcomes, as compared with mimicking in the last 10 minutes or no mimicking, because early linguistic mimicry enhanced the trust between the parties (Swaab et al., 2011). Another negotiation strategy for which timing is important is threat, which is often used to extract concessions in a negotiation. For example, research shows that the effectiveness of threats in negotiation is determined in part by when it is used. Implicit threats, or threats that fail to specify the precise consequences for non-compliance, were more effective in eliciting concessions when issued at early (vs. late) stages of a negotiation because they were perceived as more credible early in a negotiation (Sinaceur & Neale, 2005).

In fact, early stages of a negotiation are highly malleable and can thus set the tone for the entire negotiation (Morris & Keltner, 2000; Pruitt, 1981). For instance, conversational dynamics such as vocal mirroring that occurred within the first five minutes of a negotiation accounted for up to 30% of the variance in individual outcomes (Curhan & Pentland, 2007). Furthermore, breaching someone's trust at the start (vs. later stages) of a social interaction can have more negative long-term consequences (Lount et al., 2008). However, when trust is breached and someone is wronged in an interpersonal conflict scenario, apologies tend to be more effective when they are issued at later (vs. earlier) stages of the conflict (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005). In two studies that involved real and hypothetical conflict scenarios, Frantz and Bennigson (2005) found that individuals who were wronged by another were more satisfied with late apologies than early ones because they had more time to express themselves to the perpetrator and, as a result, felt better heard and understood.

Based on prior research on the timing of negotiation strategies and tactics, we propose that the effects of anger on negotiators' relational outcomes also depend on when it is expressed. Previous research has shown that anger can sometimes be viewed as appropriate in negotiation (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), particularly when it is directed at the negotiation offer or behavior, rather than at the negotiatior (Steinel et al., 2008). In addition to the target of negotiators' anger, we argue that the timing of expressed anger can also influence how the recipient perceives it because the negotiation process consists of stages or phases that are commonly characterizied by different strategies or behaviors (Adair & Brett, 2005; Pruitt, 1981; Putnam & Jones, 1982). For example, Adair and Brett (2005) proposed and found empirical support for a four-stage negotiation model that can illustrate the temporal progression of a mixed-motive negotiation. Based on this model, negotiations are sequentially divided into four time periods: relational positioning, identifying the problem, generating solutions, and reaching agreement (Adair & Brett, 2005). Each stage of a negotiation is characterized by a unique combination of negotiator motives, expectations, and behaviors.

Early stages of a negotiation typically consist of negotiator behaviors such as posturing, positioning (e.g., affective persuasion), and generally more competitive bargaining to establish power in the negotiation (Adair & Brett, 2005; Lytle et al., 1999; Pruitt, 1981; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005). As part of affective persuasion

(Adair & Brett, 2005), negotiators may express anger (e.g., toward their counterparts' initial offer) to signal their toughness and establish a strong bargaining position. Importantly, the recipients of anger expression will hardly be surprised at this stage of a negotiation because it is likely that they already expect their counterparts to engage in some form of posturing and positioning, and anger expression meets that expectation. In other words, when anger is expressed at early stages (e.g., the beginning) of a negotiation, the recipients will likely infer that the expressers are showing anger simply because they are following the unwritten rules of negotiation and not because they are prone to negative emotions or particularly unreasonable.

Compared with the early stages of a negotiation, late stages tend to be characterized by a move away from exclusively competitive bargaining and an adoption of increasingly rational, cooperative negotiation strategies and tactics if an agreement is to be reached (Lytle et al., 1999; Pruitt, 1981). In other words, as a negotiation moves away from the early stages that are often characterized by a lack of information about one another's interests and priorities, affective appeals (Adair & Brett, 2004, 2005) will likely be less expected by negotiators and therefore may be particularly harmful to the relational outcomes of those who use them. In other words, when anger is expressed at late stages (e.g., the middle or end) of a negotiation, the recipients will likely find it unexpected, especially when the parties have spent a considerable amount of time in exchanging offers and making concessions and/or are getting closer to an agreement. Furthermore, they may infer that the anger expressers are difficult to work with and care about their own interests more than others' or the relationship between the parties.

In sum, based on research on anger in negotiation and the temporal effects of negotiation strategies and behaviors (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005; Pruitt, 1981), we hypothesize that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiaiton will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages. In addition, consistent with the findings in prior research (e.g., Allred et al., 1997; Pietroni et al., 2009; Van Beest & Scheepers, 2013), we also hypothesize that negotiators who express anger (e.g., at early or late stages) during a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who do not. We tested our hypotheses in an online study and a face-to-face study. We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures (Simmons et al., 2012).

Study 1

Method

Participants

We recruited 220 participants based in the United States from the Prolific participant pool in exchange for monetary payment and received 219 complete responses.[2] Two participants failed one of our two attention checks and, in accordance with the preregistration, were excluded from the analyses, leaving a final sample size of N = 217. Of these participants, 79.7% were female, 16.6% were male, 65.0% were White or European American, 18.4% were Latino or Hispanic, 9.2% were Asian or Asian American, 5.1% were Black or African American, and 2.3% self-identified as Other. Participants had a mean of 27.5 years of age (SD = 9.20).

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[2] Sample size, exclusion criteria, hypotheses, procedures, and materials were all preregistered *a priori* on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/9p5qa.

Procedure

After consenting to take part in the study, participants read a scenario about purchasing a used furniture set from an online classified ad posting. The ad listed the seller's asking price for the set as $1500. Participants were told that they hoped to purchase the set for $800 (i.e., their aspiration price), since a similar set recently sold for that amount. They were also told that they could spend no more than $1200 (i.e., their reservation price) because that was all the money they had. Before proceeding to the negotiation rounds, participants were required to pass three comprehension check questions about their aspiration price, their reservation price, and the price of the furniture set that recently sold online.

Next, participants were told that they would be paired with another online participant, who would play the role of the seller, to negotiate for the final price of the furniture set. The computer displayed a timer that ticked off nine seconds while it was purportedly searching for another online participant. To increase believability that a real person would be paired with the participants for the study, they were told that another online participant could not be found. They were then told that if the computer failed to find a negotiation counterpart for them the second time, they would be returned to the platform and paid for their time. The computer then searched again for four seconds and this time reported that another online participant had been found and was prepared to act as the seller in the negotiation. In reality, the computer was the seller.

Participants were then presented a screen with two text boxes. In the first box, they were asked to type an optional message to the seller. In the second box, they were asked to type their initial price offer, which was required. This was repeated for each of the six rounds. Each time, the computer waited a moment and then a new screen appeared with the seller's (computer's) response message, as well as a counteroffer from the seller (computer). For instance, after the first round, participants saw this message: "i could take $1400." Messages intentionally included typographical errors to further increase believability.

To ensure that participants did not finish early and therefore skew their perceptions of timing in the negotiation, they were not allowed to offer more than $1200 (i.e., their reservation price). The seller's (computer's) offers, on the other hand, started at $1400 and decreased gradually but never fell below $1200. As a result, there was no positive bargaining zone until the final negotiation round. The computer's offers were standard across conditions. After the sixth and final round, the computer accepted participants' final offers and the negotiation ended.

Timing of Anger Manipulation

To manipulate the timing of expressed anger, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: control (no anger), early anger, and late anger. In the control (no anger) condition, participants received neutral messages from the seller (computer) in all six rounds. In the early anger condition, participants received an angry message from the seller (computer) in round 1 and neutral messages in all other rounds. In the late anger condition, participants received an angry message in round 5 and neutral messages in all other rounds. The angry message presented in both the early and late anger conditions was adapted from Van Kleef et al. (2004) and read, "WHAT??! Are you kidding me?? u are really making me mad. It is the [NUMBER] ROUND of this negotiation and i am so angry that you would even consider an offer of [buyer's most recent offer] at this point. That kind of offer ticks me off. i could take [seller's next offer]". The counteroffers and messages across the six rounds are presented in the Appendix.

Measures

Feelings about the Relationship. We used the 4-item relationship subscale of the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) (Curhan et al., 2006) to measure relational outcomes after the negotiation. Participants answered the following four questions based on a 7-point scale (1 = *extremely negative or not at all*, 7 = *extremely positive or perfectly*): "What kind of "overall" impression did your counterpart make on you?", "How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart as a result of this negotiation?", "Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart?", and "Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your counterpart?" (Curhan et al., 2006). These items were averaged together to form a composite score of Feelings about the Relationship (α = .96).

Desire for Future Interaction. We used the Desire for Future Interaction scale, which is a measure of negotiators' willingness to work with their counterparts in the future (Ames et al., 2004), as a secondary measure of relational outcomes after the negotiation. Participants indicated their level of agreement (1 = *completely disagree*, 7 = *completely agree*) with the following two statements: "I'd be willing to do a favor for my counterpart in the future," and "I'd look forward to future interaction with my counterpart" (Ames et al. 2004). The two items were significantly and positively correlated (r = .86) and thus averaged together to form a composite score of Desire for Future Interaction.[3]

Other Measures. Participants also completed a two-question manipulation check. The first question asked, "Did your counterpart express anger during the negotiation?" (yes/no). Those who answered "yes" were then shown a second question that asked, "When did your counterpart express anger during the negotiation?" Options ranged from "round 1" to "round 6". We also measured participants' felt anger as an exploratory variable. Specifically, participants were asked, "How angry did you feel during the negotiation?" (1 = *not angry at all*, 7 = *extremely angry*). After answering this question, as well as basic demographic items, participants were asked another exploratory question, "While you were negotiating, how confident were you that you were negotiating with a real person?" (1 = *I was not confident at all that I was negotiating with a real person*, 7 = *I was completely confident that I was negotiating with a real person*). We refer to this exploratory variable as "confidence" in the analyses.[4]

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables are presented in Table 1. To check the effectiveness of our anger manipulation, we examined participants' answers to the two manipulation check questions. As discussed previously, we first asked participants to indicate *whether* their counterpart expressed anger during the negotiation (yes/no). We expected those in the control (no anger) condition to answer "no" and those in the early and late anger conditions to answer "yes." All but one (98.6%) of the participants in the control condition answered this question correctly. Similarly, all but one (98.6%) of those

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[3] In addition to completing the Feelings about the Relationship and the Desire for Future Interaction scales at the end of the negotiation, participants also responded to the items of these two scales after rounds one, three, and five. These within-negotiation measures were exploratory, as mentioned in the preregistration materials, and the analyses are available in a Supplemental Analyses document available at https://tinyurl.com/2s3wjzf2.

[4] All main analyses were repeated with felt anger and confidence as the covariates, and results remained the same. These analyses are available in the Supplemental Analyses document available at https://tinyurl.com/2s3wjzf2.

in the early anger condition and all but two (97.3%) of those in the late anger condition answered this question correctly. A chi-square analysis was statistically significant, χ^2 (2, N = 217) = 199.45, p < .001, suggesting that the manipulation of expressed anger was successful.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Feelings about the Relationship	3.29	1.72									
2. Desire for Future Interaction	2.99	1.77	.87**								
3. Round 1 Offer	791.29	169.29	.04	.06							
4. Round 2 Offer	943.59	176.24	.07	.08	.62**						
5. Round 3 Offer	1042.77	193.66	.07	.07	.45**	.84**					
6. Round 4 Offer	1087.43	192.44	.13	.12	.32**	.69**	.85**				
7. Round 5 Offer	1116.22	184.38	.15*	.13	.25**	.61**	.79**	.78**			
8. Round 6 Offer	1100.37	249.84	.10	.11	.08	.35**	.50**	.52**	.53**		
9. Participants' felt anger	2.58	1.45	-.35**	-.33**	.04	.00	-.03	-.08	-.04	-.11	
10. Confidence (it was a real person)	3.01	1.88	.24**	.21**	-.04	-.03	.03	.08	.14*	.09	-.14*

*p < .05. **p < .01.

We then asked participants in the early and late anger conditions to indicate *when* their counterparts expressed anger during the negotiation. Participants could select any round, from round 1 to round 6. All but two (97.2%) of those in the early anger condition gave the correct answer and indicated that their counterparts expressed anger in round 1 of the negotiation. All but three (95.8%) of those in the late anger condition answered the question correctly and said that their counterparts expressed anger in round 5 of the negotiation. A chi-square analysis was statistically significant, χ^2 (6, N = 144) = 190.65, p < .001, suggesting that our manipulation of the timing of expressed anger was effective.

Because we had three experimental conditions, we ran a series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and pairwise comparisons to test our hypotheses. We started with Feelings about the Relationship, which was our primary measure of relational outcomes. Results showed that there was a statistically significant difference in Feelings about the Relationship across conditions, F(2, 210) = 32.21, p < .001, η_p^2 = .24. As predicted, participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.34, SD = 1.43) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the early anger condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.46), p = .001, η_p^2 = .30. Participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.34, SD = 1.43) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the control condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.63), p < .001, η_p^2 = .12. Participants in the early anger condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.46) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the control condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.63), p < .001, η_p^2 = .08. Together, these findings provided empirical support for our prediction that while anger expression (vs. no anger) during a negotiation will hurt the expresser's relational outcomes after the negotiation, anger expressed at a late (vs. early) stage will be especially detrimental.

We then turned to Desire for Future Interaction, which was our secondary measure of relational outcomes. Results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in Desire for Future Interaction across conditions, $F(2, 214)$ = 16.72, p < .001, η_p^2 = .14. Again, as predicted, participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.20, SD = 1.50) were less willing to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the early anger condition (M = 2.99, SD = 1.67), p = .004, η_p^2 = .19. Participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.20, SD = 1.50) experienced less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.80), p < .001, η_p^2 = .05. Participants in the early anger condition (M = 2.99, SD = 1.67) also had less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.80), p = .004, η_p^2 = .06.

Finally, we conducted exploratory analyses to see whether there were any differences in the economic outcome of the expresser as a function of the existence and timing of expressed anger. The means and standard deviations of participants' offers by conditions are presented in Table 2. We ran a series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and pairwise comparisons to examine participants' offers at rounds 2 and 6 and their concessions at rounds 2 and 6, which were calculated by subtracting their offers at rounds 1 and 5 from their offers at rounds 2 and 6, respectively. We focused on offers and concessions at rounds 2 and 6 because they were the two rounds that immediately followed the rounds (i.e., rounds 1 and 5) in which anger was expressed in the early and late anger conditions, respectively. In addition, round 6 was the final round of the negotiation in which the seller (computer) accepted each participant's final offer.

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations for Offers by Conditions

Round	Computer Offer	Control (No Anger)		Early Anger		Late Anger	
		M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
1	1400	787.32	172.94	797.64	169.91	788.92	167.28
2	1320	950.85	134.06	937.57	237.18	942.50	140.95
3	1280	1057.39	130.01	1016.49	280.08	1054.32	132.07
4	1240	1113.17	107.65	1060.38	261.78	1089.07	174.48
5	1220	1143.73	92.14	1068.26	281.60	1136.47	109.12
6	N/A	1129.51	167.10	1102.08	247.77	1070.74	310.63

Results showed that the only statistically significant difference in the economic outcomes was the concessions by the participants at round 6 between the early and late anger conditions, $F(2, 214)$ = 3.93, p = .021, η_p^2 = .04. Specifically, participants in the late anger condition (M = -65.73, SD = 304.09) conceded less than those in the early anger condition (M = 33.82, SD = 145.53), p = .021, η_p^2 = .04. The result of this exploratory analysis may suggest that expressing anger at a late stage (e.g., toward the end) of a negotiation might have backfired, causing anger recipients to concede less than they otherwise would have. Despite this difference in round 6 concessions, there was no statistically significant difference in participants' final offers between any of the conditions.

Discussion

Results of Study 1 provided strong empirical support for our hypotheses that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages, and that negotiators who express anger (e.g., at early or late stages) during a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who do not. We used two established scales (i.e., Feelings about the Relationship, and Desire for Future Interaction) to measure relational outcomes and found evidence that negotiators were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and experienced less desire to interact with them in the future when their counterparts expressed anger, especially at late stages of a negotiation, than when no anger was expressed. Additionally, exploratory analyses revealed that negotiators whose counterparts expressed anger at a late stage of the negotiation (i.e., at round 5) made smaller concessions at round 6 than those whose counterparts had expressed anger at an early stage (i.e., at round 1). This could indicate that expressing anger late in a negotiation may hurt the expresser not only relationally, but economically as well, even though there was no statistically significant difference between participants' final offers across the two anger conditions.

Although results of Study 1 provided initial empirical support for our hypotheses, two questions remain. First, we used an online negotiation task in Study 1, and the anger expression was embedded in a computer-mediated message. While the nature of this negotiation rendered the test of our hypotheses a conservative one due to the lack of stimuli (e.g., participants only received typed messages and not verbal or nonverbal anger cues), it is an open question whether the same effects can be observed in a face-to-face setting in which negotiators can express anger more vividly (e.g., by using a variety of verbal and nonverbal messages including raised voice and frowning). Second, the negotiation task in Study 1 was purely distributive in that negotiators had only one issue to discuss (i.e., the price of a used furniture set) and needed to compete with each other to claim more value for themselves. In other words, no integrative potential existed in this negotiation. In Study 2, we sought to replicate the timing effects of expressed anger on negotiators' relational outcomes in a face-to-face negotiation in which negotiators could use additional cues to express anger and in which they could jointly create value and achieve an integrative outcome.

Study 2

Method

Participants

Sixty-five MBA students were recruited from two MBA courses at a large university in the western United States to participate in this study as part of an in-class exercise.[5] Because the size of this convenience sample was smaller than the one in Study 1 and our main interest was in comparing the effects of anger

[5] We did not collect typical demographic data in Study 2 because this study was conducted as part of an MBA course where we had limited time. We were able to administer a short questionnaire that contained only items that were directly relevant to the research question. For the reader's information, recent reports show that the program's average age is approximately 29, and about 25% of admitted students are women.

expressed at early versus late stages of a negotiation, we had two conditions including anger at an early stage (i.e., the beginning) and anger at a late stage (i.e., the middle). We did not include a control (no anger) condition in this study so that we could increase the statistical power of our analyses. No participants were excluded from our analyses.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to either the buyer or the seller role in the Myti-Pet negotiation, which is a dispute resolution situation that offers some integrative potential. They then negotiated in a team of two or three, against another team of two or three. To simplify the procedure, all participants in the role of buyer were instructed to express anger during the negotiation. To manipulate the timing of expressed anger, the buyer teams were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: early anger and late anger. Those in the early anger condition were instructed to act angry for the first 10 minutes of the negotiation, and those in the late anger condition were instructed to act angry for 10 minutes beginning at the half-way point in the negotiation (i.e., 22 minutes into the planned 45-minute negotiation). It would have been ideal to video-record these negotiations to ensure that anger was expressed at the appropriate times. However, since it was not feasible at the time of data collection, the experimenter visited each room 22 minutes into the negotiation to remind everyone that the negotiation time was half over. This visit served as a signal to the buyer teams in the late anger condition that it was time to start expressing anger.

To convincingly express anger in a face-to-face negotiation, participants in the buyer role were instructed to display one or more of the following behaviors during the negotiation: raising their voice, frowning, interrupting the other party, and banging their fists on the table. These instructions were adapted from Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006). After the negotiation ended, all participants filled out a survey questionnaire that included a manipulation check and dependent measures. However, only responses from anger recipients (i.e., the sellers) were analyzed, since the reaction to anger expression was the focus of our research.

Measures

Feelings about the Relationship. We used the same 4-item relationship subscale of the SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) as a primary measure of anger expressers' relational outcomes. These items were averaged together to form a composite score of Feelings about the Relationship (α = .84). Participants were also asked to write a few sentences to explain their answers to the Feelings about the Relationship, but this open-ended question was exploratory and was not analyzed.

Desire for Future Interaction. In addition, we also used the same two-item Desire for Future Interaction scale (Ames et al., 2004) as a secondary measure of anger expressers' relational outcomes. The two items were significantly and positively correlated (r = .78) and were averaged together to form a composite score of the Desire for Future Interaction.

Other Measures. Although our questionnaire contained the entire 16-item SVI (Curhan et al., 2006), we only analyzed the relationship subscale because the other three subscales (i.e., outcome, process, and self) were not directly related to our hypotheses. Additional questions included in our survey asked participants whether their counterparts expressed anger during the negotiation, how believable their counterparts' anger was, whether they themselves expressed anger during the negotiation, and whether they had been instructed to express anger.

Results

To check the effectiveness of our timing of anger manipulation, we asked the sellers to indicate when their counterparts expressed anger during the negotiation. They were asked to choose from three options: “at the beginning”, “toward the middle”, or “not at all”. Ninety-three percent of the sellers in the early anger condition reported that their counterparts expressed anger “at the beginning” of the negotiation. Eighty-two percent of the sellers in the late anger condition indicated that their counterparts expressed anger “toward the middle” of the negotiation. A chi-square analysis was significant, χ^2 (2, N = 26) = 18.83, $p < .001$, suggesting that our timing of anger manipulation was effective.

To test our hypothesis that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiaiton will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages, we ran a series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in the Feelings about the Relationship across the two conditions, $F(1, 29) = 11.05$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .26$. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.37$) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the early anger condition ($M = 5.34$, $SD = 1.38$), $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .26$.

Next, we turned to Desire for Future Interaction. Results indicated that there was also a statistically significant difference in Desire for Future Interaction across the two conditions, $F(1, 29) = 8.06$, $p =.008$, $\eta_p^2 = .21$. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.82$) had less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the early anger condition ($M = 5.38$, $SD = 1.45$), $p =.008$, $\eta_p^2 = .21$.[6]

To test the robustness of the timing effects of expressed anger, we also ran a series of analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) with sellers' own expressed anger and believability of buyers' expressed anger as covariates in the model. Results indicated that neither sellers’ expressed anger, $F(1, 27) = 3.01$, $p = .09$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$, nor believability of buyers’ expressed anger, $F(1, 27) = .27$, $p = .61$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, was significantly associated with Feelings about the Relationship. Importantly, with these two covariates in the model, the timing effect of expressed anger on Feelings about the Relationship remained significant, $F(1, 27) = 7.96$, $p = .009$, $\eta_p^2 = .23$. The overall model was also significant, $F(3, 27) = 5.41$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .38$. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition ($M = 3.79$, $SE = .36$) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the early anger condition ($M = 5.26$, $SE = .35$), $p = .009$.

In addition, results indicated that believability of buyers’ expressed anger was not significantly associated with Desire for Future Interaction, $F(1, 27) = .94$, $p = .34$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Sellers’ own expressed anger was significantly associated with Desire for Future Interaction, $F(1, 27) = 6.55$, $p = .016$, $\eta_p^2 = .20$, but with these two covariates in the model, the timing effect of buyers’ expressed anger on Desire for Future Interaction remained significant, $F(1, 27) = 6.20$, $p = .019$, $\eta_p^2 = .19$. The overall model was also significant, $F(3, 27) = 6.80$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .43$. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition ($M = 3.83$, $SE = .39$) experienced less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the early anger condition ($M = 5.25$, $SE = .38$), $p = .019$. Together, the results of these additional analyses provided further empirical support for our hypothesis.

Discussion

Results of Study 2 provided more empirical support for our hypothesis that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiaiton will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at

[6] Desire for Future Interaction and Feelings about the Relationship were also highly correlated ($r = .88$, $p < .001$).

early stages. Specifically, we found that negotiators were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and experienced less desire to interact with them in the future when their counterparts expressed anger at a late stage (vs. an early stage) of a negotiation. The fact that the negotiation in this study was face-to-face and also offered integrative potential increased our confidence in the finding that the timing of anger expression during a negotiation matters for the expresser from a relational point of view. Whereas negotiators may express their frustration and dismay with some relational impunity at an early stage of a negotiation, doing so at a late stage is particularly risky because it can severely damage the relationship between the parties.

General Discussion

In this research, we examined whether and how the timing of expressed anger influences negotiators' relational outcomes after a negotiation is over. An online study and a face-to-face study provided converging empirical support for our hypotheses that while anger expression (vs. no anger) in negotiation will hurt the expresser's relational outcomes after a negotiation, anger expressed at a late (vs. early) stage will be especially detrimental. Study 1 demonstrated that negotiators in an online distributive bargaining scenario were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and experienced less desire to interact with them in the future when their counterparts expressed anger than when they did not. The negative effects of expressed anger on the relational outcomes of the expresser were particularly pronounced when anger was expressed at late stages (vs. early stages) of a negotiation. Study 2 provided further empirical support for our hypothesis in that negotiators in a face-to-face, integrative negotiation were also less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and had less desire for future interaction when their counterparts expressed anger at a late (vs. early) stage of a negotiation. Together, these findings demonstrate a real relational risk associated with expressing anger in a negotiation, especially when a negotiation has moved past an early stage, which is often characterized by competitive positioning, and into a phase in which more cooperative, deal-making behaviors tend to be the norm.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

Our research makes several contributions to the literature on anger in negotiation. First, our findings extend the theoretical approaches to the benefits and drawbacks of anger expression in negotiation. Past research has shown that negotiation is a dynamic process in which early and late stages have qualitatively different purposes and foci (Olekalns & Weingart, 2008; Prietula & Weingart, 2011), and the frequency and sequencing of strategies and tactics can systematically affect negotiation outcomes (Olekalns & Smith, 2000). Across two studies, we showed that the timing of expressed anger had indeed influenced the relational outcomes of the expresser, such that late anger was more detrimental relationally than early anger. This suggests that negotiators need to be cognizant of not only *whether*, but also *when* they show their frustration and dismay, because expressing anger late in a negotiation could hurt their relational outcomes after the negotiation is over. Importantly, these findings are based on two different negotiation stimuli (i.e., distributive vs. integrative), two different samples (i.e., online working adults vs. full-time MBA students), and two different communication channels (i.e., computer-mediated vs. face-to-face). The consistency of results across the two studies has bolstered our confidence in the generalizability of these findings as they relate to the different types of negotiations, negotiation channels, and negotiators.

Second, our focus on negotiators' relational outcomes as a function of anger expression adds to a growing body of negotiation literature that examines the psychological and subjective aspects of negotiation outcomes that are valued by negotiators (Curhan et al., 2006; Curhan et al., 2010). For example, in addition to the economic outcomes of a negotiation, negotiators also evaluate their negotiation outcomes based on how the negotiation makes them feel about themselves, about the negotiation process, and about their relationship with their counterparts (Curhan et al., 2006). Because negotiators' relational outcomes can have an impact on their performance in future negotiations (Curhan et al., 2009; Curhan et al., 2010), it is important to investigate how negotiators' relational outcomes may be influenced by the timing of their expressed emotions. Our findings suggest that to maintain a positive long-term relationship, negotiators need to be especially careful about when they express a negative emotion, such as anger, during a negotiation. Whereas showing anger at early stages of a negotiation may be expected as part of posturing and affective persuasion (Adair & Brett, 2005), doing so late in a negotiation runs the risk of being perceived as counter-normative and can damage the long-term relationship between the parties.

Our research also contributes to the practice of negotiation in that we have shown that it is in negotiators' best interests to view their anger expression through a temporal lens, as they would other negotiation strategies and tactics, such as linguistic mimicry (Swaab et al., 2011), threats (Sinaceur & Neale, 2005), and apologies (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005). Because anger is a commonly experienced negative emotion during a negotiation, negotiators may be tempted to express it throughout a negotiation to convey their toughness and disapproval (e.g., of their counterpart's demand). However, our research suggests that, from a long-term, relational point of view, it makes sense for negotiators to be more strategic about when they show anger during a negotiation. While expressing anger at early stages (e.g., at the beginning) of a negotiation could bolster their position by sending a signal of toughness, negotiators are better served relationally by using alternative methods to communicate their frustration at late stages (e.g., toward the end) of a negotiation. For instance, rather than expressing anger toward their counterparts, negotiators may emphasize what all parties stand to gain from a potential agreement, or maybe even firmly point out what they could lose in the event of an impasse (Cialdini, 2007), especially after a considerable amount of time and effort have been devoted to the arduous process of deal making and when a mutually beneficial agreement is within reach.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

While this research broadens the lens through which we understand the influence of expressed anger on relational outcomes in negotiation, our studies have some limitations. First, our proposed mechanism underlying the timing effects of anger on the expressers' relational outcomes was theorized rather than directly tested. In other words, the findings in this research cannot tell us whether it was expectation violation or some other mechanism that could account for the observed effects. For example, it could be that rather than perceiving early or late anger from an expectation violation perspective, negotiators were more affected by the contrast of their counterpart's behavior over time. For instance, Hilty and Carnevale (1993) found that negotiators whose counterparts were tough at first and generous later gave more concessions than when the reverse order of strategies was used. This could have been because the negotiators were relieved or felt a sense of satisfaction about "winning over" a tough counterpart. The same could be true with an early versus late expression of anger. Future research needs to directly test the argument that the reason expressers of late (vs. early) anger in a negotiation have worse relational outcomes is because their counterparts expect them to replace a competitive initial approach with a more cooperative one as the negotiation progresses (Adair & Brett, 2005).

In addition, future research could explore another plausible explanation for the observed effects, which concerns trust repair in the negotiation. Recent findings in the trust literature show that individuals begin an interaction or a relationship with a relatively high level of initial trust (Lewicki et al., 2006). This trust then grows or diminishes as the interaction progresses. Lewicki et al. (2006) suggests that cooperation and predictability from the other party cause trust to grow, and trust is broken when these positive expectations are not met. When an individual enters a negotiation and is met with anger, trust may drop initially. However, trust may be rebuilt as the angry negotiator calms down and begins to cooperate and work toward a deal. In contrast, if a negotiation starts well, trust grows initially but can be damaged when a negotiator begins to express anger half-way through or toward the end of the negotiation. After the angry spell, there may not be enough time left in the negotiation to rebuild the trust before a deal is made and, as a consequence, relational outcomes may suffer. Future research can help to clarify the precise mechanism underlying our present observations.

Conclusion

Expressing anger in a negotiation can signal toughness and sometimes lead the other party to make larger concessions, but doing so can also hurt the relationship between the parties, thereby putting the expresser's long-term success in jeopardy. Our research suggests that *when* anger is expressed in a negotiation can also influence the expresser's relational outcomes. Compared with expressing anger late in the process, showing anger early in a negotiation can send a strong signal of toughness but at the same time decrease the risk of severe damage to the long-term relationship between parties. Aristotle was right—anyone can become angry. But knowing when to express anger during a negotiation process is essential to preserving important relationships and ensuring long-term success.

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Appendix

Full Computer Offers and Text Responses by Conditions

Round	Offer	Control (No Anger)	Early Anger	Late Anger
1	1400	i could take $1400.	WHAT??! Are you kidding me?? u are really making me mad. It is the FIRST ROUND of this negotiation and i am so angry that you would even consider an offer of $[buyer's offer] at this point. That kind of offer ticks me off. i could take $1400.	i could take $1400.
2	1320	That's too low, but i could do $1320.	That's too low, but i could do $1320.	That's too low, but i could do $1320.
3	1280	What about $1280?	What about $1280?	What about $1280?
4	1240	I'll come down to $1240.	I'll come down to $1240.	I'll come down to $1240.
5	1220	Can u agree to $1220?	Can u agree to $1220?	WHAT??! Are you kidding me?? u are really making me mad. It is the FIFTH ROUND of this negotiation and i am so angry that you would even consider an offer of $[buyer's offer] at this point. That kind of offer ticks me off. Can u agree to $1220?
6	N/A	OK, I'll take [buyer's final offer].	OK, I'll take [buyer's final offer].	OK, I'll take [buyer's final offer].