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Structuring and Integrating 50 Years of Research on Multi-Person Negotiations – The MTR Database

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Abstract

There is much research on multi-person negotiations, including negotiations between multiple parties, negotiations between large parties, or negotiations conducted by representatives on behalf of one or several constituency members. Despite the breadth of this research, it has developed in separate subfields, hindering progress and cross-fertilization. We present a database of 50 years of empirical research on multi-person negotiations, structured along three dimensions that distinguish multi-person from dyadic negotiations: (a) they include Multiple parties; and/or (b) at least one party may have more than one member, making it a Team; and/or (c) at least one party may negotiate through Representatives. Using two cases of research questions on multi-person negotiations, we exemplify how our database may help to i) identify gaps in the literature -unexplored but relevant areas in multi-person negotiation research- and ii) highlight how studies of the different forms of multi-person negotiations can learn from and inspire each other. We thereby provide a research agenda to inspire future scholars to capitalize on unique features of different forms of multi-person negotiations. We conclude with reviewing a large part of the database in a third case example.

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To reach agreements on how to implement austerity measures, several managers of departments within organizations need to negotiate with each other. After being elected, politicians often need to negotiate and form coalitions to implement policy plans. Large business transactions involve negotiating with multiple suppliers, clients and financing consortiums. Representing employers and employees, labor and union teams come together and negotiate new terms of employment. While all these examples of frequent societal events depict very different negotiations, they have in common that they all involve more than two persons.

Despite its relevance for real-world events, empirical research on negotiations often focuses on dyadic, rather than multi-person negotiations (Boothby et al., 2023; Brett & Thompson, 2016; Schaerer et al., 2020) despite acknowledging that the latter is in dire need of more research attention. Moreover, the available research on multi-person negotiations is fragmented. There has been surprisingly little integration between the various forms of multi-person negotiations, even though they share important characteristics and challenges. Thus, while researchers have investigated a variety of negotiation forms that qualify as multi-person negotiation, there is little knowledge on how these forms are related to each other and whether insights on one form extend to another. This might hinder advancement in the science of negotiations but also lead to unnecessary redundancies in research efforts (where negotiation forms are studied separately while observed effects are the same). Existing knowledge in one area of negotiations might not be found or used by researchers in another, potentially leading researchers to start from scratch or

alternatively incorrectly conceiving of their research question as novel and innovative, rather than building on the existing empirical evidence that is present. We thus argue for the integration of the fragmented field of multi-person negotiations. To that end, we review 50 years of empirical research of multi-person negotiations and organize it in a structured database. Importantly, our focus is on integrating the diversity of research on negotiations which involve more than two persons, not on comparing multi-person to dyadic negotiations. The database is structured based on a novel taxonomy to help researchers answer questions such as: which forms of multi-person negotiations have been studied extensively, and which have not yet received substantial empirical exploration; which forms of multi-person negotiations have distinct features that may call for separate examination and which forms share features, allowing for the integration of insights?

We first introduce the concept of multi-person negotiations and explain the motivation to form a structured database integrating research across all forms of multi-person negotiations. We next explain how we structured the literature and designed the MTR Database based on a novel taxonomy. Then, we provide an integrative research agenda, pointing to areas where researchers should further focus on the unique features of each multi-person negotiation form by identifying gaps in relevant knowledge for that specific negotiation form. We subsequently present three hypothetical cases illustrating the value of the database; one focusing on understudied research areas within multi-person negotiations, one focusing on how our database can promote cross-fertilization across subfields and one demonstrating how our database can help to review part of the literature.

The Importance of Studying Multi-Person Negotiations: Definition and Core Challenges Beyond Dyadic Negotiations

Drawing on the definition of negotiations provided by Thompson et al. (1988), we define multi-person negotiations as a decision-making process in which more than two individuals forming at least two parties with (perceived) divergent interests seek to reach an agreement. This broad definition encompasses negotiations between three or more parties; negotiations held between only two parties, when at least one party consists of more than one individual; and negotiations in which at least one party is relying on another person, an agent or representative, to conduct the negotiations. These three elements of multi-person negotiations can also be combined. For example, peace talks or climate change talks are held by delegations of several countries and are thus a combination of all three elements - with more than two parties, each including more than one person, who are representing their constituency group (nation).

Past reviews of multi-person negotiations have focused on one element of multi-person negotiations, for example team negotiations (Cohen & Thompson, 2011) or multi-party negotiations (Crump & Glendon, 2003). We argue that research fitting the above definition, whether it consists of team negotiations, multi-party negotiations, representative negotiations or a combination thereof, should all be considered as part of the larger literature on multi-person negotiations, because these forms share important elements and face similar challenges beyond those typical for dyadic negotiations.

We identify at least four core categories of challenges that are either only present in multi-person negotiations or likely exert a much more defining influence on the negotiations in such settings as compared to dyadic negotiations. Firstly, the challenge of interest alignment, where multiple persons likely all have at least slightly different interests. The difficulty of reaching an agreement increases when multiple and diverse interests and preferences need to be incorporated

in the agreement. Secondly, the information asymmetry challenge refers to increasing dispersion and availability of information between the multiple persons in the negotiation. This increases cognitive load and makes it difficult for individuals to decide if and with whom to share their information. Thirdly, the competition over cooperation challenge refers to the presence of the "interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect" (Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Wildschut et al., 2003): the presence of multiple persons heightens competition and reduces preferences for cooperation. This increases complexity in multi-person negotiations and potentially makes it harder to reach a win-win agreement. Finally, the challenge of process coordination relates to increased difficulty of coordinating processes and behavior in the presence of multiple people, parties, and layers of direct involvement. See Table 1 for a more detailed overview.

These challenges caused by the presence of more than two people at the negotiation table increase complexity in multiple ways compared to two-person, dyadic negotiations and beget research questions unique to multi-person negotiations (Boothby et al., 2023). Thus, research on dyadic negotiations may not provide insights into navigating these challenges. However, insights from research on one form of multi-person negotiations can frequently be applied to other forms because these forms regularly are affected by similar challenges. To facilitate the transfer of knowledge between the different forms we offer an integrated broad conceptualization of multi-person negotiations and created a comprehensive database to provide a structured overview of the literature.

Table 1 The challenges of multi-person negotiations

Core challenge	Relevance to MPN (beyond dyadic negotiations)	Examples
Interests' alignment	The presence of more than two people increases the difficulty of reaching an agreement, as the agreement must satisfy (potentially) more different interests and preferences.	This is particularly evident when there are more than two negotiating parties with diverging interests, but it also applies to other multi-person negotiation settings. For instance, all representative negotiations face the challenge of aligning the interests of the representative/agent with those of the constituency/principal (Fassina, 2004; Mnookin & Susskind, 1999). Conflict within teams may also reflect interest misalignment among team members, which impedes the possibility to form mutually acceptable agreements between parties (Halevy, 2008; Keenan & Carnevale, 1989).
Layered information asymmetry	With an increasing number of individuals involved in a negotiation, as well as negotiations at different tables (between parties at the negotiation table but also behind the table within party members or between a representative and a constituency), the amount and dispersion of relevant information increases exponentially. Moreover, as each individual has access to unique	Representatives need to navigate the interests of their (often divided) constituency in addition to their own interests and the interests of the other party, increasing their cognitive load such that it becomes harder to fully understand and process all information (Druckman, 1977). Such cognitive overload can in turn lead to a competitive approach and reduce the quality of agreements (Halevy,

	information, there is a higher chance of diverging content of information on specific subjects between individuals. This makes it difficult for individuals to decide if and with whom to share their information (cf. Toma & Butera, 2009). It also increases the cognitive challenge for each individual to keep up with processing and integrating all relevant information (De Dreu et al., 2006).	2008). As a second example, in a multiparty team negotiation, each party may hold different unique information on the performance of a to-be-developed machine relevant for a project. Additionally, within each team, the ability to process the relevant technical information likely differs between members, for instance due to their educational and/or professional background and expertise on the topic.
Competition over cooperation	The presence of multiple persons in any party systematically heightens competition and reduces preferences for cooperation with the counterpart - a phenomenon known as the "interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect" (i.e., the tendency for relations between groups to be more competitive than relations between individuals; see Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Wildschut et al., 2003). This effect, in turn, has been related to fewer and lower quality agreements, because parties fail to exchange information and reach creative solutions (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; Gelfand et al., 2013; Hüffmeier et al., 2019).	All multi-person negotiation settings are - by definition - characterized by the presence of multiple persons and thus affected by the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect.
Process coordination	Increasing numbers of people, parties, and layers of direct involvement create substantial challenges for processual and behavioral coordination between individuals (cf. Brett et al., 2009).	Negotiating teams not only need to align their interests, they also benefit from coordinating their behavioral strategies, control the information flow from individuals in the team to the negotiation counterpart(s), and need to create processes that allow for confidential within-team communication during the negotiation. Similarly, representatives need to coordinate the information flow and ratification process to and with their constituency.

Structuring the Literature with a Taxonomy of Multi-Person Negotiations

The MTR Taxonomy


To facilitate structured access to the fragmented research on multi-person negotiations, we introduce the MTR taxonomy, which is comprised of three dimensions: To qualify as a multi-person (rather than dyadic) negotiation, there must be *M*ultiple parties, that is, *more than two*

distinct parties at the negotiating table, such as multi-lateral or multi-party negotiations, where more than two negotiating parties represent their own interests, which each diverge from the others', at least to some degree. The M is therefore the first factor of the MTR taxonomy. Alternatively, or additionally, *at least one of the parties must consist of more than one individual*, making it a *T*eam. Negotiating teams may comprise of as few as two people (e.g., a married couple buying a car) or a large number (e.g., organizational departments consisting of teams negotiating the distribution of tasks or resources). The T, thus, constitutes the second factor of the MTR taxonomy. Finally, any of the parties may be *represented at the negotiation table by agents or proxies*, resulting in an extra layer in the negotiation due to *R*epresentation. For instance, employees may be represented in wage negotiations by a union spokesperson, while a manager represents organizational interests, and political leaders should represent the citizens they were elected to serve. Representatives in negotiations fall into two main groups: They can be mere agents acting on behalf of their principal or constituency without decision authority, or they can be leaders of a constituent group whose approval is important, but not vital for the implementation of the agreement. Either way, this form of negotiation is often conceptualized as having two negotiation tables: The primary table, at which the respective representatives negotiate with each other; and a secondary table, at which the representative and principal or constituency negotiate with each other (Putnam, 1988). The R is hence the third factor of the MTR taxonomy.

While each of the three factors in our taxonomy (M, T and R) individually is sufficient to create a multi-person negotiation, many negotiations represent a combination of more than one of these factors. We offer the MTR taxonomy to characterize multi-person negotiations and categorize them as one of seven distinct forms. Figure 1 provides an overview of the seven forms. For each form, we present a three-digit code and a convenient label. The code reflects the presence (coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of each of the three factors in the order M-T-R. Using this code, a simple bilateral two-person (dyadic) negotiation would receive 0 for all three factors and thus be coded as MTR-000 (Note that research about this form is not represented in our database, which exclusively focuses on multi-person negotiations). Combinations of different factors address different multi-person negotiation forms. The most complex form, MTR-111, involves all three factors, i.e., the negotiation involves multiple parties (M), where at least one party has more than one member, forming a team (T), and at least one party is represented by an agent (R). Importantly, the more complex forms (i.e., those that combine at least two factors) may be affected by idiosyncratic dynamics that are not sufficiently modelled by merely combining our knowledge about the basic forms that they are made of. While we of course should be able to apply part of our knowledge on, for instance, team negotiations to the MTR-011 form (i.e., team negotiation in which at least one team is representing a wider constituency), it is likely that the specific combination of representation and team dynamics in this MTR-011 form interact with each other in a way that is not captured by research on either of the basic forms. Thus, the application of knowledge based on research focused on basic forms may be systematically misleading in such cases. We discuss some examples of this problem further below.

The different combinations of the MTR code representing different forms of multi-person negotiations along with verbal labels describing them are presented in Figure 1. These labels are used in addition to the MTR codes throughout the rest of this paper for ease of reading. However, it is important to note that these labels are merely descriptive but not definitive, and that other labels might be used equally well to describe each combination of the MTR factors.

Figure 1 The different forms of multi-person negotiations, with their MTR codes and labels



We utilize the MTR taxonomy to systematically organize quantitative empirical articles investigating human dynamics in multi-person negotiations published between 1969 and 2025 in English in peer-reviewed journals. To provide a comprehensive review, we followed the PRISMA flow diagram (Moher et al., 2009). To be included, studies had to (a) be quantitative and empirical; (b) be peer-reviewed and published in English; (c) include negotiations as a paradigm, and include a measure related to negotiations as an outcome variable; (d) include human participants; and (e) involve more than two persons in the negotiation. This process led to 126 unique manuscripts. See Appendix A for the manuscript selection process.

Topic Clusters

To allow for a meaningful overview of research conducted for the seven forms of multi-person negotiations, we extracted the predictors, mediators, moderators, and dependent variables from each of the reviewed manuscripts. This way we identified a total of 254 distinct variables across the 126 manuscripts. To group the variables into a manageable number of topic clusters, we followed an input-process-output (IPO) distinction categorizing each of the variables as either an *input* to the negotiation, part of the negotiation *process*, or an output of the *negotiation*. In multi-person negotiations, *output* variables occur on different levels. We therefore distinguish in our classification between outcomes for the individual negotiation party (own party), outcomes pertaining to the involved parties in aggregate (inter-party), and outcomes pertaining to dynamics within a party (intra-party). This distinction allows us to understand which inputs and processes are studied more extensively in relation to the different outcome levels and potentially which challenges are associated with these different levels of negotiation complexity.

We classify *processes* as psychological processes which occur within the negotiators' "minds" (i.e., their perceptions, goals, cognitions, and emotions) and processes reflected in the negotiators'

actual behavior. For instance, perceptions and cognitions include the fixed pie perception - the assumption that gains by one party must equate to losses by the other - (Kern et al., 2020; Traavik, 2011), procedural fairness perceptions (Beersma & De Dreu, 2003), and shared identity (Swaab et al., 2007). In contrast, negotiation behavior describes, among others, the communication within and between negotiating parties (Lee & Thompson, 2011; McGinn et al., 2012; Swaab et al., 2011), or information exchange and patterns of concession making (Frey & Adams, 1972; Olekalns et al., 2003; Weingart et al., 2007).

Finally, we classify *input* variables based on the features of the negotiation they relate to. Here, we distinguished between five sets of input variables, designed to create topic clusters which were neither overly broad nor overly narrow: inputs characterizing the *individuals* involved in the negotiation (e.g., demographic characteristics or personality traits), inputs describing some or all participants as a *group* (e.g., compositions of social motives between group members or whether the group uses unanimous or majority-based to make decisions), inputs describing the *setting* of the negotiation (e.g., structure of the task or medium of communication), inputs relating to the different *roles* of the persons involved in the negotiation (e.g., representatives' accountability to the constituency, or their mandate base, as well as their monitoring by the constituency), and inputs relating to the *configuration* of the negotiation (e.g., teams vs. individuals, representative or not, different forms of third-party negotiations). We additionally classified the methods used in the respective publication: lab experiment with student sample, classroom exercise, experiment with professionals as sample, field study, or unclear whether lab experiment or classroom exercise.[1]

Each of the three authors independently reviewed the list of variable-entries extracted from the manuscripts and classified them into the ten suggested IPO topic clusters. All variables were classifiable. Cases of disagreement were discussed until one categorization was mutually agreed upon. See Appendix B for the full list of variables classified into the ten IPO topic clusters.

The MTR Database[2] includes several variables for each manuscript, adding up to 631 variable-entries across the 126 manuscripts. Table 2 provides an overview of the MTR Database, showing the frequency of studies investigating the different negotiation forms (based on the MTR building blocks) and the count of variable-entries in each topic cluster (based on the IPO framework). Note that the numbers in each cell in the table reflect the *count of variable entries*. For example, individual-level inputs were studied 5 times in the 22 papers exploring the Representative-constituent (or principal-agent) form of negotiation (i.e., form MTR-001). The database and accompanying user guide on OSF serve any researcher interested in multi-person negotiations providing information on what research is or is not available for each MPN form and each IPO topic. Figure 2 contains a screenshot of the excel file containing the database itself.

[1] We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to code for the methods of the studies in our database. The vast majority of the publications in our database used lab experiments with a student sample (N_{papers}=81, 64%) or classroom exercise with (mostly grad or MBA) students (N_{papers}=34, 27%). Few publications did not describe which of these two they used (N_{papers}=5, 4%) and there were a small number of lab experiments using professionals as sample (N_{papers}=3, 2%) and field studies (N_{papers}=3, 2%).


[2] available on OSF: https://osf.io/hfys9/?view_only=d932c93e4f80477d9589b76fb02f1555

Table 2 Variable entries by IPO topic cluster and MTR form

	MTR-001 Representative-constituent (or principal-agent) negotiation (N = 22; 17%)	MTR-010 Team negotiation (N = 24; 19%)	MTR-011 Team + representative negotiation (N = 26; 21%)	MTR-100 Multi-party negotiation (N = 34; 27%)	MTR-101 Multi-party + representative negotiation (N = 8; 6%)	MTR-110 Multi-party + team negotiation (N = 3; 2%)	MTR-111 Multi-party + team + representative negotiation (N = 9; 7%)
Inputs: Individual (K = 24; 4%)	5	6	5	6	1	-	1
Inputs: Group (K = 53; 8%)	6	10	12	19	1	-	5
Inputs: Setting (K = 60; 10%)	9	8	11	23	3	4	2
Inputs: Roles (K = 61; 10%)	21	1	26	3	8	-	2
Inputs: Configuration (K = 33; 5%)	2	16	2	8	-	-	5
Processes: Psychological (K = 31; 5%)	4	4	10	9	3	1	-
Processes: Behavioral (K = 118; 19%)	29	27	23	26	6	5	2
Outcomes: Own-party (K = 52; 8%)	5	15	6	16	5	2	3
Outcomes: Intra-party (K = 21; 3%)	7	5	4	1	2	-	2
Outcomes: Inter-party (K = 178; 28%)	29	30	32	53	13	4	17

Note. The database includes several variables for each manuscript, adding up to 631 variable-entries across the 126 manuscripts. The count of manuscripts is denoted by *N*. The count of variable-entries is denoted by *K*. The relative share of count of manuscripts and count of variable-entries is denoted in in percentage.

Figure 2 Screenshot of MTR Database



Topic cluster	Variable	Reference	Full reference	DOI	Method	Multi-party (M)	Team (T)	Representative (R)	Form
Inputs: Group	constituency hawks or doves	Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012	Aaldering, H., & De Dreu, C. K. (2	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Inputs: Group	status within constituency	Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012	Aaldering, H., & De Dreu, C. K. (2	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Inter-party	joint outcome	Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012	Aaldering, H., & De Dreu, C. K. (2	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Intra-party	trust in approval	Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012	Aaldering, H., & De Dreu, C. K. (2	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Psychological	perception of cooperativeness	Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012	Aaldering, H., & De Dreu, C. K. (2	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Own-party	individual outcome	Aaldering & Kopelman, 2022	Aaldering, H., & Kopelman, S. (20	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-02	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Inputs: Setting	expectation of future interaction	Aaldering & Kopelman, 2022	Aaldering, H., & Kopelman, S. (20	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-02	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Behavioral	infosharing: questions	Aaldering & Ten Velden, 2018	Aaldering, H., & Ten Velden, F. S.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Behavioral	integrative vs distributive strategies	Aaldering & Ten Velden, 2018	Aaldering, H., & Ten Velden, F. S.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Inter-party	joint outcome	Aaldering & Ten Velden, 2018	Aaldering, H., & Ten Velden, F. S.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Inter-party	subjective outcome	Aaldering & Ten Velden, 2018	Aaldering, H., & Ten Velden, F. S.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Own-party	individual outcome	Aaldering & Ten Velden, 2018	Aaldering, H., & Ten Velden, F. S.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Behavioral	first offers/ demands	Aaldering et al., 2013	Aaldering, H., Greer, L. L., Van K	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.20	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Inputs: Individual	measure SVO	Aaldering et al., 2013	Aaldering, H., Greer, L. L., Van K	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.20	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Inter-party	duration of negotiation	Aaldering et al., 2013	Aaldering, H., Greer, L. L., Van K	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.20	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Outcomes: Own-party	individual outcome	Aaldering et al., 2013	Aaldering, H., Greer, L. L., Van K	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.20	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Psychological	motivation to serve constituency	Aaldering et al., 2013	Aaldering, H., Greer, L. L., Van K	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.20	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Psychological	motivation to serve constituency	Aaldering et al., 2013	Aaldering, H., Greer, L. L., Van K	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.20	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Inputs: Roles	interest misalignment between representative an	Aaldering et al., 2013	Aaldering, H., Greer, L. L., Van K	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.20	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Behavioral	deception	Aaldering et al., 2020	Aaldering, H., Zerres, A., & Steine	http://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Behavioral	deception	Aaldering et al., 2020	Aaldering, H., Zerres, A., & Steine	http://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Inputs: Group	constituency endorsing (un)ethical behavior	Aaldering et al., 2020	Aaldering, H., Zerres, A., & Steine	http://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Inputs: Group	constituency endorsing competitive vs. unethica	Aaldering et al., 2020	Aaldering, H., Zerres, A., & Steine	http://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011
Processes: Psychological	moral disengagement	Aaldering et al., 2020	Aaldering, H., Zerres, A., & Steine	http://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020	Lab experiment with students as su	0	1	1	MTR-011

Core Findings: The Current Research Landscape and Future Directions

Overall, our database reveals three areas where the existing literature on multi-person negotiations falls short of its potential, leaving broad scope for further investigation: (1) some forms of multi-person negotiations have been generally understudied; (2) considering their respective relevance for the form, some topics have not received the appropriate research attention for particular forms of multi-person negotiations; and (3) some relevant unique features of multi-person negotiation forms have been overlooked. Here, we describe each area in detail, and discuss potential sources of inspiration to help researchers in developing further studies.

Understudied Forms of Multi-person Negotiations: A Call for New Paradigms

Table 2 clearly points to gaps in the literature: 63% of the manuscripts focus on negotiation forms that involve only one factor (M, T or R), leaving more complex forms of multi-person negotiation, involving multiple factors, fairly unexplored (primarily MTR-101, MTR-110, and MTR-111). There seems to be a paucity of studies on negotiations involving multiple parties and at least one team (MTR-110). We found only three papers (2% of all papers) which investigated this negotiation form. One of them used the International Space Station negotiation with 5 parties consisting of two individuals each to study the role of coalition ("clique") formation and centrality in satisfaction and problem-solving behavior (Money & Allred, 2009). However, they did not investigate how within-team dynamics might affect the between-party dynamics and thus did not provide insights into the interplay between the different MTR forms. This interplay is, however, to some extent investigated by a series of papers by Swaab and colleagues (2005; 2011) on intra- and inter-team discussions prior to multiparty team negotiations. They find that intra-team discussions foster shared cognitions and material outcomes while inter-team discussions improved fairness, cooperative behavior, and social outcomes. Interestingly, one experiment in this series demonstrated that the order of caucusing matters: intra-team discussions followed by inter-team discussions resulted in better economic and social outcomes than a reverse order (Swaab et al., 2011, experiment 3). The latter finding represents one of the rare occasions when research has identified an idiosyncrasy of a combined form (in this case MTR-110) that could not have been studied in either of the basic forms (MTR-100 or MTR-010) alone. As such, it also demonstrates why - despite many occasions when we can cross-fertilize our knowledge on one combined form with research from the respective basic forms - the separate consideration of combined forms as proposed with the MTR framework adds to our theoretical understanding of multi-person

negotiations.

The scarcity of research on these complex forms is not surprising, given the research methods that are generally applied in the study of negotiations - experiments in which participants negotiate with each other. Gathering sufficient data from complex negotiation forms, with six or more participants per data point, becomes increasingly challenging both logistically and financially. One could say that a "convenience gap" exists: Despite the prevalence of more complex negotiation forms in practice, we as negotiation researchers often do not actively investigate the interplay of the MTR elements in a design (e.g., Aaldering et al., 2020; 2022; Money & Allred, 2009; Saygı et al., 2015).

We suggest that developing new research paradigms would facilitate the investigation of complex multi-person negotiations. Several studies already employ novel paradigms to investigate the complex dynamics inherent to such settings. For example, Kersten and colleagues (2016) devised complex online negotiation and auction systems to study the effects of negotiations between a buyer and several sellers; and Curșeu and colleagues (Curșeu & Schruijer, 2018; 2020; Trif et al., 2020; 2023) alternate roles of representatives, team members and number of parties negotiating together in one long negotiation simulation, thereby also addressing these different dynamics. These studies show that it is possible to investigate complex configurations using creative paradigms.

Negotiation scholars may also consider borrowing paradigms that are more common in economics, such as agent-based modeling or auctions (as in Kersten et al., 2013; 2016). Network analysis, which has gained in popularity over recent years, also provides an interesting and innovative way to study dynamics within and between negotiation parties (Carbonneau et al., 2011; Schwaninger et al., 2019).

Underdeveloped Investigation of Certain Topics in Certain Forms: A Call for Cross-Fertilization

Our analysis showed that not all relevant topics have received equal research attention in relation to the different forms of multi-person negotiations. Specifically, the study of some topics, such as psychological processes (e.g., perceptions and cognitions), has been neglected across all forms (19% of all variable-entries). Other topics have been overlooked in specific negotiation forms, as evident in the lack of research on roles as inputs in negotiations where factor M is present (13 entries in total). Given that all forms of multi-person negotiations share certain core characteristics and complex dynamics, we believe that the current situation, where topics are studied vis-à-vis particular forms in isolation, may represent a missed opportunity. Researchers could and should use our database to inform their theoretical argumentation using negotiation research in different but relevant forms.

For example, the challenge of "interest alignment" has typically focused on representative negotiations, investigating principals and agents. However, this topic is also relevant to team negotiations and could focus on how a negotiating team makes decisions across the potentially conflicting interests of team members- might what we know about principal and agent (mis) alignment transfer to such (mis)alignment between team members? Another example concerns studying power roles: These have been investigated abundantly in the study of representative negotiations, where representatives may be leaders, group members, or merely delegates (Hermann & Kogan, 1968; Jackson & King, 1983; McCrone & Kuklinski, 1979). Effects of such power relations would likely extend to dynamics within a team (factor T), or even between

negotiation parties in multi-party negotiations (factor M). How do team members with different status conduct negotiations? (For an exception researching this dynamic, see Doyle et al., 2023). And what about coalition formation in negotiations depending on power positions? We hope we can inspire researchers to draw from existing research on different forms of negotiations to develop their own research, and to advance the field at a more rapid pace.

Overlooked Features: Drawing Inspiration from Other Fields

It is not only important to investigate commonalities and look for cross-fertilization, as mentioned above, but also to address unique features of the different forms of multi-person negotiations. It seems that the unique features of representation have been investigated, with research questions focused on the roles and relationship between representatives and their constituency (k = 57, see Table 2). However, various research topics are poorly studied in research on multi-party negotiations, MTR-100 (k= 3 for roles, and k = 1 for intra-party outcomes) or in negotiations involving teams, MTR-010 (k = 1 for roles, k = 4 for psychological processes), suggesting a lack of focus on their unique features.

Researchers may wish to draw inspiration from other fields beyond behavioral sciences like organizational behavior, management sciences and psychology, to facilitate the identification of relevant features unique to certain forms of multi-person negotiations. For example, quantitative research on multi-party negotiations (factor M) could benefit from the literature on international relations and case studies addressing multi-party negotiations. Such case studies, including collaborations and disputes between regions, states, ethnic groups, and countries, may inspire the identification of features unique to negotiations with multiple parties. For example, Crump and Druckman (2012) analyzed turning points in multi-party trade negotiations regarding intellectual property rights; and Chasek (1997) compared eleven cases of multi-party international environmental negotiations. Similarly, Elgström (2007) addressed the importance of roles in negotiations with more than two parties by analyzing the different roles the European Union is perceived as taking in international multi-party negotiations. Another source of inspiration could come from computer sciences using simulation models of multi-party negotiations such as those used by Pinto and Harrison (2003) to analyze negotiations over climate change policy, or by Simon and colleagues (2007) to model the distribution of water among French farmers.

Searching for unique features of negotiations involving more than one person in a party (factor T), researchers may seek inspiration in studies of teams and groups more broadly. For example, Mathieu and colleagues (2019) recently reviewed features that influence team effectiveness, including structural features, such as interdependence, virtuality and contingencies; compositional features, such as member abilities and diversity; and mediating mechanisms, such as motivation and trust. Some of these features have been addressed in negotiation research, but most have not yet been developed and incorporated, despite their apparent relevance. The usefulness of integrating theory and research on teams in theory and research on negotiations can be exemplified in our own work.

Finally, to further investigate unique features associated with representation (factor R), researchers could find inspiration in economics-based literature on agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agent-based models have been applied to further understand the problem of interest misalignment between principal and agent and have subsequently inspired political science and international relations research (Berkowitz, 2018; Earnest, 2008), as well as management research (Wall, 2016). Simulation models can provide insights into the relationships

and behavior of interdependent parties, and as such, also seem relevant for studying multi-person and particularly represented negotiations.

Three Case Examples on how to Use the MTR Database

Having discussed the core findings and research directions based on gaps and insights we identified using the database, we next present three examples demonstrating the usefulness of the MTR Database.

Case Example 1: Why is There no Research?

Imagine, a PhD student starting his research on a large grant to uncover 'multi-layered complexities in negotiations'. As the title suggests, this is not easy research, and the PhD student doesn't know where to begin. From reading the literature, he gets the impression that negotiations are often simplified so much that they hardly mirror reality. There seems to be nothing out there in the negotiation literature that fits his research question. He is interested in understanding how multiple interdependent parties deal with competing pressures from their teams and their constituents, and how roles can quickly shift in dynamic negotiations where one can take the role of representative in one part of the process, and be a constituent in another part, or even change party affiliation during multiple negotiation rounds. Put differently, he is curious to learn more about the process coordination challenge as well as the layered information asymmetry challenge. We might assume that he is interested in the case of MTR-111; multiple parties with multiple members each and multiple levels in the negotiation. When consulting the MTR database, he immediately notices how little empirical research exists for this complex form (9 papers only), confirming his idea that this is an understudied area. The available research in this category by Curșeu and colleagues (Curșeu & Schruijer, 2018; 2020; Trif et al., 2020; 2023) on multiparty systems seems very interesting to him: team, multi-party and representative negotiations are studied at once by assigning participants to different roles at different stages. These studies provide interesting experimental designs where participants alternate between negotiating as team member or as representative, and with one or with multiple other parties. This set-up might inspire the student to develop his own paradigms. The samples are generally too small to focus on interparty outcomes, but do reveal interesting patterns during the negotiation process. For example, teams who had the impression that other teams had more power in the negotiations felt that others were more responsible for the outcomes and were less interested in future collaborations (Trif et al., 2020); in another study, higher goal difficulty predicted higher outcomes- especially among high power teams (Trif et al., 2023). Teams who were excluded for stages of the negotiation sequence reported less power, higher interdependence and lower collaborative intentions (Curșeu & Schruijer, 2020) and experienced relationship conflict increases with perceived conflict between parties, which leads to more relationship conflict, showing a destructive spiral. At the same time, perceived collaboration and reported task conflict co-evolve over the course of the negotiation as well (Curșeu & Schruijer, 2018). All of these studies provide interesting insights on the coordination of processes in a long negotiation sequence, addressing the process coordination challenge.

This research is somewhat different than the (less relevant) negotiation research he knows about. Exploring the references of these papers lead him to discover more indirectly related research (not in our database) on multi-party systems and multi-actor networks and broadens his

view on negotiation complexity beyond the scope of this manuscript. However, he is also interested in understanding concrete processes during such complex negotiations. For this, he turns back to the MTR database and zooms in on 'Setting'. He receives 60 hits (see Table 2) and decides to further narrow his search down to first investigate these settings for multi-party and team negotiations: MTR 110 (k = 4). This brings him very relevant research on team alignment and caucusing in negotiations, showing that caucusing within or between negotiating teams affected negotiation satisfaction and outcomes, such that material outcomes were higher when subgroup caucusing had taken place, but outcome distributions were more equal and satisfaction was higher after superordinate caucusing (Swaab et al., 2005; Swaab et al., 2011) - findings which again inform the process coordination challenge. He next broadens his search a bit to MTR 100 (k = 23) and finds, among other things, relevant studies on how networking style affects multi-party negotiations (Schwaninger et al., 2019), how negotiation outcomes are affected depending on the composition of motivational orientations between the parties at the table (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999, 2002; Gillespie et al., 2000; Tzafrir et al., 2012; Weingart et al., 1993) and how power dynamics within and between teams affect negotiation outcomes (Doyle et al., 2023). Specifically, these studies show that in three or four party groups, an (induced) prosocial orientation (vs. an individualistic orientation) lead to higher joint gains (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; 2002; Weingart et al., 1993) - especially when the social value orientation of the individuals was also prosocial (Tzafrir et al., 2012). When social motivations are mixed, prosocials use more integrative (distributive) strategies when the number of other prosocial parties increased (decreased) (Weingart et al., 2007). A pro-self value orientation decreased satisfaction with the outcomes (Gillespie et al., 2000). In team negotiations, teams reached higher quality agreements when team members had the same power position (egalitarian) as compared to when one team member was higher in power than the other team member (hierarchy; Doyle et al., 2023). This also applied when the egalitarian vs. hierarchy teams negotiated with a team that was composed differently. Video codings of the negotiations indicated more value claiming and less information elaboration for the hierarchy than for the egalitarian teams, accounting for the differences in agreement quality. He also again finds a study on caucusing, showing that in multi-party negotiations, parties make different trade-offs depending on whether they can caucus with one party at the same time, leading to reciprocal trade-offs, or with multiple parties at the same time, leading to circular trade-offs (Palmer & Thompson, 1995).

In sum, using our MTR Database has helped the PhD student both to narrow down his focus and to broaden his mind. He now understands that he might have to look outside the experimental negotiation literature to different paradigms and methodologies to cover the breadth of his research topic. At the same time, he has learned that there is a lot of research on communication processes and social motivation between parties with different interdependences that would be very relevant for his type of research- even though it has not yet been applied there and at first glance it seemed like there was hardly any research on his topic of interest. He has new direction and focus to pursue his PhD.

Case Example 2: Understudied or not? The Potential of Cross-fertilization

Imagine a researcher wants to investigate how representatives balance opposing preferences of their constituency and their negotiation counterpart. So far, she has based her predictions on research on dyadic as well as representative negotiations. She now wants to examine how disagreement *within* the constituency affects representatives' dealmaking- focusing on the interest

alignment challenge.

Following our taxonomy, the researcher is interested in cases consisting of M=0 (two parties present), T=1 (several team or constituency members) and R=1 (presence of a second table; a representative and constituents). While she is familiar with the research on representative negotiations, she had not yet conceptualized discord within the constituency as an intra-team negotiation conflict. She is particularly curious to see what she can learn from the MTR Database on topic 'Group characteristics' (our second input category) which gives her 12 hits within the MTR-011 constellation (See Table 2). These studies are about divergent norms within the constituency with respect to the way a representative should approach a negotiation. The research shows that representatives are more likely to adopt a hawkish approach when this is preferred by even a minority in the constituency (Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Aaldering et al., 2020; Steinel et al., 2009). Moreover, representatives endorse and use ethically questionable tactics if these are preferred by a majority in the constituency (Aaldering et al., 2020). This research is familiar to her. However, she now also discovers research on how teams earn more for themselves and were more willing to contend when they are accountable to a supervisor who cares only about money versus a supervisor who also cares about relationships (or no supervisor). This was especially the case for teams consisting of strangers to each other, as opposed to teams consisting of friends (Peterson & Thompson, 1997). Moreover, she finds interesting research on how the embeddedness of the representative in the constituency (e.g., being a founding member of the constituency or not; being involved in pre-discussions of the constituency or not) affects, for instance, how the representative defends the interests of the constituency (Jones & Worchel, 1992). These studies provide relevant insights into variables that she could either control for or consider as moderators in her research. These articles help her answering questions such as: Is disagreement solved differently when the constituency members know each other? And how does the way representatives are elected affect potential discord- and outcomes? These questions are all relevant to address the interest alignment challenge. Now her interest on these potentially relevant team dynamics is piqued, the researcher also opens the research on Group characteristics for MTR-010 in the database. Her research so far has made her curious about team dynamics as she realizes that insights from team negotiations could potentially be applied to negotiations between constituency members. From the MTR Database, she now learns that cultural and ethical climate can impact team performance: a team of sellers is more likely to withhold information that could be damning for them in the negotiation when there is a clear competitive (as compared to a honesty) climate (Stawiski et al., 2009), and teams show more integrative and less distributive (attacking and defending) strategies when there is an element of a collectivistic culture in an otherwise individualistic team (a French person in a team of otherwise Germans, Wilken et al., 2013). Moreover, within team discussions prior to the negotiation are influenced by the composition of the team members; when there was even a minority of members with hawkish preferences in the team, their proposal for the negotiation was adopted more readily than when the majority preferences were dovish (Bonner et al., 2011). While very divergent, these variables could further affect whether and how within-constituency disagreements are effectively solved- e.g. by introducing a collectivistic and honesty climate. To be complete, she also considers the five hits for MTR-111, revealing two more relevant studies on power differences within team members (Trif et al., 2020- described for the previous case example) and the influence of a collaboration within a team prior to negotiations (Thiemann et al., 2019). This last study shows that in preparing for a negotiation, it matters whether team members can prepare together, using audioconference, or alone- even if they receive information about all team members' preferences. Representatives

made offers further away from their personal preferences, representing the other team members better, after a collective preparation (Thiemann et al., 2019). This knowledge helps the researcher not only to sharpen her ideas and form hypotheses for her own work, but also prevents her from doing research within the field of representative negotiations that has essentially already been conducted by researchers on team negotiations. The MTR Database thus helps her to find research she was not familiar with and thereby to accumulate knowledge quickly. This example focused mainly on the input variables of interest- of course, the same exercise could be repeated if the researcher were curious to learn more about, for example, intra-constituency outcomes; a hardly researched topic. Learning more from our database on intra-team outcomes however would help her to get started with her research.

Case Example 3: What Do We Know About the Challenge of Competition?

A negotiations researcher is excited to find the current database. She has been interested in the interpersonal-intergroup discontinuity effect for a while and would like to write a review on how this challenge of heightened competition occurs in different forms of multi-person negotiations. Thus, rather than investigating the effect itself (higher competitiveness and conflict between groups than between individuals) she is interested in discovering more about the forces underlying, amplifying and mitigating competitive behavior in multi-person negotiations- the competition over cooperation challenge. Our database provides exactly that information. She starts with investigating the behavioral processes in our database (irrespective of the MTR codes, as she would like to review all different multi-person negotiation forms). She casts a wide net and decides to include all processes that might be relevant to her and derives a list of 10 processes including, among others, competitive communication, constituents' directives about cooperative or competitive behavior, or problem solving. In total, these give her K = 70 hits. She continues examining the psychological processes, selecting perceptions of the degree of the conflict of interest and perceptions of cooperativeness (K = 5).

She also checks whether there are input variables that might be relevant for her area of interest and selects almost all of the studies which manipulate a configuration, meaning that they compare negotiation behavior of teams, representatives, or multi-party groups with each other or with dyadic negotiations (K = 24). From the group category of input variables, she selects anything that seems related to competitive behavior and receives K = 19 hits. From the individual inputs, she selects social value orientation and aspirations that are set as high or medium (K = 7). From the roles input, she selects research that has considered accountability as well as monitoring and evaluation of representatives (K = 19). And finally, from the 'settings' inputs, she selects research that has focused on the competitiveness vs. cooperativeness of counterparts, the expectation of future interaction, the degree to which the task includes more cooperative vs. competitive issues, degree of conflict between the parties and the presence of competitive vs. cooperative goals (K = 14). Because many of the hits overlap (i.e., refer her to the same publications), this gives her a total of 90 unique publications within multi-person negotiations that she suspects might be related to understanding forces behind increased competition in multi-person negotiations. She can now start reading the work extensively. After reading all articles, she drops another 23 because they seem only tangentially related to competitive negotiation behavior or because the variables of her interest are only qualifiers of other effects and not related to competitive negotiation behavior themselves. She is now ready to write her review on 67 articles on the cooperation over competition challenge.

First of all, reading the publication on 'Configurations' as Input shows that many studies in our database have compared dyadic (also called 'solo-on-solo', or 'individual') negotiations to team negotiations. Directly related to her topic of interest, several of these studies provide evidence that teams generally show more competitive behavior (Cohen et al., 2014; Howard et al., 2007; Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Polzer, 1996) than dyadic negotiations, but also that they use more deceptive tactics (Aykac et al., 2017) and reach lower relationship outcomes (Hüffmeier et al., 2019). However, it seems that most of these studies use the sum of the outcomes reached by the parties together as an indication of negotiation success. She decides to keep these studies in mind for later - after all some degree of competition is required to discover integrative potential. However, she notices that most (but not all) of these studies find that negotiations between teams end with higher joint outcomes than negotiations between individuals (Doyle et al., 2023; Hüffmeier et al., 2019; Lunnan et al., 2011; Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Thompson et al., 1996; Swaab et al., 2021).

Besides comparing teams with dyads, our database shows that research compared multi-party (usually three persons) to dyadic negotiations, finding that multi-party groups are more competitive than individuals as demonstrated by a larger endowment effect when selling goods (Galin, 2013) and by withholding more information (Stawiski et al., 2009). There are also signals that multi-party negotiations can outperform dyadic ones, for example because they are less driven by a fixed-pie bias (Kern et al., 2020).

When comparing representative negotiators to dyads, the keyword seems to be accountability. Representatives who are accountable to their constituents reach lower joint outcomes and more partial impasses than individual negotiators (Loschelder & Trötschel, 2010) and high as compared to low accountability leads to lower negotiation quality (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale et al., 1979; 1981; Klimoski & Ash, 1972; 1974; O'Connor, 1997; Wall, 1975b) and more competitive behavior (Kogan et al., 1969; Lamm, 1973; Neale, 1984; Peterson & Thompson, 1997). Some other amplifiers of competitive behavior between representatives include the presence of (a minority of) hawkish constituent members, which increases value claiming (Aaldering & Kopelman, 2022; Steinel et al., 2009) and decreases the quality of the negotiated agreement (Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Aaldering & Ten Velden, 2018). Feeling closely attached (Klimoski, 1972) or prototypical of (Steinel et al., 2010) the constituent group also increases representatives' competitive behavior- and so does a peripheral status in the group when the representative finds the constituency group attractive to belong to (Van Kleef et al., 2007) or has a high general 'need to belong' (Steinel et al., 2010).

While this all paints a rather bleak picture of representative negotiations, there are also studies suggesting that their competitive inclination can be mitigated- for example by the prospect of future interaction (Aaldering & Kopelman, 2022; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984, though see also Gruder, 1971); when the constituency clearly communicates a preference for a cooperative (or 'dovish') approach (Aaldering et al., 2012; 2016; 2020; Benton & Druckman, 1974) or when they have such a cooperative preference themselves (Wall, 1975); or when the supervisor or constituent emphasizes the value of the relationship with the counterpart (in case of represented team negotiations, & Thompson, 1997).

For multi-party negotiations she finds several papers on the role of social motivation within multi-party negotiations, showing how the composition of parties in terms of their individual vs. cooperative mindset affects negotiation processed and outcomes (e.g. Schei & Rognes, 2005; Schei et al., 2008; Weingart et al., 1993; Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; 2003; Ten Velden et al., 2007). This seems to be an interesting but also quite nuanced field that she marks for later in-depth analysis.

Communication is also crucial for (competitive) outcomes in multi-party negotiations. When all three parties could communicate openly as opposed to when communication was restrained to two parties at a time, competitive behavior decreased (Palmer & Thompson, 1995). Similarly, caucusing between the three parties (as opposed to caucusing within negotiation teams) as well as instructions to maximize group outcomes, led to more prosocial norms (Swaab et al, 2004), more self-reported prosocial behavior (Swaab et al., 2011) and more equal outcome distributions (Swaab et al., 2005; 2011). Moreover, communication about fairness and establishing fairness as norm led to more equal resource distributions (McGinn et al., 2012).

There is comparatively little research on amplifiers and diminishers of competitive behavior in team negotiations. Available evidence shows that discussion about the goals between negotiating teams in advance of the negotiation improves negotiation outcomes (Swaab et al., 2021); that the use of integrative strategies increases while teams use less defending and attacking strategies when there is one French person present in a team otherwise consisting of Germans, suggesting the cooperative influence of more collectivistic cultures (Wilken et al., 2013); that the presence of a climate focusing on honesty (as compared to competition) reduces seller teams' unethical behavior (Stawiski et al., 2008); and that teams that are more cohesive and participative report less contending behavior towards their counterpart (Backhaus et al., 2008).

Overall, the researcher concludes that some topics have been studied extensively for specific forms (accountability and social motivation for representative negotiations; social motivation and communication for multi-party negotiations, and comparisons with dyadic negotiations for team negotiations), but also that few studies relating to competitive negotiation behavior examine a combination of the MTR building blocks, and that much of the research relating to competitive behavior in one field has not been investigated in another. She ends her review section with a call for more research on the combined MTR negotiation forms but also especially on team negotiations, studying when and why teams show competitive behavior towards each other.

Concluding Remarks and Limitations

The goal of this manuscript was to provide a structured database on research in multi-person negotiations. We used the MTR taxonomy to structure the scattered field of multi-person negotiations, classifying negotiation forms based on three questions: Are more than two parties involved in the negotiation (factor M)? Does at least one of the parties consist of more than one person (factor T)? Do any of the negotiating parties represent another person or group (factor R)? While the MTR database is the main contribution of this work, we also demonstrate the use of it and thereby provide several - albeit not exhaustive - reviews of research-topics within the field of multi-person negotiations, which offers an additional contribution.

In structuring the field, we focused on quantitative research with human participants. This means that much research from economics but also sociology, biology and anthropology is excluded because this either used simulated behavior and theoretical models or consists of larger qualitative case studies. Such research is incredibly valuable to understand particularly the more complex forms of multi-person negotiations, which are difficult and effortful to research using quantitative, often experimental, methods. Yet, this research often very context-bounded and therefore might inspire, but not answer questions about commonalities and differences between forms and topics. As such, they can be helpful to understand complex phenomena by themselves yet are less representative of the field of multi-person negotiations as a whole. Unfortunately, our analysis of the extant literature on the complex forms of multi-person negotiation revealed that

only very few of the empirical studies in our database that model complex forms in their experiments, actually address the interplay of the MTR elements and idiosyncrasies associated with these complex forms (for noteworthy exceptions, see for instance Swaab et al., 2005; 2011; Thiemann et al., 2019; Trif et al., 2020; Valley et al., 1992). Moreover, even research that focuses on one basic form often does not offer comparisons between forms, or between multi-person and dyadic negotiations (some noteworthy exceptions come from research on team negotiation, e.g., Thompson et al., 1996; Hüffmeier et al., 2019). Here more research is necessary to systematically understand the differences and similarities between the different forms of multi-person negotiations.

Importantly, the main goal of this manuscript was to structure the field, not to provide an in-depth narrative review with detailed discussion of studies. However, we nonetheless decided to review large parts of the content of the database based on the themes identified using our structuring analysis, also to demonstrate how the MTR database may be used for research. As such, this manuscript still serves a secondary goal of providing an, albeit non-exhaustive, overview of the *content* of the field of multi-person negotiations.

As described in case example 3, researchers seeking to provide narrative reviews or learning on the various topics and forms may use the MTR Database to quickly find potentially relevant papers for their own work. Maintaining the relevance of the database as the field evolves is, however, an ongoing challenge. This could be achieved through coordinated efforts supported by professional associations, for example by establishing periodic updates, encouraging community contributions, or integrating database maintenance into existing scholarly infrastructures. Such initiatives would help ensure that the database remains a living resource that continues to support cumulative and transparent research.

In sum, we provide a map of the scattered landscape of studies in this field. Doing so, we highlighted commonalities and differences between the different negotiation forms in terms of their frequency of research, and in terms of their research foci as well as demonstrated the usefulness of the MTR Database with a concrete example. Based on this overview, we identified three significant patterns in multi-person negotiation research: 1) a lack of research into complex forms of multi-person negotiations; 2) failure to capitalize on commonalities between different forms; and 3) the overlooking of unique features for each multi-person negotiation form. Following these patterns may advance the field by answering the questions we raise based on the sources of inspiration we offered. Our review is thus a call for negotiation scholars to join forces, to inspire each other with methods and research questions, and to work together towards a better understanding of multi-person negotiations.

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
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Appendix

Appendix A: Manuscript Selection Process



No automation tools were used during selection; one student-assistant helped in the first screening stage. Two of the three authors conferred with each other to resolve ambiguous cases during the last screening stage.

Adhering to the PRISMA flow diagram (Moher et al., 2009; Page et al., 2021), we cast a wide net to identify all potentially relevant papers. Given that our topic is broad and not easily captured with a few keywords, we searched the online databases Google Scholar, EBSCO, PsychInfo, and Web of Science for all articles matching the search terms [team, group, multilateral, multiparty, bilateral, representative, constituen*, agent, principal], plus [negotiat* (negotiation, negotiating), bargaining], plus [empirical] or [field] or [experiment], excluding [case study]. This produced, for example, "(negotiate* AND representative) AND (experiment OR field OR empirical) NOT ('case study')." Additionally, we conducted forward and backward citation searches for key articles, such as reviews on team or multi-party negotiations. These searches returned an initial list of 2,337 hits. In the screening phase, we first removed duplicate records, then manually scrutinized the retrieved

papers to identify those that conform to our inclusion criteria. This process led to 126 unique manuscripts, see PRISMA diagram above.

Appendix B: The full list of variables classified into the ten IPO topic clusters

Inputs: Configuration	as representative or not
	compare auction with verifiable vs. non verifiable multi-bilateral negotiations
	compare individuals and representatives
	compare individuals and teams or dyads
	dyad vs multiparty
	negotiation or discussion group
	role as principal or agent
	team vs team, indiv vs indiv and indiv vs team
	team vs. individual
	third part: med-arb or arb-med
	third party present vs. not
Inputs: Group	attractiveness of group to representative based on bogus score
	collaboration within team pre-negotiation possible or not
	collaborative team preferences
	comparing cultures (same culture dyad)
	constituency endorsing (un)ethical behavior
	constituency endorsing competitive vs. unethical behavior
	constituency hawks or doves
	counterpart team is friend or not
	decision rule
	decision rule: unanimity vs majority
	ethical climate; honest vs competitive vs control
	facial width to height ratio average in team
	faction size within team (minority/ majority opinion)
	gender of team
	gender: both parties female vs. both parties male
	gender: opposing sexes in representatives and opposing sexes in constituents
	get acquainted with other negotiating parties before negotiation
	identification with other parties to negotiate with
	Information about interests distributed differently within team: Team members have identical or overlapping but also unique info
	intrateam hierarchy vs. egalitarian
	intrateam hierarchy vs. egalitarian vs. interteam hierarchy or egalitarian
	liking between parties high or low
	long term or short-term relationship with principal (as agent)
	majority rule vs. one member decision making
	measure SVO; groups allocated on priorly measured SVO
	number of partes (states) in negotiation
	one team member matches vs does not match culture of other party
	power: ascribed by others
	power: attributed to others

	status within constituency
	team level of polychronicity (measured)
	team member (within-team) is friend
	within multiparty group: majority motivational orientation manipulation
	within multiparty group; all coop, two coop, 1 coop, none coop (vs. indiv) Motivational Orientation
	you are new group member vs. all new
Inputs: Individual	attachment style prime for agent; secure, avoidant, anxious
	buyer patient or impatient
	collectivism vs individualism as person
	collectivism vs individualism as person; one team more coll than counterpart based on nationality.
	dominance (individual level measure aggregated)
	gender of representative selling agreement
	goals (set by mediator): moderate vs high (aspiration levels)
	initial individual preferences
	interdependent self-construal prime
	learning orientation: high vs low learning vs. performance
	locus of control
	measure SVO
	need to belong
	own aspiration (instructed): medium vs high
	power role; legitimate source (senior/ junior)
	power: self-rated
	risk aversion measured
Inputs: Roles	accountability focused on people vs profit
	accountability to constituents (process)
	accountability to constituents no or yes or yes continuous
	accountability to constituents yes or no
	accountability to supervisor yes or no
	accountability with explicit surveillance by constituency during negotiation
	affecting present vs. future generations
	agents knows reservation price of seller, of buyer, or of both
	bonus for agent
	compatible interests with one of the multiple negotiation partners or not (possibility to form coalition)
	compensation percentage received by agent
	competence of representative: high or low
	explicit monitoring during negotiation which will be followed up by evaluation by own constituents or others
Inputs: Roles	incentives aligned or not between principal and agent
	information advantage (of agent)
	interest aligned within negotiating teams or not
	interest misalignment between representative and constituency, plus between representative and counterpart
	knowledge that interests (outsider receptiveness) of counterpart are positive or negatively aligned with own principals' interests.
	leader: elected vs. imposed

	mandate base: elected based on competence vs. affect vs. unspecified control)
	mandate: elected representative or elected alternate or non-rep by student group
	mandate: representative selected at random or elected
	mediator advice; integrative or not
	mediator gives reward for offer of representative or not
	mediator gives suggestion vs not
	mediator info: knows everything or only a bit
	mediator: passive (take break), process (how to paraphrase) or active settlement suggestion
	monitoring of agents by principals
	obedience of agent to principal's instructions
	outcome based compensation: sales volume, sales revenue, profit margin
	own status position affirmed by constituency or not
	power
	premium reflecting effort by agents
	prototypicality of representative
	re-election as representative possible or not
	representatives are part of decision-making process on first offer or not
	stakeholder inclusion high or low
	status: being leader vs. delegate
	third party: binding or non-binding in intervention
	trust of constituent in representative
Inputs: Setting	awareness of costs of potential future arbitration
	BATNA
	caucusing only with one other counterpart (when there are 3 or more)
	caucusing with members of other parties possible or not
	caucusing with team members during negotiation possible
	communication allowed
	communication between and within negotiating parties prior to negotiations
	communication between rep and const before neg; specific about neg (= preparation) or general
	communication type; ftf vs computer
	communication type: chat or audio or both
	communication with some of the other parties (for coalition formation) in private vs secretly vs public
	communication within party pre-negotiation on superordinate goal
	communication within party pre-negotiation on unrelated stuff (schmoozing)
	conflict/ competition between negotiating parties
	content about security vs. non-security agreements
	context as exchange relationship or context free: present mere numbers as investment decisions or present numbers as decisions affecting people.
	cooperativeness/ competitiveness of counterpart
	discount factor in bargaining position: power
	entitlement cues
	expectation of future interaction
	having many vs few resources or different outcome scales
	info complexity
	Information elaboration yes or no

	initial response to offer; accept vs. reject
	Involvement of NGO or IGO
	MO (coop/ comp goal)
	network style inclusive or not to third participant
	network style line or triangle
	no mediation vs person mediation vs. robot mediation
	principal (firm) high vs. low in risk taking
	scarcity vs abundance of resources
	situational flexibility (= mix)
	size of bargaining zone large vs small
	size of pie to be distributed; related to justice perceptions of agent
	task structure; issues more cooperative or competitive
	task structure: burdens or benefits
	task structure: pre-existing good solution or not (open vs fixed)
	task structure: symmetrical vs. asymmetrical
	task structure: trade-offs circular or reciprocal
	time pressure; high or low
	visual access
Outcomes: Inter-party	agreement quality
	agreement/ impasse
	coalition formation
	constructive behavioral tendencies
	defensive negotiation behavior
	duration of negotiation
	efficiency of market performance
	equality of resource division
	evaluation of mediator
	external attributions of intergroup outcomes
	future collaborative intentions
	group (interparty) climate
	integratively vs. distributively coded agreements
	intergroup climate
	interparty trust
	joint outcome
	pareto efficiency
	perceived closeness outgroup
	perceived collaborativeness between parties
	perceived conflictuality between parties
	perceived interdependence
	prosocial intentions
	relationship between parties
	sharing with third member
	subjective outcome
	time to reach agreement
	trust in other parties
Outcomes: Intra-party	compensation for representative by principal
	conflict within party

	consensus within team
	effort of agent
	evaluation of representative by constituent
	expected approval constituency
	experienced constituency pressure
	information elaboration within team
	intragroup social identity
	intraparty trust
	satisfaction with communication process
	team cohesion
	trust in approval
	trust of constituent in representative
Outcomes: Own-party	acceptance of mediator suggestion
	cooperation in subsequent PDG
	improvement in performance over tasks
	individual outcome
	offer acceptance
	perceived goal achievement
	representation of constituency wishes
	resistance to merger
Processes: Behavioral	agenda: explicit on order vs open
	agreement process (which of five types)
	coalition building (with which other participants did you talk most)
	communication about fairness
	communication between parties: send competitive vs. fairness messages
	communication: paraphrasing
	communication: patterns and sequences between agent and parties
	communication: competitive
	communication: use of pronouns
	concession patterns
	contending/competitive behavior
	cooperative fair behavior tactics
	counterpart coop or comp
	counterpart presents as confident vs not confident
	counterpart reward vs reciprocity strategy
	counterpart's constituency coop or comp
	deception
	decision blocking
	directives to representative by constituents: coop vs. comp.
	effectiveness of behavior (output) of agent
	endowment effect
	first offers/ demands
	heuristic trial and error behavior
	influence tactics on constituency
	info sharing: giving info
	info sharing: questions
	integrative vs distributive strategies

	logrolling
	messages to constituents (by representative): obedient vs. resistant to constituent demands
	most important first or least important first
	network centrality (power position which emerges during negotiation)
	participative decision making
	power struggles
	problem solving
	reciprocity behavior
	risky shifting positions
	sequential vs simultaneous issue consideration
	size of concessions
	timing of concessions
	transitions in function and orientation
	vary order of good cop and bad cop (by confederates)
Processes: Psychological	cognition; time to think about relevant negotiation aspects vs. irrelevant ones prior to negotiation
	feeling of control
	feeling of power/ having advantage
	judgment accuracy
	moral disengagement
	motivation to be accepted by constituency
	motivation to serve constituency
	norms for harmony
	outcome expectations
	perceived negotiation difficulty
	perception of cooperativeness
	perception of degree of conflict of interest
	perception of mediator's credibility
	perception of task conflict
	positive impression of mediator
	procedural fairness perceptions
	shared identity
	suggested concern for other (by mediator)
	trust in principal (of agent)
	understanding of principal's interests