Emergent Negotiations: Stability and Shifts in Negotiation Dynamics

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Abstract

Negotiation is a dynamic process in which negotiators change their strategies in response to each other. We believe mutual adaptation is best conceptualized as an emergent process and is a critical determinant of negotiators' abilities to identify mutually beneficial solutions. We argue that three factors drive the process of negotiation and influence the quality of agreements: alignment of negotiators' strategies across individuals (strategy sequences), alignment of negotiators' strategies with the negotiation-wide dynamic (phases), and congruence of negotiators' goals.

Negotiation provides a process for mutually dependent individuals to resolve conflicting goals (Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1999). In that organizations are comprised of interdependent collections of people (Weick, 1979), this definition makes clear the ubiquitous role of negotiation in organizational life. Whether they are about individual contracts, the coordination of activities to meet organizational goals, or industry-wide employment conditions, negotiations occur because managers and employees alike believe that reaching agreement and working together is a preferable, if not necessary, means for achieving their goals.

Failed negotiations are costly for organizations. They can result in missed opportunities and large financial losses and can threaten the very survival of organizations. An ongoing question for negotiation researchers is, "Why are individuals and organizations

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remiss at crafting mutually beneficial solutions when the benefits of doing so seem obvious?" The most frequent answer is that the negotiating context can trigger a cycle of escalating competitiveness and impasse. A focus on losses, accountability to others, an emphasis on individual rather than joint outcomes, and structural power are among the contextual variables identified as establishing the preconditions for high levels of competitiveness (for reviews see Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). Yet these contextual factors do not consistently result in competitive spirals that generate at best suboptimal outcomes and at worst impasse. In fact, empirical findings repeatedly show that negotiators in objectively identical situations obtain very different outcomes (e.g., Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996; Putnam & Jones, 1982a).

This finding implies that while context may be predictive of how individuals initiate negotiations, it is not strongly predictive of how negotiations end. This is because negotiators' strategic choices at the outset of negotiation are made in the absence of information about the other party. Only when negotiation is viewed as a static process in which individuals pursue their goals and maintain their initial strategic choices can we expect to see a consistent link between context and outcomes. However, representing negotiations as static over time is implausible. As is the case in all social interactions, negotiators must adapt and change their behaviors in response to the actions of the other party (Ikle & Leites, 1962). Such is the dynamic nature of the negotiation process that individuals, through their actions, can redefine the negotiation context (Watkins, 1999). While negotiation theory has much to say on the context-outcome relationship, it is relatively mute on the question of how negotiation processes shape and are shaped by the negotiation context.

Analyses of negotiation processes typically focus on either the back and forth exchanges between negotiators (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Putnam & Jones, 1982a; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 1999) *or* on the broader phases of strategic activity that are identifiable as negotiations unfold over time (e.g., Baxter, 1982; Holmes, 1992; Olekalns, Brett, & Weingart, 2003). While both research streams have provided insight into the negotiation process, they have neglected the interplay between moment-to-moment actions and reactions exhibited by negotiators and the broader behavioral/strategic context within which it occurs. Our theory begins to address this neglected area by considering how the effects of moment-to-moment interactions differ depending on the strategic phase within which these moment-to-moment interactions occur.

Our goal in this article is to develop a theoretical framework that captures the dynamic and emergent aspect of negotiation. We focus on describing how and when negotiators shift between the broad strategic approaches of value creating and value claiming. Our theoretical framework incorporates both short-term changes, reflecting immediate responses to new information (Brett, Northcraft, & Pinkley, 1999) and longer-term changes, reflecting perceived shifts in the negotiation context or relationship (e.g., Druckman, 2003; Zartman, 1992). We argue that negotiations are characterized by periods of *process maintenance*, in which we observe a stable strategic approach, and *process shifts*, in which we observe instability in negotiators' strategic approach.

Understanding how and when negotiators shift from one period of strategic stability to another is the first step in developing a prescriptive theory that enables negotiators to effectively intervene in the negotiation process in order to craft mutually beneficial solutions within specific contextual constraints. Capturing this dynamic and the emergent aspect of the negotiation process provides managers and organizations with a powerful set of tools for redirecting the negotiation process to more functional and mutually beneficial outcomes, notwithstanding the structural conditions at the start of negotiations. This leads to our second goal for this article, which is to create a research agenda that will systematically examine the emergent aspects of negotiators' strategic choices and provide an empirical basis for better managing the negotiation process. Appendix A summarizes the terms used in this article.

Context and Strategic Choice

We represent negotiation as a goal-oriented activity in which integrative (cooperative) and distributive (competitive) strategies are used in the pursuit of both outcome and relationship goals (Taylor, 2002; Wilson & Putnam, 1990). Although models such as Pruitt's (1981) Dual Concern Model identify four strategic options, based on the extent to which negotiators emphasize achieving their own or the other party's goals, theory and research suggest that negotiators typically hold either a cooperative goal, focused on creating value for both parties, or an individualistic goal, focused on claiming value for oneself (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Both strategies carry risks. Cooperation can be enacted as accommodation when negotiators lose sight of protecting their own interests, resulting in suboptimal outcomes and dissatisfaction with the relationship. Competition can become overly contentious when negotiators lose sight of their desire to reach agreement, triggering escalatory spirals and impasse.

It is for this reason that negotiation researchers focus on problem-solving, a strategy that calls for a judicious blend of cooperating and competing as negotiators strive to maximize outcomes for both parties. A problem-solving, or collaborative, approach is recognized as the strategy best able to produce lasting agreements that meet the aspirations of both parties (Pruitt, 1981). Because of these benefits, a central concern for negotiation researchers is to better understand *how* negotiators can effectively craft mutually beneficial solutions that deliver good economic and relational outcomes to both parties. This comes from understanding how the negotiation process unfolds over time.

We base our analysis of negotiation processes on two assumptions: (a) negotiation is a goal-directed activity (Brett et al., 1999; Taylor, 2002; Wilson & Putnam, 1990) and (b) at the outset of negotiations, contextual factors may increase the salience of individualistic or cooperative outcome goals. Notwithstanding these initial conditions, in order to craft mutually beneficial solutions negotiators need to balance the dual goals of creating value to reach agreement and claiming value to ensure a personally satisfactory outcome. This means that negotiators need to blend the use of integrative strategies that create value with distributive strategies that claim value, that is, they need to move back and forth between strategies that are potentially inconsistent with their outcome goals

(Putnam, 1990). The shift between value creating and value claiming may be triggered because negotiators recognize that their current strategic path is blocking goal attainment; or, it may be triggered because negotiators redefine their goals based on shifts in their perception of what is feasible (Greeno & Simon, 1988; Kelley, 1997; Newell & Simon, 1972; Prietula & Weingart, 1994). In either case, understanding how these shifts are triggered increases our understanding of how negotiators can intervene in and redirect negotiations to a more productive process.

In this article, we focus on dyadic, multi-issue negotiations as we describe how and when negotiators shift strategies. We further limit our discussion to the relatively straightforward situation in which negotiators act on behalf of themselves (rather than on behalf of constituents). We begin by exploring the maintenance of and shifts in negotiation processes by focusing on two levels of analysis—inter-individual processes at the level of negotiators' speaking turns and negotiation-wide processes at the level of the negotiation phase. Next, we consider the effects of process maintenance and shifts on value creation, followed by a discussion of how goal congruence across negotiators affects the negotiation process. Finally, we consider implications for theory and practice.

Process Dynamics: Process Maintenance and Process Shifts

In this section, we describe the mechanisms that maintain or trigger changes in negotiators' strategic approach. Negotiation strategies reflect combinations of tactical behaviors. Individual behaviors are tactical and their combinations are strategic because they are enacted to move the individual or dyad closer to goal attainment. Depending on their initial outcome and relationship goals, negotiators' initial strategic approach may be integrative, supporting the cooperative goal of value creation, or distributive, supporting the individualistic goal of value claiming (Lewicki et al., 1999; Pruitt, 1981; Putnam, 1990; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Although negotiation processes can be analyzed at the level of either tactics or strategic approaches, in this article, we limit our discussion to the strategic level. However, our theory can be extended to the tactical level.

Negotiation processes can be analyzed at one of three levels. Most commonly, analyses focus on the frequency with which strategies are used independent of *when* they are used. This level of analysis, because it aggregates over time, can tell us about negotiators' dominant strategic approach. If the use of distributive tactics such as making demands, threatening, and attacking the other party are more frequent than integrative tactics such as sharing information, problem-solving, and expressing support for the other party, we can conclude that an individual negotiator's dominant strategic approach is distributive. This level of analysis is based on the assumption that the negotiation process is static, that is, that negotiators are unresponsive to the behaviors of the other party or that changes to strategies over time do not occur or are not important.

Recognizing that negotiators make strategic adjustments based on information they collect regarding progress towards their goals and the strategic orientation of the other party (Brett et al., 1999; Donohue, 1981; Greeno & Simon, 1988; Kelley, 1997; Newell & Simon, 1972; Weick, 1979) implies that the negotiation process is more dynamic. This realization shifts focus to the interplay of actions between two negotiators over time.

Adding a temporal element allows us to identify "when" and "how" negotiators implement value claiming and value creating, and whether the timing of strategic behavior is critical to the quality of negotiation outcomes. This temporal element can capture both moment-to-moment interaction sequences as well as patterns of strategic aggregation over more extended periods of time.

In the following sections, we elaborate on the implications of incorporating a temporal element into theories of negotiation process. To do this, we consider process dynamics at two levels of analysis, inter-individual and negotiation-wide. Inter-individual process dynamics capture the moment-to-moment choices negotiators make when they respond to the strategic choices of the other party. They are represented by *strategic sequences*. A sequence is defined by the immediate actions between negotiators, as is the case when one negotiator makes an offer and the other negotiator accepts (or rejects) that offer. Negotiation-wide process dynamics capture the aggregation of both negotiators' strategic choices over time. They are represented by *phases of strategic activity*. A phase is defined by an uninterrupted run of the same strategy, for example, the prolonged use of information about underlying priorities by *both* negotiators (Baxter, 1982; Holmes, 1992).

Our central assumption is that negotiators make strategic choices in service of their superordinate goals. Wilson and Putnam (1990) argue that negotiators hold both broad, negotiation-wide goals and more immediate, proximal goals. Negotiation-wide goals, such as obtaining a package deal that is better than their best alternative (BATNA), are relatively stable, being held for an entire negotiation. Proximal goals are shorter term and aimed at managing specific obstacles to achieving negotiation-wide goals. A proximal goal might be "making an offer that the other party cannot turn down." We recognize that if negotiators encounter sufficient obstacles to their negotiation-wide goals, these goals may be redefined. An implication of managing both negotiation-wide and proximal goals is that negotiation strategies will alternate between periods of process maintenance (strategic stability), as negotiators work towards goals, and periods of process shifts (strategic instability), as negotiators take corrective actions to reduce discrepancies between where they are and where they want to be (Brett et al., 1999).

It is our argument that negotiators' actions can maintain *or* change the negotiation process either at the inter-individual or negotiation-wide level. Table 1 summarizes patterns of process maintenance and process shifts across these levels. We elaborate on these patterns in the next section. We also consider cross-level dynamics, that is, how maintenance and shift interact across the two levels of aggregation. While examining process maintenance and shift at either level captures and describes the negotiation process, we argue that it is the cross-level dynamics that capture how individuals manage the negotiation process and move to settlement.

Process Maintenance

Process maintenance describes periods of stability in negotiators' strategic approach. During these periods, negotiators signal a shared strategic approach and common goals across negotiators. Consequently, process maintenance establishes a dominant strategic

Table 1
Patterns of Process Maintenance and Shifts at Different Levels of Aggregation

	Level of aggregation	
Process	Inter-individual interaction	Negotiation-wide dynamic
Maintenance	Reciprocal sequences	Phases
Shift	Structural sequences	Turning points

orientation that can be either integrative or distributive. *How* process is maintained depends on the level of aggregation being considered.

At the inter-individual interaction level, maintenance requires that negotiators match, or reciprocate, each other's strategies. Strategically, this is observed as a sequence of two identical strategies (e.g., integrative → integrative and distributive → distributive). Reciprocity establishes and maintains a shared approach because it provides immediate reinforcement of each negotiator's interpretation of the context (Brett, Weingart, & Olekalns, 2002; Donohue, Diez, & Hamilton, 1984; Putnam, 1990; Putnam & Jones, 1982b). In negotiations, as in other interactions, reciprocity can be positive or negative (Galluci & Perugini, 2001, 2003). Positive reciprocity, which matches cooperative moves, establishes a shared integrative orientation to the negotiation. Negative reciprocity, which matches competitive moves, establishes a shared distributive orientation. Individuals' goals will prime negotiators to display either positive or negative reciprocity. When the negotiating context makes the integrative goal of value creation salient, negotiators will display positive reciprocity; when the context makes the distributive goal of value claiming salient, negotiators will display negative reciprocity.

At the negotiation-wide level, maintenance occurs when reciprocity extends over time. As integrative or distributive strategies continue uninterrupted over time, they build into coherent phases of activity. These uninterrupted "runs" of the same strategy further reinforce the dominant strategic approach and signal the continuation of a shared approach (Baxter, 1982; Holmes, 1992). The focus on coherent phases of activity is related to, but not identical with, more normative models of negotiation phases. Two well-known models prescribe differentiation-before-integration (Morley & Stephenson, 1977; Walton & McKersie, 1965), implying that distributive strategies precede integrative strategies and the search for settlement (cf. Holmes, 1992). This sequence is supported by analyses of multi-party negotiations (Olekalns et al., 2003). Our approach is more descriptive than prescriptive. Importantly, we build on existing models by analyzing the conditions under which negotiators maintain (or redirect) a phase as well as the implications of phase maintenance for negotiation outcomes.

Process Shifts

Process shifts capture periods of instability in negotiators' strategic approach. They signal divergent strategic approaches and discrepant goals. Process shifts occur when negotiators respond to goal discrepancies by making strategic adjustments to redirect

the negotiation, consequently disrupting a dominant strategic orientation. These strategic adjustments occur at two levels, inter-individual and negotiation-wide.

At the inter-individual level, process shifts occur when negotiators introduce strategies that mismatch the immediately preceding strategies used by the other party, that is, when they use "structural" sequences (e.g., integrative → distributive, distributive → integrative; Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; Olekalns & Smith, 2000, 2003a, 2003b). Negotiators mismatch each others' strategies for two reasons. The first is that negotiators are deliberately attempting to change the negotiation dynamic. For example, a negotiator might respond to a threat (distributive tactic) with information about underlying needs (an integrative tactic) in order to redirect the threatening negotiator to a more integrative process. Such strategic *redirections* (challenges to a strategic approach) are intentional and serve to limit the immediate impact of a specific strategy (e.g., Brett et al., 1998; Kolb, 2004). The second is that negotiators are attempting to prevent a strategic redirection by the other party and return the negotiation to the dominant phase orientation. Continuing the above example, the first negotiator may ignore the information provided by the second negotiator and respond with a demand. This negotiator thus maintains the original distributive approach.

Process shifts can also be observed at the level of the negotiation, as is the case when negotiators move from phases of distribution to phases of integration, or vice versa (Donohue & Roberto, 1993; Holmes & Sykes, 1993; Lytle, Brett, & Shapiro, 1999; Olekalns et al., 1996, 2003; Putnam, Wilson, & Turner, 1990). Evidence for moves between phase of distribution and integration is provided by analyses of large-scale conflicts, which show abrupt shifts (or turning points) in the ongoing negotiation process (e.g., Druckman, 1986, 2001; Druckman, Husbands, & Johnson, 1991). The same kinds of transitions are also observed in dyadic and multi-party deal-making negotiations, leading us to conclude that negotiators rarely retain the same strategic orientation for the duration of a negotiation (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; McGinn, Lingo, & Ciano, 2004; Olekalns & Smith, 2005; Olekalns et al., 2003; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). These shifts (or turning points) act as temporal brackets that create discontinuities in negotiation phases.

Cross-Level Dynamics

An implication of identifying these two levels of analysis is that negotiation processes develop along two parallel, but interdependent, tracks in which sequences play out in the context of phases (e.g., Kelley, 1997; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Langley, 1999; Leifer, 1988; Wilson & Putnam, 1990). Consequently, the negotiation process is shaped not only by processes *within* levels of aggregation but also by the interplay of processes *across* levels of aggregation. The actions that negotiators take at the inter-individual level can either build or disrupt emergent negotiation-wide phases.

Cross-Level Process Maintenance

Negotiators strengthen the perception that they have a shared strategic approach when their actions at the inter-individual (sequence) and negotiation-wide (phase) levels are

aligned. For example, when the integrative tactic of sharing priority information is used within the context of other integrative tactics such as expressing support of the other person, problem-solving, and focusing on the process, this strategy is used within (aligned with) an integrative phase. It therefore builds and supports the emergent integrative phase. When negotiators also reciprocate these integrative strategies, they add structure to their communication, further reinforcing and strengthening an integrative phase. We can thus observe a cycle in which preceding strategies establish an integrative phase and, for as long as negotiators continue to reciprocate the preceding integrative behavior, they prolong and strengthen that strategic orientation. A relational consequence might be that, as integration continues to build over time, negotiators attribute goodwill to the other party and increasingly trust the other negotiator. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle of trust and cooperation (e.g., McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). Similarly, the dynamic can escalate into contention and distrust when negotiators use and reciprocate distributive tactics within the context of distributive phases.

One consequence of cross-level alignment is that negotiators progressively reduce strategic variability. As strategic variability decreases, negotiators become increasingly susceptible to the pitfalls associated with their dominant phase orientation: yielding and premature closure when the dominant phase orientation is integrative, escalating conflict and impasse when the dominant phase orientation is distributive. Supporting our argument, in dyadic negotiations, temporary impasses trigger a shift in negotiators' strategies (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). In large-scale socio-political negotiations mounting contention triggers a turning point that averts impasse (Druckman, 1986, 2001). Similar processes are at play in groups, where the recognition that there is a gap between where groups are headed and where they wanted to be triggers a redirection of group processes (Jett & George, 2003; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002). Our argument is that process shifts, which we describe in the next section, are triggered by the recognition that negotiations are at risk.

Cross-Level Process Shifts

Negotiators strengthen the perception that they have different strategic approaches when their actions at the sequence (inter-individual) and phase (negotiation-wide) levels are *misaligned*. For example, when the distributive tactic of attacking the other person is used within the context of integrative tactics such as giving information about underlying needs, problem-solving, and focusing on the process, this strategy is misaligned with the emerging integrative phase. It therefore disrupts the emergent integrative phase and may trigger a phase shift. This means that whenever negotiators initiate a process shift at the inter-individual level by using structural (mismatching) sequences, they can trigger a phase shift. Irrespective of whether negotiators successfully trigger a phase shift, such disruptions can affect the ongoing relationship because it violates the expectations of the other party. Positive violations, in which negotiators respond to a distributive tactic with an integrative tactic, will improve the relationship and build trust. Conversely, negative violations, in which negotiators respond to an integrative tactic with a

distributive tactic, can harm the relationship and violate trust (Hilty & Carnevale, 1992; Olekalns, Roberts, Probst, Smith, & Carnevale, 2005).

Negotiators who mismatch the other party's strategy do not always succeed in changing the dominant strategic orientation. Whether the dominant orientation is changed depends on the actions of the other party, who can respond in one of two ways. When negotiators reject the introduction of a phase-misaligned strategy, we will observe isolated disruptions that do not change the dominant strategic approach whereas when they accept those strategies, we will observe reciprocated disruptions that change the dominant strategic orientation.

Isolated disruptions occur when one party introduces a phase-misaligned strategy and the other responds by continuing to use a phase-aligned strategy (i.e., not reciprocating). In an isolated disruption, one negotiator ignores the use of a phase-misaligned strategy by the other party. From an inter-individual (sequence) perspective an isolated disruption appears as two structural sequences. As an example, in the first sequence Negotiator A uses a phase-aligned integrative strategy such as giving priority information and elicits a threat (distributive strategy) from Negotiator B. The demand is mismatched to the preceding integrative strategy used by Negotiator A and also misaligned with the integrative phase in which it is used (integrative $\text{strategy}_{\text{Negotiator A}} \rightarrow$ distributive $\text{strategy}_{\text{Negotiator B}}$). The second structural sequence is created when Negotiator A responds to the use of a threat with an integrative strategy such as expressing optimism. In this case, Negotiator A's strategy is mismatched to Negotiator B's preceding strategy but aligned with the integrative phase (distributive $\text{strategy}_{\text{Negotiator B}} \rightarrow$ integrative $\text{strategy}_{\text{Negotiator A}}$). From a negotiation-wide perspective, an isolated disruption can be represented as follows: $\text{aligned}_{\text{Negotiator A}} \rightarrow \text{misaligned}_{\text{Negotiator B}} \rightarrow \text{aligned}_{\text{Negotiator A}}$. When Negotiator A rejects the introduction of a phase-misaligned strategy by failing to reciprocate it, the dominant phase orientation is temporarily disrupted but remains fundamentally unchallenged. While these interruptions can serve an important function (such as signaling the importance of cooperating in a competitive group), the critical feature of isolated disruptions is that the dominant phase orientation of the negotiating dyad remains unchanged.

Reciprocated disruptions occur when one party introduces a phase-misaligned strategy and the other party also switches to that strategy, that is, reciprocates the use of the strategy. From an inter-individual (sequence) perspective a reciprocated disruption appears as a structural sequence followed by a reciprocal sequence. Returning to the preceding example, faced with Negotiator B's threat, instead of continuing down an integrative path, Negotiator A could choose to reciprocate by retaliating with a threat. In this case, Negotiator A's strategy is matched to Negotiator B's preceding strategy but misaligned with the integrative phase (distributive $\text{strategy}_{\text{Negotiator B}} \rightarrow$ distributive $\text{strategy}_{\text{Negotiator A}}$). From a negotiation-wide perspective, a reciprocated disruption can be represented as: $\text{aligned}_{\text{Negotiator A}} \rightarrow \text{misaligned}_{\text{Negotiator B}} \rightarrow \text{misaligned}_{\text{Negotiator A}}$. When Negotiator A accepts the introduction of a phase-misaligned strategy by reciprocating it, the dominant phase orientation is challenged (Weingart et al., 1999) and has the potential to trigger a phase shift. If negotiators continue to reciprocate the phase-misaligned strategy beyond this initial speaking turn, they converge to a new dominant



Figure 1. Cross level dynamics: process maintenance (top) and process shift (bottom).

phase orientation, that is, they initiate a new phase (e.g., Holmes & Sykes, 1993; Poole, 1983a, 1983b). We summarize these two patterns in Figure 1.

Process Dynamics and Value Creation

In this section, we consider how process maintenance and process shifts affect the value creation process, that is, the process through which mutually beneficial agreements are crafted. We argue that both process maintenance and process shifts shape negotiators' outcomes. Importantly, it is the interplay between processes across inter-individual and negotiation-wide levels that determines whether negotiators are able to create value.

Process Maintenance and Process Shifts

A dominant phase orientation is maintained when negotiators use the same strategies. At the inter-individual level, this is signaled by reciprocal sequences; at the negotiation-wide level, it is signaled by stable and prolonged phases. The consequences of reinforcing a dominant phase orientation are well documented: Broadly, reinforcing distributive strategies limits negotiators' ability to create value whereas reinforcing integrative strategies enhances that ability (Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Putnam & Folger, 1988; Putnam & Jones, 1982a; Roloff, Tutzauer, & Dailey, 1989; Weingart & Olekalns, 2004; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). These limits are challenged and changed by process shifts. At the inter-individual level, a dominant phase orientation is disrupted when negotiators introduce structural sequences; at the negotiation-wide level, disruption occurs when negotiators move from phases of integration to distribution, or vice versa (Olekalns et al., 2003). Both kinds of process shifts redefine the range of settlement options for negotiators. However, the consequences of process maintenance and process shifts cannot be fully understood by considering inter-individual and negotiation-wide

levels of action in isolation. To fully capture the relationship between negotiation processes and outcomes, we need to consider not just what negotiators do but the timing and context of their strategic actions.

Cross-Level Dynamics

When negotiators reinforce each others' strategies, they establish either a dominant integrative or dominant distributive phase orientation. However, negotiation theory and research suggest that maintaining a one-dimensional strategic approach creates challenges for negotiators. The longer negotiators remain in stable phases, the more exposed they become to the risks associated with prolonged integration or distribution. In the case of integration, negotiators risk losing sight of their personal goals when trying to maximize own and others' outcome, resulting in agreements that might be minimally acceptable, but are not optimal (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pruitt, 1981); in the case of distribution, negotiators risk escalating the level of contentiousness to the point where they are unable to reach agreement (Pruitt, 1981).

It is for this reason that negotiators are advised to blend integration and distribution in order to achieve optimal agreements (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Given this advice, it is important to understand how integrative and distributive strategies can be blended most effectively. Our discussion suggests that both isolated and reciprocated disruptions affect the value creation process. As discussed earlier, isolated disruptions occur when negotiators reject the introduction of a previously under-utilized strategy, that is, a strategy that does not reflect the dominant phase orientation. The adjustments that result from isolated disruptions punctuate the process, perhaps reminding negotiators of an alternative strategy, but do not change the dominant phase orientation or the possibilities for settlement. As a result, isolated disruptions help negotiators manage the obstacles associated with their dominant phase orientation. They determine the extent to which negotiators create or claim value within the limits established by the dominant phase orientation because they push at those limits (Brett et al., 1998; Olekalns & Smith, 2000, 2003b). In contrast, reciprocated disruptions are more likely to change the dominant phase orientation and redefine what is possible in terms of settlement options. Reciprocated disruptions occur when negotiators reinforce the introduction of a previously under-utilized strategy. In that both negotiators acknowledge the alternative strategy, these reciprocated disruptions have the potential to trigger shifts in the dominant phase orientation. Shifts will be triggered when (a) a misaligned strategy is used increasingly frequently and (b) the use of this strategy is consistently reciprocated. These adjustments are long term and initiate a new negotiation phase.

Disruptions Within Integrative Phases

When the dominant phase orientation is *integrative*, such that negotiators are focused on value creation, an isolated disruption occurs when the introduction of a distributive strategy is rejected. For example, a negotiator might introduce contention via a structural (integrative → distributive) sequence to refocus negotiators on their own interests. Rejection of the phase-misaligned (distributive) strategy allows the overall integrative

approach to be preserved. In this case, structural sequences allow negotiators to push to the upper limits of what is possible, that is, they assist in identifying all of the available settlement options. Against a background of integration, negotiators can create value when they introduce threats or respond to conciliation with contention (Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Putnam & Wilson, 1989).

Reciprocated disruptions within integrative phases occur when one negotiator introduces a distributive strategy and the other party accepts and reinforces the move to competition by reciprocating this strategy. As negotiators continue to reciprocate each other's use of distributive strategies, competition gains momentum and triggers a new, distributive phase. One consequence of this phase shift from integration to distribution is that negotiators place limits on the value creation process. When the initial, dominant phase orientation is integrative, isolated disruptions support value creation whereas reciprocated disruptions challenge value creation.

Disruptions Within Distributive Phases

When the dominant phase orientation is *distributive* and negotiators are focused on value claiming, isolated disruptions occur when the introduction of an integrative strategy is rejected. For example, negotiators can use a structural sequence to introduce a necessary element of cooperation to offset escalating contention and impasse. However, the rejection of the integrative strategy means that the overall distributive approach is preserved. One consequence is that, in a distributive phase, these sequences shift the balance of power away from the integrating negotiator and can result in an uneven split of resources. For example, when individuals introduce agreeability or conciliation into a dominant distributive approach, they obtain low joint gain and a smaller share of resources (Donohue, 1981; Olekalns & Smith, 2000).

Within distributive phases, reciprocated disruptions occur when one negotiator introduces an integrative strategy and the other party accepts and reinforces the move to cooperation by reciprocating this strategy. As negotiators continue to reciprocate each other's use of integrative strategies, cooperation gains momentum and triggers a new, integrative phase. A consequence of this phase shift from distribution to integration is that negotiators extend the upper limits to the value creation process. When the initial, dominant phase orientation is distributive, reciprocated disruptions support value creation whereas isolated disruptions amplify value claiming and challenge value creation.

Process Dynamics and Goal Congruence

Most analyses of negotiations focus on individual goals and strategies. In this article, we have shifted the level of analysis to the dyad. One implication of this shift is that negotiators' strategy choices can be congruent or incongruent with the choices of the other party. To the extent that strategic choices are driven by negotiators' goals, this further implies that negotiators can hold congruent or incongruent goals. Recent theory and research suggest that the degree to which negotiators are "in sync" with one another in terms of goals or timing affects both their strategy choices and patterns of strategy over time (Adair & Brett, 2005; Blount & Janicik, 2000, 2001; McGinn & Keros, 2003).

Interdependence increases the likelihood that individuals will strive to be in sync (Blount & Janicik, 2001). This may be because being in sync enhances intangible aspects of the negotiation experience, for example increasing trust (McGinn & Keros, 2003) and satisfaction (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994), or because it increases the likelihood of settlement (Brodt & Dietz, 1999; Drake & Donohue, 1996). Although this implies that being "out of sync" is more likely to trigger strategic shifts as negotiators attempt to align themselves with one another, our earlier arguments imply that strategic shifts are necessary for all negotiators, even within dyads that are in sync. However, the patterns of strategic shifts that emerge will differ, depending on whether negotiators are in or out of synch. We explore this argument further, differentiating between congruence between negotiators' goal type (individualistic or cooperative) and goal strength (strong or weak) (Table 2).

Negotiators' goals are cued by structural features of the negotiation as well as the characteristics associated with individual negotiators (De Dreu et al., 2000). We start with the assumption that it is possible to ascribe a dominant outcome goal to a negotiator in a given negotiation. As stated earlier, outcome goals drive negotiators' strategy choices: cooperative goals (maximize own and other's outcome) focus negotiators on value creation and increase reliance on integrative strategies whereas individualistic goals (maximize own outcome) focus negotiators in value claiming and increase reliance on distributive strategies (Carroll & Payne, 1991; De Dreu et al., 2000; Deutsch, 1982; Putnam, 1990; Walton & McKersie, 1965).

The dominant goals held by negotiators can also vary in strength. Goal strength is shaped by the extent to which the negotiation context provides negotiators with unambiguous cues about their goals, that is, by whether negotiators are in a strong or weak context (Druckman, 2003). By definition, *strong situations* arise when contextual cues reduce strategic ambiguity, implying that negotiators are more likely to present a predictable, one-dimensional approach. The structural context—factors such as power, accountability, and explicit instructions—creates strong situations that signal a dominant phase orientation because they are often explicit and relatively immutable. For example, task instructions that explicitly set cooperative goals elicit integrative strategies whereas instructions that set individualistic goals elicit distributive strategies (Carnevale

Table 2
Patterns of Process Shifts as a Function of Goal Strength and Congruency

	Goal strength	
Goal congruency	Weak	Strong
Congruent: Cooperative and Individualistic	Long phases of goal-congruent strategies: cooperative goals establish long phases of integration and individualistic goals establish long phases of distribution.	
Incongruent	Negotiators display mutual adaptation; adaptation triggers cyclical phases of integration and distribution	Cooperative negotiator displays unilateral adaptation; adaptation triggers long distributive phases

& Lawler, 1987; Lewis & Fry, 1977; O'Connor, 1997; O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Olekalns & Smith, 2003b; Schulz & Pruitt, 1978; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). *Weak situations* arise when contextual cues are more ambiguous, implying that negotiators will present a multi-dimensional approach because ambiguous goals will cue a variety of interpretations and a range of potential action. The social context—factors such as culture and the other party's disposition—creates weak situations because it generates cues that are more implicit and thus less readily accessible to either party. Culture, for example, exerts its influence on behavior at a subconscious level, through a value system (Chen, Chen, & Meindl, 1998). As a result, negotiators are more likely to implement a multi-dimensional strategy (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998).

Implications for Process Dynamics

When negotiators have *congruent goals* (both parties are cooperative or both are individualistic), they employ the same strategies. At the inter-individual level, this results in sequences of reciprocal integration or distribution. Negotiators reinforce each other's strategies and signal a dominant strategic orientation (Olekalns & Smith, 2000, 2003a, 2003b). At the negotiation level, this ongoing reciprocity aggregates to form a stable phase of either integration or distribution. Congruent cooperative goals increase the likelihood and duration of integrative phases; congruent distributive goals increase the likelihood and duration of distributive phases. This pattern is largely unaffected by goal strength: in both settings, individuals initiate negotiations with congruent strategies, resulting in reciprocity and the establishment of stable, goal-congruent phases.

When negotiators have *incongruent goals* (one cooperative, one individualistic), negotiators initiate different strategies. At the inter-individual level, this results in mismatching or structural sequences. Negotiators challenge each other's strategies and signal their discrepant goals. At the negotiation level, this pattern of structural sequences means that strategies do not easily aggregate into phases and so a dominant phase orientation is less likely to emerge. Following our earlier argument, negotiators with incongruent goals are likely to show behavioral adaptation, that is, a shift to increasingly similar strategies as they strive for the benefits of being in sync. However, research suggests that the specific patterns of adaptation will be affected by goal strength.

In strong contexts, negotiators have unambiguous goals that trigger a one-dimensional, highly consistent strategy, sending a clear signal of strategic intent. When these goals are incongruent (e.g., when one party's business will benefit from a long-term relationship whereas the other's business will not), negotiators are placed in an asymmetrical position: the individualistic negotiator sees the potential of exploiting the other party's cooperation whereas the cooperative negotiator sees the likelihood of being exploited (Camac, 1992). Here, process shifts are more critical for the negotiator holding cooperative goals, because they serve a self-protective function (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Weingart et al., 2007). This implies that cooperative negotiators are more likely to reciprocate distributive strategies than are individualistic negotiators likely to reciprocate integrative strategies. The consequence of process shifts on the part of

cooperative negotiators is that distributive phases are more likely to become established than integrative phases. We therefore expect that, over time, the process in dyads with strong, incongruent goals will come to resemble those of dyads with congruent individualistic goals.

In weak contexts, negotiators have more ambiguous goals that trigger a multi-dimensional strategy. As a result, weak contexts are less likely to trigger strategic shifts by the cooperatively motivated negotiator. This is because each negotiator displays a multi-dimensional strategy that is not internally consistent, that is, has elements of both integration and distribution. This lack of stability can be interpreted as a willingness to adapt and change strategies. For the individualistic negotiator, the ability of the cooperative negotiator to introduce distributive strategies places checks on attempts to exploit; for the cooperative negotiator, the ability of the individualistic negotiators to introduce integrative strategies provides some safeguards against exploitation. Consequently, there is no clear incentive for one party to change strategies. One consequence is that dyads may establish a dominant integrative approach (Miller & Holmes, 1975), a dominant distributive approach, or maintain a multi-dimensional approach (Olekalns & Smith, 1999, 2003a). This implies that, in weak situations, we will not observe consistent strategic changes on the part of one party. Instead, the first strategy to be consistently reinforced will determine the dominant phase orientation, but the more flexible strategies of both negotiators imply that the dominant phase orientation will be readily disrupted. Relative to negotiators in strong contexts, negotiators in weak contexts will maintain phases for shorter periods of time.

Implications for Value Creation

In the preceding section, we argued that dyads with congruent and incongruent goals will differ in two ways: (a) whether negotiators start with a phase of strategic alignment or misalignment and (b) how long stable phases are maintained. We now consider how these patterns affect value creation. We argue that, independent of goal congruence, process shifts are necessary for value creation. However, the nature of these shifts will differ, depending on goal type and strength. The patterns that we expect to emerge are summarized in Table 3.

We argued that when negotiators have *congruent* goals, long phases of integration or distribution expose them to the risks of accommodating and impasse, respectively. In both cases, negotiators need to effect process shifts in order to create value. In the case of congruent, cooperative goals, this shift is likely to be triggered by negotiators' need to meet their own interests and the consequent introduction of distributive strategies (Pruitt, 1981). In the case of congruent, individualistic goals, this shift is likely to be triggered when negotiators reach a temporary impasse (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004), resulting in the introduction of integrative strategies. This implies that, in order to create value, cooperatively oriented negotiators need to introduce distributive strategies that disrupt their dominant integrative approach whereas individualistically oriented negotiators need to introduce integrative strategies to disrupt their dominant distributive approach.

Table 3
Process Shifts That Create Value

	Goal strength	
Goal congruency	Weak	Strong
Congruent, individualistic	Create value via reciprocated (integrative) disruptions; requires shift from distributive to integrative phases	
Congruent, cooperative	Create value via isolated (distributive) disruptions; requires introduction of structural sequences within integrative phases	
Incongruent	Pattern parallels that for cooperative congruent goals	Pattern parallels that for individualistic congruent goals

However, the scale of the process shifts associated with value creation will differ depending on goal type because integration is a more fragile and readily disrupted process than distribution (Weingart et al., 1999). In order to maximize the benefits of cooperative goals, negotiators need to sustain a dominant integrative approach while introducing the requisite level of contention. This implies that, in order to create value, cooperatively oriented negotiators should inject isolated disruptions into the process. When dyads have shared cooperative goals (and thus, their dominant phase orientation is integrative), we expect that dyads' ability to find mutually beneficial solutions will be associated with the limited introduction of distribution, that is, sequences of the form $\text{integrative}_{\text{Negotiator A}} \rightarrow \text{distributive}_{\text{Negotiator B}} \rightarrow \text{integrative}_{\text{Negotiator A}}$. Conversely, the greater stability of a distributive approach implies that individualistically oriented negotiators need to effect reciprocated disruptions in order to successfully offset the risks associated with distribution and create value. Consequently, we expect goal-congruent, individualistic dyads that reciprocate integrative strategies (e.g., $\text{distributive}_{\text{Negotiator A}} \rightarrow \text{integrative}_{\text{Negotiator B}} \rightarrow \text{integrative}_{\text{Negotiator A}}$) to be more likely to shift from distributive to integrative phases and increase value creation than those who do not reciprocate integrative strategies.

When negotiators hold *incongruent* goals they are out of synch (McGinn & Keros, 2003). This signals the absence of a shared perspective making value creation more difficult. Negotiators with a shared perspective more readily maximize joint gain (Adair et al., 2001; Olekalns & Smith, 1999). The need to converge leads to the emergence of a dominant phase orientation (either integrative or distributive), potentially exposing negotiators to the associated risks. Building on our earlier arguments, we expect that when negotiators have strong, incongruent goals the process shifts associated with value creation will parallel those observed in dyads with congruent, individualistic goals—value is primarily created through reciprocated disruptions that shift the negotiation from distribution to integration. This is because we expect dyads with strong incongruent goals to initially converge to a dominant distributive phase orientation (as the cooperative negotiator engages in self-protection), implying that the most critical factor in value creation is the ability to introduce integrative strategies. When negotiators have weak and incongruent goals, we expect the process shifts associated with value creation to parallel those in dyads with congruent, cooperative goals such that isolated

disruptions create value via structural sequences within integrative phases. This is because when both negotiators have a multi-dimensional approach, they are less likely to settle into a dominant phase orientation, instead cycling between phases of integration and distribution. The longer they are able to maintain phases of integration, the greater the prospects for value creation.

In summary, we have argued that negotiators will cycle between periods of stability and instability, as negotiators introduce instability to manage the risks associated with stable phases (i.e., accommodating or impasse) and strive for stability to signal shared goals and improve both intangible and tangible outcomes. We have further argued that the duration of stable phases and the kind of instability that results in value creation will be determined by goal congruency, goal type, and goal strength.

Implications for Theory and Practice

Negotiation theory recognizes the need to blend integrative and distributive strategies in order for negotiators to craft mutually beneficial solutions (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Phase models of negotiation, for example, propose a differentiation-before-integration sequence (Holmes, 1992; Olekalns et al., 2003; Putnam, 1990), further arguing that this sequence delivers the most effective means for creating value. We extend phase models by proposing that strategic blending occurs at two levels. Negotiators can blend on a moment-to-moment basis, through the use of structural sequences, or on an aggregate level, moving between phases of integration and distribution. Moreover, we have argued that decisions to match or mismatch strategies on a moment-to-moment basis have implications for how strategies aggregate over time.

Linking these two levels of analysis enabled us to identify the mechanisms that trigger strategic shifts and focused attention on double interact sequences (Negotiator A $\rightarrow$ Negotiator B $\rightarrow$ Negotiator A; Weick, 1979) and beyond. Only by examining these sequences in the context of the dominant phase orientation can we predict the consequences of negotiators' decisions to accept or reject attempts to introduce a new strategic approach. Our argument fits with a broader literature demonstrating that group processes are punctuated by a series of interruptions that provide the opportunity for redirecting processes (Gersick, 1989; Jett & George, 2003; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002). We explore the theoretical, empirical, and applied implications of our framework in the following sections.

Phase Sequences

An important difference between our analysis and current phase models of negotiation centers around the ''differentiation-before-integration'' prescription. Instead, we argued that negotiators' goals and their dominant phase orientation determine where negotiations start, the length and stability of integrative and distributive phases of negotiation, as well as the within-phase strategic adjustments that negotiators make. Comparing negotiating dyads with congruent goals to dyads with incongruent goals, we observed that goal (in)congruency affects the emergence of dominant phase orientations. In

contrast to past theory, showing that negotiators in goal incongruent dyads do not necessarily persist with their dominant strategies (e.g., Chatman & Barsade, 1995; De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1994; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Wagner, 1995), we identified two conditions that determine strategic adaptation: (a) whether goals are cooperative or individualistic and (b) whether they are cued by strong or weak contexts. One clear avenue for further research is an examination of how moment-to-moment strategic sequences and phase sequencing are affected by the negotiating context. Our analysis suggests that where a negotiation starts, how long dyads sustain a dominant strategic orientation, and who is more likely to display strategic adaptation are influenced by the negotiating context.

Our analysis has implications for individuals in planning and initiating their negotiations. Individuals and organizations need to undertake a strategic analysis of the negotiating context, specifically the strength with which context cues a dominant strategic orientation. This will enable negotiators to assess the benefits of a one-dimensional versus a multi-dimensional strategic approach. When the negotiation context is characterized by clear and unambiguous cues about the other party's goals, negotiators should plan to initiate negotiations by matching the other party's strategy. However, when the negotiation context is weak and presents ambiguous cues about the other party's goals, negotiators will benefit from initiating and reinforcing an integrative approach.

Phase Shifts

We have argued that all negotiations are characterized by periods of process stability and periods of process shift. In developing this argument, we have challenged the prevailing view that negotiators benefit from being "in sync," that is, from consistently enacting the same strategic approach. We identified the pitfalls of an invariant (stable) strategic approach to negotiation and proposed that negotiators cannot create value unless they alternate periods of stable process with periods of process shifts. While we were able to describe how these patterns of stability and shift might emerge, to date research has not systematically explored how and when strategic challenges at the inter-individual level successfully trigger changes to the dominant strategic orientation at the aggregate level (Olekalns et al., 2003). A clear avenue for future research is to model how and when strategic challenges, in the form of structural sequences, trigger phase shifts.

An important implication of this theoretical development is that negotiators can shape the dominant approach by introducing and reinforcing the use of nondominant strategies. Our analysis fits within a broader literature focusing on how *turning points* at the aggregate level and *turns* at the inter-individual level can be used to redirect the negotiation process (Druckman, 2003; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Kolb, 2004; Olekalns & Smith, 2005). It extends this literature by identifying two conditions that affect how and when negotiators should interrupt a dominant strategic orientation: (a) whether negotiations started in a distributive or an integrative phase and (b) whether negotiators are attempting to interrupt and redirect negotiations from integration to distribution or vice versa. This becomes even more important when we consider the implications for value creation (below). To successfully interrupt and change a dominant orientation, negotiators need to

watch not only for the build-up of a dominant orientation with its associated pitfalls, but for interruptions to strategic stability. They need to assess whether these interruptions are functional and move the negotiation forward, or whether they are disruptive and likely to impede successful value creation. Based on their assessment, negotiators need to be prepared to either follow the interruption into a new phase (reciprocated disruption) or to recover the previous phase (isolated disruption). Although we believe that the identification and use of turning points and moves will give negotiators greater control of the negotiation process, very little research has attempted to specify the conditions under which such interruptions will shift negotiations to a more productive path.

Continuing this line of reasoning, linking disruptions to dominant phase orientations enables negotiators to determine the most effective interventions for value creation. We have argued that when the dominant phase orientation is integrative, negotiators will benefit from isolated disruptions, that is, patterns in which the introduction of a distributive strategy is rejected. Conversely, when the dominant phase orientation is distributive, negotiators will benefit from reciprocated disruptions, that is, patterns in which the introduction of an integrative strategy is accepted. Theoretically, this extends the argument that a blend of integration and distribution is necessary for value creation, demonstrating that the effects of blending these approaches are asymmetrical. In practice, this means that negotiators need to be aware that when limited distributive behaviors are introduced against a background of integration, negotiators obtain high joint gain, but that the introduction of limited integration against a background of distribution does not similarly lead to high joint gain. Instead, when the dominant phase orientation is distributive, negotiators must introduce coherent phases of integration in order to create value.

Phase Spillover and Other Issues

In discussing process stability and process shifts, we have to some extent treated the initiation of a new strategic phase as a clean slate. However, it is likely that preceding phases will spill over to affect the interpretation of and reaction to strategic choices within a new phase. For example, negotiations that move from a distributive to an integrative phase will carry with them the impressions and emotions that characterized the distributive phase. An implication is that this may affect negotiators' tolerance of and reactions to strategic challenges at the inter-individual level. Research shows that individuals' goals (individualistic or cooperative) affect their tolerance for delays in reciprocity (Flynn, 2005; Parks & Rumble, 2001). Similarly, individuals' goals affect their sensitivity to positive (helpful) or negative (harmful) reciprocity (Galluci & Perugini, 2001, 2003). Both lines of research imply that the strategic context created by an early dominant phase will spill over to shape subsequent decisions about matching and mismatching strategies. We believe that examining how strategic spillover shapes the longer-term negotiating dynamic is a further and important direction for negotiation research.

Although we have focused on negotiators' goals as determinants of their initial strategic approach, this is but one of several contextual variables that shape strategic decisions. Accountability to others, power, reputation, and individual differences such as social motives all shape how negotiators approach their task. However, we believe that

the impact of all of these contextual variables culminates in pushing individuals to either a more cooperative or a more competitive orientation to negotiation. Nonetheless, exploring the extent to which these variables uniformly trigger the same patterns of strategic aggregation over time provides a further avenue for research.

Finally, we have not touched on how interested researchers can follow the research directions we identified in this article. To understand patterns of process stability and process change requires that we analyze what negotiators say and how their opponents react. This calls for a fine-grained analysis of negotiators' communication. We have elsewhere addressed how such data can be collected, interpreted, and analyzed (Smith, Olekalns, & Weingart, 2005; Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2005).

Conclusion

In developing our theory, we reviewed research that focused on face-to-face interactions and analyzed negotiators' communication. We have suggested that process maintenance and process shifts occur at two levels: inter-individual and overall negotiation. The interplay between these levels determines negotiators' ability to craft mutually beneficial solutions. We extended this basic model of negotiation to processes, to take into consideration both the nature and strength of negotiators' goals, as well as goal congruency in negotiating dyads. In developing this theory, we have shown not only that negotiation is a highly adaptive process but that understanding the emergent properties of negotiation is critical to understanding the unexplained variance in negotiators' outcomes.

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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Levels of Analysis

Inter-individual: moment-to-moment choices negotiators make when they respond to the strategic choices of the other party, represented by strategic sequences.

Negotiation-wide: aggregation of both negotiators' strategic choices over time, represented by phases of strategic activity.

Integrative phase—dominant phase orientation characterized by integrative, cooperative, value creating, and problem-solving behaviors.

Distributive phase—dominant phase orientation characterized by distributive, contentious, value claiming, and argumentative behaviors.

Goals

Goal levels

Proximal goals: local or shorter-term goals designed to manage specific obstacles to achieving negotiation-wide goals.

Negotiation-wide goals: superordinate goals, relatively stable, held throughout the negotiation.

Goal types

Cooperative: goal to maximize own and others' outcomes.

Individualistic: goal to maximize own outcome.

Goal strength

Strong: unambiguous, explicit outcome/relational goals resulting from strong situational cues.

Weak: ambiguous, vague outcome/relational goals resulting from weak situational cues.

Goal congruence: the similarity of strategic goals across negotiators within a negotiation.

Process Dynamics
Process maintenance: periods of stability in negotiators' strategic approach.
Inter-individual—occurs via reciprocity (called *matching*).
Negotiation-wide—occurs via extended reciprocity over time, builds into coherent phases of activity.
Process shifts: periods of instability in negotiators' strategic approach.
Inter-individual—occurs via introduction of strategies that do not match immediately preceding strategies (called *mismatching* or *structural sequences*).
Negotiation-wide—occurs via changes from one strategic phase to another (e.g., integrative to distributive).
Cross-level dynamics
Cross-level process maintenance (alignment)—when a tactic of type A (e.g., integrative) is used within a phase of type A (e.g., integrative).
Cross-level process shifts (misalignment)—when a tactic of type B (e.g., distributive) is used within a phase of type A (e.g., integrative) (also referred to as a disruption).
Isolated disruption—when a disruption is not reciprocated.
Reciprocated disruption—when a disruption is reciprocated.

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