negotiation and conflict management research

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Expectations, Conflict Styles, and Anchors in Negotiation

Colleen Tolan[1], **Deborah A. Cai**[1], & **Edward L. Fink**[1]

1 Media and communication Doctoral Program, Klein College of Media and Communication, Temple University

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negotiation, conflict styles, expectations, anchor, dominating, accommodating

Correspondence
Deborah A. Cai, Klein College of Media and Communication, Temple University, 334 Annenberg Hall, 2020 N. 13th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122, U.S.A.; e-mail: debcai@temple.edu

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Abstract

This study examines whether negotiators' expectations about their opponents' conflict style and the anchoring of their initial offers affects their offers and satisfaction with their negotiation partner. Using a multi-round Ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982; *N* = 269), we first measured negotiators' own conflict styles and their expectations about their opponent's use of the accommodating or dominating style, based on Pruitt and Rubin's (1986) dual concern model, using the ROCI-II scale (Rahim, 1983). We found that when negotiators scored higher on the use of the accommodating or dominating style, they generally expected their opponent to match their conflict style. However, negotiators' use of the dominating conflict style also was associated with a high expectation that their opponent would use an accommodating style. But expectations about the opponent's conflict style did not affect offers as much as anchoring: The first round of offers served as an anchor for subsequent offers, which influenced satisfaction with the partner and with the negotiation. In other words, first round offers were a significant predictor of the offers and outcomes of the negotiation.

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Within negotiation, understanding how people respond to others' behaviors and attitudes can lead to more mutually beneficial and satisfactory outcomes (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). One approach to studying negotiation has been to examine the conflict styles that negotiators use (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Another approach has been to look at how negotiators respond to the other party's behavior (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Smith et al., 1982). However, there is little research about whether people make offers based on their expectations about how the other party will behave or what happens when those expectations are not met. Nor is there research that compares expectations about conflict styles to the anchoring of offers as affecting subsequent offers in negotiation. Drawing from expectancy violations theory as a framework, this study examines how expectations about conflict styles and the anchoring of initial offers affect negotiators' subsequent offers and their overall satisfaction with the negotiation.

Expectations and Conflict Styles

Expectations in Negotiation

Negotiation is a decision-making process during which multiple parties decide how to allocate resources (Pruitt, 1983). Among the many social and psychological factors involved in negotiation is the role of expectations (Rubin et al., 1990). How expectations about another party can affect interpersonal interaction has been the subject of investigation in anthropology (e.g., Hall, 1959), sociology (e.g., Berger et al., 1972), psychology (e.g., Bigelow, 1977; Bigelow & la Gaipa, 1975; Epstein & Eidelson, 1981) and communication (e.g., Burgoon, 1983; Burgoon & Jones, 1976). Within negotiation, expectations about the other party and the negotiation itself can influence the process of the negotiation. Early research has shown that a negotiator's expectations can contribute to assumptions about the negotiation, such as confirmation bias and perceptions of others (Darley & Gross, 1983; Rubin et al., 1990; Swann, 1984), but there has been little recent research on the role of expectations about conflict styles in negotiation.

This study uses *expectancy violations theory* (EVT; Burgoon, 1993; Burgoon & Jones, 1976) as a framework for thinking about expectations at the negotiation table. EVT was originally developed to explain the negative attitudes that can arise when another person violates our normative expectations about communication behavior. This theory posits that when a violation of normative behavior occurs, people who experience the violation interpret the behavioral violation as either positive or negative, while also evaluating the person who committed the violation. These two evaluations provide a *violation valence*. For example, if someone accidentally steps on your foot, that would be a negative violation. But if a behavior violates expectations in a way that is desirable, the violation will be evaluated as positive and will result in *more* favorable outcomes.

As part of this violation assessment, EVT proposes that individuals assess their ability to punish or reward the other person who committed the violation; this assessment is called a *reward valence*: The more ability one has to reward or punish the other person for the violation, the more positive the reward valence. For example, if the person who steps on your foot is a good friend, and it happens while dancing, the valence may be negative, but it is likely less negative than if the violator is a stranger who steps on your foot while standing in the checkout line at a store.

Initially, EVT was directed toward violations in nonverbal behavior, but it was later expanded to include expectations about social behavior more broadly, such as message comprehension and persuasive discourse (Burgoon, 2016). However, although expectations can play an important role in negotiation outcomes, there is not much research that looks at expectations about conflict styles in negotiation.

Negotiation Anchors

One way that expectations have been studied within negotiation is through the examination of *anchors*. Anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) are a well-known heuristic that negotiators use to influence decisions (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Klein et al., 2014). Anchors serve as reference points by which offers are evaluated. Anchors can be indiscriminate, such as Ariely et al.'s (2006) example of having participants recall the last digits of their social security number, which influenced how much the participants were willing to pay for a household item. Or anchors can be purposeful, such as comparing a sale price to an original price.

Anchors may serve as the basis for forming and assessing expectations about the other party and the other party's offers. In describing anchors, Ariely (2009) explained *arbitrary coherence* as the process of determining an initial price or position in one's mind against which expectations about future prices or positions are assessed. More specifically, when negotiators determine their own bargaining anchor, this anchor may be more malleable than an anchor that is externally provided, such as an original price for a product.

Examining anchors in combination with expectancy violations theory in a negotiation context is notable because the two perspectives predict slightly different outcomes: EVT suggests that individual expectations about an opponent's conflict style should influence outcomes, whereas research on anchoring suggests that the first offer should provide the strongest expectation around which subsequent offers and outcomes are anchored. This study addresses whether expectations about another person's conflict style affect the offers made in a negotiation and how those expectations hold up once an initial offer is introduced.

The Dual Concern Model

Pruitt and Lewis (1975) proposed a dual concern model that predicts variations in a negotiator's conflict style based on concerns a negotiator has for one's own versus the other party's outcomes (see Figure 1). High concern for both one's own and the other's outcomes should predict the use of a problem-solving style at the negotiation table. High concern for one's own outcomes combined with low concern for the other party's outcomes predicts that a negotiator will use a dominating style. Low concern for one's own outcomes combined with high concern for the other party's outcomes predicts the use of an accommodating style. And low concern for both one's own and the other party's outcomes predicts the use of an avoidant style (although Cai & Fink, 2002, demonstrated that avoidance may represent high concern for the other party's outcomes, and it is more complex than a simple lack of concern; see also Wang et al., 2012).

A number of experiments have tested the dual concern model (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a, 1984b; Pruitt et al., 1983; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Typically, however, these experiments have been designed to predict the behavior of individuals rather than expectations within dyads. Thus, one of the major critiques of the dual concern model has been its inability to predict outcomes when negotiators bring different motivational or stylistic orientations to the table (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, 1990).

To fill this gap, Rhoades and Carnevale (1999) tested what happens when negotiators have different motivations. Findings from their study suggest that the other party's approach and one's own negotiation style affect tactics used in negotiation. Specifically, these researchers found that negotiators who were motivated to use a dominating style were the least affected by their partner's negotiation style, whereas negotiators motivated to use a problem-solving style were most affected by their partner's negotiation style. Additionally, problem solvers indicated a higher likelihood of changing tactics based on their partner's style than did those who reported using other conflict styles.

Figure 1
Dual Concern Model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)



Research Question and Hypothses

We first wanted to know whether it is possible to manipulate expectations of one's own conflict style. Thus, we ask the following research question:

RQ. Does the manipulation of one's own and the partner's conflict styles affect participants' offers?

Our study extends research about the dual concern model as a heuristic for predicting negotiation tactics by examining the role of expectations and anchors on negotiation outcomes. We compare two opposite conflict styles, accommodating and dominating, by first asking participants about their own conflict style and then asking about the conflict style they expect the other party to use, whether accommodating or dominating.

Based on the literature review on expectations and anchors provided above, we predict negotiators will expect the other party to have motivational concerns matching their own (Ireland & Henderson, 2014); for example, someone with an accommodating style will expect the opponent to have an accommodating style. Further, if a negotiator expects the other party to have low concern for the other party's outcomes—to use a dominating style—we expect that the negotiator will make a more distributive offer, one that advantages one's own side over the opponent as opposed to an offer that could achieve mutual gains. We anticipate that when negotiators' expectations about the other party's conflict style are met, they will view the other party more favorably. Overall, we expect negotiators who use a dominating style will be less satisfied with their partner and with the negotiation overall. In contrast, we expect negotiators who use an accommodating style will be more satisfied with their partner, even when their offers are rejected, because they may have a generally more accommodating view of the other party. Thus, the following are the hypotheses to be tested in this study:

H1. Participants who report a more accommodating style will expect the other party in the negotiation to be accommodating (**H1a**), and participants who report a more dominating style will expect the other party in the negotiation to be dominating (**H1b**).

H2. Participants who expect the other party to be accommodating will make initial offers that are less distributive (**H2a**), or participants who expect the other party to be dominating will make initial offers that are more distributive (**H2b**).

H3. Participants who are dominating will be less satisfied with the negotiation.

H4. Participants who expect the other party to be accommodating will be more satisfied with the other party (**H4a**), whereas participants who expect the other party to be dominating will be less satisfied with the other party (**H4b**).

Offer refusal should result in participants being less satisfied with both the other party and the negotiation:

H5. When offers are refused, more distributive offers will result in less satisfaction with the other party (**H5a**) and with the negotiation (**H5b**).

Further, we examine whether first round offers serve as an anchor and whether these anchors are more influential than conflict style expectations. Based on anchoring research, we predict the following:

H6. Initial offers will anchor subsequent offers.

To test these hypotheses, a structural equation model will examine the relationships between the negotiator's style and the negotiator's expectation of the other party's style on offers as well as on satisfaction with the other party and the negotiation. See Figure 2 for the conceptual structural model with the hypotheses indicated.

Method

The hypotheses were tested with an experiment using a 2 × 2 design that examined the participant's own conflict style (accommodating vs. dominating) and expectations about the other party's conflict style (accommodating vs. dominating) as independent variables. Participants' own accommodating and dominating style were first measured. Then the conflict style was manipulated in that participants were randomly assigned to conditions by being told they had an accommodating or dominating conflict style. Similarly, participants' expectations about their partner's conflict style (accommodating vs. dominating) were measured. The reported conflict style of the partner was manipulated, because there was no partner; partner's responses were pre-programmed and computer generated.

A pilot study was conducted to ensure measures and manipulations used in this study were reliable, which was then followed by the main study. The research was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the researchers' university. The study was designed in Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs, 2019), and the data were collected using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). As discussed by Mason and Suri (2012), using MTurk allows for a more externally valid and diverse sample as compared to relying on college campus convenience samples.

Figure 2

Conceptual Model with Hypothesized Relationships



Participants

The study had 269 participants (males = 166 [61.7%]; females = 103 [38.3%]). Ages ranged from 21 to 55 (*M* = 36, *Mdn* = 33). (Due to one missing case, some estimates are based on *N* = 268.) Ethnicities reported were as follows: Caucasian (*n* = 183); Black or African American (*n* = 21); Hispanic (*n* = 8); Asian, Asian American, Pacific Islander (includes Indian from Asia; *n* = 35); more than one ethnicity (*n* = 11); no ethnicity specified (*n* = 10); and Native American (*n* = 1). Note that participants were asked to self-identify their own ethnicity (or more than one ethnicity) by typing in an open text box and were not required to self-disclose.

Procedure

After completing the conflict style scale, participants were provided with the following statement: "We are waiting for a person to randomly be assigned to you for a negotiation. This wait generally takes up to 2 minutes." After a short pause (up to 30 seconds), participants were allowed to proceed with the survey. They were given the following instructions:

> You will be interacting with another person through MTurk to negotiate a situation: Before interacting with the other person, please rate your expectations about how the other person is likely to handle the situation.

Participants then completed a modified version of the ROCI-II scales for accommodating and dominating (11 items in all; the scale ranged from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*) to assess their expectations about how the other party will interact with them. After completing these measures, the participants were provided with the following definitions of the accommodating and dominating conflict styles:

> ***Accommodating:*** An accommodating style is one characterized by concern for the other party's interests and outcomes over your own interests. You are willing to look for a good outcome for the other party at the cost of your own best possible outcome. You are more concerned with working WITH than AGAINST the other person.
>
> ***Dominating:*** A dominating style is one characterized by concern for your own interests and outcomes over the other party's interests. You are willing to look for a good outcome for yourself at the cost of the other party's best possible outcome. You are more concerned with working AGAINST than WITH the other person.

Participants were then asked to respond to the two following questions: (a) "I expect my partner will be more accommodating" (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), and (b) "I expect my partner will be more dominating" (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). They were then asked two versions of the following question using the same scale: "For this negotiation, I would prefer that my partner is more accommodating [dominating]."

After answering these questions, participants received the following information: "The results of your conflict style measure have concluded that you are most likely to use an Accommodating [or a Dominating] style when negotiating with others." Following this information, these two styles were once again defined. Despite having completed the ROCI-II scale, the participants' alleged conflict style was randomly assigned to them as accommodating or dominating.

Next, the negotiation task was described. "The Ultimatum Game" (Güth et al., 1982) was modified for use in this study to make it a three-round ultimatum game so we could assess the anchoring of initial offers. This game randomly pairs participants with a partner. The participants were then asked to make a single offer to the partner, who can either accept it or reject it. Participants were instructed that, if the offer is accepted, both parties would gain the amount offered, but if the offer is rejected, the game would be over. In our study, participants made offers in each of three rounds. Instead of an actual partner responding to the offer, a computer-generated response rejected the participant's offer in the first round and again in the second round. Participants were able to modify their offers in both the second and third rounds. To start, participants were provided with the following instructions:

> Your task is to divide $3 with your partner. Here's how it works: There are $3 that can be split between you and your partner. You must select from one of the following offers: $0 for you and $3 for your partner; $1 for you and $2 for your partner; $2 for you and $1 for your partner; $3 for you and $0 for your partner.

The instructions further described the three rounds of play:

> Round 1: You get to propose which offer you will make to your partner. Your partner can accept your offer or reject it. If your offer is accepted the game will end. If your offer is rejected, you can make another offer.
>
> Round 2: If your offer is accepted, the game will end. If your offer is rejected, you have one more round to propose an offer to your partner.
>
> Round 3: In this round, you can choose any amount, from 0 to $3 that totals $3, to offer to your partner or to keep for yourself. If your partner does not accept the offer in the third round, neither of you get anything. [Round 3 information was not analyzed.]

To examine their comprehension of the instructions, participants were asked, "How much money do you have to split with the other person?" "What happens if you do not come to an agreement with the other side?" and "How many rounds will you have to try to reach an agreement?" After responding to these questions, participants were asked to make their first offer and then to explain their reason for making this offer.

After selecting their first offer (round1a offer), participants were informed that the negotiation style of their partner was now available, presumably based on the partner's completion of the conflict style scale. Participants were told that their partner was either accommodating or dominating, and once again the definitions for these styles were provided. Note, however, that information about the partner's conflict style was a deception; the partner's conflict style was actually assigned randomly, because there was no actual partner.

Before proceeding, participants were asked to verify their own negotiation style and their partner's negotiation style. They were then asked to respond "yes" or "no" to the following question: "Now that you know your partner's negotiation style, do you want to change your opening offer?" They were asked once again to select their round 1 offer (now, round1b), which gave participants an opportunity to modify their initial offer (round1a). They were once again asked to explain the reason for their offer.

After a brief pause, participants received the following response: "Your partner has rejected your offer." They were then instructed to proceed to round two. The same procedure was used for round two, except that participants were given only one opportunity to make the round 2 offer. Once again, participants

received a message that told them that their partner had rejected their offer. The same procedure was used for round three, except instead of selecting from one of four possible offers (e.g., "0 for other, $3 for self"), participants were provided with a sliding scale where they could determine the amount they were willing to offer to the partner and how much the participant would receive based on that offer: The amount offered to both oneself and the partner had to total to $3. (Qualtrics forced the two offers to total $3: e.g., if a participant slid the offer for the partner to $1.43, the slider for own offer would move to $1.57.) Next, participants were asked the same set of questions as in rounds 1 and 2.

After the round 3 offer was made, participants were told, "Unfortunately, your partner has rejected your offer once again. This is the end of the negotiation." Following this response, participants were then asked a series of questions about their satisfaction with the negotiation and its outcome, and with their partner. Finally, participants were asked to respond to demographic questions, including age, sex, and ethnicity.

At the end of the study participants were debriefed, which was important because the study involved two deceptions: First, the participant's own negotiation style and the partner's negotiation style were both randomly assigned rather than based on measured styles, and second, there was no actual partner. The debriefing information is provided in the Appendix. Each participant received $3 for participating in the study, which was the amount for which they were supposedly negotiating.

For analyses that examined round 1 and round 2 offers, the higher the number, the more distributive the offer; in other words, higher numbers represented an offer of more money for oneself and less money for the other party.

Scales

Conflict Styles

The ROCI-II scale was used to measure the five conflict styles: problem solving, compromising, avoiding, accommodating, and dominating. Each style is assessed with either 5 or 6 items (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). A sample item of the accommodating scale is "I give in to the wishes of others with whom I may be in conflict," and a sample item from the dominating scale is "I sometimes use my power to win a competitive situation."

To measure expectations about the other party's conflict style, only the accommodating and dominating scales were used. A sample of how the questions were adapted to measure a participant's expectations about the other party on the accommodating scale is "I expect the other party will accommodate my wishes," and a sample from the dominating scale is "I expect the other party will use his or her power to win a competitive situation."

Each conflict style scale used in this study (own accommodating, own dominating, expectation of other accommodating, and expectation of other dominating) was analyzed using a principal components analysis. For each style, the analyses showed that each scale had only one component with an eigenvalue over 1.0. The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of each scale was also satisfactory. Table 1 provides eigenvalues and reliabilities for each of the four scales. Once each scale was evaluated and found to be satisfactory, the component score for each scale was saved for use in all subsequent analyses.

Satisfaction

Three items measured participants' satisfaction with the other party, and four items measured satisfaction with the negotiation, using a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Example questions included the following: "My partner's response to my offer was fair," and "I perceived my partner

to be honest [trustworthy, or cooperative]" for satisfaction with the other party, and "I was pleased by the negotiation's outcome" and "I think this negotiation was set up fairly" for satisfaction with the negotiation. For each scale, the items were combined to form one scale; a principal component analysis resulted in one component for each scale with an eigenvalue above 1.0, and the scale items were reliable; see Table 1.

Table 1

Principal Component Analysis Results for Conflict Styles, Adapted Other's Accommodating and Dominating Styles, and Satisfaction with Other Party and with the Negotiation

	# of items in scale	Eigenvalue	% variance explained	Cronbach's α
Accommodating (own)	6	3.46	57.66	.85
Dominating (own)	5	3.16	63.28	.85
Accommodating (expectation of other)	6	4.60	76.72	.94
Dominating (expectation of other)	5	3.26	65.22	.87
Satisfaction with other party	3	2.46	82.21	.89
Satisfaction with negotiation	4	2.94	73.52	.87

Note. N = 269.

Evaluating the Structural Equation Model

The research question and hypotheses were tested using a structural equation model (SEM; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2018). The RQ asked whether the manipulation of one's own and the partner's conflict styles affected the participants' offers. We first compared the manipulated styles for both one's own and the partner's styles with the manipulation checks for both assigned styles; see Table 2, which shows that each manipulation was successful. Next, we tested the structural equation model that included the following variables: satisfaction with the negotiation, satisfaction with the other party, round 1a offer, round 1b offer, round 2 offer, manipulated other style (accommodating or dominating), manipulated own style (accommodating or dominating), expectation that the negotiation partner will be accommodating (measured), expectation that the other will be dominating (measured), the participant's accommodating style (measured), and the participant's dominating style (measured). The SEM analyzed the covariance matrix of these eleven variables. Six of these variables used scales that were aggregated using principal component analyses; these six variables had a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Evaluating the Research Question

In the SEM, except for the covariance between own accommodating style and own dominating style, which was not predicted so it was not assessed for significance, all coefficients were significant at $p < .05$, except for the paths from manipulated own style to round 1a offer and from manipulated other style to round 1b offer. (Recall that the own style manipulation was reported to participants prior to their making the round 1a offer, and the other style manipulation was reported to participants prior to their making the round 1b offer.) These two paths were not significant. Further, modification indices did not suggest that any additional paths should be added between these two manipulated variables and other outcome variables in

Figure 3

Structural Equation Model with Unstandardized Coefficients



Note. Except for the covariance between own style accommodating and own style dominating, which was not assessed for significance, all coefficients were significant at *p < .05 (**p < .01). The χ^2 for the model was not significant: χ^2 = 17.67, p = .41. The model had a less than 2:1 ratio between χ^2 and degrees of freedom: relative (normed) $\chi^2(17, N = 268) = 1.04$. RMSEA = .01, goodness of fit index (GFI) = .99, adjusted GFI = .96. The errors of prediction were not allowed to covary.

the model. The errors of prediction were not allowed to covary. That model's χ^2 was not significant, $\chi^2(29, N = 268) = 38.66$, $p = .11$; further, the model had a less than 2:1 ratio between the model's χ^2 and its degrees of freedom: relative (normed) $\chi^2(29, N = 268) = 1.33$, RMSEA = .03, goodness of fit index (GFI) = .98, adjusted GFI = .94. Although the model had reasonable fit, the two manipulated variables did not add anything to the model. Therefore, the answer to the RQ is that the manipulation of own and other conflict style did not affect the offers or other outcomes of the negotiation.

Table 2

Relationship Between Manipulations and Manipulation Checks

	Manipulated Style: Own		
Manipulation Check: Own	Accommodating	Dominating	Total
Accommodating	*n* = 121 (92%)	*n* = 34 (25%)	*n* = 155 (58%)
Dominating	*n* = 11 (8%)	*n* = 103 (75%)	*n* = 114 (42%)
Total	*n* = 132 (100%)	*n* = 137 (100%)	

Note. χ^2 (1, $N = 269$) = 123.03, $p < .01$; φ (phi) = .68, $p < .01$.

	Manipulated Style: Partner		
Manipulation Check: Partner	Accommodating	Dominating	Total
Accommodating	*n* = 132 (87%)	*n* = 11 (9%)	*n* = 143 (53%)
Dominating	*n* = 19 (13%)	*n* = 107 (91%)	*n* = 126 (47%)
Total	*n* = 132 (100%)	*n* = 137 (100%)	*N* = 269

Note. χ^2 (1, $N = 269$) = 162.24, $p < .01$; φ (phi) = .78, $p < .01$.

Retesting the Model

We reran the model, leaving out manipulated conflict styles (see Figure 3). The SEM analyzed the covariance matrix of these nine variables (see Table 3).

In the SEM, except for the covariance between own accommodating style and own dominating style, which was not assessed for significance (see above), all coefficients were significant at $p < .05$. The χ^2 of this model was not significant, χ^2 (27, $N = 268$) = 17.67, $p = .41$, and the model had a less than 2:1 ratio between the model's χ^2 and its degrees of freedom: relative (normed) $\chi^2(17, N = 268) = 1.04$, RMSEA = .01, GFI = .99, adjusted GFI = .96. The errors of prediction were not allowed to covary. The model had excellent fit.

Further, a χ^2 comparison between the retested model and the first model showed a significant improvement when the two manipulated variables were removed (χ^2 difference = 20.99, difference in df = 12, $p < .05$), according to a standard significance table (Timm, 1975, p. 588). Further, the model indicators, such as GFI, RMSEA, the relative χ^2, and the model's probability, were better in the second model over the first. Figure 3 provides the estimated structural model.

Results

Hypothesis 1

H1 predicted that participants who reported a more accommodating style would expect the other party in the negotiation to be accommodating (H1a), and participants who reported a more dominating style would expect the other party in the negotiation to be dominating (H1b). Participants were asked to estimate

Table 3

Means (Standard Deviations) and Correlations (and Covariances) of Conflict Styles, Offers, and Satisfaction

	†Mean (*SD*)	Own accommodate	Own dominate	Expect other to accommodate	Expect other to dominate	Round 1a offer	Round 1b offer	Round 2 offer	Satisfaction w/ partner	Satisfaction w/ negotiation
†Own accomm	0.00 (1.00)	1.00 (1.00)								
†Own domin	0.00 (1.00)	.02 (.02)	1.00 (1.00)							
†Expect other accomm	0.00 (1.00)	.39** (.39)	.49** (.49)	1.00 (1.00)						
†Expect other domin	0.00 (1.00)	.21** (.21)	.37** (.37)	-.06 (-.06)	1.00 (1.00)					
Round 1a offer	2.93 (.66)	.22** (.14)	.09 (.06)	.13* (.08)	.12 (.08)	1.00 (.43)				
Round 1b offer	2.92 (.73)	.27** (.20)	.12 (.09)	.22** (.16)	.09 (.07)	.81** (.39)	1.00 (.54)			
Round 2 offer	2.74 (.74)	.33** (.24)	.09 (.06)	.24** (.17)	.12 (.09)	.37** (.18)	.38** (.21)	1.00 (.55)		
†Satisf w/ partner	0.00 (1.00)	.26** (.26)	.32** (.32)	.47** (.47)	.16** (.16)	.16** (.11)	.25** (.18)	.17** (.13)	1.00 (1.00)	
†Satisf w/ negotiat	0.00 (1.00)	.30** (.30)	.46** (.46)	.48** (.48)	.32** (.32)	.23** (.15)	.30** (.22)	.26** (.20)	.66** (.66)	1.00 (1.00)

†*Note*. *N* = 269. For all multi-item scales, means are 0.00 and standard deviations are 1.00 because component scores were used. *p < .05. **p < .01.

the extent to which the other party was expected to be accommodating or dominating *before* being told the alleged conflict style of the other.

To test Hypothesis 1, we examined the correlation and SEM unstandardized coefficient , represented by a lower-case b, between one's own accommodating style and the expectation of the other's accommodating style; this correlation was significant (r = .39, p < .01; b = 0.46, p < .01), as was the correlation between own dominating style and the expectation of the other's dominating style (r = .37, p < .01; b = 0.36, p < .01). The relationships between own accommodating style and the expectation that the other would be dominating (r = .21, p < .01; b = 0.20, p < .01) and between own dominating style and the expectation that the other would be accommodating (r = .49, p < .01; b = 0.62, p < .01) were also significant.

Although the data supported H1a and H1b, there was more going on in this relationship than just matching one's own style with expectations about the other's style. When participants were accommodating, they expected the other party to be more accommodating than dominating, and when participants were dominating, they also expected the other party to be more accommodating than dominating.

The SEM confirmed what the correlations showed. In addition, the SEM's R^2 for the expectation that the other would be accommodating was .51, but the R^2 for the expectation that the other would be dominating was much smaller (but still significant) at .18. H1a and H1b were both supported.

Hypothesis 2

We predicted that participants who expected the other party to be accommodating would make initial offers that were less distributive (H2a), whereas participants who expected the other party to be dominating would make initial offers that were more distributive (H2b). The correlation between the expectation that the other would be accommodating with the initial offer was significant but in the opposite direction than expected (r = .13, p < .05), suggesting that the expectation that the other would be accommodating led to initial offers that were more distributive. The same relationship was found between the expectation that the other would be dominating; however, this correlation was not significant (r = .12, *ns*). Further, in the SEM, there were no significant coefficients between expectations that the other party would be accommodating or dominating with the initial offer. H2a and H2b were not supported.

Hypothesis 3

We hypothesized that participants who were dominating would be less satisfied with the negotiation. The correlation and SEM unstandardized coefficient between own dominating style and one's satisfaction with the negotiation was positive and significant (r = .46, p < .01; b = 0.14, p < .01). These results suggest that participants who reported a more dominating conflict style were more satisfied, not less satisfied, with the negotiation. Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Hypothesis 4

We predicted that participants who expected the other party to be accommodating would be more satisfied with the other party (H4a), whereas participants who expected the other party to be dominating would be less satisfied with the other party (H4b). Expectation that the other would be accommodating was significantly and positively associated with the participants' satisfaction with the other party (r = .47, p < .01; b = 0.78, p < .01), and expectation that the other would be dominating was also significantly and positively associated with satisfaction with the other party (r = .16, p < .01; b = 0.41, p < .01). Thus, H4a was supported.

Although the relationship between expecting the other to be dominating and satisfaction with the partner was significant, it was inconsistent with the direction of the hypothesis. H4b was not supported.

Hypothesis 5

We expected that, in the context of refused offers, distributive offers should result in less satisfaction (H5a) with the other party and with the negotiation (H5b). Recall that in this experiment, the participants' offers were all refused. And note that a distributive offer involved offering less to the other party and more to oneself. Thus, the refusal of this distributive offer should make participants unhappy with the other party and with the negotiation.

To test H5a, we considered the correlation and SEM unstandardized coefficient between the round 1b offer with satisfaction with the other party, which was positive (r = .25, p < .01; b = 0.35, p < .01). The more distributive the offer, the more satisfaction with the other party, which was in the opposite direction of the prediction in H5a.

To test H5b, we considered the relationship between the round 1b offer and satisfaction with the negotiation; the correlation was positive (r = .30, p < .01); however, in the SEM, the path was not significant, so it was not included in the model. The more distributive the offer, the more satisfaction with the negotiation, which was in the opposite direction of the prediction of H5b. The path from the round 2 offer to satisfaction with negotiation was included in the SEM; however, this path was also positive (b = 0.13, p < .05). Therefore, neither H5a nor H5b were supported.

Hypothesis 6

This hypothesis predicted that initial offers would anchor subsequent offers. To examine this hypothesis, we had two relationships that could be tested: the influence of the round 1a offer on the round 1b offer, and the relationship between the round 1b offer and the round 2 offer. The relationship between round 1a offer and round 1b offer was positive and very strong (r = .81, p < .01; b = 0.88, p < .01). The relationship between the round 1b offer and round 2 offer was also positive (r = .38, p < .01; b = 0.32, p < .01). The first path was remarkably high and supportive of the anchoring effect. Hypothesis 6 was supported.

Discussion

This study tested (1) whether negotiators expect their opponent would use a conflict style similar to their own, (2) how offers were influenced by these expectations, (3) the extent to which initial offers served as anchors, and (4) how negotiators' satisfaction with the negotiator's counterpart and with the negotiation developed when offers were being exchanged. We posited six hypotheses. Although not all the hypotheses were supported, the results provide insight into the effect of expectations and anchoring on negotiation outcomes.

Results showed that negotiators expected their opponent's conflict style would be similar to their own conflict style, and our results support this prediction: Accommodating negotiators expected their opponent to be accommodating, and dominating negotiators expected their opponent to be dominating. This was a *matching effect* (Ireland & Henderson, 2014).

However, we also found an effect that was not predicted, one that suggests greater complexity. Although accommodating negotiators expected that their opponent would be dominating, the largest effect for expectations was that dominating negotiators expected their opponent to be accommodating. This finding suggests that *mismatching* may be more likely than matching.

Further, the expectation that the opponent would use an accommodating style yielded a more, rather than a less, distributive offer. Perhaps participants expected their opponents to be pushovers, resulting in offers that were more distributive. But the expectation that the opponent would be more

dominating had no significant effect on the initial offer; possibly negotiators who expected their opponent would use a dominating style used a wait-and-see mindset about making offers that were more or less distributive.

We also found that dominating participants were quite satisfied with the negotiation. Moreover, although not hypothesized, results showed that accommodating participants were also satisfied with the negotiation (r = .30, p < .01). These results may reflect participants treating the negotiation process more as a computer game, so everyone found the "game" to be, overall, a more positive experience. Maeve Duggan, of the Pew Research Center (December, 2015, p. 13), reported that

> While the public is largely uncertain what to think about video games, within the gaming community there is more consensus. Put simply, people who play video games are more likely to respond to the positive aspects of their pastime while they disagree with certain negative portrayals.

The satisfaction found in our negotiation study may simply reflect an entertainment value of negotiating online. Relatedly, distributive offers—especially those refused by one's partner—resulted in the negotiation being more satisfying, which supports the idea that negotiating online was more like a fun game rather than reflecting a serious disappointment with one's partner.

Relatedly, satisfaction was found regardless of the expectations about one's partner's conflict style. Like soft positional bargaining, accommodating is often associated with being nice, whereas dominating, like hard positional bargaining, is often associated with being tough, or even mean (Fisher & Ury, 1991). Thus, having the expectation that the other will accommodate to one's own needs should be satisfying. But the effect of expecting a negotiation partner to be dominating was weak. That said, this finding was consistent with those of Rhoades and Carnevale (1999), who found that negotiators who use a dominating style were least affected by their partner's negotiation style.

These results also raise an interesting question about expectations: Are expectations more informative for those who presume the other negotiator will use an accommodating style? In other words, do those who expect the other to accommodate find outcomes to be more satisfying simply because they have a rosier expectation? There has been some evidence to suggest that having positive expectations (or no expectations at all) may lead to more positive experiences (see Ariely, 2009). Our findings were far from conclusive on this front. However, further exploration regarding the extent to which initial positive expectations may (or may not) overwhelm offers could help to better determine the ways in which pre-existing expectations affect negotiation.

Finally, support was found for the anchoring effect of initial offers. Once an initial offer was made, it had a strong influence on subsequent offers. In other words, offers were built on the anchor of the initial offer rather than being a process of simple trial and error. The anchoring effect has been supported in previous research (see, for example, Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995), but it was significant here as a replication of the effect in a new context. The current study provides support for the strength of anchors despite having added social information—in this case, one's own and one's partner's conflict style.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

There are several limitations to our study that can be addressed in future research. The manipulations of the negotiator's conflict style and the other party's conflict style did not yield significant results. Further research could eliminate these manipulations. We evaluated the influence of telling negotiators their partner scored high on the accommodating or dominating style, as well as telling the participants they were accommodating or dominating despite how they actually scored on these conflict style scales. Yet the manipulation of conflict styles had no influence on the expectations, offers, or

satisfaction. Instead, the measured versions of participants' own conflict style and their expectations about the other party's style influenced their offers and their satisfaction with the other party and with the negotiation.

We limited our examination of conflict styles to accommodating and dominating. Although we measured additional conflict styles (own problem solving, compromising, and avoiding), we did not consider these styles in this study. These styles, and expectations about the opponent's use of these styles, could be examined in future research.

There are a number of directions for future research based on our model. Overall, it seems that negotiators hoped for or expected their opponent to be accommodating, whether or not they themselves were accommodating. Is this a cultural expectation influenced by American individual norms and expectations around competition? In other words: I expect to win, so I expect you to give in. This question is worth further investigation.

Next, what sources—interpersonal and mediated—have created the norms of acceptable behavior for negotiators? The satisfaction found in our negotiation study may reflect the "game's" entertainment value, and perhaps nothing more. Future research should attempt to disentangle the causes of participant satisfaction.

In the future, examining cross-cultural expectations about accommodating and dominating and what we expect of others, whether they come from intracultural or cross-cultural backgrounds, could extend our theoretical understanding around expectations in negotiation.

Conclusion

We began our discussion focusing on negotiation as a method of resolving conflict. However, our study was limited by implicitly focusing our investigation of negotiation in the realm of gesellschaft—society—rather than gemeinschaft—community (see Bond, 2012). In other words, a negotiation with money or hierarchical success as the primary outcomes is not the same as one with friendship or affection as the primary outcomes.

This very different focus for generalizing our expectations and anchors about negotiation was provided by the comparison that Blau (1964) made using exchange theory. Blau extended our knowledge to negotiation based on romantic relations—in the realm of gemeinschaft, rather than in the realm of gesellschaft. As Blau (1964) explained,

> There are . . . numerous parallels between expressions of affection in love relations and expressions of approval in social associations generally. There are also some contrasts, however. The main source of the difference is that the conditions in a collective structure largely govern the significance of social approval while the conditions established by a pair of lovers themselves primarily govern the significance of their affection for one another . . . . (pp. 86-87; see also Walster et al., 1973)

Thus, Blau's view suggests, or perhaps requires, that future research needs to extend the dynamics of negotiation in terms of interpersonal, informal, and intimate relations; that difference may create a marked change in the predictions we have made here. We hope that our work here will contribute to addressing these future directions.

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Author Bios

Colleen M. Tolan (Ph.D., Temple University) is a recent graduate (May 2023) from the Media and Communication doctoral program at Temple University's Klein College of Media and Communication. She holds a B.S. in Journalism and Mass Communication from the University of Kansas and an M.Div. from Princeton Theological Seminary. Her dissertation studied the role of language framing during decision-making among individuals in conflict. Her research interests include interpersonal communication processes related to decision making, conflict resolution, and theory building.

Deborah A. Cai (Ph.D., Michigan State University) is Professor and Senior Associate Dean in the Klein College of Media and Communication at Temple University, and she is a faculty member in the Media and Communication doctoral program. Deborah is an international researcher with expertise in intercultural communication, persuasion, negotiation, and conflict management. Deborah is a Fellow in the International Academy for Intercultural Research and a Fellow of the International Association for Conflict Management. She is a former editor of *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* and served as editor of the four-volume collection, *Intercultural Communication* (Sage, Benchmark in Communication).

Edward L. Fink (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin) is the Laura H. Carnell Professor of Media and Communication and Affiliate Professor of Sociology at Temple University, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Maryland. He studies attitude change, intercultural communication, and research methods. He has published articles in the major academic scholarly research journals, and has served as editor of *Human Communication Research.* He is a Fellow of the International Communication Association (ICA), of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Honor Society, and of the International Academy for Intercultural Research. He is a recipient of ICA's B. Aubrey Fisher Mentorship Award.