Examining the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Non-Intervention Principle as a Conflict Management Strategy in the Horn of Africa

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Abstract

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) advocates for non-intervention principle as a conflict management strategy in the Horn of Africa. However, the principle's contribution and effectiveness in conflict management have sparked debates and concerns. Thus, the purpose of this article is to critically examine the IGAD non-intervention principle in conflict management, focusing on its actual contributions and potential shortcomings. The principle is assessed based on its stated objectives and the attainment of the desired outcomes. The study used the principles of non-intervention and responsibility to protect to examine the IGAD's non-intervention. The study adopted qualitative research methodology with a case study design. Four interstate interventions were selected as case studies and used as data sources. The findings demonstrate that IGAD's non-intervention policy fails to prevent and manage interstate intervention and intrastate conflicts. The principle does not manage to protect the sovereignty of its member states, as the region witnessed four cases of interstate intervention between 2005 and 2020. The principle's inability to prevent and manage interstate interventions and intrastate conflicts demonstrates its limitations in achieving desired outcomes. The article has identified four limitations of the principle: lack of clarity on non-intervention and internal affairs, mismatch between rhetoric and state practice, IGAD's lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the principle's limitations in dealing with contemporary peace and security challenges in a region with high level of conflicts. This article further illustrates that the principle not only has limitations in managing conflicts but also contradicts its objectives, hindering the organization's leadership role.

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Introduction

Since its 1996 revitalization, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been tasked with maintaining regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa (IGAD Agreement, 1996, Art. 7(g) and 6(d)). To this effect, IGAD adopted shared norms and principles aligned with its goals for peace, stability, and prosperity, using them as part of the lawful mechanisms for conflict management and regional security. Specifically, Article 6 of the IGAD Agreement (1996) outlines its norms and principles, including the sovereign equality of all member states, non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states, peaceful settlement of interstate and intrastate conflicts through dialogue, maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security, and conflict resolution within the IGAD framework before referring them to other regional and/or international organizations. The non-intervention principle, a fundamental principle of the organization, has been in place for nearly thirty years to guide interstate relations in the region (see. Art. 6(b)) and Art. 6(d)) of the IGAD Agreement). The principle has been viewed as an important conflict management strategy aimed at preventing governments to meddle in neighboring states' internal affairs, managing interstate wars, and ensuring regional stability in the region (Asnake, 2015).

However, the contribution and efficacy of the IGAD's non-intervention principle have sparked significant debates and concerns. On the one hand, the principle has been scrutinized, revealing contradictions in its actions and indicating that it is not in line with its stated objectives. The organization consistently fails to effectively implement its non-intervention stance, as its implementation has not been definitively established in reality (Adetula, Redie, & Jaiyebo, 2016). IGAD member states, despite claiming to uphold the principle, have consistently been involved in the domestic affairs of their neighbors (Asnake, 2015). On the other hand, the principle contradicts its mandate to uphold regional peace and security, as evidenced by numerous recent conflicts in the region. IGAD, due to its non-intervention as a conflict management strategy, has shown a reluctance to intervene in the domestic conflicts of its member states (Adetula et al., 2016). The organization's inability to intervene in member states' internal affairs could hinder its ability to assume leadership roles in conflict management. In this regard, Asnake (2015) argues that IGAD's lack of intervention hinders its ability to deal with crises such as human rights abuses and violations in its member states.

Moreover, IGAD's non-intervention principle often clashes with international norms like human rights protection, humanitarian intervention, and responsibility to protect (henceforth the R2P) concepts, which advocate for regional and international intervention in state affairs. According to Apuuli (2004), IGAD's non-intervention principle limits the organization to conduct humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping operations in member states' internal conflicts.

The aforementioned contradictions and concerns about the IGAD's non-intervention principle necessitate further investigation to determine whether it is a viable strategy that can contribute to conflict management in a region with high levels of interstate and intrastate conflicts. The principle's actual contributions and potential limits as a conflict strategy need to be questioned and critically examined. Thus, the article challenges the organization's non-intervention principle, arguing that it lacks clear outcomes and is incompatible with effective conflict management. The article explores the dilemma of IGAD's non-intervention strategy, where regional governments are involved in internal conflicts of other states and the organization is hesitant or unable to intervene in internal conflicts of its member states without their consent. However, it should be stated that the article does not argue

that IGAD's failure is solely due to its principles, like non-intervention. Rather, it argues that IGAD's efforts at conflict management are hindered by its non-intervention principle.

Research Questions

To examine the overall contributions, effectiveness, and potential failures of the IGAD's non-intervention principle as a viable conflict management strategy, we asked:

RQ1. Does the IGAD's non-intervention principle achieve its intended objectives?

RQ2. What explanations could hinder IGAD's non-intervention principle from achieving its desired outcomes?

RQ3. How does IGAD's non-intervention principle contribute to the organization's failure to manage regional conflicts?

Significance of the Study

The article contributes to the existing literature in four of its thematic areas. First, the article provides a comprehensive understanding of conflict management, a concept that is not frequently explored in the existing literature. Second, the article fills a gap in the literature on the role of regional organizations (ROs) in conflict management, despite extensive research on international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN). Third, this article provides fresh insights into non-intervention as a conflict management strategy for ROs and explores their interconnectedness. The literature extensively explores the concept of non-intervention, but its application as a conflict management strategy in ROs is rarely studied. Fourth, this article provides a comprehensive case study on non-intervention and conflict management in the Horn of Africa, highlighting the IGAD's non-intervention strategy.

Methodology

Study Design

The article employed a qualitative research design. The article aims to explore the qualitative aspects of IGAD's non-intervention principle, examining its contributions, effectiveness, and potential limitations in preventing and managing interstate intervention and intrastate conflicts. Creswell (2009) emphasizes the significance of qualitative research in comprehending and delving into individuals' perspectives of social or human issues. Neuman (2013) also asserts that qualitative research involves gathering ideas and opinions from subjects using a natural setting.

Case Study Method

The article employed a case study method within the qualitative research design. Four unilateral state interventions were selected as case studies, including Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, Kenya's intervention in Somalia, Uganda's intervention in South Sudan, and Eritrea's intervention in Ethiopia's Tigray war. Despite those four cases influencing it, the recent Tigray conflict (2020-2022), the role of IGAD in managing the conflict, and the organization's reaction to Eritrea's intervention in the conflict triggered the writing of this article.

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Sampling Methods

The study used purposive sampling method. The selection of those four cases was based on three reasons. First, they are the best examples of whether the IGAD's non-intervention contributes to the management of inter-state intervention and conflict. Second, they excel in demonstrating various types of interventions, including state-state, state-non-state regional organizations, and state-non-state armed groups. The selection of a case without considering these all cases does not adequately explain the IGAD non-intervention, which includes various interventions mentioned above. Third, there are no other analogous cases of unilateral state intervention since the organization's expanded mandate in 1996 to include maintaining regional peace and security in the region.

Data Collection and Analysis Methods

The article used the four cases as its data sources. In other words, the article evaluates the IGAD non-intervention principle using the four case studies for interstate intervention and moving on to considerations of other intra-state conflicts where the organization failed to take leadership roles due to the principle's limitations and flawed application. Finally, the data was analyzed using a descriptive qualitative analysis. This tool is crucial for analyzing social concepts, perspectives, and actions (Tilahun, 2009).

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation of the article is primarily based on international principles of non-intervention and the R2P. These principles are useful for understanding and assessing the effectiveness and limitations of the IGAD non-intervention strategy in conflict management. Concepts such as conflict management, non-intervention, and the R2P are also intensively discussed. The discussion then moves on to the nexus between ROs and conflict management, non-intervention and ROs, the R2P and ROs, and non-intervention and conflict management.

Conflict Management

Conflict management is a complex term with various interpretations. Anderson (1990) and Thomas (1992) found that conflict management has a broad scope of application. Burton (1987) defined conflict management as the process of containing a dispute or preventing its escalation. Similarly, Thakore (2013) defined conflict management as strategies and approaches for controlling and resolving conflicts. Alagappa (1997) conceptualized conflict management into three stages: prevention, containment, and termination, suggesting these stages may overlap in practice. Alagappa's conflict prevention strategy aims to prevent escalating conflicts and hostilities or disruptive behavior. Similarly, Breslawski, Cunningham, and Fleishman (2022) reveal that conflict prevention is a non-violent conflict management activity that occurs when violence is possible but the conflict is currently non-violent. Conflict containment is a strategy used to prevent the spread of conflict by denying victory to conflicting parties and halting both horizontal and vertical escalation (Alagappa, 1997). Alagappa (1997) further identifies conflict termination as the third component of conflict management, which involves bringing hostilities to a suitable end through settlement or resolution.

The aforementioned definitions demonstrate that conflict management is an inclusive concept that encompasses conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Thus, this article employs the conflict management concept to encompass both conflict resolution and prevention.

Thakore (2013) argues that conflict management involves addressing the entire structure of a conflict, addressing destructive elements like hostility, and helping parties with incompatible goals to find solutions. Breslawski et al. (2022) also argue that conflict management involves prompt prevention and response to disputes, involving strategies from IOs, ROs, national governments, and non-state actors. Following the end of the Cold War, international actors like the UN, ROs, civil society organizations (CSOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a crucial role in managing conflicts. However, this article highlights the role of ROs in conflict management.

Regional Organizations and Conflict Management

The literature on conflict management often demonstrates that IOs like the UN have a significant advantage in conflict management. For example, Breslawski et al. (2022) discovered that conflict management is not solely the UN's responsibility, despite being the primary focus of conflict management literature. Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism has been used for conflict management due to the international community's reluctance to engage in domestic conflicts (Alagappa, 1997). Since then, ROs have significantly contributed to peace and security, and conflict management (Acharya, 2004; Asnake, 2015; Breslawski et al., 2022). Asnake (2015) remarks that ROs are vital for regional security governance. Breslawski et al. (2022) further underlined that ROs, due to their geographical location and extensive conflict management experience, can effectively manage conflicts, enabling quick response and direct impact on member states. Gartner (2011) also suggests ROs are effective mediators due to shared identities, trust, and protection from civil war spillover effects and legitimacy. Breslawski et al. (2022) further added that regional actors are motivated to initiate early involvement in disputes to respond swiftly to potential crises or conflict escalations, coordinating responses through meetings and appointing special envoys.

Non-Intervention: Definitions and Its Application in State and Non-State Actors

The term non-intervention is challenging to define due to its complex legal and political interpretations. The concept's widespread use in various contexts and applications in IRs and international law makes it challenging to unpack. Wu (2000) identifies non-intervention as a complex and contentious issue at both international and regional levels. The principle, despite its political rhetoric in IRs, is also rooted in substantial legislation, including judicial rulings, treaties, and UN resolutions. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of non-intervention in IR, international law, and the UN Charter.

The terms non-intervention and non-interference are frequently used interchangeably and are distinct. Scholars like Raynova (2017), Jamnejad and Wood (2009), Sean (2014), and Mumuni (2017) have explored the definitions of non-intervention and non-interference in various situations. Jamnejad and Wood (2009) suggest that non-intervention is more commonly used, while interference may indicate a larger restriction when combined with intervention. Raynova (2017) asserts that although these phrases are often used interchangeably, they have distinct meanings. According to Mumuni (2017), non-intervention is frequently used synonymously with non-interference, although the latter may refer to a broader prohibition. Sean (2014), Stanton (1993), and Jamnejad and Wood (2009) also differentiated between non-intervention and non-interference. Watts (2015) suggests that interference can also involve low-intensity activities. Jennings and Watts (2009) qualify that interference must be forceful, dictatorial, or coercive, thereby denying the intervening state control over the issue at hand. Jamnejad and Wood (2009) reveal that interference is a form of coercion, while

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non-intervention is the subordination of sovereign will. Similarly, Stanton (1993) emphasized the role of coercion in non-interference, distinguishing between a foreign presence with a host state's consent and an interfering force. The UN defines intervention as coercive interference, whether economic or military, with a country's autonomous internal affairs, whether unilateral or multilateral. However, this article uses non-intervention and non-interference interchangeably.

The article outlines three distinct ways of non-intervention: between states, state and non-state regional and international actors, and state and non-state armed groups. The principle of non-intervention between states is an intriguing conceptual distinction that warrants inclusion. The principle of non-intervention prohibits state threats or the use of force against territorial integrity or political independence and prohibits dictatorial intervention in other states' internal affairs. The principle is closely linked to the role of state sovereignty and serves as a safeguard for it. Abegunde (2021) asserts that the concept [non-intervention] allows a state to establish laws for its citizens without external interference, thereby enhancing its legitimacy as an international community member. Wu (2000) also notes that the concept deals with states that are the most influential and legitimate players in IRs, focusing on bilateral, regional, and global interaction. Similarly, Jamnejad and Wood (2009) qualify that non-intervention is a principle respecting a state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence and refraining from interfering in other states' internal affairs.

The principle of non-intervention between states and non-state armed groups is also another intriguing conceptual distinction that warrants inclusion. The international community distinguishes between states' non-intervention and non-state armed groups in the international law. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that member states have an inherent right to defend themselves individually or collectively if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until the Security Council (henceforth the SC) takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945). The Article permits states to defend themselves against non-state attacks, but self-defense measures must be assessed based on the necessity, magnitude, and proportionality of the attack.

The third distinction of non-intervention pertains to the involvement of states and non-state actors, including regional and international organizations. Wu (2000) identifies non-intervention as a fundamental concept in interstate relations and intergovernmental cooperation. The principle has been incorporated into numerous international agreements, including the UN Charter, the Friendship Relations Declaration, the Venin Convention, the Geneva Convention, the International Court of Justice, and Nicaragua. The UN Charter upholds the principle of non-intervention as a fundamental principle of international law. It is a jus *cogens* norm in international law, reflecting a state's inviolable nature and recognized by the international community (Shen, 2001; Guerreiro, 2022). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter stipulates that all members shall refrain in their international relations from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN (UN Charter, 1945).

Regional Organizations and the Principle of Non-Intervention

ROs like the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union (AU)), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and IGAD have adopted the principle of non-intervention to respect other states' sovereignty and prohibit intervention in their internal affairs.

Article 4 of the Treaty on the EU, as amended in the 2012 consolidated version, emphasizes the non-intervention of other EU members in their internal affairs. Article 4(2) of the Union also states that the Union must uphold the equality and national identities of Member States, including regional and local self-government, and uphold essential state functions like territorial integrity, law, and national security (EU Treaty, 2012).

Article 4 of the AU's Constitutive Act (AU CA) establishes the principle of non-intervention, with three fundamental instruments relevant to this principle (AU, 2000). Article 4(a) affirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. Article 4(f) of the Union prohibits the use or threat of force among Union countries. Article 4(g) states that non-intervention by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.

The ASEAN explicitly prohibits any form of intervention in its internal affairs. The ASEAN Charter mandates member countries to uphold Article 2(2), promoting independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, national identity, non-intervention in internal affairs, and freedom from external interference (ASEAN, 2008).

The OAS Charter mentions non-intervention in Articles 3 and 19. Chapter IV of the Charter outlines the non-intervention concept's rights and duties, including the freedom to develop cultural, political, and economic life freely. Article 3 of the OAS grants states the right to establish their own political, economic, and social systems, while also requiring them to refrain from interfering in other states' affairs (Jamnejad & Wood, 2009). Article 19 explicitly prohibits any form of interference in the affairs of states, including non-coercive measures (Guerreiro, 2022).

Non-intervention as a Conflict Management Strategy of Regional Organizations

Another critical subject of discussion in this article is how ROs and IOs adopt non-intervention as a conflict management strategy. Conflict management strategies are various methods, tools, activities, and actions used to prevent and effectively manage conflicts (Thakore, 2013). Breslawski et al. (2022) also note that ROs employ four primary conflict management strategies: rhetorical, diplomatic, economic, and military, each of which can significantly reduce violence. Boutros-Ghali (1992) proposes four conflict prevention strategies: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building, which are part of the conflict management literature. Similarly, Alagappa (1997) identified nine strategies of ROs for conflict management, including norm-setting, assurance, community-building, deterrence, non-intervention, isolation, intermediation, enforcement, and internationalization.

The article aims to showcase the literature on the use of non-intervention by ROs as a conflict management strategy. Scholars like Alagappa (1997), Haacke and Williams (2009), and Asnake (2015) identified that non-intervention is a conflict management strategy. Alagappa (1997) suggests that regional institutions can use non-intervention strategies when they prefer not to intervene in a specific conflict. Asnake (2015) defines non-intervention as a conflict management strategy enabling regional states to resolve bilateral disputes without involving a third party, like a RO. Similarly, Haacke and Williams (2009) explored that non-intervention is recommended when conflict parties want bilateral resolution, and if this is not possible, third-party mediation or arbitration from within or beyond the region is a possibility. According to Alagappa (1997), regional institutions often opt for non-

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intervention in domestic conflicts due to principle adherence, lack of government invitation, capability, conflict intractability, anticipated costs, tension between principles, and belief in marginal conflict resolution impact.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Concept: A Challenge to Non-Intervention

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of non-intervention has undergone significant challenges and changes. It has been weakened by changes in state sovereignty understandings, practices, and shifting state responsibilities. It faced numerous challenges, especially in cases of severe human rights violations (Alagappa, 1997). Sarkin (2009) and Almedia (2002) challenge the non-intervention concept for lack of defending human rights and ensuring international peace and security, highlighting inherent constraints and the need for humanitarian actions. The limitations of non-intervention in protecting human rights led to the shift from non-intervention to intervention, resulting in new concepts like the R2P and humanitarian intervention (HI).

R2P, a response to the 1990s atrocities in Rwanda and Yugoslavia (Clifford, 2022; Djupmark Ödegaard, 2022), was developed by South Sudanese diplomat Francis Deng and the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (Sarkin, 2009). The 2001 ICISS report suggests that the debate on human rights protection should shift from the right to intervene to the R2P, acknowledging military intervention as an extraordinary measure (ICISS, 2001). The report added that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from catastrophes like mass murder and starvation, but when unable, the broader community assumes responsibility (Ibid. para.10-13).

Despite debates about its origin (Sarkin, 2009), the R2P has been endorsed in various UN documents, including the 2004 High-Level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challenges, and Change, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, and several UN General Assembly resolutions. Most importantly, in 2005, the UN World Summit adopted the R2P doctrine as an official policy, emphasizing state responsibility to protect the world population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (World Summit Outcome, 2005). The 2005 UN World Summit underscored the international community's responsibility to protect the world's population from major severe human rights abuses and crimes like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing (World Summit Outcome, 2005, supra note 10, paras. 138–139). The outcome further upheld the R2P principle, prohibiting states from being involved in such crimes and human rights violations (Sarkin, 2009; Clifford, 2022; Djupmark Ödegaard, 2022). Since its adoption, the R2P has been implemented in conflicts in Libya, Cote d'Ivoire, Syria, and other regions (Clifford, 2022).

Furthermore, the UN General Secretary has emphasized the importance of R2P, which has been emphasized in various UN SC resolutions. Specifically, the UN SC has introduced R2P as a norm in international law, with resolutions 1674 and 1706 promoting its widespread acceptance and development (Sarkin, 2009). The World Summit Outcome document further noted that the international community through the UN is tasked with using diplomatic, humanitarian, and peaceful means to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter. The UN Charter emphasis that in situations where peaceful negotiations are insufficient, forceful intervention is the only viable option for protecting citizens within a state (Kabau, 2012). Article 2(7) of the Charter also allows enforcement measures to be exempt from state intervention prohibition, referring to forceful intervention in a state. Article 42 grants the SC the authority to take the necessary actions. Article 39 of the charter empowers

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the UN SC to identify and address peace threats, including states' responsibilities to prevent and punish genocide.

Regional Organizations and the Adoption of the R2P as an Intervention Mechanism

Regional organizations can facilitate the implementation of the R2P through peaceful negotiations and consensual interventions (Kabau, 2012). The UN Charter empowers ROs to address international peace and security threats, with the UN SC's authorization, outlining principles and modalities for their engagement. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter grants ROs the authority to enforce rules and regulations, ensuring peacekeeping, peacemaking, and enforcement operations are conducted under UN mandate (Asnake, 2015). The UN Charter empowers ROs to resolve internal conflicts within their regions, as per Article 52, aiming to maintain international peace and security. Article 53(1) of the UN Charter also permits ROs to intervene and enforce actions with the approval of the SC for managing regional conflicts within their mechanisms (Kabau, 2012). This article explores the use of ROs' intervention mechanisms for implementing the R2P in conflict management efforts, focusing on their intervention instruments.

Since 1993, the OAS has prioritized democracy and human rights protection in the Northern American region (Alagappa, 1997), shifting its focus from non-intervention to R2P (Schnably, 1993). In 1991, the OAS shifted towards an interventionist stance, committing to the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System (Schnably, 1993). The Santiago commitment, a pledge by OAS foreign ministers to expedite processes for promoting and safeguarding representative democracy, prioritizes democratic regime protection over non-intervention (Alagappa, 1997). To that end, the OAS has been instrumental in resolving conflicts in Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador-Honduras (Nguyen, 2002).

The EU has implemented the R2P and adopted intervention mechanisms to effectively manage conflicts and safeguard human rights in Europe. The EU, a powerful regional organization, has shown a growing interest in conflict resolution, particularly in European countries (Giannaki, 2007). Article 7 of the EU Treaty establishes a mechanism for the Union to intervene in the domestic affairs of member countries. Article 7(1) of the EU's Treaty allows the Council to determine if a Member State is at risk of serious breach of Article 2 values after a reasoned proposal from one-third of Member States, the European Parliament, or the European Commission.

The EU, a significant regional and global actor (Giannaki, 2007), has significantly contributed to peace and security in Europe and around the world through its effective conflict management capabilities (Juncos & Blockmans, 2018). Rummel (2004) suggests the EU's involvement in conflict resolution was influenced by its failure to prevent the Yugoslavian civil wars and conflicts in Africa in the mid-1990s and its response to the USA's global crisis management dominance. Giannaki (2007) praised the EU's intervention in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The EU's membership power is crucial for conflict management, and Croatia's exclusion from NATO's Partnership for Peace has led to economic and technical losses and international isolation (Giannaki, 2007). Giannaki (2007) further notes that the EU and NATO collaborated to manage the conflict in FYROM, negotiating an all-party government and providing financial aid for a peaceful resolution.

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Before its 2001 dissolution, the OAU prioritized non-intervention over protection against widespread human rights abuses (Sarkin, 2009; Aning & Atuobi, 2009). The OAU, despite resolving the DRC conflict and facilitating the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal (Sarkin, 2009), faced criticism for failing to stop the Rwandan genocide or end wars in Liberia and Burundi (Kindiki, 2003). The OAU's inability to manage conflicts and protect human rights led to its transformation into the AU in 2000, adopting an interventionist approach, indicating a shift from non-intervention to a non-indifference principle.

Former AU Commission Chair, President Alpha Oumar Konare, made a significant statement advocating for non-indifference for the first time. Konare deemed it unsustainable for African countries to remain silent in the face of neighboring countries' atrocities (Murithi, 2009). The new AU doctrine, rooted in Pan-Africanism, urges African countries to cease indifference to their neighbors' suffering, promoting peace, security, and well-being through political will (Aning & Atuobi, 2009). Thus, non-indifference refers to the shift from non-intervention to intervention, enabling the AU to intervene in member states in severe situations like genocide, war crimes, and war against humanity (AU CA, 2000). Five years later, after the adoption of the AU in January 2005, African leaders endorsed the R2P in the Ezulwini Consensus recognizing the need for protective measures (Aning & Atuobi, 2009). Article 4 of the AU legalizes R2P in Africa and affirms the Union's right to intervene in member states. This article permits intervention without a specific state request or invitation, potentially targeting a state's government if it is the perpetrator of atrocities. Article 4(f) also allows the Union to use or threaten force among AU states in cases of the aforementioned crimes. Furthermore, Article 4(j) grants member states the right to request Union intervention to restore peace and security.

The AU has initiated R2P, involving military intervention in conflicts in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, and Comoros (Kabau, 2012; Murithi, 2009). In 2003, the AU intervened in Burundi for the first time and established the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to ensure peace and promote R2P. The AMIB played a crucial role in establishing peace in Burundi, despite its fragile nature, establishing relative peace in most provinces by the end of its mission (Kabau, 2012). The AU has also facilitated peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia, relying on territorial state consent, but has shown reluctance to resort to forceful intervention in Darfur and Libya (Kabau, 2012; Murithi, 2009). The AU and the Sudanese government were negotiating ceasefire agreements to establish the AU Mission in Sudan but failed for various reasons (Kabau, 2012). On March 6, 2007, the AU's Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Ambassador of Somalia, signed the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) (Ibid.).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has implemented interventionist approaches for conflict management and human rights protection. ECOWAS, unlike other regional economic organizations, is highly involved in security issues (Haftel & Hofmann, 2017). The organization is implementing conflict management mechanisms to swiftly resolve disputes without relying on the international community (Breslawski et al., 2022). It has demonstrated its effectiveness (Abegunde, 2021) and extensively intervened in many conflicts in West Africa. The organization intervened in the Liberian civil war in 1990 (Sarkin, 2009) and approved the ECOMOG mission, demonstrating its involvement in intervention efforts (Abegunde, 2021). In 1998, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone, extending the ECOMOG mission to the region (Sarkin, 2009; Abegunde, 2021). Moreover, ECOWAS intervened in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and 2001, threatening expulsion due to its involvement in the 2003 coup d'état (Sarkin, 2009). It also led peaceful resolutions and restored constitutional governments in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia (Breslawski et al., 2022). Specifically, the organization played a crucial role in resolving conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire since its intervention in 2002 (Sarkin, 2009).

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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has implemented principles and protocols related to the R2P. The 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation permits the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security (OPDS) to authorize intervention as a last resort (art. 2). In 1998, the SADC intervened in the DRC conflict (Sarkin, 2009). Moreover, South Africa and Botswana, under SADC's guidance, intervened in Lesotho in 1998 to prevent a coup d'état, but the charter, mandate, and motivations remain controversial (Likoti, 2007).

The IGAD's Non-Intervention and Management of Interstate Intervention

As indicated in the introduction, since its mandate was expanded to include peace and security in 1996, the IGAD has implemented the non-intervention principle as a conflict management strategy to prevent and manage interstate interference and wars in the Horn of Africa (IGAD Agreement, 1996). Article 6(b) of the IGAD Agreement mandates member states to reaffirm their commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Asnake (2015) asserts that the IGAD employs non-intervention and state sovereignty principles to prevent member states from interfering in each other's internal affairs and resorting to war and violence.

The question is whether non-intervention is a viable strategy for conflict management and regional security, and to what extent it achieves the aforementioned objectives. Thus, the article examines the effectiveness, contribution, and potential failure of the IGAD's non-intervention strategy in preventing and managing interstate intervention, violence, and intrastate conflicts in the region. However, it should be apparent from the start that this article acknowledges that IGAD's non-intervention is not expected to prevent all armed conflicts and enmity among the member states but argues that reducing and managing interstate intervention and violence is desirable.

Although IGAD advocates for collective measures against regional peace and security threats, as stated in Article 18, unilateral interventions have historically worsened the region's peace and security situation. The region has witnessed a rise in unilateral state interventions in neighboring states' internal affairs, with IGAD member states routinely involving in neighboring countries' internal conflicts. Between 2005 and 2020, only fifteen years, the region has experienced four unilateral state interventions in other states' internal conflicts. This article examines four unilateral state interventions as case studies, evaluating the IGAD non-intervention in each of these cases.

Ethiopia's Intervention in Somalia

Ethiopia intervened militarily in the Somalia conflict from December 2006 to January 2009, claiming to counter Islamic Court Union (ICU) terrorist threats. However, this intervention has remained a contentious one. The question is why Ethiopia intervened? What was the response of IGAD to the military intervention? Ethiopia justified its military intervention based on two legal perspectives: the right to self-defense and the threat of an armed attack. First, Ethiopia claimed its inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In fact, the article grants Ethiopia the right to self-defense against an armed attack or a threat from a non-state actor. However, Ethiopia's international legal claims have been criticized for failing to comply with international law on self-defense and terrorist threats. Allo (2010) argues that Ethiopia failed to meet at least two legal requirements of international law outlined in UN Charter Article 51. First, the country did not provide a clear description of the scale and impact of the armed attack. Second, the response to the terrorism threat in Somalia was not proportional, as it occupied major cities, including the Mogadishu, the capital city and stayed

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for three years from 2006 to 2009. Allo (2010) further contends that Ethiopia's military intervention in collective self-defense violates international law, as Ethiopia and Somalia have not signed any bilateral agreement.

Second, Ethiopia justified its military intervention against a terrorist threat by citing a clear threat and growing fear of an attack by the non-state actor, the UIC. Allo (2010) contends that the UIC's armed attack not only does not necessarily indicate an armed attack but also that the attack was not a major danger to its territorial integrity and political independence. Thus, the UIC's threat to Ethiopia was deemed insufficient to justify self-defense. In terms of proportionality, Ethiopia's three-year occupation of Somalia's major cities and airports, despite claims of self-defense, does not accurately reflect the proportion of armed attacks (Allo, 2010). Similarly, the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2013) asserts that Ethiopia's intervention was disproportionately reacted to, despite the potential for a terrorist retaliatory campaign.

What was IGAD's reaction to Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia? Redie (2012) criticized IGAD for supporting Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, arguing it aimed to influence the international community and other regional member states. Redie (2019) reveals that Ethiopia used IGAD to support its 2006 invasion of Somalia to safeguard its national security from the threat of ICU. Thus, the IGAD's response to Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia has led to a loss of trust among its member nations, particularly Eritrea. Eritrea's 2007 suspension from IGAD membership was due to Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, which in turn intensified its involvement in the Somali crisis, turning it into a proxy war with Ethiopia (Woodward, 2013). In fact, IGAD is legally unable to support unilateral interference in another state's internal affairs. However, this article argues that IGAD's inability to withdraw Ethiopia's three-year presence in Somalia demonstrates its failure to adhere to its non-intervention stance, as evidenced by Ethiopia's control over major cities, including the capital, Mogadishu.

Kenya's Intervention in Somalia

On October 16, 2011, Kenya launched a military intervention in Somalia (ICG, 2012; Birkett, 2013; Yirga, 2014). The military intervention, referred to as *Operation Linda Nchi* in Kiswahili, was described as an invasion by the ICG (2012) and Birkett (2013). Kenya's intervention, which resembled Ethiopia's intervention, was motivated by various factors. Menkhaus (2012) argues that kidnappings prompted Kenya's offensive against al-Shabaab, while plans for a Kenya-backed military operation in the border region had been in the works for some time. Similarly, Yirga (2014) revealed that Kenya's military intervention was driven by economic, political, and strategic factors, in addition to frequent kidnappings and terrorist attacks. Yirga further explained that the military operation was linked to Kenya's strategic goal of creating a buffer state in southern Somalia. Similarly, ICG (2012) also reported that Kenya planned to establish a buffer zone in Jubaland, southern Somalia, between itself and al-Shabaab-controlled territory, with 2500 militiamen trained for this purpose. The buffer zone was created to ensure Kenya's uninterrupted oil exploration and secure offshore oil blocks between Kenya and Somalia, prompting military intervention (Yirga, 2014).

The question arises as to the legal justification for Kenya's military intervention in Somalia. Kenya used almost the same legal justification as Ethiopia did in Somalia: self-defense and an act against an armed attack. Kenya justified its military operation by citing a series of kidnappings by al-Shabaab, a non-state actor affiliated with Al-Qaeda, on Kenyan territory (Gettleman, 2011; Birkett,

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2013). Kenya's actions could be justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter (Birkett, 2013), which grants member states the right to defend themselves in case of an armed attack, pending Security Council action (UN, 1945). Birkett (2013) further argued that Kenya's self-defense measure meets the international law necessity criterion, despite controversial views on necessity. He further noted that Kenya urged al-Shabaab to cease operations amid attacks and kidnappings, ignoring calls for help, and thus has used armed force in self-defense. However, this article contends that al-Shabaab's threat to Kenya was insufficient to justify self-defense. We argue Kenya's response is illegal and violates international law as it used force against Somalia's territorial integrity by sending troops into its territory. In this regard, the ICG (2012) notes that the threshold and magnitude of al-Shabaab's armed attacks were not mentioned, except for frequent attacks and kidnappings. The ICG (2012) further underscored that a small group approved military intervention swiftly without proper consideration.

In terms of proportionality, this article also posits that the legal foundations were disproportionately influenced by economic motives. In this regard, Birkett (2013) reports that Kenya's operation reached Kismayo, 190 kilometers from its border, to drive al-Shabaab beyond Kismayo, less than 200 kilometers from the Somali-Kenyan border. Similarly, ICG (2013) found Kenya's long-term occupation of southern Somalia does not make its self-defense proportional. The ICG (2013) contends that despite the potential for a stable, extremist-free, and viable polity in the Juba Valley, the response was disproportionately retaliatory. The ICG further deemed Kenya's intervention excessive and an invasion, disregarding the unintended consequences (Ibid.).

Subsequently, what was IGAD's reaction to Kenya's intervention in Somalia? The IGAD promptly supported the scaling-up of security operations on October 21, 2011 (IGAD's 41st Communiqué of the Extra-Ordinary Session, 2011), less than a week after the Kenyan military offensive began. The IGAD meeting shifted Kenya's hot pursuit of kidnappers to weaken al-Shabaab and establish a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia (ICG, 2012). Despite convincing IGAD member states that its involvement targeted an armed terrorist group, Kenya's unilateral engagement was criticized. The organization has been criticized for not adhering to its non-intervention principle, ignoring the Kenyan troop's withdrawal from Somalia for nearly a year before joining the AU's mission, AMISOM. IGAD's failure to take steps to remove Kenyan troops from Somalia can be seen as support by for the military incursion as the ICG (2012) and Birkett (2013) described Kenya's intervention as an invasion. However, IGAD has no power to endorse a state's unilateral state intervention against another sovereign state. Therefore, Kenya's unilateral action breached IGAD's and international norms by interfering in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state.

Eritrea's Intervention in Ethiopia's Tigray Conflict

Eritrea's involvement in Ethiopia's Tigray conflict is a recent instance of state interference. The Ethiopian government and the TPLF engaged in an armed conflict on November 4, 2020, that ended on November 2, 2022, following the signing of the Pretoria peace deal. During the two-year civil war, Eritrean troops, along with the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and Amhara paramilitary forces, fought against the Tigray forces (Blanchard, 2021; ACLED, 2022; Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2022; Abel, 2023). AI and HRW (2022) accused Eritrean troops of numerous human rights violations and war crimes, including mass killings, massacres, extrajudicial activities, rape, looting, and property destruction in Tigray.

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The first question is why Eritrea is involved in the armed conflict in Tigray? The political interpretation of Eritrea's involvement in the conflict is influenced by the historical relationship between the Eritrean government and the TPLF. Collins (2021) and Reid (2022) found that the conflict between Eritrea and the TPLF significantly influences the relationship between the two countries. The TPLF and Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) have a history of conflict dating back to the 1970s, despite supporting each other during the armed struggle against the *Derg* regime in Ethiopia (Reid, 2022). The relationship between the two parties has been more strained since the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrean war (Collins, 2021). In 2018, Ethiopia's political dynamics under Prime Minister Abiy significantly impacted the relationship between the TPLF and the Eritrean government. Despite reconciliation efforts between the two countries under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's leadership, the regime in Eritrea and the TPLF's relationship remains unresolved. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's power struggle with the TPLF escalated, leading to the Tigray conflict on November 4, 2020, exacerbating Eritrea's disputes with the TPLF and resulting in its military intervention in the two-year destructive war in the Tigray region.

The normalization of the two countries provided President Isaias of Eritrea with an opportunity to seek revenge against the TPLF. Eritrea's defeat in the 1998 conflict under TPLF Ethiopian leadership (Reid, 2022; Collins, 2021) can be attributed to President Isaias, who sought military intervention to defeat the TPLF as a way of retaliation (Aucoin et al., 2022; Abel, 2023). Aucoin et al. (2022) argue that Isaias believes defeating the TPLF would strengthen military and political power in the Horn of Africa. Reid (2022) also argues that Isaias used the Tigray war for three benefits, including to end Eritrea's international isolation, gain influence in Ethiopia's internal affairs, and seek revenge on the TPLF, which had outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily and diplomatically. Similarly, Abel (2023) asserts that Eritrea has achieved objectives in the Tigray war, such as weakening the TPLF, devastating northern Ethiopia, decimating Tigray's economy, and capturing shared territory.

The second question is about the legal basis for Eritrea's military intervention. Eritrea's intervention has sparked legal debates involving invitation, self-defense, and coercion elements. The article presents three legal justifications for Eritrea's involvement in the Tigray conflict. First, there are claims that the Ethiopian government provided an invitation to Eritrea. Legally speaking, international law allows a state to intervene by invitation in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) (Clifford, 2022). Clifford defined NIAC as an armed conflict within a state's territory, with Eritrea's actions primarily occurring within Ethiopia's borders, making it non-international (Ibid.).

However, the most contentious issue is whether the Ethiopian government invited Eritrea. Although this issue will be addressed under the coercive element, Ethiopia's invitation to Eritrea has been disputed due to a lack of precise information. However, some reports show that Ethiopia has requested Eritrea's intervention. For example, Clifford (2022) argues that Eritrea's involvement is the Ethiopian government's invitation to deter the TPLF's attack. Clifford further claims that a state has the right to seek external assistance to end a civil war, but the situation in Ethiopia appears to be different (Ibid.). For him, Ethiopia's third-party invitation to Eritrea violates R2P, as Eritrea committed war crimes, targeting civilians and arresting political dissidents in Tigray. R2P is a concept that justifies third-party intervention to protect the population from atrocities like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and prevent these international crimes (ICISS, 2001; World Summit Outcome, 2005; Sarkin, 2009). Similarly, Djupmark Ödegaard (2022) notes that the Ethiopian government's inability to protect its citizens is a violation of the R2P principle. Clifford (2022) also concludes that the R2P

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doctrine establishes a legal norm that Eritrea's intervention is unconstitutional, despite Ethiopia's acceptance.

Second, Eritrea's intervention includes a self-defense component. The Ethiopian government claimed Eritrea's involvement was primarily for self-defense purpose. After five months of denial, Prime Minister Abiy announced in April 2021 that Eritrean troops crossed the border to avoid TPLF attacks, promising to leave once the Ethiopian military controls the border (Reuters, 2021). Similarly, Clifford (2022) asserts that Eritrea's continued involvement in Ethiopia is driven by fear of a resurgence of the TPLF. In this context, however, Eritrea has never justified its military intervention for self-defense purpose. Rather, in response to Prime Minister Abiy's speech, Eritrea's minister of information claimed the Prime Minister's speech was mistranslated but did not respond to inquiries about the mistranslated part or reports of atrocities (Reuters, 2021). Therefore, with no confirmation from Eritrea, it is difficult to prove that Eritrea's intervention was justified by self-defense.

Third, Eritrea's intervention has a coercive element. Ethiopia's invitation to Eritrea is disputed because Ethiopia's invitation to Eritrea is not officially documented, despite reports from rights groups and IOs. Prime Minister Abiy's speech on Eritrean troops crossing the border to avoid TPLF attacks is insufficient to justify his government's invitation. Moreover, Eritrea and Ethiopia's governments denied Eritrea's involvement, despite evidence of human rights violations against civilians in captured areas until April 2021 (Abel, 2023). However, five months later, the Prime Minister confirmed Eritrea's involvement, agreeing to withdraw its forces from Tigray and maintain territorial sovereignty (Reuters, 2021). This indicates that Eritrea's intervention was initially implemented without Ethiopia's consent or invitation, indicating the coercive nature of the intervention.

Furthermore, on November 02, 2022, the Ethiopian government and the TPLF signed the Pretoria peace deal, but Eritrea and Ethiopia resisted acknowledging Eritrea's involvement. The peace agreement advocates for the withdrawal of foreign forces but does not explicitly mention Eritrea's withdrawal or its involvement in the conflict. In addition, Eritrean forces remained active in rural areas of Tigray after the Pretoria agreement, despite being required to leave the region (Abel, 2023). The presence of Eritrean forces demonstrates either Eritrea's refusal to leave the region or Ethiopia's desire for its presence, highlighting the coercive nature of the intervention. This article concludes that Eritrea's involvement in Ethiopia's internal conflict is a violation of international law in terms of invitation, self-defense, and coaction. International law violations, by definition, involve violations of regional norms, like the non-intervention norm of the IGAD.

The other key question is how IGAD responded to Eritrea's involvement in the conflict? IGAD has not recognized or denied Eritrea's intervention in the conflict, unlike Kenya and Ethiopia's interventions in Somalia, nor has it demanded its evacuation, like Uganda's involvement in South Sudan. Most importantly, IGAD has been hesitant to condemn Eritrea's involvement. Collins (2021) argues that despite evidence suggesting Eritrean forces were involved in the conflict, IGAD has been excluded from the war in Tigray, indicating it's more than just an internal issue. Its inaction in Eritrea's intervention can be attributed to various reasons. First, Ethiopia holds a significant influence in IGAD. Abel (2023) claims that Ethiopia's significant influence within the IGAD regional bloc has hindered its ability to effectively resolve the conflict. Second, the IGAD member states show a lack of political commitment and willingness to address Eritrea's intervention. Third, in 2018, regional dynamics, including leadership changes in Sudan and Ethiopia, the restoration of relations between Somalia,

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Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and a lack of political interests, influenced IGAD's leadership role in addressing the conflict.

Uganda's Intervention in South Sudan

Uganda's 2013 military intervention in South Sudan's conflict is another example of a unilateral state intervention. On December 15, 2013, Uganda launched a military intervention in South Sudan (Apuuli, 2014; De Bello, 2014). The question then arises as to why Uganda intervened in the conflict in South Sudan? According to Apuuli (2014) and De Bello (2014), Uganda's military involvement is reportedly driven by national and regional security concerns and economic interests. The question raises the legal justification for Uganda's military intervention in South Sudan. According to Apuuli (2014), Uganda provided four justifications for its intervention: an invitation from the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), a request from the UN Secretary-General, IGAD sanctions, and the evacuation of Ugandan and foreign citizens.

First, Uganda claimed it was invited by the GoSS to uphold peace and order in South Sudan. Ugandan officials, including Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga, claimed to have received an invitation from GoSS, citing South Sudan's President Kiir's letter to President Museveni (Tajuba, 2014). However, Apuuli (2014) argues that Ugandan officials' claim is illegal and in violation of international norms due to the GoSS's failure to send a letter requesting intervention. Apuuli further noted that government interventions in civil wars, either on its behalf or for opposing groups, are illegal, implying that a state's intervention in another state's civil war is prohibited (Ibid.).

Second, Uganda's intervention was also justified by a request from UN Secretary-General Genry-General Ver. De Bello (2014) argues that Uganda's military presence received minimal support, especially from the UN. Similarly, Apuuli (2014) argues that the UN Secretary-General's plea to President Museveni does not legalize military involvement, as the proposal focuses on finding a diplomatic solution rather than a military one.

Third, Uganda's military intervention was justified by the authorization of IGAD. Ugandan officials claimed that Uganda's presence in South Sudan was permitted by IGAD (Mukisa, 2014). Musisi further noted that Samuel Lominsuk, South Sudan's ambassador to Uganda, has defended Uganda's intervention in South Sudan, claiming that the intervention was made under the IGAD (Ibid.). However, Uganda's military presence in South Sudan has sparked debates and concerns among IGAD countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan (De Bello, 2014), despite the country claiming legal authorization for its actions from the organization (Apuuli, 2014). IGAD and the aforementioned states disagreed with Uganda's involvement, citing it as escalating the conflict and potentially undermining the peace process (Ibid.). Uganda denied involvement in the de-escalation of the conflict, claiming that its forces played a crucial role.

The disagreement between IGAD and Uganda raises the question of IGAD's authority to authorize military intervention by one state in another. If so, Uganda's intervention in South Sudan is deemed illegal by this analysis, as it contradicts the long-awaited precept of non-intervention in a state's domestic affairs. First, IGAD has no legal authority to authorize a country's military intervention in another. Second, neither IGAD nor the UN is capable of doing so (Apuuli, 2014). However, IGAD commended Uganda's efforts in protecting South Sudan's vital infrastructure during its 23rd extraordinary meeting in December 2014 (IGAD Communiqué of the 23rd Extraordinary Session, 2014). If considered authorized, IGAD offered Uganda support to safeguard vital infrastructure and facilities,

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with Uganda's assistance being limited to this matter (Apuuli, 2014). Apuuli further argued that the IGAD communiqué does not explicitly authorize Uganda's intervention beyond securing critical infrastructure and installations (Ibid.). Rather, Ugandan officials may have misinterpreted IGAD's support in securing infrastructure facilities as authorization, even though IGAD's communiqué does not make it legal. Thus, the article argues that Uganda's intervention is deemed illegal not only due to the IGAD's non-intervention but also under international law.

Finally, IGAD imposed a directive for Uganda to withdraw its forces from South Sudan, citing its policy of preventing simultaneous conflict. This article posits that IGAD's sole non-intervention contribution led Uganda to withdraw from South Sudan. This article argues that IGAD's involvement in Uganda's withdrawal was driven by the interests of the member states, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. This would not have occurred if these countries were not interested in Uganda's withdrawal. This raises the question of why IGAD did not actively prevent and oversee Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, Kenya's intervention in Somalia, and Eritrea's intervention in Ethiopia. This also begs the question of whether IGAD maintains a consistent approach in its application of non-intervention. The Eritrean intervention in Ethiopia's Tigray conflict serves as a prime example of this fact. Why did IGAD back Ethiopia and Kenya's intervention in Somalia? Why has there been silence on Eritrea's involvement in the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict? Why has IGAD pushed Uganda to withdraw its troops from South Sudan? This may require further research, but IGAD has been inconsistent when implementing its non-intervention principle, which could be influenced by member states' interests.

Four Explanations Influence the IGAD's Non-Intervention in Managing Conflicts

The article attempts to provide an explanation why the IGAD's non-intervention strategy has not had a positive impact on decreasing and managing interstate intervention and intrastate conflicts. The analysis reveals that IGAD's non-intervention strategy is a failed attempt at preventing and managing mutual intervention, destabilizing, and managing regional crises. This article found four main explanations for why IGAD's non-intervention strategy fails to effectively manage conflicts and ensure regional peace and security. These four explanations include a lack of clarity on non-intervention and internal affairs, a mismatch between the principle's rhetoric and state practice, a lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the principle's inherent limitations to deal with contemporary peace and security challenges in a region with high level of interstate and intrastate conflicts.

Lacks of Clarity on Non-intervention and Internal Affairs

The 1996 IGAD Agreement lacks clarity on its non-intervention and internal affairs, as it lacks a sufficient definition or explanation of internal affairs governing its inability to intervene in a member state. The IGAD Agreement is unable to provide precise answers to the following questions: what if atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing are committed in one of its member states? The question raises doubts about the R2P concept, which aims to prevent potential atrocities like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing in one of its member states. When and how can IGAD intervene to stop such atrocities committed in one of its member states? The IGAD Agreement does not address these specific inquiries. In contrast, as described in the theoretical framework section, various IOs and ROs have defined non-intervention in member states' internal affairs and implemented intervention measures to prevent international crimes. For example, ASEAN demands non-intervention, refraining from criticizing governments'

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actions, directing criticism at violating non-intervention principles, and denying support to rebel groups seeking destabilization or overthrow (Wu, 2000). Similarly, the AU, as clearly stated in Article 4(h), has the authority to intervene in Member States' domestic affairs in grave situations, such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (AU, 2000).

The lack of clarity on the concept has led to IGAD's inability to prevent and manage inter-state interference in its member states. In 2013, Jacobsen and Nordby also noted that IGAD's inability to address potential conflict issues in member states is due to unclear definitions of internal affairs. Similarly, Mehari and El Fassi (2015) found that IGAD's involvement in peace and security issues is hindered by a lack of clarity on the distinction between unjustified and legitimate interference. Jacobsen and Nordby (2013) further suggest that a lack of clarity on internal affairs poses a threat to fragile regional security, potentially hindering institutional action of the organization.

Mismatch between the Principle's Rhetoric and State Practice or/and Lack of Adherence

The article claim that the IGAD's non-intervention strategy has largely failed due to a misalignment between rhetoric and state practice. The region's states, despite their rhetorical adherence to the principle, have shown inconsistent practices in their implementation. Asnake (2015) found that IGAD's regional security interdependence advocates cooperation without state intervention, but state practices frequently disrupt this principle, leading to forceful intervention and alliance shifts. Redie (2012) also asserts that IGAD has in principle established non-intervention, but it does not currently exist in practice. According to Asnake (2015), despite member states' commitment to the principle, it does not prevent interstate violence and conflict, highlighting its poor record in managing such issues. Asnake further criticized the IGAD's non-intervention, arguing it doesn't prevent member states from interfering and its inability to effectively contain inter-state intervention is poor or nonexistent (Ibid.). That is why the Horn of Africa states are well-known for their mutual intervention and destabilization in each other's internal affairs (Healy, 2011; Elowson & Albuquerque, 2016). As previously discussed, in the past fifteen years (2005–2020), the region has experienced four unilateral state interventions, including Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, Kenya's intervention in Somalia, Uganda's intervention in South Sudan, and Eritrea's intervention in Ethiopia.

Moreover, the principle does not prohibit member states from engaging in war and violence against each other. The region has experienced both interstate and proxy wars throughout its history. In 2015, Asnake noted that despite all member states technically adhering to this norm, it doesn't necessarily prevent them from engaging in war and violence within their respective borders. The region has experienced numerous interstate conflicts, including the Ethio-Eritrea war (1998–2000), the Eritrea-Djibouti war in 2008, the Sudan-South Sudan conflict since 2012, the Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute since 2013, and the Ethio-Sudan border conflict since 2020.

A proxy war is a common strategy used for destabilization and intervention in domestic matters in the region. A proxy war is a destabilizing strategy where each government uses subtle tactics to undermine the stability of the others. The Horn countries have a history of proxy wars, where they intervene and destabilize each other's enemies to achieve their own security goals (Cliffe, 1999). Proxy war, including support for rebel armed groups, is a significant foreign policy tool among Horn of Africa governments, potentially contributing to numerous interstate conflicts (Cliffe, 1999; Berouk, 2011; Healy, 2011).

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Lastly, as we said, one may wonder how a principle may have such a profound effect. However, a decrease or management of conflicts is a desirable outcome of such principles in order to determine whether the principle is beneficial to the organization's day-to-day operations and achievement of its objectives. Moreover, it should be clear that IGAD's non-intervention is not a stand-alone issue but rather that it is not strictly applied or adjusted in the interventionist approach. The article's critic is not concerned with IGAD's endorsement of the principle but with its lack of practical and empirical application and incapacity to achieve the intended goals. This article argues that the IGAD's non-intervention strategy is merely a facade and nominal, lacking effective implementation in terms of practicability and implementation. Acharya (2009) noted that ASEAN's success in conflict management can be attributed to its commitment to non-intervention. Asnake (205) also analyzed ASEAN's non-intervention strategy, arguing it ensures regional security by preventing interstate conflict among its member states. Acharya (2009) highlighted ASEAN's ability to sustain cooperation among its member countries through non-intervention, effectively resolving numerous territorial disputes.

In contrast, Asnake (2015) found that IGAD member states have not fully implemented their commitment to non-intervention, resulting in hindered effectiveness due to inconsistent state practices. IGAD's goal of becoming a genuine regional security actor is hindered by mutual intervention, destabilization, and member countries' refusal to distance themselves from force use (Asnake, 2015). Similarly, Heally (2011) argues that IGAD's conflict management practices are significantly influenced by the region's history of mutual intervention, characterized by armed force, mistrust, and shifting state alliances. This makes IGAD's non-intervention serve as a case study of failed non-intervention, demonstrating its inability to prevent and manage interstate disputes and mutual intervention in multiple regional crises. IGAD's failure to take collective regional security measures is evident in Ethiopia's 2006 intervention in Somalia, Kenya's 2011 intervention in Somalia, Uganda's 2013 intervention in South Sudan, and Eritrea's 2020 intervention in Ethiopia. These unilateral state interventions demonstrate IGAD's inability to manage regional crises collectively, despite its norms and principles prohibiting doing so.

IGAD's Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms and Capacity to execute its Treaty Obligations

Kingah and Langenhove (2012) argue that the function of ROs is influenced by three factors: willingness, legitimacy, and capability. Legitimacy refers to the RO's recognition or acceptance as a regional security actor and its position in the multilateral arena (Nguyen, 2002). The acceptance of an RO is significantly influenced by its true power, influence, and perception by states and other IOs and ROs. An RO's lack of enthusiasm can lead to other organizations disregarding its efforts to promote peace in its region (Nguyen, 2002). Similarly, Kingah and Langenhove (2012) highlight that gaining acceptance from other IOs and ROs is challenging, particularly when an RO lacks essential human resources and material assets for peace and security.

The capability of ROs is another determinant factor, influenced by their organizational capacities and operational experiences. According to Nguyen (2002), the effectiveness of an RO in peace and security depends on its organizational capacity, operational experience, financial resources, strong institutional framework, and sophisticated command structures. Similarly, Alagappa (1997) found that the challenges that regional institutions face in conflict management include maintaining unity, neutrality, limited authority, and capacity, including financial and human resources. For example, the delivery capacity of ROs can be impacted by limited financial resources and weak staffing;

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hence, it is crucial to consider both input and output aspects when formulating expectations and budgetary figures (Kingah & Langenhove, 2012).

The willingness of an RO is the most crucial factor. The term "willingness" in this context refers to two distinct aspects. First, the degree to which member states are willing to entrust power to an RO (Nguyen, 2002) Second, the extent to which an RO can exercise the authority granted to it, including the authority to interfere unilaterally in any member state within the regional space (Kingah & Langenhove, 2012). Thus, empowerment through regional constitutional texts or unambiguous empowerment of the RO through regional treaties and protocols can influence the willingness to act. Kingah and Langenhove further noted that the constitutional texts of several ROs grant them the right to intervene and enforce measures, playing a crucial role in preserving regional and international peace and security (Ibid.).

The IGAD, based on three determinant factors and intervention and enforcement mechanisms, is deemed one of the weak ROs. In terms of acceptance, IGAD aims to become the leading regional body for promoting peace and security in the region (IGAD, 1996). However, the IGAD's role as a primary regional security actor has a poor track record. Several studies indicate that IGAD has not yet effectively addressed regional conflicts in the region. Healy (2011) and Adetula et al. (2016) argue that IGAD is behind ECOWAS and SADC in terms of regional security acceptance. The organization has a poor record in ensuring regional security (Asnake, 2015), as it has proven ineffective in preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts (Elowson & Albuquerque, 2016). For example, it has not been a leading mediator in most regional conflicts, including the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war, the northern Uganda conflict (Borchgrevink & Lie, 2009; Healy, 2009; Asnake, 2015), the Darfur conflict (El-Affendi, 2009; Redie, 2012), the Eritrea-Djibouti border war (Ferras, 2013; Redie, 2012), and the civil war in Ethiopia's Tigray region (Collins, 2021; Abel, 2023).

In terms of capacity, the IGAD is a weak institution with significant institutional incapability. The organization and its institutions are often non-functional due to a lack of necessary capacity, authority, and autonomy (Adetula et al., 2016). In terms of the power to act (willingness), IGAD has limited power and authority to execute its treaty obligations. The organization is criticized for its weak structure and limited authority, indicating its inability to effectively function as a regional security actor. Scholars like Healy (2009), Solomon (2014), Witt (2014), Asnake (2015), Adetula et al. (2016), and Redie (2012) have criticized IGAD for its institutional weakness and insufficient mechanisms to effectively fulfill its authority and responsibilities. Similarly, Coe and Nash (2020) assert that IGAD's level of activity is comparable to SADC, but its institutional engagement is selective due to its institutional weaknesses.

Whose fault is it that IGAD is such a weak RO, and what factors contribute to its failure to create a stable region? The question may be beyond the article's scope, but it is crucial to analyze IGAD's non-intervention as it significantly contributes to its weaknesses. The first to blame for IGAD's dismal performance as a regional security actor is its member states. In other words, IGAD's failure is partly attributed to member states creating a weak security organization lacking legal authority and enforcement mechanisms, among other factors. The organization has encountered challenges in its enforcement mechanisms due to two factors.

First, IGAD member states are reluctant to providing sufficient constitutional authority to achieve the organization's regional objectives. They lack the political will and commitment to compromise their sovereign powers to achieve common objectives and interests, including ensuring

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regional security in the turbulent region of the Horn of Africa (Adetula et al., 2016). That is why the IGAD peace and security framework cannot enforce military and diplomatic actions, including sanctions and military interventions, on its member states (Micheale et al., 2022). Farole (2018) asserts that IGAD faces challenges in managing regional conflicts due to a lack of enforcement capacity, states violating non-intervention principles, and a strong desire for unilateral interventions. Similarly, Hull et al. (2011), cited in Adetula et al. (2016), argue that IGAD lacks enforcement mechanisms against member states, especially during conflicts and humanitarian emergencies (p. 9).

Second, it is also important to note that IGAD's regional security shortcomings stem not only from a lack of enforcement instruments and member states reluctance to grant authority but also from its fundamental institutional weaknesses. IGAD is a subpar RO for effectively implementing its principles and mandates, with the main challenge being the insufficient implementation of its norms and principles. For example, the IGAD's non-intervention policy may not be a major issue, but it has three faults. First, IGAD has not fully committed to or adhered to the non-intervention principle (Asnake, 2015). Second, it does not make it clear in its treaty obligation what constitutes internal affairs reflecting non-intervention (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2013; Mehari & El Fassi, 2015).

Third, the IGAD lacks amendment procedures that can intervene or shift from non-intervention to intervention approaches. Many regional organizations, as discussed in the ROs and R2P section, have adopted intervention approaches like the R2P to enhance their active and leading roles in addressing conflicts. For example, the AU played a pivotal role in military intervention in conflicts in Burundi and Somalia (Kabau, 2012; Murithi, 2009). ECOWAS also played a role in resolving conflicts in Liberia in 1990 (Sarkin, 2009), Sierra Leone in 1998 (Sarkin, 2009; Abegunde, 2021), Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and 2001, and Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 (Sarkin, 2009). The OAS played a pivotal role in resolving conflicts in Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador-Honduras (Nguyen, 2002). The EU also played a crucial role in resolving conflicts in Croatia and FYROM (Giannaki, 2007). The SADC sought to handle the crisis in DRC in 1998 (Sarkin, 2009) and staged a coup in Lesotho in 2007 (Likoti, 2007).

Unlike the aforementioned ROs, the IGAD lacks instruments to enforce its treaty duties, exposing the organization's limitations in resolving internal disputes. This article contends that adopting intervention mechanisms such as R2P and humanitarian strategies can help IGAD's contribution to conflict management. However, it is worth noting that not all ROs with intervention instruments are successful in their conflict management responsibilities. For example, the AU, despite its intervention mechanisms under Article 4h, has not effectively resolved conflicts in the Darfur conflict in Sudan and the Libya conflict (Kabau, 2012). Abel (2023) argues that the AU failed to maintain R2P after the Tigray war, reverting to non-interference principles and disengaged from Ethiopian dynamics, resulting in ineffective mediation.

The IGAD's Non-Intervention Limitations in Addressing Cotemporary Peace and Security Problems

Non-intervention is a conflict management strategy used when external actors have a minimal impact on domestic conflict management (Alagappa, 1997). As noted in the R2P section, however, states are responsible for protecting their citizens, and if they fail, the international community can intervene, particularly in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Given the region's current complex peace and security challenges and threats, the IGAD non-intervention strategy has limitations in tackling the aforementioned international crimes. Alagappa (1997)

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identifies the limitations of non-intervention as a conflict management strategy in regional organizations, highlighting three key points. First, regional institutions' lack of involvement in domestic conflicts significantly hinders their role as agents of conflict management. Alagappa further notes that the lack of intervention in managing internal conflicts, particularly those in Africa, often renders regional institutions irrelevant and ineffective (Ibib.). For example, the OAU's reputation in Africa and internationally has been significantly tarnished due to its non-intervention mechanism and reluctance to engage in domestic conflicts. Second, regional institutions often favor incumbents due to their status quo character, as seen in Tanzania's former President Julius Nyerere's statement that the OAU protects African Heads of State (El-Ayoutty, nd. cited in Alagappa, 1997, p. 431). Third, regional institutions can both contain and intensify domestic conflicts, as seen in Burma, by reinforcing the government's power and escalating the persecution and insecurity of political change-seeking groups (Alagappa, 1997).

Given the limitations of the IGAD's non-intervention in achieving the desired outcomes, the article argues that the principle has inherent limits, not only because it is yet to be adequately implemented, but also because it is inappropriate in a region marked by a high level of both violent and non-violent intervention among its member states. Specifically, critics of the article attributed the organization's inability to effectively manage conflicts, particularly those involving grave incidents like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, to its failure to implement a non-intervention strategy. Adetula et al. (2016) argue that IGAD's non-intervention approach is outdated and ineffective in addressing current peace and security issues. Similarly, Asnake (2015) criticized IGAD's non-intervention, arguing it hinders its ability to effectively handle crises like human rights abuses within member states. Apuuli (2004) also asserts that IGAD's non-intervention hinders its capacity to execute regional peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions.

IGAD's Non-Intervention and Its Role in the Organization's Failure

This section discusses how IGAD's non-intervention strategy is used by member states as a preventive strategy, hindering its leadership role in managing regional conflicts in the region. This article contends that the principle has not only failed to achieve its desired objectives but has also contributed to the organization's failure to play a leading role in managing regional crises. In other words, the study posits that IGAD's non-intervention strategy hinders its ability to intervene in member states internal conflicts and influences its leadership role in regional conflicts, as member states use it as a preventive measure. The IGAD aims to become the leading regional organization in promoting and maintaining peace and security in the region (IGAD Agreement, 1996). To that end, IGAD adopted Art. 18(c) on conflict resolution, requiring member states to resolve disputes within the sub-regional mechanism before referring them to other regional or international organizations (IGAD Agreement, 1996).

IGAD, despite its objective to resolve disputes within this regional body, has a poor track record of leading numerous regional crises. For example, IGAD did not take a leadership role in managing the Ethio-Eritrea war 1998-2000 (Healy, 2009; Asnake, 2015), the Darfur conflict (El-Affendi, 2009; Redie, 2012), the Ugandan-LRA conflicts (Borchgrevink & Lie, 2009), the Eritrea-Djibouti border war in 2008 (Ferras, 2013), Sudan and South Sudan (Elowson & Albuquerque, 2016), and Ethiopia's Tigray region (Collins, 2021; Aucoin et al., 2022; Abel, 2023).

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The question is why IGAD is unable to take a leadership role in addressing regional conflicts before other ROs and IOs. Despite other factors like a lack of enforcement mechanisms and political commitment among member states contributing to its failure, IGAD's failure to take on leadership roles is also partly attributed to its non-intervention strategy. The organization's non-intervention principle is not its issue, but member states misuse it to prevent the organization from intervening and taking a leadership role in addressing their conflicts. The article argues that IGAD's non-intervention strategy hinders its regional security mission, posing a significant challenge to its ability to intervene in regional conflicts and daily activities. Mehari and El Fassi (2015) and Adetula et al. (2016) also highlighted that IGAD has faced challenges from member states regarding sovereignty and internal affairs sensitivity. Similarly, Apuuli (2004) asserts that sovereignty and non-intervention have hindered IGAD from executing critical mandates like regional peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions.

Furthermore, the principle is deemed unsuitable for IGAD to intervene in the internal crises of its member states. The article argues that IGAD's non-intervention strategy is a legal and intentional preventive and defensive measure to protect member states' sovereignty and internal affairs. It is utilized by member states as an avoidance strategy to prevent IGAD from influencing their internal affairs and sovereignty. In this regard, Asnake (2015) reveals that IGAD member states employ non-intervention as a legal preventive measure to prevent foreign actors' intervention in their internal crises. Thus, the principle serves as a safeguard mechanism for protecting state sovereignty from external meddling.

More importantly, the principle permits member states to block IGAD from intervening in their internal affairs. States that are strongly obsessed with non-intervention in their internal affairs use the principle that permits member states to halt IGAD's intervention even in cases of severe humanitarian crises, human rights violations, or international crimes. Three instances have been reported where states have denied IGAD's intervention in managing intrastate conflicts. First, Ethiopia blocked IGAD from intervening in the Ethio-Eritrea war from 1998 to 2000 (Redie, 2012; 2019). Second, Sudan refused IGAD's intervention in the Darfur conflict in 2003 (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009), despite the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the conflict (Bellamy, 2005). The ICC has requested an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, the former Sudanese president, for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (Aning & Atuobi, 2009). In 2020, Ethiopia denied IGAD from intervening in the Tigray conflict (Collins, 2021; Aucoin et al., 2022; Abel, 2023).

The IGAD's non-intervention policy not only allows governments to impede the regional process but also lacks an effective tool to address their internal grievances. The IGAD, for nearly three decades, has been hindered by the lack of legal authority to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. The IGAD, due to the region's 'non-intervention' principle, was unable to intervene in its member states' conflicts and could not conduct meaningful interventions. In other words, the organization is denied the right to intervene for humanitarian or conflict resolution purposes in the internal affairs of its member states. IGAD's legal and policy documents do not include the concept of R2P in forceful intervention to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. What if the member countries reject IGAD's efforts to manage internal crises, which amount to international crimes including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity? In 2003, IGAD's inability to stop the Darfur crisis in Sudan, which was alleged to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, damaged its credibility. Bellamy (2005) highlights the 2003–2004 Darfur crisis as a prime example of

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a situation where intervention is the only possible solution to prevent further violence. IGAD's involvement in conflict management in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and the South Sudanese conflict is largely due to these countries' willingness to manage their disputes through this regional body.

The Tigray War in Ethiopia is a litmus test for IGAD's failure to intervene and take the lead in regional conflict management. The IGAD's stance and role in the Tigray conflict were subpar amidst the increasing atrocities, partly due to institutional issues (Abel, 2023). The organization has shown a lack of interest in actively participating and making meaningful efforts to resolve the two-year civil war (Collins, 2021; Aucoin et al., 2022). The question aims to explore the reasons behind IGAD's hesitation in taking a leadership role in the conflict. First, the organization declared the conflict an internal affair in Ethiopia. Similarly, Abel (2023) argues that Ethiopia's significant influence within the IGAD bloc has hindered its ability to effectively intervene in resolving the conflict (Abel, 2023). Second, Ethiopia has reportedly blocked international intervention in the conflict, including IGAD, citing it as a domestic matter of law and order operation. Tsegaye (2021) asserts that the Ethiopian former foreign minister's spokesperson stated on October 28, 2021, that the Tigray conflict is an internal issue within the country's legal framework.

Conclusion

The article concludes that IGAD's non-intervention as a conflict management strategy has shown flaws in dealing with regional crises. It has been ineffective in managing conflicts, ensuring regional peace and security, and potentially failing to achieve its objectives due to minimal contribution to interstate interference and internal conflicts. Not only does the principle fail to avoid and manage unilateral interstate intervention and internal conflicts, but it also fails to protect the sovereign power of its member states. Between 2005 and 2020, the region has seen four unilateral state interventions and four interstate wars, excluding the devastating 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. None of these unilateral state interventions and interstate wars were carried out within the auspices of IGAD. Moreover, the region has witnessed numerous interstate conflicts, including those between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea and Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan, Kenya and Somalia, and Ethiopia and Sudan. The IGAD's ineffective implementation of the non-intervention principle does not prevent state intervention or respect state sovereignty. IGAD not only fails to prevent interstate wars but also fails to take the lead in managing them. However, as explained, it is worth noting that the IGAD's non-intervention is not expected to prevent all armed conflicts and enmity among member states but suggests that reducing and managing interstate intervention and violence is desirable.

Moreover, the IGAD's non-intervention has not only failed to achieve its objectives but has also contributed to its failure to take a leadership role in managing regional conflicts. The principle is incompatible with the realization of IGAD's mandates and objectives and is inappropriate in a region with high levels of both violent and non-violent interventions between member states. It is posing a significant challenge to its goal of becoming a genuine regional security actor. The IGAD, for nearly three decades, has been hindered by the lack of legal authority to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. More importantly, the principle permits member states to block IGAD from intervening in their internal affairs. The study reveals IGAD's inaction in Ethiopia's Tigray region and Sudan's Darfur crisis, highlighting its inability to take leadership roles and member states' ability to halt its intervention.

The article finally remarks that why the IGAD's non-intervention has failed to achieve the desired outcomes. The first to blame is its member states' reluctance to implement the principle in practice. IGAD member states frequently violate the principle, despite recognizing it as a foundation for regional security cooperation and conflict management strategy. However, the principle's shortcomings are not only due to the lack of member state adherence but also to its fundamental institutional weaknesses. With all at odds, IGAD has to be criticized for its inadequate implementation of the principle. This is because the fact that IGAD has been inconsistent when implementing its non-intervention principle, which could be influenced by member states' interests. The organization's inconsistency in implementing the principle has negatively impacted its credibility and effectiveness in managing regional conflicts. However, it is worth noting that the article does not necessarily contradict the IGAD's adoption of the principle. Rather, it argues that IGAD has not effectively implemented or modified its principle to enable interventionist mechanisms, allowing the organization to intervene in member states' internal affairs.

Paper Implications

The findings of this article have policy implications. The results of the study indicate that IGAD policymakers have not adequately assessed the contribution and potential failures of the non-intervention strategy in managing conflicts. Thus, the findings can assist policymakers in evaluating the principle's effectiveness and potential limitations, potentially leading to more effective solutions. In a region with high levels of violent conflicts and interstate interventions, strict obedience of the principle or adoption of intervention and enforcing mechanisms is quite necessary. However, the article reveals that IGAD and its members, despite their rhetorical commitment, have shown reluctance to implement the principle in practice. The organization faces criticism for its inadequate implementation of a principle, which member states use to prevent intervention in domestic conflicts, contributing to its failure in conflict management. This could determine the organization's future existence, which has been harmed by its inability to fully adhere to the principle, making it a weak regional security actor.

What should the IGAD policymakers do? This may need further research but IGAD policymakers should prioritize the following tasks, which have policy implications for the organization's future endeavors. First, IGAD policymakers should strictly adhere to the principle in practice to achieve the desired outcomes. Second, IGAD policymakers can adopt an intervention mechanism like R2P similar to other ROs by transitioning from non-intervention to intervention strategies. Implementing intervention and enforcing mechanisms can enhance the organization's active and leading role in conflict management. IGAD policymakers must address the Horn of Africa's high violent conflicts, requiring a robust IGAD with sufficient constitutional power, including intervention mechanisms such as military and forceful interventions when peaceful means are insufficient. Third, the IGAD policymakers should enhance the organization's regional security cooperation by compromising the sovereign powers of its member states to enhance its role in conflict management and regional peace and security.

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