ncmr negotiation and conflict management research

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION IACM FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Negotiation and Conflict Management Research

Getting off to a "Hot" Start: How the Timing of Expressed Anger Influences Relational Outcomes in Negotiation

David A. Hunsaker*[1] and Teng Zhang*[2]

1 NYU Shanghai
2 Penn State Harrisburg

Keywords
negotiation; relational outcomes; anger expression; timing; experimental

Correspondence
David Hunsaker, NYU Shanghai, 1555 Century Avenue, Pudong New District, Shanghai, China 200122.
david.hunsaker@nyu.edu

10.34891/2022.0467

Abstract

While expressing anger during a negotiation can have positive effects on expressers' economic outcomes (e.g., larger concessions from their counterparts), it can also have adverse effects on their relational outcomes (e.g., decreased trust and a damaged relationship). However, little is known about whether and how the timing of expressed anger may affect expressers' relational outcomes. Because negotiation is a dynamic social interaction that consists of various stages or phases, anger expressed at early vs. late stages of a negotiation may lead to different responses from a counterpart. Drawing on research on the temporal effects of negotiation strategies and tactics, we hypothesized that anger expression (vs. no anger) in negotiation will hurt expressers' relational outcomes, and anger expressed at a late (vs. early) stage will be especially detrimental. Two studies provided consistent empirical support for our hypotheses. Practical implications and directions for future research are discussed.

Volume X, Number X, Pages X-XX

* Asterisk denotes equal contribution.

> Anybody can become angry, that is easy; but to be angry with the right person, and to the right degree, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way, that is not within everybody's power, that is not easy.
>
> —Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*

Over the past few decades, scholars of negotiation have sought to understand the role that emotion plays in negotiation (see Van Kleef & Côté, 2018). Anger has been of particular interest because it tends to occur during the negotiation process (Fisher et al., 1990; Olekalns & Druckman, 2014). Research has shown that expressing anger in negotiation can yield economic or financial benefits for the expressers (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004), suggesting that showing anger may be a good strategy for negotiators who are looking to elicit greater concessions from their counterparts. However, more recent research has also found that anger can have adverse effects on the expressers' relationship with their counterparts (e.g., Campagna et al., 2016; Pietroni et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012), which means that anger is at best a double-edged sword that needs to be wielded with caution in negotiation, if at all.

In light of these findings, one is left to wonder, 'should negotiators express anger in negotiation?' Is it possible for negotiators to show their frustration and dismay, which tend to arise in a conflict situation, without jeopardizing their long-term relationship with their counterparts? To answer these questions, we propose that scholars ask the question of *when*, as opposed to *whether*, negotiators should express anger during a negotiation. Because negotiators are typically expected to transition from a competitive orientation to a more cooperative one in negotiation (Lytle et al., 1999; Pruitt, 1981), we argue that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages of a negotiation or those who express no anger at all.

Anger and Negotiation

Negotiation is a give-and-take decision-making process that commonly evokes negative emotions, especially anger, which may explain why so much research has been conducted on the effects of anger in negotiation (Olekalns & Druckman, 2014; Van Kleef & Côté, 2018). Whereas some scholars focus on the causes of anger in negotiation (e.g., Butt & Choi, 2006; Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999; Johnson et al., 2009; Pillutla & Murnigham, 1996), a large majority of research seeks to explain the effects of anger on the economic and relational outcomes (e.g., Allred, 2000; Filipowicz et al., 2011; Lelieveld et al., 2012; Overbeck et al., 2010; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004).

Regarding the economic outcomes of a negotiation, anger has been shown to benefit the expresser because of its effects on the recipient's concession-making behavior (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004). For example, Van Kleef et al. (2004) found that in a computer-mediated negotiation, negotiators lowered their demands and made larger concessions to an angry counterpart than to a happy one because they inferred that an angry negotiator had a higher limit or resistance point. Similarly, Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) reported empirical evidence that compared to those who displayed no emotion, negotiators who expressed anger were able to claim more value because they were viewed by their counterparts as tougher. The positive effects of expressed anger on economic outcomes can carry over to future negotiations as the recipients of anger continue to perceive their angry counterparts to be tough and, as a result, lower their demands in subsequent negotiations (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010).

While anger can help the expressers improve their economic outcomes in both the current and subsequent negotiations, it can also create negative repercussions including retaliation from the counterpart (Allred, 1999, 2000; Wang et al., 2012), the reciprocation of anger (Friedman et al., 2004), the introduction of deceptive behavior into the negotiation (Olekalns & Smith, 2009), and the increased likelihood of a badly

damaged relationship (Allred et al., 1997; Pietroni et al., 2009; Van Beest & Scheepers, 2013). Essentially, research shows what many could have guessed intuitively—that expressing anger does not bode well for long-term relationships. For instance, anger can lower the recipient's impression of the expresser (Côté et al., 2013; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010), cause the recipient to exclude the expresser from coalitions (Van Beest et al., 2008), reduce the desire to work with the expresser in the future (Allred et al., 1997; Van Beest & Scheepers, 2013), and decrease trust between the parties (Liu & Wang, 2010).

The Importance of Timing in Negotiation

Prior research in the negotiation literature has demonstrated the important role of timing on the effectiveness of various negotiation strategies and tactics. For instance, Swaab et al. (2011) examined the effects of linguistic mimicry on negotiation outcomes and found that linguistic mimicry was more effective at early (vs. late) stages of a negotiation. In one study, mimicking a counterpart's language in the first 10 minutes of an online negotiation improved a negotiator's individual outcomes, as compared with mimicking in the last 10 minutes or no mimicking, because early linguistic mimicry enhanced the trust between the parties (Swaab et al., 2011). Another negotiation strategy for which timing is important is threat, which is often used to extract concessions in a negotiation. For example, research shows that the effectiveness of threats in negotiation is determined in part by when it is used. Implicit threats, or threats that fail to specify the precise consequences for non-compliance, were more effective in eliciting concessions when issued at early (vs. late) stages of a negotiation because they were perceived as more credible early in a negotiation (Sinaceur & Neale, 2005).

In fact, early stages of a negotiation are highly malleable and can thus set the tone for the entire negotiation (Morris & Keltner, 2000; Pruitt, 1981). For instance, conversational dynamics such as vocal mirroring that occurred within the first five minutes of a negotiation accounted for up to 30% of the variance in individual outcomes (Curhan & Pentland, 2007). Furthermore, breaching someone's trust at the start (vs. later stages) of a social interaction can have more negative long-term consequences (Lount et al., 2008). However, when trust is breached and someone is wronged in an interpersonal conflict scenario, apologies tend to be more effective when they are issued at later (vs. earlier) stages of the conflict (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005). In two studies that involved real and hypothetical conflict scenarios, Frantz and Bennigson (2005) found that individuals who were wronged by another were more satisfied with late apologies than early ones because they had more time to express themselves to the perpetrator and, as a result, felt better heard and understood.

Based on prior research on the timing of negotiation strategies and tactics, we propose that the effects of anger on negotiators' relational outcomes also depend on when it is expressed. Previous research has shown that anger can sometimes be viewed as appropriate in negotiation (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), particularly when it is directed at the negotiation offer or behavior, rather than at the negotiatior (Steinel et al., 2008). In addition to the target of negotiators' anger, we argue that the timing of expressed anger can also influence how the recipient perceives it because the negotiation process consists of stages or phases that are commonly characterizied by different strategies or behaviors (Adair & Brett, 2005; Pruitt, 1981; Putnam & Jones, 1982). For example, Adair and Brett (2005) proposed and found empirical support for a four-stage negotiation model that can illustrate the temporal progression of a mixed-motive negotiation. Based on this model, negotiations are sequentially divided into four time periods: relational positioning, identifying the problem, generating solutions, and reaching agreement (Adair & Brett, 2005). Each stage of a negotiation is characterized by a unique combination of negotiator motives, expectations, and behaviors.

Early stages of a negotiation typically consist of negotiator behaviors such as posturing, positioning (e.g., affective persuasion), and generally more competitive bargaining to establish power in the negotiation (Adair & Brett, 2005; Lytle et al., 1999; Pruitt, 1981; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005). As part of affective persuasion

(Adair & Brett, 2005), negotiators may express anger (e.g., toward their counterparts' initial offer) to signal their toughness and establish a strong bargaining position. Importantly, the recipients of anger expression will hardly be surprised at this stage of a negotiation because it is likely that they already expect their counterparts to engage in some form of posturing and positioning, and anger expression meets that expectation. In other words, when anger is expressed at early stages (e.g., the beginning) of a negotiation, the recipients will likely infer that the expressers are showing anger simply because they are following the unwritten rules of negotiation and not because they are prone to negative emotions or particularly unreasonable.

Compared with the early stages of a negotiation, late stages tend to be characterized by a move away from exclusively competitive bargaining and an adoption of increasingly rational, cooperative negotiation strategies and tactics if an agreement is to be reached (Lytle et al., 1999; Pruitt, 1981). In other words, as a negotiation moves away from the early stages that are often characterized by a lack of information about one another's interests and priorities, affective appeals (Adair & Brett, 2004, 2005) will likely be less expected by negotiators and therefore may be particularly harmful to the relational outcomes of those who use them. In other words, when anger is expressed at late stages (e.g., the middle or end) of a negotiation, the recipients will likely find it unexpected, especially when the parties have spent a considerable amount of time in exchanging offers and making concessions and/or are getting closer to an agreement. Furthermore, they may infer that the anger expressers are difficult to work with and care about their own interests more than others' or the relationship between the parties.

In sum, based on research on anger in negotiation and the temporal effects of negotiation strategies and behaviors (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005; Pruitt, 1981), we hypothesize that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiaiton will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages. In addition, consistent with the findings in prior research (e.g., Allred et al., 1997; Pietroni et al., 2009; Van Beest & Scheepers, 2013), we also hypothesize that negotiators who express anger (e.g., at early or late stages) during a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who do not. We tested our hypotheses in an online study and a face-to-face study. We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures (Simmons et al., 2012).

Study 1

Method

Participants

We recruited 220 participants based in the United States from the Prolific participant pool in exchange for monetary payment and received 219 complete responses.[2] Two participants failed one of our two attention checks and, in accordance with the preregistration, were excluded from the analyses, leaving a final sample size of $N = 217$. Of these participants, 79.7% were female, 16.6% were male, 65.0% were White or European American, 18.4% were Latino or Hispanic, 9.2% were Asian or Asian American, 5.1% were Black or African American, and 2.3% self-identified as Other. Participants had a mean of 27.5 years of age ($SD = 9.20$).

[2] Sample size, exclusion criteria, hypotheses, procedures, and materials were all preregistered *a priori* on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/9p5qa.

Procedure

After consenting to take part in the study, participants read a scenario about purchasing a used furniture set from an online classified ad posting. The ad listed the seller's asking price for the set as $1500. Participants were told that they hoped to purchase the set for $800 (i.e., their aspiration price), since a similar set recently sold for that amount. They were also told that they could spend no more than $1200 (i.e., their reservation price) because that was all the money they had. Before proceeding to the negotiation rounds, participants were required to pass three comprehension check questions about their aspiration price, their reservation price, and the price of the furniture set that recently sold online.

Next, participants were told that they would be paired with another online participant, who would play the role of the seller, to negotiate for the final price of the furniture set. The computer displayed a timer that ticked off nine seconds while it was purportedly searching for another online participant. To increase believability that a real person would be paired with the participants for the study, they were told that another online participant could not be found. They were then told that if the computer failed to find a negotiation counterpart for them the second time, they would be returned to the platform and paid for their time. The computer then searched again for four seconds and this time reported that another online participant had been found and was prepared to act as the seller in the negotiation. In reality, the computer was the seller.

Participants were then presented a screen with two text boxes. In the first box, they were asked to type an optional message to the seller. In the second box, they were asked to type their initial price offer, which was required. This was repeated for each of the six rounds. Each time, the computer waited a moment and then a new screen appeared with the seller's (computer's) response message, as well as a counteroffer from the seller (computer). For instance, after the first round, participants saw this message: "i could take $1400." Messages intentionally included typographical errors to further increase believability.

To ensure that participants did not finish early and therefore skew their perceptions of timing in the negotiation, they were not allowed to offer more than $1200 (i.e., their reservation price). The seller's (computer's) offers, on the other hand, started at $1400 and decreased gradually but never fell below $1200. As a result, there was no positive bargaining zone until the final negotiation round. The computer's offers were standard across conditions. After the sixth and final round, the computer accepted participants' final offers and the negotiation ended.

Timing of Anger Manipulation

To manipulate the timing of expressed anger, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: control (no anger), early anger, and late anger. In the control (no anger) condition, participants received neutral messages from the seller (computer) in all six rounds. In the early anger condition, participants received an angry message from the seller (computer) in round 1 and neutral messages in all other rounds. In the late anger condition, participants received an angry message in round 5 and neutral messages in all other rounds. The angry message presented in both the early and late anger conditions was adapted from Van Kleef et al. (2004) and read, "WHAT??! Are you kidding me?? u are really making me mad. It is the [NUMBER] ROUND of this negotiation and i am so angry that you would even consider an offer of [buyer's most recent offer] at this point. That kind of offer ticks me off. i could take [seller's next offer]". The counteroffers and messages across the six rounds are presented in the Appendix.

Measures

Feelings about the Relationship. We used the 4-item relationship subscale of the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) (Curhan et al., 2006) to measure relational outcomes after the negotiation. Participants answered the following four questions based on a 7-point scale (1 = *extremely negative or not at all*, 7 = *extremely positive or perfectly*): "What kind of "overall" impression did your counterpart make on you?", "How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart as a result of this negotiation?", "Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart?", and "Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your counterpart?" (Curhan et al., 2006). These items were averaged together to form a composite score of Feelings about the Relationship (α = .96).

Desire for Future Interaction. We used the Desire for Future Interaction scale, which is a measure of negotiators' willingness to work with their counterparts in the future (Ames et al., 2004), as a secondary measure of relational outcomes after the negotiation. Participants indicated their level of agreement (1 = *completely disagree*, 7 = *completely agree*) with the following two statements: "I'd be willing to do a favor for my counterpart in the future," and "I'd look forward to future interaction with my counterpart" (Ames et al. 2004). The two items were significantly and positively correlated (*r* = .86) and thus averaged together to form a composite score of Desire for Future Interaction.[3]

Other Measures. Participants also completed a two-question manipulation check. The first question asked, "Did your counterpart express anger during the negotiation?" (yes/no). Those who answered "yes" were then shown a second question that asked, "When did your counterpart express anger during the negotiation?" Options ranged from "round 1" to "round 6". We also measured participants' felt anger as an exploratory variable. Specifically, participants were asked, "How angry did you feel during the negotiation?" (1 = *not angry at all*, 7 = *extremely angry*). After answering this question, as well as basic demographic items, participants were asked another exploratory question, "While you were negotiating, how confident were you that you were negotiating with a real person?" (1 = *I was not confident at all that I was negotiating with a real person*, 7 = *I was completely confident that I was negotiating with a real person*). We refer to this exploratory variable as "confidence" in the analyses.[4]

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables are presented in Table 1. To check the effectiveness of our anger manipulation, we examined participants' answers to the two manipulation check questions. As discussed previously, we first asked participants to indicate *whether* their counterpart expressed anger during the negotiation (yes/no). We expected those in the control (no anger) condition to answer "no" and those in the early and late anger conditions to answer "yes." All but one (98.6%) of the participants in the control condition answered this question correctly. Similarly, all but one (98.6%) of those

[3] In addition to completing the Feelings about the Relationship and the Desire for Future Interaction scales at the end of the negotiation, participants also responded to the items of these two scales after rounds one, three, and five. These within-negotiation measures were exploratory, as mentioned in the preregistration materials, and the analyses are available in a Supplemental Analyses document available at https://tinyurl.com/2s3wjzf2.

[4] All main analyses were repeated with felt anger and confidence as the covariates, and results remained the same. These analyses are available in the Supplemental Analyses document available at https://tinyurl.com/2s3wjzf2.

in the early anger condition and all but two (97.3%) of those in the late anger condition answered this question correctly. A chi-square analysis was statistically significant, χ^2 (2, N = 217) = 199.45, p < .001, suggesting that the manipulation of expressed anger was successful.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Feelings about the Relationship	3.29	1.72									
2. Desire for Future Interaction	2.99	1.77	.87**								
3. Round 1 Offer	791.29	169.29	.04	.06							
4. Round 2 Offer	943.59	176.24	.07	.08	.62**						
5. Round 3 Offer	1042.77	193.66	.07	.07	.45**	.84**					
6. Round 4 Offer	1087.43	192.44	.13	.12	.32**	.69**	.85**				
7. Round 5 Offer	1116.22	184.38	.15*	.13	.25**	.61**	.79**	.78**			
8. Round 6 Offer	1100.37	249.84	.10	.11	.08	.35**	.50**	.52**	.53**		
9. Participants' felt anger	2.58	1.45	-.35**	-.33**	.04	.00	-.03	-.08	-.04	-.11	
10. Confidence (it was a real person)	3.01	1.88	.24**	.21**	-.04	-.03	.03	.08	.14*	.09	-.14*

*p < .05. **p < .01.

We then asked participants in the early and late anger conditions to indicate *when* their counterparts expressed anger during the negotiation. Participants could select any round, from round 1 to round 6. All but two (97.2%) of those in the early anger condition gave the correct answer and indicated that their counterparts expressed anger in round 1 of the negotiation. All but three (95.8%) of those in the late anger condition answered the question correctly and said that their counterparts expressed anger in round 5 of the negotiation. A chi-square analysis was statistically significant, χ^2 (6, N = 144) = 190.65, p < .001, suggesting that our manipulation of the timing of expressed anger was effective.

Because we had three experimental conditions, we ran a series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and pairwise comparisons to test our hypotheses. We started with Feelings about the Relationship, which was our primary measure of relational outcomes. Results showed that there was a statistically significant difference in Feelings about the Relationship across conditions, F(2, 210) = 32.21, p < .001, η_p^2 = .24. As

predicted, participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.34, SD = 1.43) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the early anger condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.46), p = .001, η_p^2 = .30. Participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.34, SD = 1.43) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the control condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.63), p < .001, η_p^2 = .12. Participants in the early anger condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.46) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the control condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.63), p < .001, η_p^2 = .08. Together, these findings provided empirical support for our prediction that while anger expression (vs. no anger) during a negotiation will hurt the expresser's relational outcomes after the negotiation, anger expressed at a late (vs. early) stage will be especially detrimental.

We then turned to Desire for Future Interaction, which was our secondary measure of relational outcomes. Results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in Desire for Future Interaction across conditions, F(2, 214) = 16.72, p < .001, η_p^2 = .14. Again, as predicted, participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.20, SD = 1.50) were less willing to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the early anger condition (M = 2.99, SD = 1.67), p = .004, η_p^2 = .19. Participants in the late anger condition (M = 2.20, SD = 1.50) experienced less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.80), p < .001, η_p^2 = .05. Participants in the early anger condition (M = 2.99, SD = 1.67) also had less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.80), p = .004, η_p^2 = .06.

Finally, we conducted exploratory analyses to see whether there were any differences in the economic outcome of the expresser as a function of the existence and timing of expressed anger. The means and standard deviations of participants' offers by conditions are presented in Table 2. We ran a series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and pairwise comparisons to examine participants' offers at rounds 2 and 6 and their concessions at rounds 2 and 6, which were calculated by subtracting their offers at rounds 1 and 5 from their offers at rounds 2 and 6, respectively. We focused on offers and concessions at rounds 2 and 6 because they were the two rounds that immediately followed the rounds (i.e., rounds 1 and 5) in which anger was expressed in the early and late anger conditions, respectively. In addition, round 6 was the final round of the negotiation in which the seller (computer) accepted each participant's final offer.

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations for Offers by Conditions

Round	Computer Offer	Control (No Anger)		Early Anger		Late Anger	
		M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
1	1400	787.32	172.94	797.64	169.91	788.92	167.28
2	1320	950.85	134.06	937.57	237.18	942.50	140.95
3	1280	1057.39	130.01	1016.49	280.08	1054.32	132.07
4	1240	1113.17	107.65	1060.38	261.78	1089.07	174.48
5	1220	1143.73	92.14	1068.26	281.60	1136.47	109.12
6	N/A	1129.51	167.10	1102.08	247.77	1070.74	310.63

Results showed that the only statistically significant difference in the economic outcomes was the concessions by the participants at round 6 between the early and late anger conditions, F(2, 214) = 3.93, p = .021, η_p^2 = .04. Specifically, participants in the late anger condition (M = -65.73, SD = 304.09) conceded less than those in the early anger condition (M = 33.82, SD = 145.53), p = .021, η_p^2 = .04. The result of this exploratory analysis may suggest that expressing anger at a late stage (e.g., toward the end) of a negotiation might have backfired, causing anger recipients to concede less than they otherwise would have. Despite this

difference in round 6 concessions, there was no statistically significant difference in participants' final offers between any of the conditions.

Discussion

Results of Study 1 provided strong empirical support for our hypotheses that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages, and that negotiators who express anger (e.g., at early or late stages) during a negotiation will have worse relational outcomes than those who do not. We used two established scales (i.e., Feelings about the Relationship, and Desire for Future Interaction) to measure relational outcomes and found evidence that negotiators were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and experienced less desire to interact with them in the future when their counterparts expressed anger, especially at late stages of a negotiation, than when no anger was expressed. Additionally, exploratory analyses revealed that negotiators whose counterparts expressed anger at a late stage of the negotiation (i.e., at round 5) made smaller concessions at round 6 than those whose counterparts had expressed anger at an early stage (i.e., at round 1). This could indicate that expressing anger late in a negotiation may hurt the expresser not only relationally, but economically as well, even though there was no statistically significant difference between participants' final offers across the two anger conditions.

Although results of Study 1 provided initial empirical support for our hypotheses, two questions remain. First, we used an online negotiation task in Study 1, and the anger expression was embedded in a computer-mediated message. While the nature of this negotiation rendered the test of our hypotheses a conservative one due to the lack of stimuli (e.g., participants only received typed messages and not verbal or nonverbal anger cues), it is an open question whether the same effects can be observed in a face-to-face setting in which negotiators can express anger more vividly (e.g., by using a variety of verbal and nonverbal messages including raised voice and frowning). Second, the negotiation task in Study 1 was purely distributive in that negotiators had only one issue to discuss (i.e., the price of a used furniture set) and needed to compete with each other to claim more value for themselves. In other words, no integrative potential existed in this negotiation. In Study 2, we sought to replicate the timing effects of expressed anger on negotiators' relational outcomes in a face-to-face negotiation in which negotiators could use additional cues to express anger and in which they could jointly create value and achieve an integrative outcome.

Study 2

Method

Participants

Sixty-five MBA students were recruited from two MBA courses at a large university in the western United States to participate in this study as part of an in-class exercise.[5] Because the size of this convenience sample was smaller than the one in Study 1 and our main interest was in comparing the effects of anger

[5] We did not collect typical demographic data in Study 2 because this study was conducted as part of an MBA course where we had limited time. We were able to administer a short questionnaire that contained only items that were directly relevant to the research question. For the reader's information, recent reports show that the program's average age is approximately 29, and about 25% of admitted students are women.

expressed at early versus late stages of a negotiation, we had two conditions including anger at an early stage (i.e., the beginning) and anger at a late stage (i.e., the middle). We did not include a control (no anger) condition in this study so that we could increase the statistical power of our analyses. No participants were excluded from our analyses.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to either the buyer or the seller role in the Myti-Pet negotiation, which is a dispute resolution situation that offers some integrative potential. They then negotiated in a team of two or three, against another team of two or three. To simplify the procedure, all participants in the role of buyer were instructed to express anger during the negotiation. To manipulate the timing of expressed anger, the buyer teams were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: early anger and late anger. Those in the early anger condition were instructed to act angry for the first 10 minutes of the negotiation, and those in the late anger condition were instructed to act angry for 10 minutes beginning at the half-way point in the negotiation (i.e., 22 minutes into the planned 45-minute negotiation). It would have been ideal to video-record these negotiations to ensure that anger was expressed at the appropriate times. However, since it was not feasible at the time of data collection, the experimenter visited each room 22 minutes into the negotiation to remind everyone that the negotiation time was half over. This visit served as a signal to the buyer teams in the late anger condition that it was time to start expressing anger.

To convincingly express anger in a face-to-face negotiation, participants in the buyer role were instructed to display one or more of the following behaviors during the negotiation: raising their voice, frowning, interrupting the other party, and banging their fists on the table. These instructions were adapted from Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006). After the negotiation ended, all participants filled out a survey questionnaire that included a manipulation check and dependent measures. However, only responses from anger recipients (i.e., the sellers) were analyzed, since the reaction to anger expression was the focus of our research.

Measures

Feelings about the Relationship. We used the same 4-item relationship subscale of the SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) as a primary measure of anger expressers' relational outcomes. These items were averaged together to form a composite score of Feelings about the Relationship (α = .84). Participants were also asked to write a few sentences to explain their answers to the Feelings about the Relationship, but this open-ended question was exploratory and was not analyzed.

Desire for Future Interaction. In addition, we also used the same two-item Desire for Future Interaction scale (Ames et al., 2004) as a secondary measure of anger expressers' relational outcomes. The two items were significantly and positively correlated (r = .78) and were averaged together to form a composite score of the Desire for Future Interaction.

Other Measures. Although our questionnaire contained the entire 16-item SVI (Curhan et al., 2006), we only analyzed the relationship subscale because the other three subscales (i.e., outcome, process, and self) were not directly related to our hypotheses. Additional questions included in our survey asked participants whether their counterparts expressed anger during the negotiation, how believable their counterparts' anger was, whether they themselves expressed anger during the negotiation, and whether they had been instructed to express anger.

Results

To check the effectiveness of our timing of anger manipulation, we asked the sellers to indicate when their counterparts expressed anger during the negotiation. They were asked to choose from three options: "at the beginning", "toward the middle", or "not at all". Ninety-three percent of the sellers in the early anger condition reported that their counterparts expressed anger "at the beginning" of the negotiation. Eighty-two percent of the sellers in the late anger condition indicated that their counterparts expressed anger "toward the middle" of the negotiation. A chi-square analysis was significant, χ^2 (2, N = 26) = 18.83, p < .001, suggesting that our timing of anger manipulation was effective.

To test our hypothesis that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiaiton will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at early stages, we ran a series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in the Feelings about the Relationship across the two conditions, F(1, 29) = 11.05, p = .002, η_p^2 = .26. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition (M = 3.70, SD = 1.37) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the early anger condition (M = 5.34, SD = 1.38), p = .002, η_p^2 = .26.

Next, we turned to Desire for Future Interaction. Results indicated that there was also a statistically significant difference in Desire for Future Interaction across the two conditions, F(1, 29) = 8.06, p =.008, η_p^2 = .21. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition (M = 3.70, SD = 1.82) had less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the early anger condition (M = 5.38, SD = 1.45), p =.008, η_p^2 = .21.[6]

To test the robustness of the timing effects of expressed anger, we also ran a series of analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) with sellers' own expressed anger and believability of buyers' expressed anger as covariates in the model. Results indicated that neither sellers' expressed anger, F(1, 27) = 3.01, p = .09, η_p^2 = .10, nor believability of buyers' expressed anger, F(1, 27) = .27, p = .61, η_p^2 = .01, was significantly associated with Feelings about the Relationship. Importantly, with these two covariates in the model, the timing effect of expressed anger on Feelings about the Relationship remained significant, F(1, 27) = 7.96, p = .009, η_p^2 = .23. The overall model was also significant, F(3, 27) = 5.41, p = .005, η_p^2 = .38. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition (M = 3.79, SE = .36) were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts than those in the early anger condition (M = 5.26, SE = .35), p = .009.

In addition, results indicated that believability of buyers' expressed anger was not significantly associated with Desire for Future Interaction, F(1, 27) = .94, p = .34, η_p^2 = .03. Sellers' own expressed anger was significantly associated with Desire for Future Interaction, F(1, 27) = 6.55, p = .016, η_p^2 = .20, but with these two covariates in the model, the timing effect of buyers' expressed anger on Desire for Future Interaction remained significant, F(1, 27) = 6.20, p = .019, η_p^2 = .19. The overall model was also significant, F(3, 27) = 6.80, p = .001, η_p^2 = .43. As predicted, sellers in the late anger condition (M = 3.83, SE = .39) experienced less desire to interact with their counterparts in the future than those in the early anger condition (M = 5.25, SE = .38), p = .019. Together, the results of these additional analyses provided further empirical support for our hypothesis.

Discussion

Results of Study 2 provided more empirical support for our hypothesis that negotiators who express anger at late stages of a negotiaiton will have worse relational outcomes than those who express anger at

[6] Desire for Future Interaction and Feelings about the Relationship were also highly correlated (r = .88, p < .001).

early stages. Specifically, we found that negotiators were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and experienced less desire to interact with them in the future when their counterparts expressed anger at a late stage (vs. an early stage) of a negotiation. The fact that the negotiation in this study was face-to-face and also offered integrative potential increased our confidence in the finding that the timing of anger expression during a negotiation matters for the expresser from a relational point of view. Whereas negotiators may express their frustration and dismay with some relational impunity at an early stage of a negotiation, doing so at a late stage is particularly risky because it can severely damage the relationship between the parties.

General Discussion

In this research, we examined whether and how the timing of expressed anger influences negotiators' relational outcomes after a negotiation is over. An online study and a face-to-face study provided converging empirical support for our hypotheses that while anger expression (vs. no anger) in negotiation will hurt the expresser's relational outcomes after a negotiation, anger expressed at a late (vs. early) stage will be especially detrimental. Study 1 demonstrated that negotiators in an online distributive bargaining scenario were less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and experienced less desire to interact with them in the future when their counterparts expressed anger than when they did not. The negative effects of expressed anger on the relational outcomes of the expresser were particularly pronounced when anger was expressed at late stages (vs. early stages) of a negotiation. Study 2 provided further empirical support for our hypothesis in that negotiators in a face-to-face, integrative negotiation were also less satisfied with the relationship with their counterparts and had less desire for future interaction when their counterparts expressed anger at a late (vs. early) stage of a negotiation. Together, these findings demonstrate a real relational risk associated with expressing anger in a negotiation, especially when a negotiation has moved past an early stage, which is often characterized by competitive positioning, and into a phase in which more cooperative, deal-making behaviors tend to be the norm.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

Our research makes several contributions to the literature on anger in negotiation. First, our findings extend the theoretical approaches to the benefits and drawbacks of anger expression in negotiation. Past research has shown that negotiation is a dynamic process in which early and late stages have qualitatively different purposes and foci (Olekalns & Weingart, 2008; Prietula & Weingart, 2011), and the frequency and sequencing of strategies and tactics can systematically affect negotiation outcomes (Olekalns & Smith, 2000). Across two studies, we showed that the timing of expressed anger had indeed influenced the relational outcomes of the expresser, such that late anger was more detrimental relationally than early anger. This suggests that negotiators need to be cognizant of not only *whether*, but also *when* they show their frustration and dismay, because expressing anger late in a negotiation could hurt their relational outcomes after the negotiation is over. Importantly, these findings are based on two different negotiation stimuli (i.e., distributive vs. integrative), two different samples (i.e., online working adults vs. full-time MBA students), and two different communication channels (i.e., computer-mediated vs. face-to-face). The consistency of results across the two studies has bolstered our confidence in the generalizability of these findings as they relate to the different types of negotiations, negotiation channels, and negotiators.

Second, our focus on negotiators' relational outcomes as a function of anger expression adds to a growing body of negotiation literature that examines the psychological and subjective aspects of negotiation outcomes that are valued by negotiators (Curhan et al., 2006; Curhan et al., 2010). For example, in addition to the economic outcomes of a negotiation, negotiators also evaluate their negotiation outcomes based on

how the negotiation makes them feel about themselves, about the negotiation process, and about their relationship with their counterparts (Curhan et al., 2006). Because negotiators' relational outcomes can have an impact on their performance in future negotiations (Curhan et al., 2009; Curhan et al., 2010), it is important to investigate how negotiators' relational outcomes may be influenced by the timing of their expressed emotions. Our findings suggest that to maintain a positive long-term relationship, negotiators need to be especially careful about when they express a negative emotion, such as anger, during a negotiation. Whereas showing anger at early stages of a negotiation may be expected as part of posturing and affective persuasion (Adair & Brett, 2005), doing so late in a negotiation runs the risk of being perceived as counter-normative and can damage the long-term relationship between the parties.

Our research also contributes to the practice of negotiation in that we have shown that it is in negotiators' best interests to view their anger expression through a temporal lens, as they would other negotiation strategies and tactics, such as linguistic mimicry (Swaab et al., 2011), threats (Sinaceur & Neale, 2005), and apologies (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005). Because anger is a commonly experienced negative emotion during a negotiation, negotiators may be tempted to express it throughout a negotiation to convey their toughness and disapproval (e.g., of their counterpart's demand). However, our research suggests that, from a long-term, relational point of view, it makes sense for negotiators to be more strategic about when they show anger during a negotiation. While expressing anger at early stages (e.g., at the beginning) of a negotiation could bolster their position by sending a signal of toughness, negotiators are better served relationally by using alternative methods to communicate their frustration at late stages (e.g., toward the end) of a negotiation. For instance, rather than expressing anger toward their counterparts, negotiators may emphasize what all parties stand to gain from a potential agreement, or maybe even firmly point out what they could lose in the event of an impasse (Cialdini, 2007), especially after a considerable amount of time and effort have been devoted to the arduous process of deal making and when a mutually beneficial agreement is within reach.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

While this research broadens the lens through which we understand the influence of expressed anger on relational outcomes in negotiation, our studies have some limitations. First, our proposed mechanism underlying the timing effects of anger on the expressers' relational outcomes was theorized rather than directly tested. In other words, the findings in this research cannot tell us whether it was expectation violation or some other mechanism that could account for the observed effects. For example, it could be that rather than perceiving early or late anger from an expectation violation perspective, negotiators were more affected by the contrast of their counterpart's behavior over time. For instance, Hilty and Carnevale (1993) found that negotiators whose counterparts were tough at first and generous later gave more concessions than when the reverse order of strategies was used. This could have been because the negotiators were relieved or felt a sense of satisfaction about "winning over" a tough counterpart. The same could be true with an early versus late expression of anger. Future research needs to directly test the argument that the reason expressers of late (vs. early) anger in a negotiation have worse relational outcomes is because their counterparts expect them to replace a competitive initial approach with a more cooperative one as the negotiation progresses (Adair & Brett, 2005).

In addition, future research could explore another plausible explanation for the observed effects, which concerns trust repair in the negotiation. Recent findings in the trust literature show that individuals begin an interaction or a relationship with a relatively high level of initial trust (Lewicki et al., 2006). This trust then grows or diminishes as the interaction progresses. Lewicki et al. (2006) suggests that cooperation and predictability from the other party cause trust to grow, and trust is broken when these positive expectations are not met. When an individual enters a negotiation and is met with anger, trust may drop initially. However,

trust may be rebuilt as the angry negotiator calms down and begins to cooperate and work toward a deal. In contrast, if a negotiation starts well, trust grows initially but can be damaged when a negotiator begins to express anger half-way through or toward the end of the negotiation. After the angry spell, there may not be enough time left in the negotiation to rebuild the trust before a deal is made and, as a consequence, relational outcomes may suffer. Future research can help to clarify the precise mechanism underlying our present observations.

Conclusion

Expressing anger in a negotiation can signal toughness and sometimes lead the other party to make larger concessions, but doing so can also hurt the relationship between the parties, thereby putting the expresser's long-term success in jeopardy. Our research suggests that *when* anger is expressed in a negotiation can also influence the expresser's relational outcomes. Compared with expressing anger late in the process, showing anger early in a negotiation can send a strong signal of toughness but at the same time decrease the risk of severe damage to the long-term relationship between parties. Aristotle was right—anyone can become angry. But knowing when to express anger during a negotiation process is essential to preserving important relationships and ensuring long-term success.

References

Adair, W. L., & Brett, J. M. (2004). Culture and negotiation processes. In M. J. Gelfand & J. M. Brett (Eds.), *The handbook of negotiation and culture* (pp. 158–176). Stanford Business Books.

Adair, W. L., & Brett, J. M. (2005). The negotiation dance: Time, culture, and behavioral sequences in negotiation. *Organization Science, 16*(1), 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1040.0102

Adam, H., & Brett, J. M. (2018). Everything in moderation: The social effects of anger depend on its perceived intensity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 76*, 12–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.11.014

Allred, K. G. (1999). Anger and retaliation: Toward an understanding of impassioned conflict in organizations. In R. J. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), *Research on negotiation in organizations*: *Vol. 7*. (pp. 27–58). Elsevier Science/JAI Press.

Allred, K. G. (2000). Anger and retaliation in conflict: The role of attribution. In M. Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice* (pp. 236–255). Jossey-Bass/Wiley.

Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C. P. (1997). The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *70*, 175–187. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1997.2705

Ames, D. R., Flynn, F. J., & Weber, E. U. (2004). It's the thought that counts: On perceiving how helpers decide to lend a hand. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30*(4), 461–474. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203261890

Butt, A., & Choi, J. (2006). The effects of cognitive appraisal and emotion on social motive and negotiation behavior: The critical role of agency of negotiator emotion. *Human Performance*, *19*, 305–325. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327043hup1904_1

Campagna, R. L., Mislin, A. A., Kong, D. T., & Bottom, W. P. (2016). Strategic consequences of emotional misrepresentation in negotiation: The blowback effect. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 101*(5), 605–624. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000072

Cialdini, R. B. (2007). *Influence: The psychology of persuasion.* Collins.

Côté, S., Hideg, I., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2013). The consequences of faking anger in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *49*, 453–463. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.12.015

Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Eisenkraft, N. (2010). The objective value of subjective value: A multi-round negotiation study. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *40*(3), 690–709. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00593.x

Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Kilduff, G. J. (2009). Getting off on the right foot: Subjective value versus economic value in predicting longitudinal job outcomes from job offer negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *94*(2), 524–534. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013746

Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Xu, H. (2006). What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*(3), 493–512. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.493

Curhan, J. R., & Pentland, A. (2007). Thin slices of negotiation: Predicting outcomes from conversational dynamics within the first 5 minutes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(3), 802–811. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.3.802

Davidson, M. N. & Greenhalgh, L. (1999). The role of emotion in negotiation: The impact of anger and race. In R. J. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), *Research on negotiation in organizations*: *Vol. 7*. (pp. 3–26). Elsevier Science/JAI Press.

Filipowicz, A., Barsade, S., & Melwani, S. (2011). Understanding emotional transitions: The interpersonal consequences of changing emotions in negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(3), 541–556. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023545

Fisher, R. J., Grant, P. R., Hall, D. G., Keashly, L., & Kinzel, R. (1990). The development and testing of a strategic simulation of intergroup conflict. *The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied*, *124*, 223–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1990.10543219

Frantz, C. M., & Bennigson, C. (2005). Better late than early: The influence of timing on apology effectiveness. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *41*(2), 201–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2004.07.007

Friedman, R., Anderson, C., Brett, J., Olekalns, M., Goates, N., & Lisco, C. (2004). The positive and negative effects of anger on dispute resolution: Evidence from electronically mediated disputes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *89*(2), 369–376. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.2.369

Hilty, J. A., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Black-hat/white-hat strategy in bilateral negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *55*(3), 444–469. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1993.1039

Johnson, N. A., Cooper, R. B., & Chin, W. W. (2009). Anger and flaming in computer-mediated negotiation among strangers. *Decision Support Systems*, *46*(3), 660–672. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2008.10.008

Lelieveld, G., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2012). Why anger and disappointment affect other's bargaining behavior differently: The moderating role of power and the mediating role of reciprocal and complementary emotions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *38*(9), 1209–1221. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212446938

Lewicki, R. J., Tomlinson, E. C., & Gillespie, N. (2006). Models of interpersonal trust development: Theoretical approaches, empirical evidence, and future directions. *Journal of Management*, *32*(6), 991–1022. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206306294405

Liu, M., & Wang, C. (2010). Explaining the influence of anger and compassion on negotiators' interaction goals: An assessment of trust and distrust as two distinct mediators. *Communication Research*, *37*(4), 443–472. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650210362681

Lount, R. B., Zhong, C. B., Sivanathan, N., & Murnighan, J. K. (2008). Getting off on the wrong foot: The timing of a breach and the restoration of trust. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*(12), 1601–1612. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208324512

Lytle, A. L., Brett, J. M., & Shapiro, D. L. (1999). The strategic use of interests, rights, and power to resolve disputes. *Negotiation Journal, 15*(1), 31–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1999.tb00178.x

Morris, M. W., & Keltner, D. (2000). How emotions work: The social functions of emotional expression in negotiations. *Research in Organizational Behavior, 22*, 1–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-3085(00)22002-9

O'Connor, K. M., & Arnold, J. A. (2001). Distributive spirals: Negotiation impasses and the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84*(1), 148–176. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2000.2923

Olekalns, M., & Druckman, D. (2014). With feeling: How emotions shape negotiation. *Negotiation Journal, 30*(4), 455–478. https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12071

Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2000). Understanding optimal outcomes. *Human Communication Research*, *26*(4), 527–557. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2000.tb00768.x

Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2009). Mutually dependent: Power, trust, affect and the use of deception in negotiation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *85*, 347–365. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9774-4

Olekalns, M., & Weingart, L. R. (2008). Emergent negotiations: Stability and shifts in negotiation dynamics. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, *1*(2), 135–160. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2008.00008.x

Overbeck, J. R., Neale, M. A., & Govan, C. L. (2010). I feel, therefore you act: Intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotion on negotiation as a function of social power. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *112*(2), 126–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.02.004

Pietroni, D., Van Kleef, G. A., Rubaltelli, E., & Rumiati, R. (2009). When happiness pays in negotiation. *Mind & Society*, *8*, 77–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-008-0047-9

Pillutla, M. M., & Murnighan, J. (1996). Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional rejections of ultimatum offers. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *68*(3), 208–224. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1996.0100

Prietula, M. J., & Weingart, L. R. (2011). Negotiation offers and the search for agreement. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, *4*(2), 77–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2011.00074.x

Pruitt, D. G. (1981). *Negotiation behavior*. Academic Press.

Putnam, L. L., & Jones, T. S. (1982). Reciprocity in negotiations: An analysis of bargaining interaction. *Communication Monographs*, *49*(3), 171–191. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758209376080

Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2012). *A 21 word solution*. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2160588

Sinaceur, M., & Neale, M. A. (2005). Not all threats are created equal: How implicitness and timing affect the effectiveness of threats in negotiations. *Group Decision and Negotiation*, *14*, 63–85. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-005-3876-5

Sinaceur, M., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is effective in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *42*(3), 314–322. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.05.002

Steinel, W., Van Kleef, G. A., & Harinck, F. (2008). Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*(2), 362–369. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.12.002

Swaab, R. I., Maddux, W. W., & Sinaceur, M. (2011). Early words that work: When and how virtual linguistic mimicry facilitates negotiation outcomes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47*(3), 616–621. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.01.005

Van Beest, I., & Scheepers, D. (2013). Challenge and threat responses to anger communication in coalition formation. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, *38,* 50–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.005

Van Beest, I., Van Kleef, G. A., & Van Dijk, E. (2008). Get angry, get out: The interpersonal effects of anger communication in multiparty negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*(4), 993–1002. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.02.008

Van Kleef, G. A., & Côté, S. (2007). Expressing anger in conflict: When it helps and when it hurts. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(6), 1557–1569. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1557

Van Kleef, G. A., & Côté, S. (2018). Emotional dynamics in conflict and negotiation: Individual, dyadic, and group processes. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 5*, 437–464. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032117-104714

Van Kleef, G. A., & De Dreu, C. W. (2010). Longer-term consequences of anger expression in negotiation: Retaliation or spillover?. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *46*(5), 753–760. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.03.013

Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. W., & Manstead, A. R. (2004). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*(1), 57–76. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.57

Wang, L., Northcraft, G. B., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2012). Beyond negotiated outcomes: The hidden costs of anger expression in dyadic negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *119*(1), 54–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.05.002

Yip, J. A., & Schweinsberg, M. (2017). Infuriating impasses: Angry expressions increase exiting behavior in negotiations. *Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8*(6), 706–714. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616683021

Author Bios

David A. Hunsaker is Assistant Professor of Management and Organizations at NYU Shanghai with a joint appointment in the Department of Management and Organizations at New York University's Stern School of Business. He received his Ph.D. in Business Administration from the University of Utah David Eccles School of Business. His research interests include emotion and cross-cultural negotiation.

Teng Zhang is Assistant Professor of Management at Penn State Harrisburg. He received his Ph.D. in Business Administration from David Eccles School of Business at the University of Utah. His research examines behavioral ethics & morality, conflict management & negotiation, and social hierarchy in organizations.

Appendix

Full Computer Offers and Text Responses by Conditions

Round	Offer	Control (No Anger)	Early Anger	Late Anger
1	1400	i could take $1400.	WHAT??! Are you kidding me?? u are really making me mad. It is the FIRST ROUND of this negotiation and i am so angry that you would even consider an offer of $[buyer's offer] at this point. That kind of offer ticks me off. i could take $1400.	i could take $1400.
2	1320	That's too low, but i could do $1320.	That's too low, but i could do $1320.	That's too low, but i could do $1320.
3	1280	What about $1280?	What about $1280?	What about $1280?
4	1240	I'll come down to $1240.	I'll come down to $1240.	I'll come down to $1240.
5	1220	Can u agree to $1220?	Can u agree to $1220?	WHAT??! Are you kidding me?? u are really making me mad. It is the FIFTH ROUND of this negotiation and i am so angry that you would even consider an offer of $[buyer's offer] at this point. That kind of offer ticks me off. Can u agree to $1220?
6	N/A	OK, I'll take [buyer's final offer].	OK, I'll take [buyer's final offer].	OK, I'll take [buyer's final offer].