En Hommage: The Contributions of I. William Zartman

Larry Crump [iD],[1] P. Terrence Hopmann,[2] Terrence Lyons[3] and Bertram Spector[4]

1 Griffith University, Brisbane, Qld, Australia
2 Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, U.S.A.
3 George Mason University, Arlington, VA, U.S.A.
4 Center for Negotiation Analysis, Potomac, MD, U.S.A.

Abstract

In this tribute to the 2001 International Association for Conflict Management Lifetime Achievement Award recipient, we recognize and celebrate the work of I. William (Bill) Zartman—a prolific scholar who has offered understanding and insight about conflict, negotiation, and peace throughout a remarkable career. We specifically highlight Zartman's substantial contribution to scholarship, knowledge, and understanding in four areas: international negotiation; negotiation and conflict in Africa; negotiation complexity and its analysis; and his work as a teacher and educator. The article closes by providing Bill Zartman with an opportunity to reflect and impart words of wisdom to negotiation and conflict management students and scholars.

Discord exists as a prominent state of affairs within international relations. It is not surprising, given this observation, that I. William Zartman devoted, and continues to devote, his scholarly and professional life to understanding such phenomena internationally and within Africa specifically, while seeking to develop tools and methods to analyze conflict.

I. William Zartman received the 2001 International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) Lifetime Achievement Award at the Association's 14th annual conference in Cergy, France. At that time, he was the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution and the Director of African Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Many other distinctions accompany Zartman's academic career, including leadership within the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program located at Clingendael in the Netherlands and leadership within the Washington Interest in Negotiation (WIN) group while serving as a founding member of the editorial board of the journal *International Negotiation*—a publication that has supported the negotiation scholarly community since 1996. Professor Zartman also provided leadership in the study of Africa and the Middle East through his work with the Middle East Studies Association, the American Institute of Maghrib Studies, the Tangier American Legation Institute for Moroccan Studies, and the West African Research Association, among other bodies. Zartman helped establish a peacemaking focus within the International Peace Academy (Institute) and initiated negotiation courses within the U.S. State Department's Foreign Service Institute.

Author names are listed in alphabetical order.

I. William Zartman has received numerous research grants (Rockefeller Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, among others), and his publications include books, edited books, academic articles, and others that are too numerous to mention here (see a sample in the reference list). I. William Zartman was bestowed with a Doctorate Honoris Causa from the Catholic University of Louvain, and was honored as a Commander of the Moroccan Alawite Order (Ouissam Alawi). Throughout his career, he has provided leadership on numerous boards, committees, and communities engaged in international relations generally and African relations specifically.

I. William Zartman served on the faculties of the University of South Carolina (where he received a teaching award) and New York University early in his career before serving as a Distinguished Fellow of the US Institute of Peace. He went on to teach at Sciences Po in Paris and the American University of Cairo while lecturing at many universities in North Africa, Europe, and throughout the Arab world. Eventually, his career took him to the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he flourished and also received two teaching awards.

I. William Zartman began his scholarly career by earning a master's degree from the Johns Hopkins University in 1952, a diploma from the University of Copenhagen (on a Fulbright Scholarship) the following year, and a doctorate in international relations from Yale University in 1956.

Zartman, like the other IACM Lifetime Achievement Award recipients, spans boundaries (Gross, 2016), as his scholarship influences diverse disciplines and perspectives on negotiation. While honoring and celebrating the achievements of Zartman, this article illustrates his major scholarly contributions. Bertram Spector discusses Zartman's contributions to the study of international negotiation, Terrence Lyons considers Zartman's contributions to conflict in Africa and the link between the study of African politics and conflict management, Larry Crump explores Zartman's contributions to negotiation complexity and its analysis, and Terry Hopmann reflects on Zartman's work as a colleague, teacher, and educator. Each of these sections highlights and documents the significant scholarly contributions that support our understanding of conflict and negotiation—a field of study that would be much less without the substantial contributions of I. William Zartman.

Along with this article, we have included some photographs of Bill Zartman and his life and work. Some photographs capture Bill in his role as a professional and other are more personal in nature. Some photographs were posed and others depict a fleeting moment in a scholarly journey.

International Negotiation—Bertram Spector

I may have been the first doctoral student in international negotiation that Bill Zartman taught and mentored at New York University in the early 1970s. His classes resonated so well—organizing concepts into theories and bringing theory and practice together—along with his signature motivational push to innovate. As Bill's research assistant for one semester, I was a bit frightened to present my initial data analysis results that did not confirm his hypothesis, but that did not ruin our relationship. And I still remember being greeted by his sly smile as I waited in the department hallway for the decision of my dissertation defense board and was then presented by Bill with a bottle of champagne hidden behind his back as I was addressed as "Dr. Spector" for the first time. His mentorship did not end there; it continued with effective advice on finding a research position in the conflict resolution field in Washington, invitations to include chapters in his earliest edited volumes on international negotiation, encouragement to apply for directorship of the Processes of International Negotiation project in Austria, and continued collaborations on book projects and the *International Negotiation* journal. Being a student of Bill Zartman is a lifetime—and rewarding—endeavor filled with inspiration and continuous support.

But so much more than my personal interactions, I. William Zartman has been central to the development and sophistication of the international negotiation field. Forty years ago, there was a good but

small literature explaining how the negotiation process works. Zartman's contributions have been truly significant, generating many innovative behavioral concepts, theories, and models that have quickly become adopted as the principal organizing framework in the field.

Zartman's theories of the negotiation process can be viewed as a complex multidisciplinary system of learning, adjustment, and change. International negotiation is more than mere reciprocity or a tit-for-tat exchange. As the engine by which expectations are adapted, learning drives changes in strategic choice, modifications in payoffs that are perceived as acceptable, and ultimately, the ability to achieve negotiated agreements (Cross, 1978, 1996). Achieving outcomes is possible only if the protagonists come to think about the problem, the strategies, the context, and "the way out" differently than they did before the negotiation began. Viewing the situation based on new insights, offering viable opportunities to resolve the problem, and motivating the parties to accept altered conceptions of the situation become the central purpose of the entire negotiation enterprise. All of these learned and adaptive cognitions and behaviors are central to the negotiation experience.

How are learning and adaptation incorporated in Zartman's conceptualization of the dynamics among negotiating parties toward a common solution? At the risk of oversimplifying Zartman's key concepts, the following discussion specifically addresses their learning aspects in particular.

1 Zartman's *formula-detail conception* (1977) challenges the concession–convergence model to explain *how* agreements are reached. The search for a negotiation formula—a common understanding of the conflict and its resolution—is an essential exercise in learning. What is considered to be fair and just? How can divergent visions be combined to achieve a group vision of a fair and just outcome? These steps usually require incentives—rewards and punishments—to motivate change, feedback, and adjustment by all parties. Agreement on a formula within which implementing details can be subsequently negotiated is a learning process requiring change to prior attitudes on the part of each protagonist for a convergence of opinion to emerge on shared principles.

2 *Ripeness* (1989; 2000) explains *when* conflicts are ready to be resolved through negotiation. Here, Zartman's writings clearly draw on the basic principles of learning. Negotiation processes are feasible when the parties perceive that they are faced with mutually hurting stalemates or enticing opportunities, and there is a credible way out of the conflict that all parties can see. The stalemates or opportunities are external cues for the protagonists that signal future punishment or reward if the parties seize the moment to pursue negotiation (or not). The consequences of their adjusted behaviors are anticipated in the vision of the negotiated outcome. By averting the punishing stalemate or approaching the beneficial opportunity, the parties mutually reinforce their decision to negotiate versus staying the course.

3 Zartman's challenge to the *cultural explanation* of negotiation (1982 with Berman; 1993) helps to refocus research away from national stereotypes and toward the factors that are truly important in motivating negotiator behavior. He proposes that what is often viewed as culturally determined styles can be more effectively explained in behavioral terms. It is not the Russian-ness or Chinese-ness of the negotiator that determines his or her negotiating style, how tough or soft their strategy, or how creative and flexible their approach. Although cultures do instill certain values, for example, regarding winning or conceding, these values manifest themselves in the negotiation context in ways that can be explained without any reference to cultural underpinnings, thus making the behaviors universal. What Zartman does emphasize as being important in the negotiation process is learned *professional* culture within the international diplomatic and business community. This is where observational learning and common educational experiences play an essential role.

4 Zartman's discussion of how international regimes function, evolve, and adjust over time through *postagreement negotiation processes* is an exposition of the pervasive and continuing negotiation activity that occurs *after* primary negotiated agreements are achieved (Spector and Zartman 2013). Postagreement negotiation is a quintessential learning activity. The functioning of international regimes relies

on continued negotiation to resolve evolving issues and conflicts that arise as a result of change in the situation—successes or failures of the regime, unresolved issues from the initial regime-forming negotiation, or changed environments. Regimes persist—well or badly—because they can adapt to changing circumstances and resolve problems. Postagreement negotiation is the vehicle for sustaining regimes. Here, a wide range of factors influence the process of learning, and feedback loops are a major source of information for the regime system, feeding future agendas, informing local constituencies, and creating new coalitions—all so that the regime can continue to function effectively under changed circumstances.

5 Zartman's analysis of the effects of *power asymmetry* explains how weak states can negotiate effectively with the strong (Zartman & Rubin, 2000). Perceived and actual power asymmetry can be productive for achieving mutually acceptable negotiation outcomes. The weak manage to negotiate effectively with stronger actors, in part, when they are flexible enough to adapt their strategies to the relative power of the other. By framing and reframing the conflict and adjusting counterstrategies and response behaviors, weaker parties in an asymmetric relationship can often learn and succeed in satisfying their interests in negotiation.

6 Zartman's analysis of *preventive diplomacy* examines how negotiation can be applied to reformulate situations to prevent future conflicts (Zartman 2001, 2015a, 2015b). Achieving preventive results through negotiation is often a matter of changing the actors' stakes and attitudes. This process requires adaptation of their expectations about future benefits against future costs. It also demands adjustment of their conceptions of the conflict to a positive-sum future. To accomplish these changes, the winner-take-all motive must be replaced by a reformulated vision of the outcome and how it reflects on each party's interests. This result can only be achieved through a process of open-mindedness and learning, in which the parties progressively adapt and accept a changed view of the future.

7 Zartman examines the distinguishing characteristics between *forward-looking and backward-looking negotiation outcomes* to assess their differential impact on resolving violent conflicts (Zartman & Kremenyuk, 2005). Backward-looking outcomes are based on a concept of justice defined by accountability and retribution, but such negotiated agreements often result in failed outcomes over the long term. Forward-looking results, on the other hand, are based on a definition of justice that values mutual recognition, new formulas, and new relationships; these results appear to have a greater degree of longevity and success. Open-mindedness and willingness to adapt attitudes through learning about the other are the determinants of forward-looking negotiations.

By placing Zartman's principal concepts in the context of learning theory, we begin to see a comprehensive negotiation learning system emerging—one that interrelates and highlights the dynamics of adjustment that are essential in the negotiation activity to bring about solutions in conflict situations. What is most important for negotiation theory is using this learning system to understand how and why adjustment takes place, how the concepts fit together, and how to make that system more efficient.

Viewing Zartman's negotiation concepts within the context of learning theory has practical implications. Inefficient as it is, negotiation may be the best technique that we have to resolve conflicts. As a learning system, the negotiation process evolves to improve and become more efficient over time. Even seemingly intractable conflicts may be resolvable, if the parties can just find ways to adjust their attitudes and behavior through learning about the others' strategies, interests, and limits. Furthermore, by understanding the pace of learning at each juncture in the negotiation process, negotiators can try to engineer the negotiation situation more effectively and use strategies more efficiently to promote adaptations that will lead to a faster convergence of interests. Finally, good negotiators are not necessarily born that way; they can be taught. Negotiation is a learned skill. More needs to be done to find the right channels to bring theory and analysis to practitioners (Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. President Jimmy Carter and Bill Zartman at the Carter Center, Atlanta Georgia, 1995.

Figure 2. President George W. Bush and Bill Zartman at The White House, Washington DC, 2006.

Negotiation and Conflict in Africa—Terrence Lyons[1]

I arrived at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in 1985 and joined Dr. I. William (Bill) Zartman in the doctoral program in African Studies. As I sat through my first seminars with Zartman and read his already extensive research, I approached his body of work as a student of African politics. I therefore studied *International Relations of the New Africa* (1966) and *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib* (1973), and *The Political Economy of Nigeria* (1983) before I read *The Practical Negotiator* (1982).

---

[1]This article draws from Lyons and Khadiagala (2008).

What is so striking to me about Zartman is how fundamental his contributions have been, not only to the field of conflict management, for which he has been justly awarded the *International Association of Conflict Management*'s Lifetime Achievement Award, but also to the field of African politics and international relations. To my cohort in the African Studies program, *Ripe for Resolution* (1989) was a foundational text in African politics while my colleagues in the Conflict Management Program read it as a breakthrough in understanding the timing of successful negotiations. The power of that volume, and with so much of Zartman's extensive catalog, is that it is both.

My reflections here will emphasize Zartman's contribution to African studies, which includes some of his earliest work and remains the focus of his scholarship, as we see in his most recent work on the Arab Uprisings (2015a).

Zartman's scholarship has always sought to create conceptual and analytical linkages, and simultaneously, he has kept his eye on multiple fields of scholarship and practice. A brief illustration of this academic straddling is as follows: He has deployed realist and neorealist assumptions to the study of African international relations (1966), elite theories to understanding leadership in North Africa (Zartman, 1980), and bargaining theories to the analysis of African–European trade relationships (Zartman 1967, 1971). He has bridged the gaps between North and sub-Saharan Africa at a moment when most scholars invoked linguistic and cultural differences to build walls between the two regions. Over the years, with a remarkable intellectual energy, Zartman's academic bridge building has coalesced around the fields of bargaining and conflict management. Conflict management culminated Zartman's efforts to reconcile the subdisciplines and, at same time, has allowed Zartman to transcend the narrow confines of political science by probing the contributions of social psychology and economics.

Zartman continually returned to his passion for and deep knowledge of politics in Africa to develop his theories of conflict management. *Collapsed States* (1995a) was one of the first studies on new forms of post–Cold War conflict and, at the same time and just as importantly, provided a comparative study of African politics through 10 case studies. *Governance as Conflict Management* (1996) and *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts* (Zartman 1999) were studies that focused on conflicts in Africa. *Cowardly Lions* (2005) drew on original research on Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire to advance our understanding of conflict prevention, and *Getting In* (2006) used case studies of African conflicts to consider the initiation of negotiations. His contributions to *Sovereignty as Responsibility* (1996), an important predecessor to the development of the norm of Responsibility to Protect, drew on his knowledge of international relations as well as conflicts in Africa. Grounded solidly in the Africanist and conflict management domains, Zartman's work has drawn inspiration from both, creatively moving back and forth from the two arenas, in an intellectual excursion that has been matched by few of his peers. It is impossible to separate Zartman as a scholar of negotiations and Zartman as a scholar of African politics. He is both. Each informs the other, and each is made stronger by the other.

For Zartman, Africa has always been a laboratory for teasing out big comparative ideas in international relations, comparative politics, and conflict management. This commitment is partly because Africa's diversity offers a wide menu of empirical data that are relevant elsewhere. But more important, Zartman has often counseled against the fallacy of uniqueness, insisting on appraising African events within the frame of conventional ideas and theories. It is by this conviction that he has moved comfortably between the multiple arenas, defying the standard bureaucratic boundaries (particularly between *area studies* and *theoretical studies*) that have dominated the study of political science. By bridging these arenas, Zartman's work has spoken to larger policy audiences. The essence of Zartman's ability to reconcile the subdisciplines and traverse geographical boundaries is the conception that views "Governing is conflict management. . ... Management of conflict means reacting responsively to reduce demands in a manner consistent with human dignity so that the conflict does not escalate into violence" (Zartman 1996, p. 9).

It is important to note that Zartman's conception of Africa included the states of North Africa, regardless of how others divvied up various corners of the world for their convenience. His work on North Africa includes some of his earliest scholarship (beginning in 1963!) and is extraordinary: *Government*

and Politics in North Africa (1963); *Destiny of a Dynasty* (1964); *Morocco: Problems of New Power* (1964); and editor and coauthor of *The Political Economy of Morocco* (1987); *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghreb* (1973); *Elites in the Middle East* (1980); and *Political Elites in Arab North Africa* (1982).

While firmly grounded in a range of theoretical approaches, as well as the literature and cases of Africa, Zartman kept one eye on the policymaking world. Through his work at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies, he has trained a generation of policymakers who have taken up positions of influence in Washington, across Africa, and around the globe. His engagement with policymakers in Washington and elsewhere was based in the belief that good public policies are anchored in good, theoretically informed, and empirically tested social science. Zartman has the rare ability to speak to policymakers and tell them something new, and in a way that they can understand.

Not only was Zartman simultaneously the director of the Conflict Management and the African Studies programs at SAIS, he also founded and led key research institutions in both fields. Many in the *IACM* will know of his work with the Processes of International Negotiation Program, the Washington Interest in Negotiations Group, and his editorial leadership with the journal *International Negotiation*. But he was also the founding Executive Secretary and, later, the President of the Middle East Studies Association, the Founding President of the American Institute for Maghrib Studies, President of the Tangier American Legation Museum Society, and founding Secretary-Treasurer of the West African Research Association.

Zartman's contributions to the field of conflict management and negotiation are matched by few. What is even more extraordinary is that his contributions to African studies are also unequaled. As someone who studies conflicts and conflict resolution in Africa, I have had the great fortune to work with Bill Zartman in the exciting space he has created where both areas of contribution are foundational (Figure 3).

Figure 3. King Mohammed VI of Morocco and Bill Zartman being honored as a Commander of the Moroccan Alawite Order, Washington DC, November 2000

Negotiation Complexity and its Analysis—Larry Crump

I had an opportunity to meet Professor Saadia Touval in Washington DC in 1998, and at the conclusion of our meeting, he casually invited me to attend a WIN monthly gathering. I hesitated briefly and then accepted the invitation. I was meeting with Professor Touval because I sought to understand his theories on mediator neutrality and bias (Touval, 1975, 1985), especially the biased mediator that forms a coalition with one party or another at the negotiation table. His insights would help me to complete my Ph.D.

I was introduced to I. William Zartman just prior to the start of the WIN meeting, and he naturally wanted to know of my academic interests. I briefly described the paper I was about to present at the 1998 IACM Conference in College Park, Maryland (Crump, Glendon, & Gardner, 1998). Zartman said that my ideas sounded useful and that *International Negotiation* was currently looking to develop such ideas further. Right then and there, he asked whether I would consider editing a special thematic issue on negotiation complexity. I was astonished, and a bit naïve, and quietly wondered how appropriate it would be for an academic without a Ph.D. to serve as guest editor for a respected academic journal; however, I shared none of this with anyone. Rather, I said that I was not sure that I had sufficient status for such an honor. Zartman looked at me sideways and said, "What, do you think we are British? We don't care about status—we care about ideas, and you have ideas that should be explored."

Fortunately, the WIN meeting began, which gave me time to collect myself. At the conclusion, I ask Touval what he thought of Zartman's offer. "If you want it, go get it now, as the offer may not be available later," he advised. So I asked Zartman whether he would be willing to work with me to co-edit a special issue. Almost five years and 5,000 emails later, we co-edited a thematic issue in *International Negotiation* entitled "Multilateral Negotiation and Complexity" (Crump & Zartman, 2003). We received so many high-quality submissions that we followed this issue with "Multiparty Negotiation and the Management of Complexity" (Crump, 2003) as the next issue. This experience was a turning point in my academic career.

Although rather approachable, I. William Zartman was—and remains—a scholarly legend. At that time, I knew nothing of his work on Africa (reviewed in the previous section of this article), although I knew that his classic analysis of the mutual, hurting stalemate was based on data from Africa (Zartman, 1985). I was vaguely aware of his contributions to international mediation and the relevance of ripeness theory to conflict resolution (Touval & Zartman, 1985; Zartman, 1985; Zartman & Touval, 1985, 2005). I was familiar with Zartman's work on negotiation analysis (Zartman, 1974, 1988, 1991), but it was his work on negotiation complexity that really fascinated me.

Zartman (1994) argued that negotiation theory, at that time, primarily addressed bilateral negotiations, while the complexity of multilateral negotiations remained untreated. This scholarly project sought to develop analytical tools designed for the characteristics of multilateral negotiations by first presenting two exemplary cases ("Negotiating the Single European Act in the European Community" and "Negotiating the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade") and then using these cases to demonstrate the utility of relevant disciplines, such as political science, economics, social psychology, sociology, organizational studies, and mathematics. All these disciplines discuss coalitions, many discuss power, several discuss decisions, and others discuss leadership (Zartman, 1994).

The overall focus of this study was to answer a single question: How is the inherent complexity of multilateral agreement managed? *International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity* (Zartman, 1994) is a landmark study. In the concluding chapter, complexity and chaos are distinguished by recognizing that complexity is not chaos. Complexity is "the existence of a large number of interacting variables with no dominant pattern or dimension" (Zartman, 1994, p. 218). Multilateral negotiation is organized complexity, whereas the fundamental difficulty with systems of organized complexity is that no general simplifying assumptions apply to them—that is, they do not possess any hidden

simplicity under what is apparently complex. Zartman recognized Simon's (1948) insight that hierarchy is the key to a large category of complex systems, and noted that clarity is blurred, if not eliminated, within multilateral negotiations because of the sovereign equality of actors (Zartman, 1994).

There are many possible approaches to understanding complex social phenomenon (see as examples: Crump, 2010, 2015; Gray, 2011; Watkins, 1999; Weiss, 1993); however, identifying an approach that offers utility is an essential first step in understanding underlying dynamics. Zartman's brilliance is his ability to sift through the many approaches contained within the fields of negotiation and international relations, and then assert that *management of complexity* is the organizing paradigm that can support analysis most effectively.

With definitions for understanding chaos, complexity, and organized complexity developed, Zartman sought to establish the fundamental nature of multilateral negotiation by comparing this social phenomenon to its only relevant counterpart: bilateral negotiation.

First, multilateral means multiparty negotiations, which implies autonomous entities with interests arranged along many sides. Establishing potential trade-offs and concessions becomes difficult with larger numbers. Second, multilateral negotiations are multi-issue in nature—which also applies to a bilateral setting (the difference between multilateral and bilateral settings is one of degrees rather than nature). Third, multilateral negotiations involve multiple roles, including those of leaders, managers, issue promoters, blockers, and followers. Fourth, there is a need to manage three levels of interaction, including many parties, many roles, and multiple issues that intrinsically contain variable outcome values. Finally, Zartman examines multilateral decision making, which is often conducted by consensus rather than by agreement or veto, as in bilateral settings. This dynamic establishes the fundamental characteristics of the multilateral situation, including coalitions and their formation (which makes multiple parties and multiple issues manageable) in a context of rule making rather than the redistribution of tangible goods (Sjöstedt, Spector, & Zartman, 1994; Zartman, 1994; Zartman & Berman, 1982).

Such analysis offers a multilateral negotiation framework that is summarized as follows: "Roles are used to produce party and issue coalitions so that the complexity of the multilateral situation becomes sufficiently manageable for consensus decision making to emerge" (Zartman, 1994, p. 7). Zartman's analysis of critical themes within multilateral negotiation provides the necessary insight to establish some degree of order.

Multilateral negotiation through the management of complexity is a process of achieving organized action that involves *simplification* to make complexity comprehensible, *structuring* to make it manageable, and *direction* to produce a result. The first two are often achieved through coalition building, and the latter through leadership. Managing complexity is a paradigm, not a theory. It is the context for theorizing, but more basically it is a way of thinking about multilateral negotiations to achieve a better comprehension of the full process (Crump & Zartman, 2003; Zartman, 1994, 2003).

Zartman has also offered insights on a related but more fundamental challenge: understanding negotiation process and outcome while advising that a negotiation framework of analysis is key to this effort (Zartman, 1976). Long before a community of negotiation scholars focused on negotiation analysis, Zartman essentially presented "negotiation analysis" as a fundamental organizing principle that could lead to further understanding of the negotiation process and its outcomes.

The basic analytical challenge for all negotiation analysis approaches is to answer a single question: How are negotiated outcomes explained? The negotiation analyst must find dominant, operationalizable variables that provide terms in which the answer can be given. Answers to this question should not just offer useful insights but provide strategies of behavioral rules. Zartman introduced and reviewed five different *families* of analysis to see how each family handled such questions (Zartman, 1988). A detailed review is beyond the scope of this article, but the approaches described include: (a) a structural analysis, such as power as an instrumental element—"does" not "has"; (b) a strategic analysis, which is also structural but is focused on ends not means; (c) a process analysis, or explaining outcomes through a series of concessions determined by some element inherent in each party's position; (d) a behavioral analysis,

with a focus on the social psychology of the parties; and (e) an integrative analysis, which conceives negotiation process as a series of stages (Zartman, 1988).

Throughout Zartman's scholarly career, he has explored the nature and implications of structural analysis, especially in the context of symmetrical and asymmetrical bilateral (power) relations. It is hard to say where the initial ideas began, but Zartman clearly established the foundation for his approach to power as an instrumental element in a review article of three books grounded in game theory (Zartman, 1974). It was an ambitious undertaking, given Zartman's desire to demonstrate the utility of process-based approaches to negotiation analysis.

Zartman outlined the assumptions that underpin bilateral negotiation process, including the following: two parties, a positive-sum encounter, imperfect information, mixed motives, and the assumption that values are alterable and partially unknown. He continued by describing the Nash (1950) model and its deficiency—a focus on outcomes only—and then, returning to the books under review, concluded, "Thus, they can offer hypotheses and support theories, but they cannot explain results" (Zartman, 1974, p. 392).

Shortly thereafter, Zartman injected the variable of power into this discussion. The problem is to conceptualize power as a capability in such a way as to overcome the tautology of relational power by separating process from outcome so that a theory can be established that is more than correlate effects or a causative relation: The theory must tell, in its chosen terms, what it is in one element that causes another (Zartman, 1974): "Power is the ability of one party to cause another to change its behavior in an intended direction" (Zartman, 1974, p. 396, citing Dahl, 1957). Here, Zartman has alluded briefly to the importance of asymmetry in negotiation. Later he established a theoretical framework for the structure of negotiation (Zartman, 1991).

In building a structural theory of negotiation rooted in power, Zartman recognized that the negotiation process begins with a certain distribution of actor characteristics. Whatever the components, their distribution is structural, and structure is determinant, or at least highly influential. Structural analysis, it can be claimed, forms the basis of causal analysis, whereas structure—number of parties, value of potential outcomes, sources of tactical possibilities, and so on—is likely to be determined by extraneous causes (Zartman, 1991).

The parties do the best they can under the circumstances, but once structure is determined, it provides the ingredients to make and explain the outcome. Process follows form, while structural analysis is a skeleton key. Numbers alone do not constitute structure, however, since there is nothing to distribute and nothing to provide the dynamics of movement. That element is furnished by power, the attributes of the two parties that cause movement from opposing positions to a joint position (Zartman, 1991).

I. William Zartman's collective contribution to our understanding of negotiation process and outcome through negotiation analysis, and to our understanding of negotiation complexity as found in multilateral negotiations, remains seminal to our field and inspirational to those of us who follow in his footsteps (Figure 4).

Colleague and Teacher—P. Terrence Hopmann

I have had the privilege of knowing I. William Zartman since the mid-1970s, when we met at a conference focused on negotiation theory and practice. Zartman's work in negotiation theory, especially his three-stage analysis of negotiation: diagnosis–formula–detail, had already achieved prominence in the field. He developed this framework at length in his classic work with Maureen Berman, *The Practical Negotiator,* which I have used in negotiation courses ever since its appearance.

Although we maintained contact, mostly through participation in conferences and papers that I wrote for Zartman's many edited books, we also began to work together in teaching around 2000. Although I was still teaching at Brown University full-time, for personal reasons I began commuting from Providence, Rhode Island to Washington DC most weekends. Bill, as Director of the Conflict Management

Figure 4. Bill Zartman in academic robes, Leiden University, Belgium, November 2014

Program at SAIS, kindly offered me an opportunity to teach a seminar for SAIS MA students on "Conflict Prevention," which I did until 2008. This opened an opportunity to work with Bill in teaching, as well as to observe his management of the SAIS Conflict Management Program that he had created. This relationship further developed when I "retired" from Brown University in 2008 and when Bill allegedly "retired" as Director of the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and I was invited to assume that position, which I held until 2015. Therefore, I have had the opportunity to see another side of Bill Zartman beyond the brilliant and prodigious researcher that has made him so well known throughout the world, but also as teacher and colleague.

When Bill Zartman founded the Conflict Management Program at SAIS in 1983, it was one of the few such programs to be found in a major US institution. Within the broader academic field of conflict analysis, the term "conflict management" is often defined narrowly to refer only to limiting violence in conflicts that seemingly cannot be resolved; however, under Zartman's leadership, the term as used in the program he developed at SAIS has encompassed a larger variety of topics. The program includes two primary foci. The first stems largely from Bill's extensive work on conflict in Africa, but expanded to a global scale. Thus, it deals with the full range of conflict management activities, especially in intrastate conflicts, beginning with prevention of violent conflict; management of escalation; negotiating and implementing cease-fires in the midst of violent conflict; peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement; postconflict stabilization, reconstruction, and peace-building; and finally reconciliation and the institutionalization of peace. A second track includes courses focused on the negotiation process, presenting an overview of international bargaining, negotiation, and mediation, followed by supplemental courses looking at negotiations in different global issue areas: environment, economic relations, and security. It was thus no small undertaking for Bill Zartman to integrate all of these facets of conflict analysis and management into a single, coherent academic program during his 25 years as program director. The program has, for many years, awarded between 30 and 40 MA degrees annually for students who complete a 2-year program of study.

After founding and directing over many decades one of the best programs in international conflict management, Bill Zartman continues to teach long after his alleged "retirement" as director. In addition to being an outstanding teacher in traditional courses, Bill Zartman has also been an innovator in the development of at least four nontraditional teaching programs in conflict management.

First, since 2006 Bill has organized a conflict management field trip to a region of conflict for second-year MA students, and I have led those trips with him since I joined the SAIS faculty full-time in 2008–09. Before my arrival, Bill led two trips to Haiti and one to Northern Ireland, and since 2008 we have jointly led trips to Cyprus, Kosovo, the Philippines (Mindanao) [twice], Tunisia, Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), and Colombia; in 2016, Bill led a trip to Senegal while I took a group to Sri Lanka. In all cases, we seek to observe live conflicts, yet conflicts that pose a minimum risk to our students. We make an effort to meet with all sides in a conflict, which often goes against the preferences of host governments. For example, in Cyprus we spent equal time in the Republic of Cyprus (Greek) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; in Kosovo, we visited Serb majority enclaves; in the Caucasus, we not only visited Baku and Yerevan, but also Stepanakert, capital of the self-proclaimed Artsakh Republic; in the Philippines, we traveled to Cotabato City in Mindanao and met with leaders of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces; and in Colombia, we traveled to rural Chocó Province to meet with victims of violence; in Senegal, Bill took his students to the region of Casamance.

We always meet with a wide range of actors in the conflict, including senior government officials (e.g., President Santos of Colombia), leaders of parliament including those from opposition political parties, leaders of rebel groups (e.g., Chairman Ebrahim Murad of the MILF in the Philippines), representatives of international organizations (e.g., UN agencies operating in Mindanao), leading journalists, scholars, and leaders of nongovernmental and civil society organizations, and groups of IDPs or other victims of conflict (e.g., camps for IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan). Prior to our trip, relevant experts provide briefings in Washington. Upon our return, each student writes a paper with analysis and recommendations on an aspect of the conflict of his or her choosing, which are then compiled in an edited book. The recommendations are then presented at a public briefing session to interested parties in Washington. To the best of my knowledge, this is a unique program that Bill pioneered, giving students an opportunity to apply tools of analysis learned in the classroom to an actual, ongoing conflict, analyzing drivers of the conflict, alternative narratives presented by parties to the conflict, and proposing policy recommendations directed both to participants in the host country and to international actors engaged in the conflict management process from outside.

A second academic experience pioneered by Bill Zartman since 2002–03 is called "PeaceKidz." In this credit course, a select group of Conflict Management concentrators teach a voluntary course in applied conflict management, typically at a middle school located in some of the poorest, most violence-affected areas of Washington, DC. This requires the students to apply conflict management tools to assist young teenagers to cope with violence that they encounter almost daily in their lives, including bullying and other acts of violence in their schools, domestic violence at home, and overt and sometimes even deadly violence in the communities where they live. This course serves to remind SAIS students that violence is not just something that occurs in faraway places like Africa or the Middle East, but on the streets of many neighborhoods in the capital city of one of the wealthiest countries in the world, while also sensitizing them to the feelings of insecurity and marginalization experienced by minorities residing anywhere in the world. Over the years, the students in this course have developed a curriculum, revised and updated by each year's class, which forms the foundation for their teaching program. The curriculum is based on presenting "three R's" of conflict management: "recognize, respect, and resolve," distilling essential lessons from the conflict management literature in ways that are meaningful to teenagers from poor, violence-prone neighborhoods and schools that often lack the resources of middle- and upper-class institutions in other parts of the Washington region. Finally, the program offers the SAIS students an opportunity to "give back" to the community something of what they have learned while studying there,

learning how to convey lessons of applied conflict management to teenagers who have not had the educational advantages of SAIS students.

Bill Zartman's third innovative contribution to teaching is a seminar simply titled "Negotiation Practicum." This seminar employs the methodology that he and Maureen Berman used in researching their classic text, *The Practical Negotiator,* in which they developed findings based on multiple interviews with outstanding practitioners in the field of international negotiation and mediation. In this seminar, prominent negotiators and mediators, mostly from the Washington area, are invited to meet with Professor Zartman and his students to participate in a give and take discussion of the primary lessons they have learned from their long practical experience in international negotiations. These practitioners are generally active or retired senior officials of the US State Department or other national embassies in Washington; international organizations such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization of American States, the World Bank or the IMF; senior fellows at many of the Washington-area think tanks such as the US Institute for Peace, the Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for International and Strategic Studies; and permanent or visiting faculty at Washington-area universities who previously served in a practitioner role. Students are able to interact informally, in a small group setting, with some of the world's most prominent international negotiators and mediators, to explore with them "off the record" ways in which their experience relates to theoretical principles of conflict management, providing a unique opportunity for theory to confront practice, as experienced by some of the world's best-known practitioners of the art of international negotiation and mediation.

Finally, Bill has organized students, initially in a class format, to develop and write a conflict management "toolkit," available to the general public at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/content/conflict-management#external-resources. After the toolkit was mostly developed, Bill has continued to encourage MA students voluntarily to make additions and emendations in order to keep the toolkit as up-to-date as possible. This provides a unique opportunity for students to apply what they have learned in the classroom to designing a manual of advice for practitioners in international conflict management in many diverse venues. It highlights Zartman's commitment to turning academic theory and knowledge into useful advice to reduce violence wherever possible across the globe.

In conclusion, this symposium has highlighted Bill Zartman's contributions to theory and knowledge about international negotiations and conflict management, especially in Africa, through his extensive research and voluminous publications. His contribution to the field is reflected not only in his own work, but in authors whom he has cultivated to contribute to his many edited volumes, and also in the many research scholars whom he has mentored, two of whom—Bert Spector and Terrence Lyons—have contributed to this symposium. No single individual has contributed as much as Bill Zartman, both in defining the fields of conflict management and negotiation and in producing sophisticated empirical studies of incredible breadth of subject matter and analytical depth. The breadth and openness of his scholarship and teaching are remarkable. Bill often has very strong views about many topics and frequently expresses them forcefully. At the same time, he is open, tolerant, and accepting of so many alternative views of the world—about theory, method, and practice of international negotiation—and this openness accounts for the central role that he has come to play in the field of international negotiation globally. As the French philosopher Blaise Pascal observed in his *Pensées,* one's "greatness is not displayed by standing at one extremity, but rather by touching both ends at once and filling all the space between."

In addition, as I have emphasized, Bill has also contributed to the education of countless students, especially SAIS MA and PhD students, who have taken his ideas, wisdom, and knowledge into their own practice of conflict management and international negotiations as scholars, teachers, diplomats, as well as grassroots workers in NGOs and CSOs across the world. It is in recognition of the magnitude and breadth of his contributions to our field that we who have known him and admire him join in saluting the contributions by this giant in the field of international conflict management and peace-building (Figure 5).

Reflections from I. William Zartman

I am deeply touched by the preceding testimonies, and at the same time pleased, that what I have tried to do has gotten across. I think my business is to make my small contribution to making a better world, as my religious duty and academic opportunity, notably by learning how conflict can be managed, especially through the process of negotiation. I do think we have a better grasp of the negotiation process than we did 60 years ago, in part because of that very focus on process rather than just on outcomes. My colleagues seem to think I made a contribution in that direction and I am pleased.

Yet humbled too, because I am afraid that the advances in conceptualization and understanding have not sufficiently penetrated the people who practice it. A recent symposium at the US Institute of Peace featured a former assistant secretary of state who stated that all negotiation is sui generis. That means that there is nothing learned and nothing to be learned about the process of which each encounter is a part. The diagnoses of this failing have been clear and correct: Analysts often do not write in terms accessible to practitioners, practitioners have a hard time using concepts that are necessarily sharper than this fuzzy world, and they work with "money in the bank," as one of them put it well: They do not have time to read and gain new knowledge and understanding but act on the basis of reflexes and experience.

But it is not sufficient to leave it at that. Analysts cannot hide behind the excuse that "we can't make them read," because we can. It is a matter of presenting findings from ordered and interpreted data in a relevant and accessible form, not popularizing but targeting and applying, and arguing their applicability in particular contexts. Too often, we do barricade ourselves in our well-constructed, well-decorated, and well-crenellated ivy towers and marvel that people do not listen to us. *Science* magazine, organ of the AAAS, is constantly writing about how to bring science to the operative attention of policymakers.

Yet that said, there is public testimony to the impact of conceptual analysis that is as publicly eloquent as my colleagues: The terms and even the concepts of formula, mutually hurting stalemate, ripe moment, sovereignty as responsibility, and state collapse now appear frequently in the press and in diplomat's accounts—and usually even correctly! Something is indeed getting across. The Gap that Alexander

Figure 5. Bill Zartman, Terry Hopmann, and Students at "No Man's Land" —the Green Line, Nikosia Cyprus, January 2009.

George (1993) wrote about is somehow being more frequently bridged. For one example, "state collapse" gave rise to an enormous industry of analyzing state failure (Zartman, 1995b), a larger and looser term. Sovereignty as responsibility was the first expression that has taken off as the responsibility to protect (R2P) (Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild & Zartman 1996). For another, in 2012 the new head of Policy Planning in State called me in to ask, skeptically, what is this thing called ripeness, but in 2015 when I interviewed him for reasons of the failure of the UN mediators (Hinnebusch & Zartman 2016), he answered off the cuff, "Of course, the situation wasn't ripe." The next step, of adopting a policy to make it so, was another matter.

Doubtless another problem is that conceptualists often do not have a firm grounding in world areas, politics, and cultures. In diving, it is important to know how to leave the springboard but also important to know how to hit the water. The US Navy brought me to my areas of specialization, Africa and the Middle East and Morocco specifically. I have never left it, but have always tried to combine it with my doctoral discipline, international relations. Arnold Wolfers, who taught me IR at Yale, exclaimed that he never expected to have a book on African politics and relations dedicated to him (Zartman, 1966). Working deductively gives form to one's inquiry but working deductively first provides grounding for the form. Without the two, area specialization becomes almanac and anecdote collecting, and conceptualization becomes footless and cloudy.

As an end my thankful comments, I would like to stake out a personal identification not only as a conceptualist with area attachments and policy concerns but also as an institutionalist (with an acronymic tweak). It is basic and important to be a learner (I never left college!) and to convey learning as a teacher, and to produce students who can carry the field still better than I and students I learn from, trying out concepts and looking for responses. If I listen to myself in class, it is above all to see how it lands and

Figure 6. Danièle and Bill Zartman, New York, September 2012.

what response it evokes; it is in the hope of inspiring learners, appliers, successors. The bibliography at the end of this piece includes quite a number of edited books: I like editing because it brings together a community of colleagues, often younger ones, to further their development, and expand a community of knowledge.

But beyond personal relations, I think it is important to give a more endurable framework to valued interests and giving it a name (nothing exists until it has a name, preferably catchy)—like the Conflict Management (ConMan) Program at SAIS, or the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program first at IIASA and now Clingendael, or the Washington Interest in Negotiation (an admittedly intermittent institution!) (WIN) Group, or the Tangier American Legation Institute for Moroccan Studies (TALIM, means education in Arabic), or the American Institute for Maghrib Studies (AIMS), or the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), or the Zartman Family Annual International Reunion (Z-FAIR), to end on a serious note with a light touch (Figure 6).

References

Cross, J. (1978). Negotiation as a learning process. In I. W. Zartman (Ed.), *The negotiation process: Theories and applications* (pp. 29–54). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Cross, J. (1996). Negotiation as adaptive learning. *International Negotiation*, *1*(1), 153–178. https://doi.org/10.1163/157180696x00331

Crump, L. (2003). Multiparty negotiation and the management of complexity. *International Negotiation*, *8*, 189–195. https://doi.org/10.1163/157180603322576103

Crump, L. (2010). Strategically managing negotiation linkage dynamics. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, *3*(1), 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2009.00046.x

Crump, L. (2015). Analyzing complex negotiations. *Negotiation Journal*, *31*(2), 131–153. https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12086

Crump, L., Glendon, I., & Gardner, M. (1998). A multiparty negotiation framework: Building bridges across multiparty domains. Paper presented at the 11th annual conference of the International Association for Conflict Management, College Park, MD.

Crump, L., & Zartman, I. W. (2003). Multilateral negotiation and the management of complexity. *International Negotiation*, *8*, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1163/138234003769590640

Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. *Behavioral Science*, *2*, 201–215. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303

Deng, F., Kimaro, S., Lyons, T., Rothchild, D., & Zartman, I. W. (1996). *Sovereignty as responsibility: Conflict management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

George, A. L. (1993). *Bridging the gap: Theory and practice in foreign policy*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Gray, B. (2011). The complexity of multiparty negotiations: Wading into the muck. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, *4*(3), 169–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2011.00078.x

Gross, M. A. (2016). Legacies of scholars, scholarship and praxis from the International Association for Conflict Management: Celebrating a lifetime of achievements. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, *9*, 271–273. https://doi.org/10.1111/ncmr.12079

Hinnebusch, R., & Zartman, I. W. (2016). *UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From Kofi Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi*. New York: International Peace Institute.

Lyons, T., & Khadiagala, G. M. (2008). Conflict management and African politics. In T. Lyons & G. M. Khadiagala (Eds.), *Conflict management and African politics: Negotiation, mediation and politics* (pp. 1–5). London, UK: Routledge.

Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. *Econometrica*, *18*, 155–162. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266

Simon, H. (1948). Architecture of complexity. In H. Simon (Ed.), *The sciences of the artificial*. Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press.

Sjöstedt, G., Spector, B. I., & Zartman, I. W. (1994). The dynamics of regime-building negotiations. In B. I. Spector, G. Sjöstedt, & I. W. Zartman (Eds.), *Negotiating international regimes* (pp. 3–19). London, UK: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijoff.

Spector, B. I., & Zartman, I. W. (Eds.) (2003). *Getting it done: Post-agreement negotiations and international regimes*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.

Touval, S. (1975). Biased intermediaries: Theoretical and historical considerations. *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, *1*(1), 51–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836710396848

Touval, S. (1985). The context of mediation. *Negotiation Journal*, *1*, 373–378. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1985.tb00327.x

Touval, S., & Zartman, I. W. (Eds.) (1985). *International mediation in theory and practice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Watkins, M. (1999). Negotiating in a complex world. *Negotiation Journal*, *15*, 245–270. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1999.tb00195.x

Weiss, S. E. (1993). Analysis of complex negotiations in international business. *Organisational Science*, *4*, 269–300. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.4.2.269

Zartman, I. W. (1963). *Government and politics in North Africa*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Zartman, I. W. (1964a). *Destiny of a dynasty: The search for institutions in Morocco's developing society*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Zartman, I. W. (1964b). *Morocco: Problems of new power*. Redwood City, CA: Atherton Press.

Zartman, I. W. (1966). *International relations in the new Africa*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Zartman, I. W. (1967). Africa as a subordinate state system in international relations. *International Organization*, *21*, 545–564. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300013308

Zartman, I. W. (1971). *Politics of trade negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1973). *Man, state, and society in the contemporary Maghrib*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Zartman, I. W. (1974). The political analysis of negotiation: How who gets what and when. *World Politics*, *26*, 385–399. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009936

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1976). *The 50% solution*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Zartman, I. W. (1977). Negotiation as a joint decision making process. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *21*, 619–638. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277702100405

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1980). *Elites in the Middle East*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1982). *Political elites in Arab North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt*. New York, NY: Longman.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1983). *The political economy of Nigeria*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Zartman, I. W. (1985). *Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1987). *The political economy of Morocco*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Zartman, I. W. (1988). Common elements in the analysis of the negotiation process. *Negotiation Journal*, *4*(1), 31–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1988.tb00444.x

Zartman, I. W. (1989). *Ripe for resolution* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, I. W. (1991). The structure of negotiation. In V. A. Kremenyuk (Ed.), *International negotiation: Analysis, approaches, issues* (pp. 65–77). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Zartman, I. W. (1993). A skeptic's view. In G. O. Faure & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), *Culture and negotiation*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1994). *International multilateral negotiation: Approaches to the management of complexity*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1995a). *Collapsed states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1995b). *Elusive peace: Negotiating an end to civil wars*. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1996). *Governance as conflict management: Politics and violence in West Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (1999). *Traditional cures for modern conflicts: African conflict resolution "medicine"*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (2000a). *Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Zartman, I. W. (2000b). Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and beyond. In P. Stern & D. Druckman (Eds.), *International conflict resolution after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (2001). *Preventive diplomacy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Zartman, I. W. (2003). Conclusion: Managing complexity. *International Negotiation*, *8*(1), 179–186. https://doi.org/10.1163/157180612x630929

Zartman, I. W. (2005). *Cowardly lions: Missed opportunities to prevent deadly conflict and state collapse*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Zartman, I. W. (Ed.) (2015a). *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the shadow of the Intifadat*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Zartman, I. W. (2015b). *Preventing deadly conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Polity.

Zartman, I. W., & Berman, M. (1982). *The practical negotiator*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Zartman, I. W., Berton, P., & Kimura, H. (Eds.) (1999). *International negotiation: culture, actors, structures, and processes*. New York, NY: St Martin's.

Zartman, I. W., & Deng, F. (2002). *A strategic vision for Africa: The Kampala movement*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Zartman, I. W., Deng, F., et al. (1995). *Sovereignty as responsibility*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Zartman, I. W., & Kremenyuk, V. (Eds.) (2005). *Peace versus justice*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Zartman, I. W., Maundi, M. O., Khadiagala, G. M., & Nuamah, K. (2006). *Getting in: Mediators' entry into the settlement of African conflicts*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Zartman, I. W., & Rubin, J. (Eds.) (2000). *Power and negotiation*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Zartman, I. W., & Touval, S. (1985). International mediation: Conflict resolution and power politics. *Journal of Social Issues*, *41*(2), 27–45. https://doi.org/10.1163/157180612x630929

Zartman, I. W., & Touval, S. (Eds.) (2005). *International cooperation*: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Larry Crump is the Deputy Director of the APEC Study Centre at Griffith University (Australia) and during the preparation of this article served as a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research (Germany). Larry specialises in the study of complex phenomena including global, regional and bilateral negotiations. Most recently, Larry has contributed to the development of negotiation theory from a temporal perspective through the use of negotiation linkage methodology in using precedents strategically, and through the use of turning points methodology to identify negotiation dynamics within distinct international environments.

P. Terrence Hopmann is Professor of International Relations and former director of the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Brown University, where he directed the Global Security Program in the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and served as Chair of the Political Science Department. His research has focused on international negotiations, and he is author of *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. He has also researched international security institutions, especially the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its role in conflict management in post-communist regions since the end of the Cold War.

Terrence Lyons is an associate professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, and director of its doctoral program. Lyons received his PhD from Johns Hopkins University under the supervision of I. William Zartman. He was a Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Program Director at the Peace Research Institute Oslo. His publications include: *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (1996, co-written with Zartman); *Conflict Management and*

African Politics: Negotiation, Mediation, and Politics (2008, co-edited with Gilbert M. Khadiagala); *Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks* (2012, co-edited with Peter Mandaville); and *Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace* (2005).

Bertram Spector is Editor-in-Chief of *International Negotiation* journal, Executive Director of the Center for Negotiation Analysis, and Technical Director at Management Systems International in Arlington, Virginia. He conducts research on international negotiation processes, especially focused on post-agreement negotiation and psychological impacts. For over twenty years, he has directed international development programs that support governments and civil society organizations in reducing corruption in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Ukraine and Vietnam, among others. He is author of *Negotiating Peace and Confronting Corruption* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press 2011) and co-editor with Bill Zartman of *Getting It Done: Post-agreement Negotiation and International Regimes* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press 2003).