

Feeling and Deceiving: A Review and Theoretical Model of Emotions and Deception in Negotiation

Redona Methasani ¹, Joseph P. Gaspar,² and Bruce Barry³

1 School of Business, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, U.S.A.

2 School of Business, Quinnipiac University, Hamden, CT, U.S.A.

3 Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, U.S.A.

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Correspondence

Redona Methasani,
Management Department,
School of Business, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, CT, U.S.A.;
e-mail: redona.methasani@
uconn.edu.

Abstract

Deception is pervasive in negotiation, and emotions are integral to the deception process. In this article, we review the theoretical and empirical research on emotions and deception in negotiation and introduce a theoretical model. In our review of the research, we find that emotions profoundly influence the decision to use deception. We also find that although negotiation is inherently interpersonal, theoretical and empirical research on deception has focused on the *intrapersonal* effects of emotion. For this reason, we integrate theory and research on the *interpersonal* effects of emotions into research on deception and propose a model—the *Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model*—that relates the emotions of a counterpart to the deception decisions of a negotiator. Our review and model expands our understanding of the important role of emotions in the deception decision process and provides a theoretical foundation for future research in the intrapersonal and interpersonal perspectives.

Negotiation is an inescapable form of social interaction in business, organizations, and interpersonal situations. Individuals negotiate the purchase of a new home, lawyers negotiate the terms of contracts, executives negotiate mergers and acquisitions, and human resource managers negotiate compensation packages. The prevalence of negotiation in everyday life has made it a focus of more than four decades of theoretical and empirical research in the fields of management, psychology, and economics (for a review, see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Li, Plunkett Tost, & Wade-Benzoni, 2007; Tsay & Bazerman, 2009).

Negotiation often entails conflict, and negotiators often experience mixed motives. That is, they are motivated to be both cooperative—to not to endanger the negotiation—and competitive—to further their self-interest. Negotiators also depend on their counterparts for information and must resolve a “dilemma of trust” and a “dilemma of honesty” (Kelley, 1966; Lewicki, 1983; Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999). Taken together, these characteristics of negotiation make it a potential “breeding ground” for deception (Tenbrunsel, 1998, p. 330).

In this article, we review and integrate theoretical and empirical research on emotions and deception in negotiation. Deception is pervasive in negotiations (Barry & Rehel, 2014; Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000; Koning, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Steinel, 2010; Lewicki, 1983; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Steinel, Utz, & Koning, 2010; Tenbrunsel, 1998), and emotions are integral to the decision to use deception (e.g., Barry, 1999; Fulmer, Barry, & Long, 2009; Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013; Gino & Shea, 2012; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). Accordingly, a key

assumption in our article is that integral and incidental emotions are important influences on a negotiator's decision to use deception.

Prior research has focused mainly on the *intrapersonal* effects of emotions (e.g., see Van Dijk et al., 2008). In particular, this research has focused on the effect of a negotiator's own emotions on his or her decision to use deception. The failure to explore the *interpersonal* effects of emotions on deception is an important and striking limitation in the literature, as negotiation is inherently interpersonal, and "a particularly important dimension of the negotiation is the emotions of counterparts" (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013, p. 171).

For this reason, we integrate theory and research on the *interpersonal* effects of emotions into research on deception and propose a theoretical model—the *Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model (IEDM)*—to explain the influence of a counterpart's emotions on a negotiator's decision to use deception. We propose that a counterpart's emotions influence a negotiator's decision to use deception through inferential and emotional contagion processes. We also propose that emotional deception is a common tactic in negotiation that is used to strategically mislead others, and that a negotiator's perceptions of a counterpart's use of emotional deception will influence his or her decision to use deception. In all, our model expands our understanding of the important role of emotions in the deception decision process and provides a theoretical foundation for future research on emotion and deception.

Our article is organized as follows. First, we define deception and discuss the tactical use of it in negotiation. Second, we review and integrate theoretical and empirical research on emotion and deception in negotiation and related contexts. Third, we introduce our theoretical model, which explores emotion and deception from an interpersonal (negotiator-counterpart) perspective. In this process, we present the assumptions of our model and develop a series of testable propositions that emerge from it. Finally, we discuss the contributions of our model to negotiation research and practice.

Deception in Negotiation

Definition of Deception

Deception provides negotiators with an opportunity to maintain a competitive edge while feigning cooperation. In this sense, deception is a strategy available to negotiators to manipulate an "opponent's logical and inferential processes, in order to lead the opponent to an incorrect conclusion of deduction" (Lewicki & Stark, 1996, p. 78).

Prior research has defined deception as the intentional misrepresentation of information or emotions (Boles et al., 2000; Fulmer et al., 2009; Gaspar, Levine, & Schweitzer, 2015; Lewicki, 1983; Murnighan, 1991). Deception can occur passively (through omission) or actively (through commission) (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). In contrast to deception through omission, which entails the concealment of information or emotions, deception through commission entails the expression of false information or emotions (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Integrating this research, we arrive at this definition of deception: A negotiator engages in deception when he or she "either verbally or implicitly, deliberately leads another. . .to falsely believe something that the deceiver believes is false but warrants as true" (Barry & Rehel, 2014, p. 344).

Prior research has also differentiated between deception that harms targets and deception that benefits targets. In this article, we focus on self-interested deception (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy, 2005; Levine & Schweitzer, 2014, 2015). In contrast to prosocial or altruistic deception, self-interested deception benefits deceivers at the expense of targets (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014, 2015). The use of self-interested deception is common in negotiations, as the negotiation context provides both the opportunity and the incentive for negotiators to use self-interested deception and increase their profits or payoffs (Bazerman et al., 2000).

The Deception Decision Process

Early research on deception adopted an economic perspective to understand the deception decision process. In this perspective, the decision to use deception is a product of a negotiator's perceptions of the costs and the benefits of deception (Becker, 1968; Lewicki, 1983). In support of this perspective, Tenbrunsel (1998) found that economic incentives predictably influence deception, and Akerlof (1970) demonstrated that sellers of used cars will lie if it is in their self-interest.

However, the traditional economic perspective provides an incomplete description of the decision to use deception. For instance, empirical research has shown that people often demonstrate an aversion to lying in interpersonal contexts—even when the costs of lying are low relative to the benefits (Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe, & Johannesson, 2009)—and that people use deception only when they cannot meet their goals through the use of truthful and honest communication (e.g., instrumental deception; see Koning et al., 2010). This research reveals that the decision to use deception is much more complex than that reflected in traditional economic models of the deception decision process.

For this reason, more recent research has taken a behavioral perspective to explore the psychology of deception. This research explores the individual and contextual factors that make negotiators more or less likely to use deception (for a recent review of this literature, see Barry & Rehel, 2014; Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013). In particular, this research finds that characteristics of negotiators, the negotiation structure, and the negotiation process all influence the decision to use deception. Most recently, research in this perspective has explored the role of emotions in the deception decision process.

Emotions and Negotiation

Emotions are affective responses that are intense, short in duration, and characterized across several dimensions (Schwarz, 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Emotions include integral emotions, which are triggered by the negotiation itself, and incidental emotions, which are triggered by a prior, unrelated situation (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004). Importantly, emotions differ from moods in that moods are milder, more enduring, and less complex (i.e., positive or negative; Barry, 1999; Forgas, 1992, 1998; Parrott, 2001). The distinction between emotions and moods is important, as emotions of the same valence may influence perceptions and decisions differently (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).

Emotions are integral to negotiation (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006) and “inherent to negotiation and social conflict” (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, p. 57). Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) found that the mere prospect of negotiating elicits emotions, and related research indicates that emotions pervade the negotiation process (Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Barry & Oliver, 1996). As Barry (1999) notes, “As an impetus for and byproduct of social conflict, emotion is potentially central to understanding how individuals think about, behave within, and respond to bargaining situations” (p. 94).

Theoretical Approaches to Emotions and Deception

Emotions profoundly influence the decision to use deception, and recent theoretical research has explored the role of emotions in the deception decision process. We review two theoretical models that undergird much of the empirical research on emotions and deception. These include the Emotion Deception Model (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013) and the expanded cost-benefit model of deception.

The Emotion Deception Model

Gaspar and Schweitzer (2013) proposed the Emotion Deception Model to understand the influence of emotions on the deception decision process. Their model predicts that current emotions and anticipated emotions directly and indirectly influence deception decisions.

Current Emotions: Incidental and Integral

In Gaspar and Schweitzer's (2013) model, current emotions (incidental and integral) are the emotions that negotiators experience in the moment they decide to use deception. These emotions can influence deception through their effects on the content of thought or process of thought. For instance, negotiators may ask "How do I feel about this?" (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003) and then use their current emotions to influence their decision to use deception. Further, the emotions that negotiators experience may influence their recognition (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995) of the opportunity to use deception in the negotiation (e.g., negotiators who experience anger may be more likely to recognize the opportunity to use deception).

Anticipated Emotions

In Gaspar and Schweitzer's (2013) model, anticipated emotions are the emotions that negotiators expect to experience. In this model, negotiators reflect on the emotional consequences of deception—"How will I feel about this?"—and then use their expectations to inform their deception decisions. However, the emotional forecasting process is imperfect and prone to bias. For instance, negotiators may expect to experience negative emotions, but may actually experience positive emotions (e.g., they may experience a "cheater's high" if their deception is undetected; Ruedy, Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013), or may expect to experience positive emotions, but may actually experience negative emotions (e.g., they may experience anxiety or guilt if their deception is detected; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).

The Expanded Cost-Benefit Model

Lewicki (1983) proposed a cost-benefit model of deception. In this model, the choice to deceive reflects a negotiator's perception of the costs and the benefits of deception. The costs of deception include the likelihood of detection and the consequences of detected deception, and the benefits of deception include the payoff from the use of deception. In this model, negotiators will use deception if the perceived benefits of deception exceed the perceived costs of deception.

Although the cost-benefit model proposed in Lewicki (1983) fails to consider the influence of emotions, more recent research has expanded this model to explore the role of emotions in the deception decision process. This research predicts that emotions influence deception through their effects on negotiators' perceptions of the costs and benefits of deception.

In a recent paper, Gaspar and Schweitzer (2016) proposed that feelings of confidence influence perceptions of the costs of deception and the decision to use deception. In a series of studies, they found that feeling confident leads negotiators to think that their counterparts are less likely to detect their deception. Because negotiators are more likely to use deception if they think that their counterparts are less likely to detect it, Gaspar and Schweitzer (2016) also found that more confident negotiators are more likely to use deception than less confident negotiators.

Moran and Schweitzer (2008) also integrated emotions into Lewicki's (1983) cost-benefit model and proposed that emotions influence perceptions of the costs and the benefits of deception. In contrast to Gaspar and Schweitzer (2016), Moran and Schweitzer (2008) focused on the influence of emotions on perceptions of the psychological benefits and costs of deception. In an empirical study, they found support for their prediction that envy influences negotiators' perceptions of the psychological costs and benefits of deception and makes them more likely to use deception.

Empirical Findings on Emotions and Deception

The models discussed above provide the foundation for much of the empirical research on emotions and deception in negotiation. This research finds that emotions profoundly influence the decision to use deception. In particular, this research has largely focused on three emotions: envy, anger, and anxiety. We review the research on these and other emotions.

Envy

Envy is a negatively valenced emotion that arises from upward social comparisons (Parrott & Smith, 1993; Salovey & Rodin, 1984). People experience feelings of envy when they are “confronted with a superior other, in a domain that is important to their self-view, and if the other was initially similar to them” (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2012, p. 197). Because social comparisons are common in interpersonal contexts such as negotiations, negotiators often experience intense feelings of envy (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008).

In a series of studies, Moran and Schweitzer (2008) found that feelings of envy influence the use of deception in negotiations. In one study, they found that envy makes people more likely to intend to use deception in a negotiation and that perceptions of the psychological costs and the psychological benefits of deception mediates this relationship. In a second study, Moran and Schweitzer (2008) explored the relationship between envy and deception in a negotiation task that had real monetary stakes. In this study, they again found that envy makes people more likely to use deception in negotiations.

The proposition that feelings of envy make people more likely to use deception in negotiation is further supported in experimental research on deception in organizations. For instance, Gino and Pierce (2009a) found that feelings of envy make people more likely to use deception to increase their payoffs, and Gino and Pierce (2009b) found that envy makes people more likely to use deception to hurt those they envy—even if this deception harms their financial self-interest.

Anger

Anger is a negatively valenced, conflict-oriented emotion that commonly arises in interpersonal contexts (Averill, 1983). People experience feelings of anger when they perceive that others are responsible for a negative event (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990).

In a recent article, Yip and Schweitzer (2016) found that anger increases the use of deception in negotiations. In particular, they found that people who experience anger are more likely to use deception in a negotiation than people who experience neutral emotion or sadness. They also found that empathy mediates the relationship between anger and deception. The results of their studies are especially interesting, as their studies explored incidental emotions—emotions that are unrelated to the negotiation and therefore normatively irrelevant to the deception decision process.

Olekalns and Smith (2009) also explored the influence of anger on deception. In an experimental study, they found that anger and mutuality of dependence interact to influence deception in negotiations. More specifically, they found that compared to negotiators in mutually dependent dyads, negotiators in nonmutually dependent dyads who express high anger use more deception through commission than negotiators who express low anger.

In the only paper (to the best of our knowledge) to explore the interpersonal effects of emotions on deception, Van Dijk et al. (2008) found that expressions of anger influence the inferences that negotiators make and their decision to use deception. In their studies, participants inferred that angry counterparts had high limits and, in an effort to reduce these limits, sent them incorrect information. Their research indicates that the use of anger can “backfire” if the context provides the opportunity for negotiators to use deception (e.g., if information is asymmetric).

Anxiety

Anxiety is “a state of distress and/or physiological arousal in reaction to stimuli including novel situations and the potential for undesirable outcomes” (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011, p. 44). In appraisal models of emotions, anxiety is a negatively valenced emotion that is associated with the appraisals of uncertainty and situational control, such that anxious people believe that they cannot influence the outcome of an event (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In these models, anxiety indicates the presence of a threat and triggers a “flight” (rather than “fight”) response (Marks & Nesse, 1994).

In a recent paper, Kouchaki and Desai (2015) found that individuals experiencing anxiety are more likely to use deception. In particular, they found that people who experience anxiety are more likely to use deception to mislead their clients, managers, employers, and the public than people in a neutral state. They also found that perceptions of a threat to the self mediate this relationship, such that anxiety increases threat perceptions and, in turn, makes people more likely to use deception.

Olekalns and Smith (2009) also explored the influence of anxiety on deception and found that anxiety and mutuality of dependence interact to influence deception in negotiations. In an experimental study, they found that compared to negotiators in mutually dependent dyads, negotiators in nonmutually dependent dyads who express high anxiety use more deception through omission than negotiators in nonmutually dependent dyads who express low anxiety.

Olekalns and Smith (2009) also found that anxiety and level of dependence interact to influence deception. In particular, they found that compared to negotiators in high dependence dyads, negotiators in low dependence dyads who express high anxiety use more deception through omission than negotiators in low dependence dyads who express low anxiety.

Other Emotions

Empirical research on deception has also explored the emotions of sadness, optimism, and “positive feelings.” However, empirical research on these emotions is limited, and some of the research on these emotions has used these as (mere) reference emotions (i.e., to compare the relative influence of other emotions on deception). For these reasons, our review of the empirical research on these emotions is necessarily limited.

In a recent study, Yip and Schweitzer (2016) found that people who experience sadness are less likely to use deception in negotiations than people who experience anger. Sadness is a negatively valenced emotion that is associated with the appraisal of situational control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Their research demonstrates the importance of exploring the effects of specific emotions—rather than general (positive or negative) feelings—on the deception decision process. Indeed, although anger and sadness are both negatively valenced emotions, their research indicates these emotions can influence deception differently.

Although much of research on emotions and deception has explored the effects of negative emotions, some research has explored the effects of positive emotions. This research has focused on the emotion (or psychological characteristic predicated on emotion; see Peterson, 2000, for a discussion) of optimism and positive feelings. Tiger (1979) described optimism as “a mood or attitude associated with an expectation about the social or material future—one which the evaluator regards as socially desirable, to his [or her] advantage, or for his [or her] pleasure” (p. 18).

Olekalns and Smith (2009) found that expressed optimism is related to a decrease in the use of deception through commission. They also found that expressed optimism and mutuality of dependence interact and that expressed optimism and level of dependence interact to influence deception through commission. More specifically, they found that compared to negotiators in mutually dependent dyads, negotiators in nonmutually dependent dyads who express low optimism use more deception through commission than negotiators in nonmutually dependent dyads who express high optimism. Further, they found that compared to negotiators in low dependence dyads, negotiators in high dependence dyads

who express low optimism use more deception through commission than negotiators in high dependence dyads who express high optimism.

In this same study, Olekalns and Smith (2009) also explored the influence of “positive feelings” (rather than specific positive emotions) on deception. They found that expressed positive feelings and level of dependence interact to influence deception through omission. In particular, they found that compared to negotiators in low dependence dyads, negotiators in high dependence dyads who express low positive feelings use more deception through omission than negotiators in high dependence dyads who express high positive feelings.

The Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model (IEDM)

Our review of the literature indicates that theoretical and empirical research on emotions and deception has taken an *intrapersonal* perspective (for a rare exception, see Study 2 in Van Dijk et al., 2008). Research adopting the intrapersonal perspective has focused on the influence of a negotiator’s own emotion on his or her decision to use deception. Although this research provides important insights into the role of emotions in the deception decision process, it fails to consider that negotiation is inherently interpersonal and that “a particularly important dimension of the negotiation is the emotions of counterparts” (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013, p. 171). Indeed, emotions have important social functions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999) and influence not only those who experience emotions, but also those who interact with those who experience emotions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

In this article, we take an *interpersonal* perspective to more fully understand emotions and deception in negotiation. In particular, we propose a model—the *Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model (IEDM)*—to understand the effects of a counterpart’s emotions on a negotiator’s decision to use deception (see Figure 1). This model integrates prior research to understand the interpersonal effects of emotions on the decision to use deception.




Figure 1. The Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model (IEDM).

In our model, we propose that a counterpart's emotions influence a negotiator's decision to use deception through inferential and emotional contagion processes (Propositions 1 and 2). We focus on four emotions that are pervasive in negotiations—anger, anxiety, happiness, and gratitude (e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a)—and relate each of these emotions to a negotiator's decision to use deception (Propositions 3–6). We also propose that emotional deception is a common tactic in negotiation that is used to strategically mislead others (Proposition 7) and that a negotiator's perceptions of a counterpart's use of emotional deception will influence his or her decision to use deception (Proposition 8).

Model Assumptions

The predictions in this article are based on important assumptions related to human nature. We assume that people are self-interested and, as such, will use deception to mislead others (Akerlof, 1970; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hobbes, 1950; Pfeffer, 1981). However, we also assume that people generally prefer to negotiate honestly, such that they will use deception only when they are unable to realize their desired outcomes through honest communication and action (Koning et al., 2010). These assumptions find support in recent research showing that people demonstrate some aversion to the use of deception—even when the economic benefits of deception exceed the economic costs of deception (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Koning et al., 2010; Lundquist et al., 2009; Van Beest, Steinel, & Murnighan, 2011)—and prefer to avoid situations that offer them the opportunity to deceive others (Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). In this “instrumental perspective” on deception, “bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) will refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals” (Koning et al., 2010, p. 57).

Emotional Contagion and Inferential Processes

In the IEDM, the emotions of a counterpart influence deception decisions through inferential and emotional contagion processes. In this sense, the IEDM is consistent with related research on emotions and decision making in everyday life. For instance, Van Kleef (2009) proposed a conceptual model to understand the effect of emotions in social interactions. In this model, the emotions of others influence the decisions that people make. In this article, we extend his model to understand the effect of emotions on a particularly important decision in negotiation contexts: the decision to use deception.

From an inferential perspective, emotions are an important source of information (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). In particular, negotiators can use their counterparts' emotions to make inferences that inform their deception decisions. These inferences include those related to their counterparts' competence, trustworthiness, competitiveness, limits, and aspirations. Indeed, empirical research finds that negotiators often use their counterparts' emotions as a source of information. For instance, Van Kleef et al. (2004a) found that negotiators infer that angry counterparts have higher limits than happy counterparts, and Van Kleef et al. (2006) found that negotiators infer that regretful or guilty counterparts claimed too much and that disappointed or anxious counterparts claimed too little. In our model, negotiators use their counterparts' emotions to make inferences that inform their deception decisions.

Proposition 1. *Negotiators use their counterparts' emotions to make inferences that inform their deception decisions.*

From an emotional contagion perspective, emotions are “contagious” in interpersonal interactions. This transfer of emotions may occur through processes that involve mirror neuron activity, mimicry, and afferent feedback (Van Kleef, 2009). In the context of negotiations, negotiators can “catch” the

emotions of their counterpart (Barsade, 2002; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2010). In support of this, Barsade (2002) found that expressions of positive and negative emotions are contagious in interpersonal interactions, and Filipowicz, Barsade, and Melwani (2011) and Kopelman et al. (2006) found that emotions are contagious in negotiations.

Emotional contagion is particularly important in the context of negotiation, as the emotions that transfer from counterparts to negotiators can directly influence their negotiation decisions and outcomes. For instance, Filipowicz et al. (2011) found that emotional contagion influences outcomes in distributive negotiations. Further, in research that is particularly relevant to this article, Van Kleef and Côté (2007) found that the transfer of negative emotions from counterparts to negotiators motivates negotiators to compete and retaliate. In our model, the emotions of counterparts can transfer to negotiators and influence their deception decisions.

Proposition 2. *The emotions of counterparts can transfer to negotiators and influence (a) their integral emotions and (b) deception decisions.*

Anger and Deception

Anger is pervasive in negotiation and interpersonal contexts and profoundly influences negotiation decisions and outcomes (Allred et al., 1997; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). For instance, counterparts' expressions of anger influence the competitiveness of negotiators (Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006) and the concessions that they make (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). These expressions also influence the inferences that they make (Van Kleef et al., 2004a) and their decision to retaliate (Allred, 1999; Daly, 1991).

From an inferential processing perspective, negotiators who confront angry counterparts may fear that impasse is likely. This concern may reflect the fact that negotiators perceive angry counterparts as strong, tough, dissatisfied, and unwilling to concede (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a; Wang, Northcraft, & Van Kleef, 2012). Further, the perception that impasse is likely can lead negotiators to make larger concessions—and lower demands—to reduce the risk of impasse (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). However, deception provides another means for negotiators to reduce the risk of impasse and increase their payoffs. In this perspective, negotiators may use deception to gain an advantage against their counterpart. This prediction is supported in Van Dijk et al. (2008). In their study, participants in an economic game inferred that angry counterparts had high limits and, to reduce these limits, sent them incorrect information.

From an emotional contagion perspective, negotiators may “catch” the emotions of their counterparts (Barsade, 2002; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). In this perspective, negotiators who confront angry counterparts may also experience feelings of anger, and these feelings may make them more likely to use deception for many reasons. First, anger makes people focused on retaliation (Allred, 1999; Frank, 1988; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), and the desire to retaliate increases the perceived benefits and reduces the perceived costs of deception (Yip & Schweitzer, 2015). Second, anger makes negotiators more competitive (Forgas, 1998; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), and competitive negotiators are more likely to use deception than cooperative negotiators (Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005). Third, anger makes people perceive less risk in their decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and people are more likely to use deception when their perception of the risk of deception is reduced (Becker, 1968; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Lewicki, 1983). Finally, anger reduces interpersonal trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), and negotiators are more likely to use “defensive deception” when trust in their counterpart is reduced (Tenbrunsel, 1998).

Proposition 3. *Negotiators are more likely to use deception when they confront angry counterparts than neutral counterparts.*

Anxiety and Deception

Anxiety is a particularly important emotion to understand, as it is pervasive in negotiations and organization (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). In a recent survey, 25% of respondents indicated that they suffer from persistent and excessive anxiety, and 56% of respondents indicated that anxiety impacts their performance (ADAA, 2006). Further, Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) found that the mere anticipation of negotiating elicits an intense feeling of anxiety in negotiators and that this feeling is more pronounced than other positive and negative emotions.

From an inferential processing perspective, negotiators who interact with anxious counterparts may infer that their counterparts are inexperienced, incompetent, and incapable of negotiating effectively. In particular, negotiators may infer that these counterparts are likely to make concessions, select poor negotiation tactics, and accept low offers (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006). These inferences may influence negotiators' decision to use deception, such that negotiators who interact with anxious counterparts may feel that they can negotiate more effectively than their counterparts, can persuade their counterparts to make concessions, and can effectively use strategic negotiation tactics to realize an "upper hand" in the negotiation (Sullivan et al., 2006). For these reasons, negotiators who interact with anxious counterparts may feel that deception is unnecessary (Koning et al., 2010; Lundquist et al., 2009).

Negotiators who interact with anxious counterparts may also infer that the negotiation is at risk. In particular, they may fear that their counterparts will experience a "flight" response (Marks & Nesse, 1994), such that their counterparts exit the negotiation prior to reaching an agreement (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011) or select mediation rather than continued negotiation (Arnold & O'Connor, 2006). In this situation, deception is particularly risky, as detected deception harms interpersonal trust and can further endanger the chance of an agreement (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). For this reason, negotiators who interact with anxious counterparts are more likely to use lower-risk, nondeceptive tactics that reduce the risk of impasse rather than high-risk, deceptive tactics that increase the risk of impasse.

Proposition 4. *Negotiators are less likely to use deception when they confront anxious counterparts than neutral counterparts.*

Happiness and Deception

Happiness is a positively valenced emotion that reflects the appraisals of certainty and individual control (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The expression of happiness influences concessions from counterparts, such that happy negotiators receive fewer concessions in negotiations (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Further, the experience of happiness influences the selection of negotiation tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and the mere anticipation of happiness influences the decision to initiate a negotiation and the outcomes of that negotiation (Kong, Tuncel, & Parks, 2011).

From an inferential processing perspective, negotiators who confront happy counterparts may infer that the negotiation is going well and that their counterparts find the negotiation process and their potential outcomes acceptable. Negotiators may also infer that their counterparts' limits are low and that their counterparts are not particularly tough (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). For these reasons, negotiators who interact with happy counterparts are unlikely to feel the need to use deception.

From an emotional contagion perspective, negotiators who confront happy counterparts may experience happiness themselves. In a recent study, Van Kleef et al. (2004a) found that happiness is contagious in negotiations, such that negotiators who interacted with happy counterparts experienced more happiness than negotiators who interacted with neutral counterparts. Because happiness enhances cooperation (Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, & Shack, 1990), reduces conflict (Baron et al., 1990; Barsade, 2002), and

increases interpersonal trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), negotiators who interact with happy counterparts are unlikely to use deception.

Proposition 5. *Negotiators are less likely to use deception when they confront happy counterparts than neutral counterparts.*

Gratitude and Deception

Gratitude is a positive, socially oriented emotion (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001). It is elicited in interpersonal contexts and expressed toward other people or entities (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; McCullough et al., 2001). People feel grateful when they receive a benefit from a person and think that this person intentionally provided the benefit to enhance their well-being (McCullough, Tsang, & Emmons, 2004; McCullough et al., 2001).

Gratitude is an important emotion in negotiations (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Indeed, negotiation is inherently interpersonal (Bazerman et al., 2000) and often elicits feelings and expressions of gratitude. For instance, in negotiating the purchase of a new car, a customer may be grateful to learn that a salesperson has gone out of his way to locate a vehicle with a highly desired feature. In response to this, the customer may express gratitude, and this expression may influence the remainder of the negotiation. In particular, we contend that it may influence the salesperson's decision to use deception and mislead the customer.

From an inferential processing perspective, negotiators who interact with grateful counterparts may infer that the negotiation is going well, that their counterparts are pleased with the process, and that the negotiation is likely to end in an agreement. Further, they may infer that their counterparts will reciprocate (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008; Gouldner, 1960) to fulfill the "gratitude imperative" (Schwartz, 1967). This reciprocity may take the form of concessions, cooperation, or higher offers. Because people often demonstrate an aversion to lying in interpersonal contexts (Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist et al., 2009) and use deception only when they cannot meet their goals through the use of truthful and honest communication (Koning et al., 2010), the expression of gratitude makes deception unnecessary.

From an emotional contagion perspective, negotiators who interact with grateful counterparts may also experience feelings of gratitude. This is important, as gratitude induces people to engage in prosocial behavior (Grant & Gino, 2010; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; McCullough et al., 2001; Tsang, 2006)—even when such behavior is costly (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). It also induces cooperation (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, & Dickens, 2010) and a long-term relationship focus (Bartlett, Condon, Cruz, Baumann, & DeSteno, 2012; DeSteno, Li, Dickens, & Lerner, 2014). In the emotional contagion perspective, gratitude is thus a "moral reinforcer," such that grateful negotiators are more likely to engage in cooperative, prosocial behavior than competitive, deceptive behavior.

Proposition 6. *Negotiators are less likely to use deception when they confront grateful counterparts than neutral counterparts.*

We recognize that negotiators who interact with grateful counterparts may develop an inflated moral self-concept and that this inflated moral self-concept may increase their use of deception. In fact, prior research on moral licensing indicates that people who engage in moral behavior experience an increase in their moral credentials and feel licensed to behave immorally in related and unrelated situations (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). In the context of negotiations, this research suggests that generosity may elicit a moral self-licensing effect (Monin & Miller, 2001), such that negotiators feel licensed to behave in "morally dubious ways" (Merritt et al., 2010, p. 354). However, we expect a stronger effect for Proposition 6, as this proposition is

supported from both an emotional contagion and inferential processing perspective. This proposition is also more consistent with our assumptions related to human behavior (see Model Assumptions).

Emotional Deception

In our final propositions, we focus on the use of emotional deception and the effects of perceived emotional deception. In particular, we propose that emotional deception is a common tactic in negotiation that is used to strategically mislead others (Propositions 7) and that a negotiator's perceptions of a counterpart's use of emotional deception will influence his or her decision to use deception (Proposition 8).

The use of emotional deception—that is, the intentional misrepresentation of emotions—is a common tactic in negotiations (Andrade & Ho, 2009; Fulmer et al., 2009; Kopelman et al., 2006; Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001; Van Kleef & Sinaceur, 2013). Indeed, negotiators often “game” (Andrade & Ho, 2009) their true emotions. In a recent study, Andrade and Ho (2009) found that participants in an ultimatum game strategically used their emotions to mislead their counterparts and influence the outcome of the task. In this and related research, negotiators strategically use their emotions as a “tactical gambit” to mislead others (Barry, 1999, p. 93).

Proposition 7. *Emotional deception is a common tactic in negotiation that is used to strategically mislead others.*

In many negotiations, the misrepresentation of emotions strongly influences the negotiation process and negotiation outcomes. In an important study, Côté, Hideg, and Van Kleef (2013) found that inauthentic expressions of anger reduce interpersonal trust and lead to an increase in demands from counterparts. However, more recent research indicates that the effect of the strategic use of emotions is more complex. For instance, research demonstrates that the strategic use of anger is an effective negotiation strategy—but only if counterparts have poor alternatives to the negotiation (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006) or the cost of impasse is high (Van Dijk et al., 2008).

In this article, we predict that perceived emotional deception will reduce interpersonal trust and increase the use of deception. In research that is particularly relevant to our approach, Krumhuber et al. (2007) found that people use the emotions of others to inform their trust decisions. In their studies, participants were more likely to trust counterparts who displayed an authentic smile than an inauthentic smile or a neutral facial expression (Krumhuber et al., 2007). In related research, Côté et al. (2013) also found that emotions inform trust decisions, such that participants were more likely to trust emotionally neutral counterparts than those who misrepresented their emotions. Because the use of emotional deception reduces interpersonal trust, and negotiators are more likely to use deception when they distrust their counterparts (Olekalns & Smith, 2009; Tenbrunsel, 1998; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998), negotiators' perceptions of their counterparts' use of emotional deception are likely to increase their use of deception. Indeed, people often use “defensive deception” when they distrust their counterpart (Tenbrunsel, 1998), as the use of defensive deception is easy for negotiators to rationalize. In fact, in the mutual trust perspective, deception is morally permissible “when grounds for trust are absent” (Dees & Cramton, 1991, p. 5).

Proposition 8. *Negotiators are more likely to use deception when they perceive the use of emotional deception from their counterpart than when they do not perceive the use of emotional deception from their counterpart.*

Discussion

In this article, we review the theoretical and empirical research on emotions and deception in negotiation and introduce a theoretical model linking these. In our review of the research, we find that emotions

profoundly influence the decision to use deception. Although negotiation is inherently interpersonal, theoretical and empirical research on deception has focused on the *intrapersonal* effects of emotion. To address this limitation, we propose the *Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model (IEDM)*. Our model integrates research on the interpersonal effects of emotions and research on deception and relates the emotions of a counterpart to the deception decisions of a negotiator. In all, this model expands our understanding of the important role of emotions in the deception decision process.

Theoretical Contributions

We highlight five principal contributions to negotiation theory and research. First, we provide a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical research on emotions and deception in negotiation. Deception is pervasive in negotiations, and emotions are integral to the deception decision process. This article expands our understanding of the important role of emotions in the deception decision process.

Second, this article integrates research on the interpersonal effects of emotions (Morris & Keltner, 2000) and research on deception. In this process, it expands upon prior theoretical models of the deception decision process and provides a foundation for empirical research. Although Gaspar and Schweitzer (2013) proposed that the emotions of negotiators influence their deception decisions, their model fails to consider the influence of a counterpart's emotions on this process. This is an important limitation, as negotiation is inherently interpersonal and the emotions of counterparts are an important dimension of negotiation (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013). In this sense, the IEDM integrates the interpersonal effects of emotions into extant theoretical models to provide a more complete and nuanced understanding of the deception decision process.

Third, this article integrates research on the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotions. For instance, the emotional contagion predictions in the IEDM relate interpersonal effects—that is, the emotion transfers from a counterpart to a negotiator—to intrapersonal effects—the transferred emotion then influences the decision of the negotiator to use deception. Neither theoretical nor empirical research on emotions and deception has considered these relationships.

Fourth, this article provides a foundation to understand *how* the emotions of others influence the decision to use deception in negotiations. In the IEDM, we predict that the emotions of a counterpart influence a negotiator's deception decisions through inferential and emotional contagion processes. From an inferential perspective, negotiators use their counterparts' emotions to make inferences that inform their deception decisions. From an emotional contagion perspective, the emotions of a counterpart are "contagious," such that they can transfer to negotiators and influence their deception decisions. In this sense, this article extends prior research on the interpersonal effects of emotions (Van Kleef, 2009) to an unexplored, although particularly important, decision: the decision to use deception in negotiation.

Finally, the predictions in this article raise important questions, and the implications of some of these contradict common prescription. For instance, negotiators are often instructed to maintain a "poker face, smiley face, or rant 'n'rave" (Thompson et al., 2001, p. 139). However, these recommendations are derived from empirical studies that often preclude the use of deception. For this reason, these recommendations fail to consider that the expression of emotions may also influence the use of deception (Van Dijk et al., 2008). This article prompts the need for researchers to reconsider some of the recommendations offered in prior research.

Future Directions

The model we developed here represents a starting point for inquiry into the role of emotions in the deception decision process. We recognize several avenues of work that would logically follow. First, although negotiation is interpersonal (Bazerman et al., 2000), empirical research on deception in

negotiations has focused on the intrapersonal effects of emotion (for an exception, see Van Dijk, 2008). For this reason, empirical research is needed to more fully understand the interpersonal effects of emotions and the implications of the IEDM.

Second, research is needed to explore the influence of so-called moral emotions (for a review, see Tangney et al., 2007), such as guilt, shame, pride, happiness, moral disgust, and embarrassment on deception in negotiation. Although research on deception in negotiation has explored many emotions, these and other emotions (e.g., disappointment and sadness) remain largely unexplored. Future research could look to research in the fields of business ethics (e.g., Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006; Warren & Smith-Crowe, 2008), judgment and decision making (e.g., Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015), negotiation and conflict management (e.g., Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012, 2013; Sinaceur, Kopelman, Vasiljevic, & Haag, 2015), and moral psychology (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001, 2003) for insights into the possible effects of these emotions on deception in negotiation.

Third, future research should consider the interactive effects of emotions, negotiator attributes, and the negotiation structure and process on the use of deception. For instance, the cognitions, motivations, and emotions of negotiators may interact to influence the deception decision process. Further, the negotiation structure (e.g., elasticity of information; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002), the negotiation process (e.g., conflict frames; Halevy, Chou, & Murnighan, 2012; Pinkley, 1990), and emotions may interact to influence the deception decision process.

Fourth, future research should consider the influence of emotions on other forms of deception such as prosocial deception. In contrast to self-interested deception, prosocial deception benefits the targets of deception (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014, 2015). Theoretical and empirical research is needed to understand the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotions on the decision to use prosocial deception in negotiation and related contexts.

Finally, the model developed in this article focuses on deception in the context of negotiations. Future research is needed to extend the predictions in the IEDM to interpersonal contexts other than negotiation. For instance, future research could explore the effects of a patient's emotions on a medical doctor's decision to use prosocial deception or a client's emotions on a financial advisor's decision to use self-interested deception.

Conclusion

In this article, we review the theoretical and empirical research on emotions and deception. Further, we integrate theory and research on the interpersonal effects of emotions and research on deception and propose a model—the *Interpersonal Emotion Deception Model (IEDM)*—that relates the emotions of a counterpart to the deception decisions of a negotiator. This article and model expand our understanding of the important role of emotions in the deception decision process and provide a theoretical foundation for empirical research.

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Redona Methasani is a third-year doctoral student in the University Of Connecticut School of Business. Her research focuses on emotions and decision making in negotiations and organizations. She received her BS from the Penn State University and MBA from Carnegie Mellon University.

Joseph P. Gaspar is an assistant professor of management in the School of Business at Quinnipiac University. His research focuses on deception, ethics, and decision making. His research has been published in journals such as *Business Ethics Quarterly*, *the Journal of Business Ethics*, and *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*.

Bruce Barry is Brownlee O. Currey Jr. Professor of Management at the Owen Graduate School of Management at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. His research areas include ethics, negotiation, conflict, justice, and workplace rights. He is a past president of the International Association for Conflict Management, and is presently editor in chief of *Business Ethics Quarterly*.