negotiation and conflict management research

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The Power to Oblige: Power, Gender, Negotiation Behaviors, and Their Consequences

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Abstract

This study experimentally examined how power and gender affect negotiation behaviors and how those behaviors affect negotiated outcomes. One hundred and forty-six dyads, in four combinations of power and gender, negotiated compensation agreements. In line with gender stereotypes, male negotiators were more dominating and females more obliging and somewhat more compromising. However, partially challenging the common association of power and masculinity, high-power negotiators were less dominating and more collaborating, obliging and avoiding than their low-power opponents. Generally, feminine and high-power behaviors induced agreement while masculine and low-power behaviors enhanced distributive personal gain. The study also assessed patterns of behavioral reciprocity and used sophisticated analytic tools to control for dyadic interdependence. Therefore it helps to elucidate the negotiation process and the role that power and its interplay with gender play in it.

The negotiation process involves a delicate balance between advocating for oneself and advocating for the other (Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Thompson & Nadler, 2002). Negotiators are induced to compete for a better outcome but to collaborate to avoid impasse and achieve an outcome at all (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). This balance between agentic behaviors (advocating for self) and communal ones relates to gender and to power. The current study revisits the association between masculinity and power (Hong & van der Wijst, 2013) and challenges it, by carefully examining its applicability to negotiators' actual behaviors during a simulated business negotiation. In the next sections, we will review the literature on gender, power, the ways in which they interact, and their relevance to negotiation behaviors.

Gender Roles in Negotiation

Agentic versus communal traits are related to gender. Self-reported measures, as well as studies on stereotypes, show that communality (e.g., being kind, sensitive to the needs of others) is considered more feminine (Bem, 1974; Halpern & Parks, 1996; Spence & Buckner, 2000; Spence & Helmreich, 1978, 1980). Agentic traits make up two distinct dimensions: dominance (e.g., forceful, competitive, in charge) is perceived as more masculine, and competence (e.g., active, independent), which used to be attributed more to men, has become fairly gender neutral (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Spence & Buckner, 2000).

These stereotypes form prescriptive gender roles that create different social expectations from men and women (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Eagly, 1987). Therefore, assertively negotiating

one's interests and claiming value from the opponent is harder for women than for men, because it violates prescriptions of feminine communality, a violation that is likely to raise social resistance (Bowles et al., 2007; Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Hong & van der Wijst, 2013). Indeed, negotiation literature generally portrays men as more competitive, task-oriented, and achieving better outcomes than women (Hong & van der Wijst, 2013; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). Men's stronger inclination for assertive negotiation is thought to contribute to the gender gap in income (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Barron, 2003; Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Bowles et al., 2007; Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007).

However, gender effects in negotiation are attenuated or even reversed under various circumstances, because female negotiators are sensitive to contextual factors (Bowles & Flynn, 2010; Walters et al., 1998). For example, females' competitiveness and performance are enhanced when they are given informed goals (Bowles et al., 2005), when they advocate on behalf of another person, which is essentially a communal act (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2005), and when induced to prove wrong the stereotype that they are not good negotiators (Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Kray, Reb, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001).

As part of this growing literature on contextual factors (Bowles et al., 2005), the current study revisited the role of power position in negotiation and explored its effects on male and female negotiator behaviors. In the next section, we will review relevant literature on power and gender and argue that despite some previous research, expecting power to eliminate gender-typed behavior is too simplistic.

Power and Gender in Negotiation

The prevailing concept of power in organizational and negotiation literature comprises the ability to control consequences, to achieve one's goals, and particularly to get others to serve one's goals, even against their own preference (Coleman & Vronov, 2005; Dahl, 1968). Power is virtually inherent in conflicts and negotiations; it strongly affects negotiators' alternatives and their available or appropriate behaviors and strategies (Coleman, 2006). Moreover, power is a theoretically important moderator of gender patterns, because men's competitiveness and negotiation performance have been often attributed to their increased social power, compared with women, even in studies that did not directly manipulate or measure power (e.g., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles & Flynn, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Watson, 1994).

A widely accepted argument is that, because men tend to hold positions of higher authority than women and to control greater economic resources (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004), they are implicitly associated with more power than women (Eagly, 1987) and display behaviors that are appropriate to their power positions (Aguinis & Adams, 1998; Gonzaga, Keltner, & Ward, 2008; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990; Lott, 1990; Tuval-Maschiach, 2000). Bowles et al. (2007) go as far as arguing that gender roles originate in power differences: "Prescriptive sex stereotypes stem from men's higher status as compared to women within society. . . Displays of masculine dominance by women pose a direct challenge to the gender status hierarchy. . ." (p. 86).

The rationale in which masculinity is tantamount to power had been supported in research that focused on negotiated outcomes; it generally showed that females with situational power (e.g., through position, BATNA, or induced psychological sense of power) achieved equal or better outcomes compared with males (Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Hong & van der Wijst, 2013; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Kray et al., 2001, 2004; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Watson, 1994; Watson & Hoffman, 1996). However, assuming that power would surely eliminate gender differences in negotiator behaviors is too simplistic, as we will subsequently elaborate.

First, we note that studies on the interactive effects of gender and power on negotiator behaviors (rather than outcomes) were limited in number, and findings are inconclusive. Watson (1994) reported

a few studies in which power induced dominating behavior and diminished gender effects (see also Putnam & Jones, 1982; Watson & Hoffman, 1996, 1992), but a more recent meta-analysis of studies comparing female and male negotiators' competitiveness reported a gender difference (males more competitive) that was not moderated by power in the relevant studies (Walters et al., 1998). In view of that, we extend our review to include research on the role of power in various human interactions.

A prevailing view is that power frees its holders from submission and induces assertiveness. The *approach or inhibition theory of power* (AITP; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) argues that power increases the inclination to actively seek rewards, without worrying about potential threats, and with reduced attention to others; the lack of power induces the opposite—consideration of threats, inhibition of action, and careful attention to others. Research shows, for example, that powerful participants are less inhibited and worse judges of their interaction partners' emotion (Gonzaga et al., 2008), and that they tend to take the lead in competitive situations (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Some scholars go further to suggest that power corrupts (Kipnis, 1972; Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976). Power was associated with increase in self-interested performance at the expense of others (Georgesen & Harris, 1998), and in negotiation, it was associated with coercion and with unethical behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001; Tjosvold, Johnson, & Johnson, 1984). According to the above, we would expect that high-power negotiators, male and female, would generally be more competitive and dominant than low-power negotiators.

On the other hand, other lines of research suggest reduced effects of power on females. Leadership literature argues that women in power are expected to retain their female social role and therefore cannot simply behave like their male peers. High-power female negotiators might find themselves, much like female leaders, in a *double bind* (Eagly & Carli, 2007), because if they exert their power to be competitive, and become careless of their opponents, they will violate social expectations to be communal women. Violating role expectations may lead to penalties and social backlash, and female negotiators were shown to be concerned about that (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bear, 2011). According to this idea, high-power females are forbidden from fully exploiting their power.

A further idea suggested by scholars is that high-power females may not *want* to exploit their power. Negotiation scholars have suggested that females have an embedded view of agency and would not endorse building their power at the expense of the other party (Boyer et al., 2009; Kolb & Coolidge, 1991). Instead of viewing a power position as allowing *power over* the other opponent, women would exercise *power with* the opponent, empowering both parties (see Coleman, 2006; Coleman & Vronov, 2005). Support for this view comes from research that shows how self-construal moderates the effects of power. Individuals with an interdependent self-construal were more generous to their lower-power opponents than individuals with an independent self-construal (Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007). In another study, power induced individuals with a communal relationship orientation to become more socially responsible (fair and benevolent to opponents), while for individuals with an exchange relationship orientation, power fostered self-interest (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). As women are generally found to be more interdependent and communal than men (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bem, 1974; Spence & Buckner, 2000), the above findings suggest that they would retain stereotypically communal feminine behaviors even when given a power position.

Following all of the above, we expected high-power negotiators to be more dominant and less communal than low-power negotiators. However, it is questionable whether these effects of power on *female* negotiators would be strong enough to eliminate gender differences in dominance versus communality.

So far, we have laid the ground for hypothesizing on the effects of power and gender on negotiator behaviors but addressed the latter only in general terms. The current study was motivated by two main goals: to revisit the interactive effects of power and gender and to add to the limited research on their effects on negotiation process. The latter was achieved by testing a fuller scope of negotiation behaviors than was usually done before. In the next section, we review an appropriate framework for that approach.

Negotiation Behaviors—A Dual-Concern Model

With few exceptions (e.g., Boyer et al., 2009), the study of negotiator behaviors, or styles, characterized them dichotomously, as competitive versus cooperative. Walters et al. (1998) noted this and suggested applying a more sophisticated dual-concern model of conflict management styles. One such widely researched model (Pruitt, 1981; Rahim, 1983, 2001; Rahim & Bonoma, 1979) combines two independent concerns—for the self and for the other, to create five distinct styles: A negotiator high in concern for self and low in concern for the other will be *dominating* (competitive); conversely, *obliging* and making concessions represent low concern for self and high concern for the other; moderate concern for both leads to *compromising*; high concern for both leads to *collaborating*, taking an active and creative problem-solving attitude and trying to address as many of each party's interests as possible; and last, *avoiding* the negotiation expresses, in this model, low concern for both self and the other (Rahim, 1983).

This model of conflict management styles, as well as other dual-concern models (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Thomas & Kilmann, 1974; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001), served mainly to develop self-assessment measures and to assess respondents outside the laboratory. Therefore, most of the previous literature is on self-assessed, dispositional conflict management styles.

Rahim's (2001) review of such studies suggested weak and inconsistent associations between gender and conflict management styles. However, a more recent meta-analysis (Holt & DeVore, 2005) did find that women were more compromising and that men (in individualistic cultures) were more dominating. The latter gender difference was stronger among low-status participants, which suggested that power did weaken a gender difference in dominating. More recently, data from a large American sample that was surveyed with the comparable Thomas and Kilmann (1974, 2007) Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI)[1] supplied inconclusive evidence: some analyses showed no significant effects for gender and power position (Schaubhut, 2007). Other analyses showed that power was positively related to dominating and collaborating and negatively related to avoiding and obliging. It also showed that men were more dominating than women, regardless of power position (Thomas, Thomas, & Schaubhut, 2008).

Taken together, the effects of gender and power on dispositional conflict management styles were inconsistent, although when they did appear, they were in line with gender roles and with literature suggesting that power induces active and even dominant reward-seeking. Power's role as moderating gender differences was also inconsistent in the above findings.[2]

The present research is, we believe, the first to use the dual-concern model as a framework for assessing the actual behaviors of negotiators, in simulated business negotiations in the laboratory. As such, it could only hesitantly rely on findings from dispositional self-assessment studies. However, the subsequent theoretical analysis of the model's styles in terms of gender roles and power theories (reviewed in former sections) sits well with these findings, and together, they inform our hypotheses.

Conflict Management Styles and Gender Roles

Dominating is compatible with dominance and incompatible with communality, so it would be more masculine than feminine. Obliging is the reverse—low on dominance and high on communality, so it would be more feminine.

[1]The TKI is based on a dual-concern model that is earlier than and theoretically comparable to Rahim's. However, because of the instrument's arrangement, the styles in the TKI are less independent from each other (Rahim, 2000; Van de Vliert & Kabanoff, 1990). These distinctions may affect findings based on these tools, but they are not relevant to the current research.

[2]For more on dispositional conflict styles, see Brahnam, Margavio, Hignite, Barrier, and Chin (2005), Brew and Cairns (2004), Brewer, Mitchell, and Weber (2002).

Collaborating is assertive but not dominant; rather, it is high on communality and also represents competence, as it involves an active problem-solving attitude. Therefore, we do not expect gender differences in collaborating.

Compromising is in the very middle in Rahim's model, but research on conflict management and face concerns places compromising as more compatible with interdependence and care for the other's face, than with independence and sole care for one's own face (Oetzel, 1998; Oetzel, Myers, Meares, & Lara, 2003; Ting-Toomey, Oetzel, & Yee-Jung, 2001). Therefore, we expected female negotiators to be more compromising.

Avoiding, in Rahim's model, is low both on concern for self (dominance) and concern for the other (communality), so it seems incompatible with both gender roles. However, Oetzel, Garcia, and Ting-Toomey (2008) suggested that avoiding is linked to saving the other party's face, which would be more compatible with communality. Elsewhere, women are portrayed as more avoidant of negotiation because they are less comfortable negotiating (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bear, 2011; Bowles et al., 2005). The negotiation task in the current study did not include the option of actually avoiding it, so it would take the form of stalling, "beating about the bush," and refraining from making clear commitments and statements. Such behaviors can reflect discomfort and hesitation, or delicacy and other-face support. However, they can also be used strategically and competitively to withhold information from the opponent (Olekalns & Smith, 2003) and avoid making binding offers. Therefore, there are reasons to expect either women or men to be higher on avoiding, and we refrain from a hypothesis on it.

Hypothesis 1: Female negotiators will be similarly collaborating, less dominating, and more obliging and compromising than male negotiators.

Conflict Management Styles and Power

As we have elaborated in former sections, power theories and research usually portray power holders as active, inattentive to others, and even dominant toward them in service of their own goals. A power position, therefore, would be more compatible than the low-power position with dominating and collaborating and less compatible with compromising and obliging.

Avoiding, as we have explained above, can be used strategically and not necessarily reflect passivity or discomfort, so it is hard to predict whether power holders would be lower or higher on it.

Hypothesis 2: High-power negotiators will be more collaborating and dominating, and less obliging and compromising than low-power negotiators.

As for the moderating potential of power on gender effects, in former sections, we have reviewed contradicting rationale and findings that left it questionable whether high power would eliminate, or even weaken, gender-typed behavior. Therefore, we leave this as an open research question and will report its results without proposing a hypothesis.

Negotiation Opponent Effects

Negotiator behaviors do not happen in a vacuum. Negotiation is a social interaction between at least two parties, so negotiators likely react to their opponents, and the latter affect their behaviors. Recently, negotiation scholars stressed the need to explore dyadic effects in negotiation, or at the very least, control for them when testing individual negotiator antecedents (Bowles & Flynn, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007; Bronstein, Nelson, Livnat, & Ben-Ari, 2012). With this point in mind, we had participants in the current study simulate business negotiations in all dyad compositions of power and gender (both female, both male, mixed sex with female in power, mixed sex with male in power). A full exploration of dyadic effects is out of the scope of the current article. We did, however, control for opponent effects on negotiator

behaviors when testing the effects of gender and power. Specifically, we controlled for opponent behaviors and for opponent gender (opponent power is simply the inverse of negotiator power in our study).

Opponent Behaviors

Opponent behaviors may be reciprocated; reciprocity is largely assumed in negotiation (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; Putnam & Jones, 1982). In that case, opponent dominating would positively contribute to negotiator dominating, opponent obliging to negotiator obliging, and so forth. Reciprocity could naturally extend to similar behaviors and not be constrained to the identical behavior. In that case, obliging could also contribute to compromising, or compromising to collaborating, and so on.

However, reciprocity may be limited. Although Deutsch's (1980, 2006) prominent work on cooperation suggests that cooperative behavior is reciprocated, other models of reciprocity (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a, 1970b) suggest that dominant behavior is more likely to be reciprocated than cooperative behavior. The rationale is that dominating is generally answered by reduction of cooperation, even by cooperative players, so it is reciprocated; but a dominating negotiator would likely be less attentive to cooperation and have little incentive to reciprocate it (Parks & Rumble, 2001; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). In that case, we would expect opponent dominating to contribute to negotiator dominating, but would not expect opponent obliging or compromising, for example, to contribute to negotiator obliging or compromising.

Moreover, opponent behaviors may be exploited rather than reciprocated; pro-social behaviors may signal an opportunity to drive a harder bargain against a lenient opponent (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Olekalns & Smith, 2003). In that case, obliging and even compromising may contribute positively to dominating.

Opponent Gender

Opponent gender is likely to affect negotiator behaviors because gender roles create certain expectations from male versus female opponents (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Eagly, 1987). As in the case of opponent behaviors, the effects of opponent gender could be in different directions: Negotiators may be more dominating and less obliging and compromising toward a male than a female opponent, because they expect him to be more dominating and less obliging and compromising. That would be a reciprocal approach, as reviewed above. Alternatively, negotiators may be more dominating and less obliging and compromising toward a female than a male opponent, because they see an opportunity to exploit her communality and lack of dominance (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).

Testing opponent effects is not one of the main objectives of the current article; our first goal in controlling for them was to reveal the effects of gender and power on the behaviors of negotiators, *beyond* their responses to their opponents. In view of that, and as the above review of past research leaves the directions of opponent effects questionable, we do not hypothesize on them. We will, however, report their effects if significant, and that will enrich the understating of both the antecedents of negotiator behaviors, and their consequences, which are the foci of the subsequent section.

The Contributions of Negotiation Behaviors to Outcomes

After testing gender and power effects on negotiator behaviors, a secondary objective of the current work was to test the advisability of these behaviors; in other words, their contributions to negotiation outcomes. The negotiation task in the current study was designed to leave participants the freedom to create their own content, including their range of solutions, thus allowing a rich reflection of their spontaneous behaviors (see details in the Method section). Therefore, the range of monetary outcomes was not predesigned and did not allow for specific hypotheses. However, we

could hypothesize how negotiator behaviors would contribute to reaching agreement versus impasse, which is the very basic outcome in any negotiation. Additionally, we retrospectively computed the outcomes among dyads that reached agreement (see the Method section) and will report how negotiation behaviors contributed to them.

Negotiation Behaviors' Contributions to Agreement

The literature of conflict resolution is widely concerned with the antecedents of agreement (Deutsch, Coleman, & Marcus, 2006), and some negotiation research also addresses them. Studies explored, for example, how negotiators' motivations affect partial impasse (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 2011), how rapport helps to avoid impasse (Jap, Robertson, & Hamilton, 2011; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999), or how affect and concessions in computer mediated negotiations enhance agreement (Johnson & Cooper, 2009). However, there is a lack of research directly linking an elaborate model of negotiation behaviors, such as the dual-concern model, with the outcome of agreement versus impasse. In fact, the research of negotiation outcomes often moves past impasse by offering strong incentives to reach agreement (e.g., Bowles & Babcock, 2012; Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; De Drue, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006). Therefore, the current study, by assessing negotiation behaviors and by letting participants spontaneously agree or disagree, will shed new light on the behavioral antecedents of agreement.

It is widely accepted that cooperation enhances conflict resolution while competition and high self-interest are likely to hinder it (Deutsch, 2006; Thompson, Nadler, & Lount, 2006). For example, collaboration induces the resolution of interpersonal conflicts (Sandy, Boardman, & Deutsch, 2006) and competitiveness hinders agreement in negotiation (Mosterd & Rutte, 2000). We, therefore, expect similar contributions of negotiation behaviors to agreement in the current study.

Hypothesis 3: Dominating will contribute negatively, and collaborating, compromising and obliging will contribute positively, to agreement.

As in former hypotheses, the contributions of negotiator behaviors to agreement will be tested while controlling for opponent effects (see details in the Results section).

As for avoiding, it is clear that complete avoidance of negotiation would certainly hinder the ability to reach agreement, but partial avoidance of difficult issues (for example, by leaving their resolution for the future) can in fact enhance immediate agreement. Therefore, we do not propose a hypothesis on the contribution of avoiding.

Method

Participants

Two hundred and ninety-two undergraduate students in an Israeli university participated in the study in exchange for $7. Six dyads were eliminated from analyses due to insufficient data,[3] leaving 280 participants in the study (140 dyads), of which 58% were women. We created four experimental dyad compositions (see the next section): There were 31 male–male dyads (Mm), 54 female–female dyads (Ff), and 55 mixed-sex dyads, of which, in 27, the high-power party was male (Mf) and, in 28, the high-power party was female (Fm). Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 59 years (M = 23.5, SD = 4). Participants signed their agreement to participate in the study and to have the simulated negotiation audio-recorded.

[3]Insufficient data included negotiation simulations that were not recorded well or background data that were not reported.

Tools and Procedure

Participants were recruited through advertisements that were published on various bulletin boards all around campus. When they called the laboratory to set up a date for their participation, they were matched to other participants, so that pairs of callers received the same date and time to create a negotiating dyad. To achieve the experimental dyad compositions, participants' genders were taken into account. Otherwise, matching was random. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants met an experimenter and were told that they would be taking part in a simulated negotiation. The task we chose was a negotiation over salary and other employment conditions. One participant was assigned the role of a candidate for a sales position (candidate) and the other the role of a chief financial officer (recruiter) at an office supplies company to which the candidate had been accepted. Role assignments were random, but in the mixed-sex dyads, we did ensure that gender and power would be counter-balanced.

The roles of manager-recruiter versus lower-level candidate were often used to create a power difference in negotiation experiments. For example, Curhan and Overbeck (2008; see also Magee et al., 2007; Watson, 1994) assigned the role of vice president to one participant and middle manager to the other and cited several studies that had shown that participants interpreted VP as higher of the two in status and power. The manager-recruiter is considered more powerful than the candidate (Galinsky, Thompson, & Kray, 2002), because she is perceived as controlling the main resource being negotiated (Magee et al., 2007) and because her organizational status is higher than the candidate's (Coleman, 2006; Coleman, Kugler, Bui-Wrzosinska, Nowak, & Vallacher, 2012; Curhan & Overbeck, 2008). We strengthened the latter source of power by creating a particularly large organizational gap between the CFO-recruiter and the candidate. Both parties received no BATNA, so that was not a source of power difference.

It is worth noting that the CFO-recruiter role involves representation, or advocacy, on behalf of the organization. Advocacy is known to moderate gender differences in negotiation (e.g., Bowles et al., 2005). We will revisit this point in light of the study's results when we discuss the research limitations in the Discussion section.

Each participant received short written instructions in accordance with his or her role: The candidate was informed that his target salary was 5,000 NIS (about $1350 per month[4]), whereas the CFO-recruiter was told that she wished to pay no more than 3,500 NIS. They were both induced to negotiate additional parameters (e.g., company car or commute reimbursement, employee insurance, pension, vacation time). Both were informed that they were interested in reaching an agreement, because they have long been looking for an employee/job, but agreement was not presented as mandatory and no additional incentive was offered for it. Neither side knew the other's interest in advance, nor was he or she given instructions as to how to bridge the gap between their interests.

We used these general instructions rather than a more structured negotiation task with predesigned options and points, as common in negotiation research (see Curhan & Overbeck, 2008, for an example), because we were interested in their negotiation behaviors. As we believe that this is the first study to assess the effects of power and gender on a comprehensive array of actual (rather than self-reported) behaviors, we did not want to limit our participants' behavioral repertoire to a number of options. We wanted fluent interactions that simulate real-life negotiations, in which participants would express themselves freely, because we thought those would be most diagnostic of their styles. Moreover, in view of the gender differences that we have reviewed, we particularly wanted to allow male and female negotiators to authentically express and create their interests and content rather than to direct them as to what those should be. We also refrained from additional payment to dyads who reached agreement, as is sometimes done, because that would create a strong incentive to avoid impasse and would interfere with assessing the spontaneous effects of negotiation behaviors on agreement versus impasse.

[4]In Israel, monthly and not annual salaries are usually cited.

After being given a few minutes to read the instructions, and upon ensuring the experimenter that they had understood them, participants began the simulation. For the sake of consistency, a set amount of time (20 minutes) was allotted for each negotiation. After the simulation, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire on background data, such as their gender, age, education. Once they completed the questionnaire, the experimenter reimbursed and debriefed participants and verified that they had not known each other prior to the experiment.

Negotiation Setting

Participants were seated on opposite sides of a large desk in a small room and were divided by an opaque screen. The screen was meant to block variables other than gender and power from affecting negotiator behaviors and opponent responses to them. Specifically, gender is related to variables embedded in physical appearance, such as physical attractiveness and levels of masculine versus feminine look, which could affect behavior or the way it is perceived. Moreover, physical appearance and attractiveness themselves might have affected outcomes, especially in mixed-sex dyads. The screen prevented participants from seeing one another and averted these interferences, while the entire setting allowed fluent and rich communication (more so, for example, than might have been expected in an online negotiation).

Negotiators' Assessment

Negotiator behaviors were assessed by judges rather than by themselves or their opponents, to strengthen the objectivity of the assessment, and because we thought negotiators' assessments would be particularly affected by their feelings about the outcome. To assess behaviors, we audio-recorded the simulated negotiations and transcribed negotiators' entire speech[5] and had the judges assess each negotiator's levels of dominating, avoiding, obliging, compromising and collaborating. Before we elaborate on the judgment process, it is important to note the methodological advantage of written transcriptions. When behaviors are assessed based on the latter, without seeing or hearing the participants, it renders participants' gender less salient to the judges (as physical appearance and voice are gender-related). Under such circumstances, gender-role expectations are weakened (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Stuhlmacher, Citera, & Willis, 2007), allowing judgments to be more objective and less dependent on judges' expectations.

The seven judges (psychology undergraduates) were trained by the authors and were not aware of our hypotheses. They were instructed on the dual-concern model, and each of the five behavioral styles was explained to them in a group session and also described in written materials that they kept with them for future ratings. They were instructed to judge each negotiator independently, based on his or her full negotiation verbal content, and to take the entire session into account, rather than look for specific phrases in negotiation transcripts. They rated each negotiator on each style, on a scale from 1 = *the style was not at all reflected in negotiator's verbal behavior* to 7 = *the style was very much reflected in negotiator's verbal behavior*. At first, all judges rated the same three transcriptions, and their ratings were compared. Where they differed, these differences were discussed by the group and the authors to achieve a more coherent view of negotiation behaviors. After training, each judge was asked to rate negotiation behaviors in approximately 20 transcribed negotiations randomly assigned. About 20% of the negotiations assigned to each judge were in fact rated by the entire group of judges (they did not know which were rated by the others and which were not), and we computed Pearson's correlations between their ratings, to assess interjudge agreement, conditioning for minimum correlations of .8.

Outcomes Assessment

As we have noted earlier, the negotiation task was designed to leave participants freedom to create their own range of solutions. The analyses of their outcomes was therefore retrospective and based on their

[5]Transcriptions were done by a team of undergraduate students who were trained by a linguistics professor at our university.

content. First, the judges noted for each negotiating dyad whether or not they reached agreement. Then, transcriptions of dyads who reached agreement were re-read to yield agreement details, which were noted down. The agreement details from the entire sample were classified into the following six categories: salary, commute reimbursement, annual vacation days, pension, employee insurance, and additional benefits.[6] Note that all six categories represent value granted to the candidate; although candidates sometimes made promises, such as "I'll work hard," neither party came up with more tangible value to offer the recruiter, so outcome analyses were limited to candidates. For each outcome category, we created a scale based on its specific content (solutions that participants agreed on).

Salary. Dyads agreed on many different monthly salaries. We divided the entire range of salaries (from the lowest one agreed on to the highest) to ranked subranges, reflecting the salary distribution in the sample. Then, we scored each candidate with a number representing his or her salary's subrange. For example, candidates who negotiated a salary that was in the top 20% in the sample received the score 5, while candidates with a salary in the lowest 20% received 1. The subranges are as follows: 1 = 2,800–3,400 NIS,[7] 2 = 3,500–3,900 NIS, 3 = 4,000–4,400 NIS, 4 = 4,500–5,000 NIS, 5 = 5,100–7,000 NIS.

Commute Reimbursement. Dyads agreed on one of four common options in this category, and these options are naturally ranked. We simply gave each option its number and scored the candidate accordingly: 1—public transportation fare reimbursement, 2—company partially reimburses employee's own car expenses, 3—leasing (employee is given a car by the company but the benefit is partially deducted from his salary), 4—company car (employee is given a company car with all expenses paid by the company).

Annual Vacation Days. As we did with salaries, here, we also divided the entire range of annual vacation days that dyads agreed on to subranges and numbered them. Each candidate was scored with the number representing the subrange to which her number of vacation days belonged: 1 = fewer than 10 days; 2=10–14 days; 3=15–20 days; 4=more than 20 days.

Pension and Employee Insurance. These two categories were binary—either the candidates received pension and/or insurance, or not. So we simply gave candidates one point for pension and one point for insurance if those were included in their agreement.

Additional Benefits. Participants came up with other benefits for the employee (e.g., cell phone purchased by the company, a one-time monetary bonus). We granted the candidate one point for each additional benefit.

The last step in the candidate's outcome computation was to sum up the points he or she received in the above six categories. If a category was not mentioned in any one agreement, the candidate simply received no points for that category. Candidates who reached impasse received zero points.

Results

Antecedents of Negotiator Behaviors

Hypothesis 1 proposed that gender would affect negotiator behaviors, so that females would be similarly collaborating, less dominating, and more obliging and compromising; Hypothesis 2 proposed that power position would affect negotiator behaviors so that high-power negotiators would be

[6]In Israel, commute reimbursement is quite common, and medical insurance is not (because it is governmental). Employee insurance refers to a type of saving plan that the employer contributes to.

[7]Monthly salary. At the time of the experiment, five NIS were about one dollar.

Table 1
Negotiator Behaviors by Gender

	Female Mean (*SD*)	Male Mean (*SD*)	Gender effect (β)
Dominating	3.66 (1.32)	4.41 (1.44)	.31***
Collaborating	3.68 (1.30)	3.37 (1.38)	.09
Compromising	3.78 (1.17)	3.55 (1.28)	−.11^
Obliging	3.23 (1.39)	2.38 (1.46)	−.23***
Avoiding	1.42 (0.80)	1.84 (1.25)	.08

Note. Mean values are computed from behaviors' ratings, which were on a 1–7 scale.
^$p < .06$. ***$p < .001$.

more collaborating and dominating, and less obliging and compromising. We also questioned whether high power would moderate (weaken or eliminate) gender effects on negotiator behaviors, without proposing a hypothesis. We tested these hypotheses and question, following the approach of the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), which accounts for within-dyad statistical interdependence. It addresses the dyad as a unit of analysis, while individually examining the effects of each of the parties at appropriate degrees of freedom (for further information see Campbell & Kashy, 2002; Cook & Kenny, 2005; Kashy & Kenny, 2000; Kenny, 1996). We implemented APIM using Multilevel Structural Equation Modeling (MSEM; Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011; Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010; for the applicability of MSEM to APIM, see Ledermann, Macho, & Kenny, 2011).[8] We conducted one model to predict each of the five negotiator behaviors, including avoiding, although we refrained from conclusive hypotheses regarding it. The predictors were negotiator gender (Hypothesis 1), negotiator power position (Hypothesis 2), and negotiator gender × negotiator power position (the questioned moderation). Testing the hypotheses in the same model allowed for control of power effects when testing gender effects, and vice versa. Additional predictors that were entered into the model, to control for their effects on negotiator behaviors, were opponent gender and all opponent behaviors.[9]

Gender Effects on Negotiator Behaviors

The results of the models supported hypothesis 1. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of female and male negotiator behaviors and the *beta* values of gender contributions to these behaviors. As hypothesized, female negotiators were less dominating, more obliging, somewhat more compromising, and equally collaborating. Additionally, female and male negotiators were equally avoiding.

Power Position Effects on Negotiator Behaviors

The results of the models only very partially supported Hypothesis 2. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of behaviors among high- and low-power negotiators and *beta* values of power position's contributions to these behaviors. As hypothesized, high-power negotiators were more collaborating than their low-power opponents; not as hypothesized, power did not affect compromising at all; and contrary to hypothesis, high-power negotiators were more obliging and less dominating than their opponents. Additionally, they were also more avoiding than their opponents.

[8]There are different ways to implement the APIM model (HLM, for example; see Bronstein et al., 2012). The advantage of MSEM was that it allowed control for all opponents' behaviors in each model, including the negotiator behavior that is being predicted.
[9]Opponent power is the inverse of negotiator power, so there was no need to control for it.

Table 2
Negotiator Behaviors by Power Position

	High-power Mean (*SD*)	Low-power Mean (*SD*)	Power effect (β)
Dominating	3.80 (1.37)	4.15 (1.45)	−.12*
Collaborating	3.97 (1.28)	3.13 (1.24)	.43***
Compromising	3.66 (1.26)	3.70 (1.19)	0
Obliging	3.07 (1.53)	2.69 (1.40)	.19***
Avoiding	1.82 (1.13)	1.39 (0.88)	.31***

Note. Mean values are computed from behaviors' ratings, which were on a 1–7 scale.
*$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$.

Power Position × Gender Effects on Negotiator Behaviors

The interaction between power position and gender did not significantly affect negotiator behaviors. To further verify that power did not moderate gender effects, Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of male and female behaviors at each power position, and *t*-values that indicate gender differences. Males were more dominating and females more obliging in both positions; females were more compromising than males only among high-power negotiators; females were more collaborating than males only among low-power negotiators. Additionally, in both positions, males were more avoiding. These results, somewhat different from the MSEM results which supported Hypothesis 1, are less accurate because the *t*-tests did not control for dyadic interdependence and opponent effects. However, they demonstrate that gender-typed behavior was not eliminated or weakened by high power.

Additional Results

Opponent gender and opponent behaviors were included in the models to control for their effects. We report their effects here, to complete the exploration of negotiation behaviors' antecedents.

Opponent Gender. Opponent gender affected dominating ($\beta = .25$, $p < .001$) and obliging ($\beta = -.20$, $p < .01$). Negotiators were more dominating toward a male ($M = 4.3$, $SD = 1.4$) than a female opponent ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.39$), and more obliging toward a female ($M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.37$) than a male opponent ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.5$).

Opponent Behaviors. Figure 1 presents the contributions of opponent behaviors to negotiator behaviors. As can be seen in Figure 1, dominating contributed positively to dominating, avoiding and collaborating; avoiding contributed positively to avoiding and dominating; collaborating contributed

Table 3
Negotiator Behaviors by Power Position and Gender

	High-power			Low-power		
	Female Mean (*SD*)	Male Mean (*SD*)	*t* (*df* = 135)	Female Mean (*SD*)	Male Mean (*SD*)	*t* (*df* = 135)
Dominating	3.52 (1.24)	4.20 (1.46)	2.91**	3.80 (1.39)	4.60 (1.41)	3.28**
Collaborating	4.00 (1.26)	3.93 (1.33)	−0.32	3.35 (1.26)	2.84 (1.23)	−2.37*
Compromising	3.84 (1.12)	3.40 (1.4)	−2.04*	3.71 (1.24)	3.69 (1.14)	−0.09
Obliging	3.43 (1.46)	2.53 (1.49)	−3.51**	3.03 (1.29)	2.24 (1.43)	−3.36**
Avoiding	1.61 (.89)	2.13 (1.36)	2.69**	1.22 (0.64)	1.59 (1.09)	2.45*

Note. Mean values are computed from behaviors' ratings, which were on a 1–7 scale.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.



Figure 1. Opponent behaviors' contributions to negotiator behaviors.

positively to collaborating, compromising, and obliging; compromising contributed positively to compromising and collaborating; and obliging contributed positively to dominating and collaborating, and contributed negatively to compromising.

Negotiator Behaviors' Contributions Toward Outcomes

Of 140 dyads, 94 (67%) reached agreement and 46 (33%) reached impasse. Agreement versus impasse created the largest difference in negotiators' outcomes, because negotiators who failed to agree received zero points, while the average points' score among low-power negotiators[10] who did agree was $M = 11.6$

[10]As we have explained in the Method section, only candidates' outcomes could meaningfully be scaled and computed into scores.

(SD = 3.4). Therefore, we first report negotiator behaviors' contributions to agreement in the entire sample and then report behaviors' contributions to low-power scores only among dyads that reached agreement.

Behaviors' Contributions to Agreement

Hypothesis 3 proposed that dominating would contribute to agreement negatively and that collaborating, compromising, and obliging would contribute to agreement positively. We tested this hypothesis while controlling for opponent behaviors' contributions to agreement, because, by the nature of agreement as a shared outcome, it would simultaneously be affected by both parties' behaviors.

We also controlled for the effects of dyad composition on rates of agreement, even though a logistic regression predicting agreement by dyad composition did not reach significance ($\chi^2 = 4.75$, $df = 3$, $p = .19$). We controlled for dyad composition because the pattern of agreement rates suggested that the composition likely had some effect on agreement. Specifically, agreement rate was 58% among masculine (Mm) dyads, 65% among feminine (Ff) dyads, 68% among high-power male and low-power female (Mf) dyads, and 82% among high-power female and low-power male (Fm) dyads.

We tested negotiator behaviors' contributions to agreement following the APIM approach, which allows testing individual contributions while accounting for dyadic interdependence, and we implemented APIM by MSEM[11] (see more details on APIM and MSEM in the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2). We conducted five models; in each, the dependent variable was agreement (yes/no), the predictor was one of the negotiator behaviors, and additional predictors, which were entered to control for their effects, were all opponent behaviors and dyad composition (originally a categorical variable; we represented it by three dummy variables: is-high-power-male, is-low-power-male, the product of the two).

The results of the models supported Hypothesis 3. Dominating contributed negatively to agreement ($\beta = -.40$, $p < .001$); collaborating ($\beta = .18$, $p < .05$), compromising ($\beta = .39$, $p < .001$), and obliging ($\beta = .38$, $p < .001$) all contributed positively to agreement. Avoiding, for which we did not propose a hypothesis, did not contribute to agreement ($\beta = -.02$, $p = .78$).

Behaviors' Contributions to Low-Power Outcome

For dyads that reached agreement ($n = 94$), we further tested how negotiator behaviors contributed to their outcomes. However, as we have explained in earlier sections, outcomes were computed retrospectively, from dyads' transcriptions, in which all tangible outcomes represented value that was granted to the low-power candidates. Therefore, we tested behaviors' contributions to outcomes only among the latter.

As in the former analyses, here, too, we controlled for the effects of dyad composition and opponent (high-power party) behaviors. We conducted hierarchical linear regressions in which the dependent variable was the low-power outcome score, and the predictors were as follows: In the first step, we entered the dyad composition (represented by three dummy variables as in the former analyses); in the second step, we entered all opponent (high power) behaviors; in the third step, we entered one negotiator (low power) behavior.

Dominating contributed positively ($\beta = .42$, $p < .001$) and obliging contributed negatively ($\beta = -.40$, $p < .001$) to low-power negotiators' outcomes. The contributions of collaborating ($\beta = -.19$, $p = .10$), compromising ($\beta = -.16$, $p = .16$), and avoiding ($\beta = -.17$, $p = .15$) did not reach significance.

Additional Results. Beyond their own behaviors, the gender of low-power negotiators also contributed to their outcome ($\beta = .25$, $p < .05$), with low-power males achieving better outcomes than low-power

[11]In the current analyses, the advantage of MSEM over other methods for implementing APIM was that it enabled predicting a dyad-level outcome—agreement—by individual level behaviors (see Preacher et al., 2010).

females. Additionally, two of the high-power opponent behaviors—collaborating ($\beta = .29$, $p < .01$) and obliging ($\beta = .34$, $p < .05$)—positively contributed to low-power outcomes.

Discussion

Negotiation literature has often portrayed women as a weaker party in negotiation, compared with men, in terms of competitiveness and outcomes (e.g., Bowles et al., 2007; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998), and suggested that their weakness can be overcome by induced power (e.g., Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Hong & van der Wijst, 2013; Small et al., 2007). The current study revisited the role of power and its interaction with gender by examining their effects on an array of negotiators' actual behaviors, hitherto understudied (Walters et al., 1998), within the framework of a comprehensive behavioral dual-concern model (Rahim, 1983, 2001).

Participants simulated employment terms negotiations in high power (CFO) against low-power (job candidate) dyads, in one of four dyad compositions: both female, both male, or mixed sex with either female or male in power. The results of the study reveal the effects of gender and power on negotiators' behaviors and also shed light on the implications of these behaviors by examining their effects on negotiation outcomes and on the other party's behaviors. We will discuss our findings in this order.

Gender and Power Effects on Negotiation Behaviors

We hypothesized that female, compared with male, negotiators would be more compromising and obliging, less dominating, and equally collaborating; we questioned whether these differences would be eliminated by positional high power. Our hypothesis was supported; we found that male and female negotiators, at both power positions, adhered to their gender roles (Bowles et al., 2007), with females displaying higher levels of communality (obliging, and to an extent, compromising), lower levels of dominance (dominating), and equal levels of competence (collaborating, which is also communal). High power did not weaken these gender-typed patterns.

Gender-related expectations (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010) also seemed to affect negotiators' behaviors, because in our additional analyses, we found that negotiators were more obliging toward a female opponent and more dominating toward a male opponent, possibly because they expected her to be more obliging and him to be more dominating.

A plausible interpretation for the fact that power did not diminish gender-typed findings is that female negotiators had a power-with view that endorses sharing power with the other party (Coleman & Vronov, 2005; Follett, 1973). This view might have been strengthened by females' supposed interdependent self-construal, which leads individuals to use their power in a socially responsible way (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Howard et al., 2007).

Other lines of interpretation for the fact that power did not diminish gender-typed behavior would claim that positional high power was not sufficient to free female negotiators from their binding gender roles (Eagly, 1987). Or they might simply assume that positional power in one given negotiation was not enough to counteract females' reduced social power (Gonzaga et al., 2008; Hong & van der Wijst, 2013).[12]

The last explanations link dominance and reduced communality with power, and explain gender-typed behavior in terms of unequal power. However, they are rendered unlikely, not only by the fact that power did not diminish gender differences in the current study, but also by its next results, which materially challenge the coupling of power with dominance. We hypothesized that high-power negotiators

[12]The high-power position also involved advocacy—representing a third party, the organization. This carries implications for female negotiators, and we will discuss those, in light of our results, when we discuss the research limitations.

would be more collaborating and dominating and less obliging and compromising than their low-power opponents. Mostly, results did not support this hypothesis. Power holders *were* more collaborating, which is a behavioral style that actively and creatively seeks a solution (Rahim, 1983, 2001), but they were equally compromising, *less* dominating, and *more* obliging than their low-power opponents. These results challenge a widespread traditional perception of power, which emphasizes dominance and coercion toward the other (Coleman & Vronov, 2005), and even suggests that power corrupts (Kipnis, 1972). Moreover, these results lend only partial support to AITP (Keltner et al., 2003), because our high-power negotiators did display active reward-seeking (collaborating), in line with the theory, but contrary to it, they did not display reduced attention to their opponents or a behavior that is careless of threats (as we will subsequently discuss, high-power negotiators' behavior helped, in fact, to avoid the threat of impasse).

The assumption that power reduces interpersonal concern or skill has been contended before. Researchers of nonverbal behavior showed that contrary to Subordination Theory (i.e., that subordination enhances interpersonal skills; Henley, 1973, 1977; LaFrance & Henley, 1994), high power was positively associated with interpersonal and nonverbal sensitivity (Hall, Halberstadt, & O'brien, 1997; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009). Our findings, in a different line of research, lend further and strong support for the need to reassess the association between high power and dominance, or between powerlessness and communality. Consequently, they also challenge the view of feminine negotiation style as weak and masculine as strong (e.g., Bowles et al., 2007).

Before we move on to discuss the contributions of these behaviors to negotiation outcomes, we must comment on avoiding behavior. This fifth style in the dual-concern model (Rahim, 1983) was included in our assessment, even though the current negotiation task did not allow for full avoidance, but only for stalling, "beating about the bush," and refraining from making clear commitments and statements. In that form, avoiding can be interpreted as reflecting different underlying motives, such as low concern for both parties (Rahim & Bonoma, 1979), discomfort about negotiating (e.g., Babcock & Laschever, 2003), delicacy and concern for the opponent's face (Oetzel et al., 2008), or an information-withholding competitive strategy (Olekalns & Smith, 2003).

We found that gender did not affect avoiding[13] but power did; high-power negotiators were higher than their opponents on avoiding. Given that they were also more active (collaborating), more benevolent (obliging) and less competitive (dominating), it seems unlikely that their avoiding reflected low concern, discomfort, or a sheer competitive strategy. It could still be competitive to the extent that it gets their opponents to expose themselves or to accept less-than-clear future promises or resolutions. However, it is an indirect style of competition that shies from confrontation and saves the face of the opponent (Oetzel et al., 2008). As such, it is in line with the other effects of power in the current study.

The Consequences of Negotiation Behaviors

The negotiation task in the current study was designed to leave participants material freedom to behave spontaneously. Therefore, their range of solutions was not predetermined, nor were they given a monetary incentive to agree. As a result, we were able to assess their behaviors' contributions to agreement versus impasse. Additional outcomes were retrospectively yielded from negotiators' transcriptions (see full rationale and details in the Method section), and the contributions of behaviors to those outcomes were also assessed.

Two thirds (94) of the negotiating dyads reached agreement. We hypothesized that collaborating, compromising, and obliging would positively contribute to agreement, while dominating would

[13]As reported, in *t*-tests, males were more avoiding than females in both power positions. But as the *t*-tests were not as accurate as the multi-level analyses that tested Hypotheses 1 and 2, we restrict our discussion only to results yielded by the latter.

contribute negatively. This hypothesis was fully supported; negotiation behaviors contributed to agreement much as they would contribute to the resolution of any conflict (Deutsch, 2006; Sandy, Boardman, & Deutsch, 2006). Avoiding (in its current partial form) did not contribute to agreement positively or negatively.

Among dyads that reached agreement, a further analysis of their agreements' details yielded tangible value that was granted to the low-power candidates by their high-power CFOs, thus creating a distributive solution. We found that dominating enhanced the value claimed by low-power negotiators, while obliging contributed to reduce it. The behaviors of their high-power opponents also mattered; high-power collaborating and obliging also enhanced low-power claimed value. Lastly, we found that low-power males claimed higher value compared with their female peers.

The agreements that were reached in the current study are altogether mixed-motive; agreeing was a fully shared interest (in the absence of BATNAs), but the value that was claimed among dyads that reached agreement was distributive in nature—it was given by the high-power to the low-power party. Likewise, the consequences of negotiators' behaviors were also mixed. To reach agreement at all, they needed to be collaborating compromising, even obliging, and to refrain from dominating; but to maximize their own share of the agreed-on value (or minimize that granted by them to their opponent), they were better off dominating, and refraining from collaborating and obliging. In other words, a judicious mix of communality, competence, and dominance (feminine, gender neutral and masculine styles, respectively) was required to reach an optimal solution.

These findings, calling for a sensible mixture of feminine and masculine behaviors, are in line with past research, showing that negotiation outcomes are impaired both by an extremity of competitiveness (Malhotra, Ku, & Murnighan, 2008) on one hand, and by an extremity of concession (Stuhlmacher, Gillespie, & Champagne, 1998) on the other (De Dreu, 2003; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). They are also in line with previous literature demonstrating male advantage in distributive negotiations (e.g., Hong & van der Wijst, 2013) but stressing female advantage in collaborating toward agreement (e.g., Babcock & Laschever, 2003).

The same conclusion, in favor of a judicious mixture of behaviors, is drawn from additional findings that we yielded in the current study, regarding the effects of opponent behaviors (as explained in earlier sections, we controlled for opponent effects in all our analyses). These findings reveal whether and how negotiator behaviors were reciprocated.

Generally, negotiator behaviors were directly reciprocated by the identical opponent behavior, such that dominating contributed to dominating, compromising to compromising, etc. The only behavior that was not directly reciprocated was obliging. Behaviors also tended to be reciprocated by close behaviors; for example, collaborating and compromising contributed to each other, but neither one was reciprocated by dominating or avoiding. These results are in line with the general assumption of reciprocity in negotiation and support the belief that cooperative, and not only competitive, behavior is reciprocated (Deutsch, 2006; Weingart et al., 2007).

However, being too cooperative is not sensible; not only was obliging not directly reciprocated, it actually contributed positively to dominating and contributed negatively to compromising. This behavior, very low in concern for self and very high in concern for the other, seems to have been exploited by opponents, who were induced by it to drive a harder bargain[14] (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).

Another interesting pattern was the mutual connection between dominating and avoiding, calling to mind literature on demand-withdrawal patterns in interpersonal conflict (e.g., Christensen & Heavey, 1993) and suggesting that reciprocity can involve complementary behaviors.

[14]Obliging also contributed positively to collaborating, but the latter was positively predicted by all opponent behaviors except avoiding, so it is less diagnostic.

As we have noted above, the effects of opponent behaviors generally suggest that a mixture of styles should be considered in negotiation. Altogether, negotiators should expect their behaviors to be reciprocated; if they choose to contend to maximize their value, they should be careful not to carry it too far, because it will also lead the other party to contend. Likewise, they can expect cooperation to be mutual but should be careful not to carry their cooperation to the extremity of low care for themselves, because that is likely to be exploited.

Research Limitations

We studied the effects of power and gender in simulated compensation negotiations, to which a power difference is inherent. We manipulated power by position/role and strengthened the manipulation by creating a large organizational gap between negotiators. This is a fairly typical simulation of a real-life compensation negotiation, and it is important to understand how it works, but it is also important to note its limitations. First, although common sense and former research (Coleman, 2006; Coleman et al., 2012; Curhan & Overbeck, 2008; Galinsky et al., 2002) suggest that participants would view the CFO-recruiter as more powerful than the candidate, we should have run a manipulation check to ensure that negotiators perceived their power positions as we had intended. Second, the CFO position might have confounded power with advocacy; CFOs advocated on behalf of their organization while candidates negotiated for themselves. Advocacy is known to moderate gender differences in negotiation (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2005), such that females negotiating on behalf of a third party become more competitive and successful, closing or even reversing the gender gap. Given the results in our study, it seems unlikely that female CFOs were motivated by advocacy, because their power did not eliminate their gender-typed behavior. Their behavior was more compatible with an interdependent view of power-with the opponent, than with a strong motivation to claim as much value for the entity they represent (Howard et al., 2007). However, attaining some measure of negotiators' motivations, or perceptions of their role as part of a manipulation check would have cleared the possibility of confounding and strengthened our conclusions.

We conducted negotiations through a screen, blocking the effects of physical appearance, and we assessed negotiation behaviors based on negotiators' transcribed verbal behavior. We fully explained the rationale and advantages of these practices in the Method section. However, by using this approach, we took the risk of diminishing gender and power effects. Past research has indicated that preventing face-to-face contact might mitigate gender and power influences, because it renders participants more anonymous and exposes fewer social cues that are gender related (such as physical appearance) or status related. Under such circumstances, participants tend to be less conforming to norms and stereotypes (e.g., Galin, Gross, & Gosalker, 2007; Guadagno & Cialdini, 2005; Stuhlmacher et al., 2007). Contrary to such previous findings, our participants conformed with gender roles even behind a screen. The gender effects we found were in line with previous literature that was generally drawn from face-to-face negotiations (see Kray & Thompson, 2004; Walters et al., 1998). The fact that the screen did not mitigate these gender effects might suggest that they were particularly strong. Neither were the effects of power weakened by the screen; power had clear and consistent effects, although they contradicted and challenged past findings on the role of power (of course, we have no reason to think that the screen changed the direction of power effects). Therefore, our study does not support the assumption that anonymity weakens gender or power effects. Still, the screen and the use of verbal content for behavior assessment limit our ability to generalize our findings to face-to-face negotiations or to studies where negotiators are assessed upon observation. It would be advisable to replicate the study in such settings.

The current negotiation task was designed to assess behaviors; the computation of outcomes (beyond agreement vs. impasse) was retrospective and based on participants' spontaneous solutions. This limited our exploration of behavioral antecedents of outcomes. Specifically, we could not measure how behaviors contributed to integrative solutions, because participants' content only included agreeing (fully aligned

interest) and value claimed by the candidate (distributive outcome). Future research is needed to test the contributions of actual behaviors in the dual-concern model toward integrative solutions, maybe by manipulating a predesigned range of solutions on which negotiators agree, although it's possible that such a method would limit participants' behavioral repertoire.

Conclusion and Research Contributions

The present research challenged the view that gender stereotypes stem from power and that gender-typed negotiation performance, therefore, is eliminated by power. It did so by adding to the limited research on negotiation behaviors. Male and female negotiators adhered to gender roles in their behaviors and also seemed to act upon their gender expectations from their opponents. However, stereotypically feminine negotiation behaviors did not represent lack of power, but were in fact induced by power. The "unique female voice" at the negotiation table (Kolb & Coolidge, 1991), turned out to be the voice of the powerful, too; all participants in power seemed to endorse power-with rather than power-over (Coleman & Vronov, 2005). The research also addressed the advisability of feminine and masculine behaviors at the negotiation table, supporting the call for a judicious mixture.

The present study was the first to assess the effects of gender and power on five negotiation behaviors, as manifested in the laboratory in actual behavior during business negotiations. It has theoretical, methodological, and practical worth. Theoretically, it contributes to the development of gender theories and negotiation research, by challenging traditional ideas of power and the interpretation of feminine style as weak or less effectual. Furthermore, by testing the dual-concern model and its contributions in a new context, it also contributes to the field of conflict management research. We also reported opponent effects that enriched the understanding of negotiator effects and that join to contemporary research that emphasizes the importance of dyadic effects in negotiation.

Methodologically, the study exhausted all possible gender and power compositions and used sophisticated statistical tools to control for dyadic-level statistical interdependence and for opponent effects. Therefore, its negotiator effects are more accurate because they were analyzed based on all possible combinations of gender and power and while other effects were controlled for. Additionally, negotiator behaviors were assessed by judges based on actual behavior, rather than by self-assessments based on memory or self-image. We believe this adds objectivity and therefore validity to the results.

Practically, the present research joins previous work in contributing to the world outside academics. Evidence for the association of power with collaboration, and for the advisability of the feminine alongside the masculine style, offer refreshing insights that can inform educators and negotiators.

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