

Women in Negotiation: Effects of Gender and Power on Negotiation Behavior

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Abstract

Research on gender and negotiation has shown that women are often left worse off at the negotiation table and tend to negotiate less favorable outcomes than men. These findings may be, in part, due to the socialization of men and women, which has resulted in a greater negotiation advantage for men than for women. It is, however, hypothesized that power affects men's and women's negotiation behavior in such a way that it positively influences women's negotiation behavior while men remain unaffected by it. In an experimental setting using a face-to-face distributive bargaining situation, participants were primed with the experience of having power and were subsequently asked to negotiate with an opponent about the asking price of a house. The results of this study show that women who were primed with the experience of having power made better first offers and negotiated better outcomes than women who were not. Men's first offers and negotiation outcomes turned out not to be affected by power. Moreover, results also show that power significantly reduced differences in negotiation outcomes between men and women. All in all, this study shows that power influences men's and women's behavior in negotiation differently.

Consider the case where a man and a woman, let us call them Adam and Jane, are both negotiating separately about the asking price of a similar house. Compared to Adam, Jane starts with a worse opening offer for herself and makes bigger concessions. As a result, she ends up paying more for the house than Adam. The Jane in this example confirms the studies that indicate that women do worse than men in distributive bargaining (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), the difference being partly due to the fact that Jane was less at ease in the competitive bargaining situation than Adam (Kray & Babcock, 2006). However, what would be the outcome if prior to the negotiation something happened to Jane that made her feel more powerful and more at ease in the bargaining situation? Would this experience have helped her make more favorable offers (more favorable for herself), fewer concessions, and to eventually reach a better negotiation outcome?

Power can generally be defined as the capacity of an actor to control the resources and outcomes of other individuals and one's own resources and outcomes, in order to satisfy one's own or others' purposes in a situation. This capacity can lead to power over others, the power to influence others, like for instance in a negotiation context (Deutsch, 1973; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Magee, Galinsky,

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& Gruenfeld, 2007). Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) proposed a theory about the effects this power can have on human behavior, known as the *approach or inhibition theory of power* (henceforth AITP). According to the authors, increased power causes individuals to pay more attention to self-rewards, to experience increased positive emotions and enhanced automatic cognition (e.g., increased automatic reasoning), and to show more approach tendencies (e.g., moving toward rewardful objects). Reduced power, in contrast, causes individuals to pay more attention to threats to oneself, to experience increased negative emotions, to show more controlled cognition (e.g., evaluating the actions of others), and to act in more inhibited ways (e.g., show passive and less active behavior; Keltner et al., 2003). In testing the AITP, scholars have recently shown how power affects an individual's cognition and behavior. Anderson and Galinsky (2006), for example, showed that high-power participants perceived the world as less dangerous and were more likely to take action in risky situations than did low-power participants. Furthermore, Magee et al. (2007) showed that high-power-primed participants tended more often to take the lead in a competitive situation than low-power-primed participants. All in all, the results of these studies show that power affects individuals' cognition and behavior in many meaningful ways.

In this study, we addressed the question of whether and, if so, how power influences men's and women's cognition differently and to what extent this influence affects their negotiation behavior. Negotiation power can be conceptualized as a person's capacity to influence others. An individual's negotiation power can be increased in several ways and several sources of power may be responsible for this (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2010). Generally, a distinction can be made between informational (e.g., expertise), personal (e.g., skills), position-based (e.g., authority), relationship-based (e.g., interdependency), and contextual (e.g., available alternatives) sources of negotiation power. In addition to those traditional sources of power, recent studies have shown that one's feeling of negotiation power can also be increased psychologically (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003). According to Galinsky et al. (2003), the mere recollection of having power over others already increases one's power at the negotiating table, as it triggers one's sense of power by activating concepts and behavioral tendencies associated with power. As such, power becomes a psychological property of the individual and influences their affect, cognition, and behavior. Therefore, thinking about powerful (or powerless) situations can have the same effect on individuals as the traditional sources of power.

We believe that power as a psychological property offers a very promising perspective in understanding why and how power influences men's and women's negotiation behavior differentially. Power triggers personality traits such as dominance and assertiveness. This would positively affect women's negotiation behavior more than men's negotiation behavior. Eagly's (1987) social role theory provides a plausible framework to explain the stronger reaction of women to power activation in a negotiation.

According to social role theory, individuals have beliefs about their own and others' behavior, based on what is seen as appropriate behavior for a role that an individual fulfills (Eagly, 1987). For men and women, socialization has resulted in traditional gender roles, whereby men are expected to be the breadwinner of the family, to be assertive, dominant, self-confident, ambitious, and self-oriented (Eagly, 1995), while women are expected to take care of the children and do the housekeeping, to be warm, expressive, caring, and friendly (Eagly, 1995). Negotiations are believed to be part of the masculine social role (e.g., Kray & Thompson, 2005; Stuhlmacher, Citera, & Willis, 2007), and masculine traits such as dominance, assertiveness, and rationality are more important for negotiation success than feminine traits, such as being submissive, emotional, and intuitive. Negotiations are thus more congruent with a male gender role than a female gender role, as a result of which men are likely to have a negotiation advantage over women, especially in competitive, zero-sum negotiations (Miles & LaSalle, 2009) or in negotiation situations that can be characterized as more masculine (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). As such, this may account for the results of many studies that show that men tend to be better off at the negotiation table than women (Barron, 2003; Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). The question arises, however, to what extent men would still have a negotiation advantage over women if the latter feel empowered? Put in more concrete terms: Would Jane benefit more from a feeling of power than Adam?

Power is expected to trigger personality traits that are related to power, such as dominance and assertiveness. These traits are associated more with a male gender role than a female gender role. This means that individuals who experience power are more likely to behave in a more masculine way. Women would therefore be expected to display relatively more dominant and assertive behavior when given (additional) power. With regard to specific negotiation behavior like making a first offer, one would expect power to cause women to make more beneficial first offers for themselves. For men, however, we would not expect power to influence their negotiation behavior (in any significant way) in terms of making offers because their default negotiation behavior is supposed to be already more in line with behavior related to power. Support for the notion that power does not significantly influence men's negotiation behavior comes from a recent study by Magee et al. (2007). The results from one study show a significant interaction between gender and power, indicating that only women's negotiation behavior was influenced by power. In addition, Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman (2007) examined whether power influenced men's and women's feelings of intimidation toward negotiating and showed that priming power did not influence men's feelings of intimidation toward the prospect of negotiating. Thus, men seem less susceptible to power manipulations in negotiations. This finding suggests that in negotiations in which power is activated, women's and men's first offers will differ less from each other than they normally do, as a result of the positive effect power has on women's negotiation behavior and the negligible effect it has on that of men.

Besides the first offer, the final negotiation outcome is another important negotiation behavior variable that should reflect the effect of power. These two outcome variables are related in a sense that taking the initiative to make the first offer can be beneficial for the one making the first offer, given the anchoring effect it has on the outcome of a negotiation. For example, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) showed that those who made the first offer reached better negotiation outcomes for themselves. In the same line of argument, power should also influence men's and women's negotiation outcomes differently, as the effect of power may well pertain over the entire negotiation. It is expected that power will cause women to reach relatively better negotiation outcomes for themselves, whereas men are expected not to be influenced by power. As a result, power will cause women's and men's negotiation outcomes to differ less from each other than they would normally do.

A promising way to study the differential effect the experience of power can have on male and female negotiators is by priming the feeling of power. For example, Galinsky et al. (2003) showed that participants primed with a high-power feeling took more initiatives to stop an annoying fan than did low-power participants when it was unclear whether they were allowed to act on the fan or not. On the basis of these findings, Galinsky et al. (2003) suggested that the experience of having power increases the connection between one's goals and one's actions. In other words, individuals who experience power are more goal directed; they are more likely to act in a manner needed to reach their goals. A study by Magee et al. (2007) confirmed the effect of increased goal directedness. Participants primed with high-power feeling were more likely to negotiate the price of a car than low-power-primed participants. However, the authors only examined individuals' propensity to negotiate. A logical next step is to examine how power priming affects men's and women's behavior in an actual negotiation. Therefore, in the present study, we sought to extend earlier research on the effects of power on negotiations by examining to what extent the experience of power influenced men's and women's first offers and negotiation outcomes in a distributive bargaining situation.

The hypotheses for this study are as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: In general, men will make better first offers than women.

Hypothesis 1b: Power interacts with gender. It causes women to make better offers for themselves, whereas men's first offers will not be affected by power.

Hypothesis 1c: As a result of the effect power has on women's negotiation behavior, men's and women's first offers will differ less from each other than they normally do.

Hypothesis 2a: In general, men will reach better negotiation outcomes than women.

Hypothesis 2b: Power interacts with gender in such a way that it causes women to reach better negotiation outcomes for themselves; men's negotiation outcomes will not be affected by power.

Hypothesis 2c: As a result of the effect power has on women's negotiation behavior, men's and women's negotiation outcomes will differ less from each other than they normally do.

Method

To examine the hypotheses, a negotiation experiment was conducted. The experiment consisted of a negotiation dyad in which participants had to negotiate on the price of a house.

Participants

One hundred and one undergraduate students (50 women, 51 men) from a Dutch university participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement. The average age of the participants was 21.8 ($SD = 3.6$). The control condition consisted of 49 participants (24 women, 25 men), and the power priming condition consisted of 52 participants (26 women, 26 men).

During the experiment, the participants had to negotiate with the experimenter. This was the first author of this study. The experimenter was a male aged 24. Throughout the whole experiment, he wore casual clothing. Participants were recruited from a university subject pool and received course credits for their participation.

Research Design

The experiment consisted of a 2 (male or female) \times 2 (power prime or control prime) between-subjects factorial design. The independent variables were gender and priming. The dependent variables were the amount of the participants' first offer and the amount of the participants' final offer. Half of the participants received the power prime; the other half received the control prime. The power prime was adapted from Galinsky et al. (2003); the control prime was adapted from Small et al. (2007).

Instruments

Priming Power Manipulation

The power prime involved having participants recall a situation in which they possessed power over someone else. The instructions were as follows:

Please recall and write down a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. By power, I mean a situation in which you had control and influence over others. Please describe this situation in which you had power—what happened, how you felt, and so on

The control prime involved having participants describe how they usually spend their evenings. The instructions were as follows:

Please describe the way you typically spend your evenings. Begin by writing down a description of your activities, and then figure out how much time you devoted to each activity. Examples of things you might describe include eating dinner, studying for a particular exam, hanging out with certain friends, watching TV, and so on

The power prime and control prime were translated from English into Dutch and were reviewed by the authors.

Self-Ratings on Power-Relevant Traits

To measure the effectiveness of the power and control primes, participants were asked to rate themselves on seven power-relevant items on a 9-point scale adapted from Smith, Wigboldus, and Dijksterhuis (2008): Submissive–dominant, passive–active, unassertive–assertive, timid–firm, uncertain–certain, insecure–confident, and dependent–independent. The scale was introduced with the following sentence: “To what extent would you say you are...” The self-ratings on power-relevant traits were administered at the start of the experiment (which served as a premeasurement) and after the power manipulation (which served as a postmeasurement). Every scale was translated from English into Dutch and was reviewed by the authors.

The scale mean of the premeasurement survey was 5.94 ($SD = 1.04$), and the reliability analysis showed a Cronbach’s alpha of .81. The scale mean of the postmeasurement was 6.16 ($SD = 1.00$); Cronbach’s alpha was .82. Therefore, responses to the seven-trait pairs related to power were averaged together.

Negotiation Case

The negotiation case consisted of a negotiation dyad in which participants had to negotiate the price of a house with the experimenter. Each of the participants was assigned the role of buyer; the experimenter played the role of seller of the house.

Before the negotiation took place, the participants received a case briefing in which they were told that they would negotiate the price of a house that had an asking price of € 250000.000. To help the participants and to structure the negotiations, information needed to justify their offer was provided (e.g., the average selling prices of houses in the neighborhood). The participants were given approximately 5 minutes to prepare for the negotiation, and the negotiation lasted for approximately 10 minutes. To ensure that the behavior of the seller was constant across all negotiations (i.e., for all participants), counter arguments for every argument that participants could use during the negotiation were created in advance.

The participants’ wrote their first offer on the case briefing prior to the negotiation. The participants’ final offer was written down by the experimenter on a blank sheet immediately after the negotiation.

Procedure

The experiment consisted of two parts. The first part, the manipulation phase, was conducted in a laboratory and consisted of, respectively, (a) a premeasurement of the participants’ self-ratings on power-relevant traits, in the form of a survey they were asked to fill out consisting of questions about their age, gender, and the seven self-ratings on power-relevant traits, (b) the experimental manipulation, in which participants were either primed with power or the control task, (c) a postmeasurement of the participants’ self-ratings on power-relevant traits, and (d) the negotiation case briefing. The second part consisted of the actual negotiation.

When the participants arrived at the laboratory, they were told that the goal of the experiment was to get insight into peoples’ decision-making patterns (i.e., no mention was made about the role of power). They were not told that they would be negotiating with the experimenter because this might have affected the course of the experiment. Before the negotiation would take place, the participants were asked to complete a writing task (the premeasurement self-ratings on power-relevant traits). After

completing the premeasurement survey, the power manipulation task or the control manipulation task was administered. Participants were given a blank sheet to write on and were given approximately 7 minutes to complete the task (i.e., 2 minutes to read the task and 5 minutes to complete it). To avoid distractions, the experimenter was not present in the room during this task. After the power manipulation, the participants completed the postmeasurement self-ratings on power-relevant traits. After that, the participants were given five minutes to read the negotiation case and to prepare for the negotiation.

After the preparation time, the negotiation started. The participants were asked to start the negotiation by making an offer on the house. Immediately after that, the seller told them that their offer was much lower than he had expected, and participants were asked to provide arguments that justified their offer. Each argument of the participant was challenged by the seller, who argued that their current offer was too low and that the current asking price of the house was a reasonable price.

During the course of the negotiations, participants were allowed to make subsequent offers. If participants asked the seller to make a concession, the seller would make a new offer each time that was €1000.00 lower than the previous offer. The lowest acceptable offer was €210000.00 (i.e., 16% below the asking price).

After approximately 10 minutes of negotiation, the participants were asked to make a final offer. This offer was taken to be the negotiation outcome. If participants made a final offer that was lower than the minimum price, they were told that their final offer was rejected and that there was no negotiation agreement. In all the negotiations, the buyers and the seller reached an agreement, that is, of all the 101 participants in the study, none made a final offer that was lower than the minimum asking price.

Manipulation Checks

To examine the effectiveness of the power-priming and the control-priming task, a mixed-design repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on participants' self-ratings on power-relevant traits. The independent variables were gender, priming condition (control prime or power prime), and timing of the measurement of the self-ratings on power-relevant traits (before manipulation or after manipulation). The dependent variables were the participants' self-ratings on power-relevant traits. Table 1 shows the means of the participants' sense of power before and after the priming manipulations. The results showed a significant interaction between the priming condition and the timing of the measurement of the participants' sense of power, $F(1, 97) = 65.81, p < .001, r = .40$. To break down this interaction, pairwise comparisons were performed. Participants in the power-priming condition perceived more power after the power prime ($M = 6.09, SD = 1.04$) than before it ($M = 5.71, SD = 1.06$): $F(1, 97) = 167.96, p < .001$,

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Participants' Sense of Power Before and After the Power-Prime or Control-Prime Task, Separated by Gender

| | Men | | Women | |
|----------------------|---------------------|------|-----------------------|------|
| | M | SD | M | SD |
| Power-priming task | | | | |
| Before manipulation | 5.78 _c | 1.03 | 5.64 _d | 1.11 |
| After manipulation | 5.89 _{a,c} | 0.97 | 6.28 _{a,b,d} | 1.10 |
| Control-priming task | | | | |
| Before manipulation | 6.28 | 0.97 | 6.10 | 0.97 |
| After manipulation | 6.31 | 0.97 | 6.15 _b | 0.97 |

Notes. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly according to the simple effects test.

a,b,c

< .05. d

< .001.

$r = .63$. By contrast, participants who did the control prime perceived as much power after the control prime ($M = 6.23, SD = 0.97$) as before it ($M = 6.20, SD = 0.97$): $F(1, 97) = 1.62, p = .21$. This interaction effect must be interpreted, however, in light of a significant three-way interaction of gender, condition, and timing of the measurement of the sense of power, $F(1, 99) = 37.97, p < .001, r = .28$. To break down this interaction, pairwise comparisons were again performed. Women in the power-prime condition perceived more power after the power prime ($M = 6.28, SD = 1.10$) than before it ($M = 5.64, SD = 1.11$): $F(1, 97) = 245.00, p < .001, r = .72$. Men in the power-prime condition also perceived more power after the power prime ($M = 5.89, SD = 0.97$) than before it ($M = 5.78, SD = 1.03$): $F(1, 97) = 7.16, p < .01, r = .07$. The women who did the control prime perceived as much power after the control prime ($M = 6.15, SD = 0.97$) as before it ($M = 6.10, SD = 0.97$): $F(1, 97) = 1.24, p = .27$, and the same holds for men ($M_{\text{after control prime}} = 6.31, SD = 0.97$; $M_{\text{before control prime}} = 6.28, SD = 0.97$): $F(1, 97) = 0.47, p = .50$. Thus, the power-prime manipulation turned out to be effective and worked out considerably more strongly for women.

Results

Gender, Power, and First Offers

Table 2 shows the means of first offers by gender and priming condition. We expected men to make better first offers than women if they had not been primed with power. We also expected women to make better first offers when they were primed with power, whereas men’s first offers would not be affected by power. Furthermore, we expected men’s and women’s first offers to differ less from each other when primed with power. To examine this, a two-way ANOVA was performed with gender and priming conditions (power prime vs. control prime) as independent variables. The dependent variable was the amount of money offered by the participants in the first proposal.

The results show no main effect of gender: $F(1, 97) = 3.27, p = .07$. Women’s ($M = 227330.0, SD = 8444.1$) first offers were similar to those of men ($M = 224392.2, SD = 9000.7$). Neither was there a main effect of the priming condition: $F(1, 97) = 2.88, p = .09$, which indicated that the first offers of participants who received the control prime ($M = 227295.9, SD = 10256.1$) were similar to those of participants who were primed with the experience of having power ($M = 224480.8, SD = 7020.3$).

However, there was an interaction between gender and priming condition: $F(1, 97) = 4.05, p < .05, \eta^2 = .04$. Simple effects tests show that when not primed with power, men made better (i.e., lower) first offers ($M = 224120.0, SD = 10580.3$) than women ($M = 230604.2, SD = 8962.5$): $F(1, 98) = 6.83,$

Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for First Offers and Negotiation Outcomes After the Power-Prime or Control-Prime Task, Separated by Gender

| | Control-prime task | | Power prime | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---------|-----------------------|--------|
| | M | SD | M | SD |
| First offer | | | | |
| Men | 224120.0 _b | 10580.3 | 224653.9 | 7376.7 |
| Women | 230604.2 _{a,b} | 8962.5 | 224307.7 _a | 6786.9 |
| Negotiation outcome | | | | |
| Men | 232300.0 _d | 9211.6 | 231826.9 | 7310.2 |
| Women | 240145.8 _{c,d} | 6731.6 | 232211.5 _c | 5846.6 |

Notes. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly according to the simple effects test.

$a,bp < .05$. $c p < .01$. $d p < .001$.

$p < .05$, $r_{\text{Gender}(\text{control prime})} = .26$. Furthermore, women who were primed with the experience of having power made better first offers ($M = 224307.7$, $SD = 6786.9$) than women who had done the control task ($M = 230604.2$, $SD = 6786.9$): $F(1, 98) = 6.40$, $p < .05$, $r_{\text{Priming condition (women)}} = .25$. The results also show that when primed with power, men made first offers ($M = 224653.9$, $SD = 7376.7$) that were similar to the first offers of women ($M = 224307.7$, $SD = 6786.9$): $F(1, 98) = 0.02$, $p = .89$, $r_{\text{Gender (power prime)}} = .01$. In all, the results show that the interaction is the result of women's first offers, primed with power.

Gender, Power, and Negotiation Outcomes

Table 2 shows the means of negotiation outcomes by gender and priming condition. We expected men to reach better negotiation outcomes than women if they had not been primed with power. We also expected women to reach better negotiation outcomes when they were primed with power, whereas men's negotiation outcomes would not be affected by power. Furthermore, we expected men's and women's negotiation outcomes to differ less from each other when primed with power, because women would reach better negotiation outcomes for themselves in that case. To examine this, a two-way ANOVA was performed. In the ANOVA, gender and priming conditions (power prime vs. control prime) were the independent variables. The amount of the participants' final offer reflected the negotiated outcome and was the dependent variable.

The results show a main effect of gender: $F(1, 97) = 7.86$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. The negotiated outcomes of men were better ($M = 232058.8$, $SD = 8216.2$) than those of women ($M = 236020.0$, $SD = 7399.0$). There was also a main effect of condition: $F(1, 97) = 8.21$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Participants who were primed with the experience of having power ($M = 232019.2$, $SD = 6556.7$) negotiated better outcomes than those who did the control task ($M = 236142.9$, $SD = 8935.5$).

In addition, there was an interaction between gender and priming condition: $F(1, 97) = 6.46$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .05$. Simple effects tests show that when not primed with power, men negotiated better outcomes ($M = 232300.0$, $SD = 9211.6$) than women ($M = 240145.8$, $SD = 6731.6$): $F(1, 98) = 12.64$, $p < .01$, $r_{\text{Gender}(\text{control prime})} = .34$. Furthermore, women who were primed with the experience of having power negotiated better outcomes ($M = 232211.5$, $SD = 5846.6$) than women who did the control task ($M = 240145.8$, $SD = 6731.6$): $F(1, 98) = 12.97$, $p < .001$, $r_{\text{Priming condition(women)}} = .34$. The results also show that when primed with power, men negotiated outcomes ($M = 231826.9$, $SD = 7310.2$) that were similar to the negotiated outcomes of women ($M = 232211.5$, $SD = 5846.6$): $F(1, 98) = 0.03$, $p = .86$, $r_{\text{Gender}(\text{power prime})} = .02$. Like men's and women's first offers, the results show that the interaction is the result of the negotiation outcome of women primed with power.

Discussion

This study examined whether the experience of having power influenced men's and women's negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes in a different way. To answer these questions, men's and women's first offers were examined as well as their negotiated outcomes. It was hypothesized that, in general, men will make better first offer than women (Hypothesis 1a). It was furthermore expected that gender interacts with power in such a way that power causes women to make better first offers (Hypothesis 1b). As a result of the effect power has on women's negotiation behavior, men's and women's first offers will differ less from each other than they normally do (Hypothesis 1c).

The results of the analyses show that men's first offer did not differ from women's first offer. Furthermore, the results show that women primed with the experience of having power did indeed make better first offers than women who were not. By contrast, men were not affected by the power-prime manipulation: Men who were primed to experience power made first offers that were similar to the first offers of men not primed to experience power. In all, the results support Hypotheses 1b and 1c.

The second set of hypotheses predicted that, in general, men will reach better negotiation outcomes than women (Hypothesis 2a). It was furthermore expected that gender interacts with power in that power will cause women to reach better negotiation outcomes (Hypothesis 2b). As a result of the effect power has on women's negotiation behavior, men's and women's negotiation outcomes will differ less from each other than they normally do (Hypothesis 2c). The results of the analyses show that while men did indeed negotiate better outcomes than women, power affected women's negotiation outcomes positively: Power-primed women negotiated better outcomes than did women who were not primed with power. The negotiated outcomes of men, in contrast, were not affected by the power-prime manipulation. As a result, the negotiation outcome of power-primed women did not differ from the negotiation outcomes of the power-primed men. In all, these results support Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

This study contributes to the growing literature on power (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003) by examining how gender influences the effect of power on negotiation behavior in a distributive bargaining situation. It was expected that power would affect men and women in a different way. To this end, it was theorized that women's negotiation behavior would be influenced by power because power activates personality traits and negotiation behaviors that relate to power and a male gender role, such as claiming (more) value (i.e., making better offers) and making fewer concessions. In contrast to women, however, we expected men not to be affected by power in a negotiation as negotiations are more in line with a male gender role, and negotiations are presumed to be part of the masculine social role (e.g., Kray & Thompson, 2005; Stuhlmacher et al., 2007).

Whereas many studies operationalized power by assigning a BATNA to participants (e.g., Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994) or by using contextual or position-based sources of power (for a review, see Lewicki et al., 2010), this study shows that the recollection of having power can also become a psychological source of power for an individual (Galinsky et al., 2003). Based on the approach or inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003), it was reasoned that the experience of having power, through priming power, causes an individual in a distributive bargaining situation to behave more in a manner that satisfies the individual's goals. Since this behavior is often reflected in the offers one makes, and keeping in mind that the goals in buyer-seller bargaining situations often pertain to acquiring a product from the other party at the lowest price possible, it was reasoned that the experience of having power would affect individuals' negotiation behavior. The results of this study show that while men and women both perceived an increased sense of power after the power-prime manipulation, only women's negotiation behavior was affected by the power prime. Women who experienced power made better first offers and reached better negotiation outcomes than did women who were not primed to experience power. Interestingly, power-primed women even negotiated outcomes that did not differ at all from those of men. This highlights the strong effect of power on women's behavior in negotiation, as it not only reduced the gender gap in negotiation outcomes (Bowles et al., 2005; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) but also diminished differences in negotiation outcomes between men and women. In all, the results of this study support our claims and also support the findings of previous studies, which also reported no effect of power on men's behavior (Magee et al., 2007; Small et al., 2007).

Second, the results of this study are in line with the notion that gender differences in negotiation behavior are, in part, due to differences in social power between men and women. Small et al. (2007) argued that women might view the prospect of negotiating as a face-threatening act when negotiations are framed as negotiating as opposed to asking. According to Small et al. (2007), framing situations as negotiating refers to situations in which individuals make demands from a powerful position, which is incongruent with women's relatively low-power status in society (Eagly & Wood, 1982; Henley & LaFrance, 1984). Small et al. (2007) also argued that men are less intimidated by the prospect of negotiating when framed as negotiating, as this is more congruent with their high-power status in society.

Small et al. (2007) showed that, compared to men, women initiated fewer negotiations and felt more intimidated when negotiations were framed as opportunities to negotiate than when negotiations were framed as opportunities for asking. This feeling of being intimidated might consequently affect women's negotiation performance. The results of this study show that women who were not primed to experience power made worse first offers and negotiated worse outcomes than men in general and than women who had been primed with experiencing power. Thus, it might be that the negotiation task in this study felt more intimidating to women who had not been primed to experience power than to those who had.

From a practical point of view, the results of this study suggest a focus on empowerment as an intervention to help women in negotiations. Women who are primed to experience power are more likely to negotiate better outcomes for themselves. According to Lewicki et al. (2010), it is important to be aware of power in negotiations. Thus, negotiation trainers should address issues of power to make women more aware of the role of power in negotiations. This may particularly apply to women who are negotiating for their salary. It should be taken into account, however, that it may not always be beneficial for women to behave (more) powerfully in negotiations. Displaying powerful behavior is more congruent with the male gender role than the female gender role. As such, negotiating parties may expect gender role congruent behavior of female negotiators. When this behavior is incongruent, this may result in a backlash toward the female negotiator (e.g., Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).

Limitations and Future Research

The negotiation case consisted of a distributive bargaining situation in which participants had to negotiate with the experimenter on the asking price of a house. We cannot exclude that this affected the negotiation outcomes, as most students in negotiation experiments usually negotiate with each other or with a confederate of the experiment, not with the experimenter. Consequently, the knowledge that the participants had to negotiate with the experimenter might have affected participants' feelings and behaviors, for instance by creating heightened anxiety. However, the results of this study did not indicate such effects. The fact that the experimenter was similar to the participants in age and status probably accounts for this. Nevertheless, it is not implausible that some individuals in this experiment may have adapted their negotiation behavior on being confronted with the experimenter. Future research should therefore examine whether similar results are found when the negotiation dyad consists solely of participating individuals (e.g., students or confederates of the experiment).

Another limitation of this study concerns the dependent variables that were used to examine the negotiation behavior. This study only focused on the first offers and the negotiated outcomes of the individuals. There are, however, more factors that affect negotiators' performance. The number of concessions one makes or the amount of the concessions also influences a negotiator's success (Lewicki et al., 2010). It would therefore be interesting to examine how power affects these negotiation behaviors in general and to what extent it differentially influences men's and women's negotiation behavior. As high-power individuals are more likely to act in ways that satisfy their goals (Galinsky et al., 2003), the experience of power may result in making slighter and also fewer concessions during negotiations.

The effect of power on women may change the current views about women in negotiations. For example, while research shows that women tend to frame conflicts in terms of relationship characteristics (Pinkley, 1990), the experience of power may lead women to perceive and interpret conflicts more in terms of task characteristics. Consequently, this could lead women to act less cooperatively and more competitively in negotiations. In addition, the experience of power could change the view that women tend to be more insecure than men in determining their worth when negotiating their salary (Barron, 2003). Wojciszke and Struzynska-Kujalowicz (2007) showed that participants who were primed with high power scored higher on self-esteem than participants primed with low power, which may lead women to get better outcomes in salary negotiations. Therefore, future research should test more

predictions of the approach or inhibition theory of power to get more insight into the effects of power on women's negotiation behavior.

The focus of this study was on the effects of increased power in negotiation behavior. This study did not examine the possible effect of reduced power on men's and women's negotiation performance. As reduced power is posited to activate the behavioral inhibition system (Keltner et al., 2003), resulting in repressed and avoidance behavior, this may affect the size and number of offers and the negotiation outcomes of individuals. For example, individuals who are primed to experience low power may be more inclined to make worse offers than control or high-power individuals, as these individuals are more likely to avoid actions that may lead to punishments by others (Keltner et al., 2003). Therefore, future studies should also examine the effects of low power on negotiation behavior.

Conclusion

This study broadens the literature on gender and negotiation by integrating literature on power and by its focus on the effects of power on men's and women's negotiation behavior. The results of this study show that the experience of having power benefits women in such a way that women who are primed with the experience of having power are more likely to negotiate better first offers and outcomes for themselves. Men, by contrast, are not likely to be affected by the experience of having power. While women in general tend to negotiate worse negotiation outcomes than men, this study shows that this gender gap can be reduced or even overcome by influencing women's perceptions of power.

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