negotiation and conflict management research

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When White Feels Right: The Effects of In-Group Affect and Race of Partner on Negotiation Performance

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Abstract

This research investigated the unique role of racial in-group affect, or liking one's racial group, to foster or inhibit integration in negotiations with different race partners. We hypothesized that when the racial backgrounds of the negotiators are salient, threat inherent in negotiations activates in-group affect for some White negotiators (those more "glad to be White"), triggering divergent negotiation approaches with White versus Black counterparts. In support of our hypotheses, we found that when negotiating with a Black confederate, stronger in-group affect of White participants was a liability, relating to poorer joint outcomes and a "chilling and competing" negotiation approach. When negotiating with a White confederate, stronger in-group affect of White participants instead boosted the dyad's joint outcomes by fostering greater trust. The meaning and practical implications of strong in-group affect in negotiations with diverse counterparts are discussed.

Considering the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the modern workplace in North America (Gandz, 2001; Toossi, 2006), organizational interactions between individuals from different racial backgrounds are becoming more and more common, be they in diverse work teams (Greer, Homan, De Hoogh, & Den Hartog, 2012; van Dick, van Knippenberg, Hägele, Guillaume, & Brodbeck, 2008), in interfirm partnerships, or across the negotiation table. Despite the history of conflict, oppression, and racial tensions between the majority White group and minority groups in North America, especially Blacks, virtually no psychological research has investigated whether racial identities of negotiators influence how the substantive deal is negotiated. In this study, we propose that racial in-group affect of White negotiators (i.e., being "glad to be White") has a unique role in triggering divergent negotiation approaches with White versus Black partners. We will argue that White negotiators' in-group affect, when activated, sets the stage for more co-operative, trusting, and effective negotiation approaches with White partners versus dominating, cold, and ineffective negotiation approaches with Black partners—despite the fact that the issues to be negotiated are unrelated to racial group membership.

We focus this initial investigation on White negotiators partnered with White versus Black counterparts because, as the majority group whose members disproportionately hold positions of organizational power (Mor Barak, Cherin & Berkman, 1998), their potentially different responses have the most impact on minority opportunities given that workplace negotiations determine such highly consequential outcomes as salary, job duties, resources, and training and promotion opportunities. In terms of outcomes, we focus on integrative negotiation results or the joint gains of the White–White versus White–Black negotiating pairs because so many negotiation situations are not purely win–lose (distributive)

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endeavors but hold the potential for win–win or integrative solutions (Raiffa, 1982). The novel contribution of our work is to begin unraveling how modern racial identities influence behavior and outcomes at the negotiation table in North America.

In-Group Identification

Individuals vary widely in the degree to which they identify with the groups to which they belong (Cameron, 2004; Cameron & Lalonde, 2001; Obst & White, 2005), for example, their racial group (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Phinney, 1992). In-group identification is a construct derived from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), defined as the degree to which one identifies with a social group to which they belong and the quality of their affective evaluation of the group (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). Research has clearly shown that identifying with one's in-group is not the same thing as prejudice (a negative attitude or affective aversion toward the out-group) and does not necessarily imply disliking or derogating the out-group or its members (Brown, 2000). For example, according to social identity complexity theory, individuals who see themselves as embedded in a network of multiple cross-cutting identity groups (e.g., White, Canadian, dentist, and vegetarian) have a more inclusive and complex identity structure that relates to greater tolerance of out-groups (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Under many circumstances, individuals display both a strong identification with a self-relevant in-group and a positive or nonprejudiced evaluation of out-group members (Brewer, 1999; Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006; Raden, 2003; Voci, 2006).

Situational Threat in Negotiation

Overall, then, research has not shown there to be a reliable, cross-situation correlation between in-group identification and out-group antipathy (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brown, 2000; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). However, negotiations arguably present situational threat. First, negotiation is a mixed-motive endeavor in which contested resources are divided between the parties, and there is a well-noted tendency for individuals to assume that negotiation is a zero-sum game with a fixed pie of resources (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). It therefore seems likely that negotiations prime resource threat and resource competition. Second, symbolic threat (Stephan et al., 2002) is likely also present in negotiations in which racial identity is salient and out-group members are present, especially when the groups involved have a history of conflict and oppression, such as Whites and Blacks in North America.

Under threatening circumstances, in-group identifiers do tend to engage in greater prejudice and discrimination (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian, & Hewstone, 2001; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Grant & Brown, 1995; Kenworthy, Barden, Diamond & del Carmen, 2011; Lowery et al., 2006; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Voci, 2006), despite the lack of a reliable, cross-situation correlation between in-group identification and out-group antipathy (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brown, 2000; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). For example, in field studies among different ethnic groups, in-group identification predicts out-group prejudice only among groups with a history of conflict and oppression (Bombay, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Duckitt, Callaghan, & Wagner, 2005; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Thus, the more highly racially identified White negotiators are, the more likely it is that negotiation with a Black counterpart could activate negative impressions and prejudiced responses.

The Meaning of Affective Racial Identification

There is recent consensus that in-group identification is a multidimensional construct comprised of three to five facets (Cameron, 2004; Duckitt et al., 2005; Leach et al., 2008). Common among measures are

separate cognitive and affective facets, following the definition of social identity put forth by Tajfel (1978, p. 63) stressing that in-group identification contains both knowledge of group membership and affective valence of the membership. We posit that the theoretical and predictive power of the social identity construct is greatly advanced by harnessing the established unique qualities of the subfacets of social identity measures (Cameron, 2004; Cameron & Lalonde, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2005; Obst & White, 2005).

Affective racial identification represents the valence of one's feelings about one's racial group, that is, liking the group, thinking it has positive attributes, and feeling good about being a member of that group (Cameron, 2004). It is an emotional allegiance to the group. Under the situational threat of negotiation when racial identities of the counterparts are salient, we expect that affective racial identification uniquely marks a tendency to connect and negotiate in divergent ways with White versus Black partners. Our prediction is supported by recent work that measured facets of in-group identification separately. Duckitt and colleagues (Duckitt et al., 2005) measured multiple dimensions of the ethnic in-group identification of members of four groups in South Africa. They found that only the more affective dimension representing evaluation about one's ethnic in-group related to more negative out-group attitudes—and only for groups with a history of significant conflict and oppression (between African Blacks and Afrikaans Whites). The relationship between attitudinal ethnic identification and evaluations of other out-groups was zero or positive, depending on the inter-group context, replicating systematic variability in this correlation based on the historical relationships among groups (Bombay et al., 2010; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Hinkle & Brown, 1990).

Under the situational threat of negotiation with a Black partner, we therefore expect that greater affective attachment to their White in-group will increase the sense of competition (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995) that White negotiators feel toward a Black counterpart and therefore escalate their competing stance (also known as dominating conflict behavior, reflecting pushing for one's own interests at the expense of the counterpart's, Rahim, 1983). Given that a dominating approach is not productive for expanding the pie in negotiations with integrative potential (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), we propose that the combination of negotiating with a Black partner and being more affectively identified with one's White group elicits disruptions in uncovering joint gains for White negotiators. We also expect that this competitive motivation will elicit colder interpersonal responses to the Black partner. High in-group affect White negotiators may show a greater tendency to experience common distancing reactions to their Black partners such as anxiety (Finchilescu, 2010; Plant, 2004), physiological threat (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001), and concerns over how one is coming across (Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998). If the development of trust and rapport is hindered in this way for highly identified White negotiators, they are likely to share and elicit less information, further reducing joint gains (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

In the case when high in-group affect White negotiators are paired with White partners, we instead hypothesize a boost to their integrative performance compared with low in-group affect White negotiators. Here, we propose that when people like their in-group better, they are quick to connect with individuals who share their group membership, facilitating communication, trust, and information sharing. All of these things, in turn, tend to promote a dual focus on self and other, which encourage an integrative negotiation style (focusing on the interests of the self and the partner) and increase joint gains in integratively structured negotiation tasks (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

On the other hand, for those who do not have positive affect for their White racial group, there may be little or no discrepancy between their integrative negotiation performance with White versus Black partners. The literature reviewed suggests that even under symbolic or resource threat, White individuals without positive affect toward their group will react very little to the interracial component of the negotiation interaction, acting like themselves as individuals rather than as group members (Voci, 2006). We expect that as a result, the integrative outcomes, competitive stance, and warmth with their counterpart of low in-group affect White negotiators will be similar when they negotiate with White and Black

counterparts. Finally, we expect that our anticipated pattern of results would occur only for in-group affect and not other facets of racial identification (e.g., centrality/importance to identity or ties/bonds, Cameron, 2004), based on our foregoing review of the unique definition and operation of in-group affect under threat.

Hypotheses

Based on the foregoing review and our analysis that negotiation presents situational threat, we expect an interaction between the racial mix of a negotiating dyad and the in-group affect of the White negotiator: Among people who feel more positively toward their White in-group, there should be an amplification of both negotiation difficulties with Black partners and of negotiation ease with White partners.

In addition, we anticipate an overall main effect for race of negotiation counterpart. Compared with in-group negotiators, out-group members tend to have higher impasse rates and colder affective responses, and they also engage in less information sharing and seeking in negotiation (defined as university affiliation, Moore, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 1999; Thompson et al., 1995; fictitious national identity, Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988; academic program, Harinck & Ellemers, 2006; and individualist versus collectivist culture group membership, Adair, 2003; Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001). Further, field studies have indicated an overall slight negotiation disadvantage for Black compared with White customers (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995; Gillis & Alexander, 2004). These past studies suggest that White negotiators paired with Black counterparts will achieve lower overall average joint gains than those paired with other White partners.

***Hypothesis 1*:** White negotiators interacting with Black partners will demonstrate decrements in joint gains, compared to those with White partners.

***Hypothesis 2*:** For White negotiators, there will be an interaction between the race of their partner (White vs. Black) and their racial in-group affect in predicting joint gains, such that:

***Hypothesis 2a*:** When White negotiators are paired with Black partners, higher in-group affect of the White participant will predict lower joint gains.

***Hypothesis 2b*:** When White negotiators are paired with White partners, higher in-group affect of the White participant will predict higher joint gains.

Our hypotheses assume that greater joint outcomes for those White negotiators higher on in-group affect who face White counterparts are the result of a *warming and co-operating* process, including greater trust, greater liking, and a more co-operative bargaining approach. On the other hand, we expect that lower joint outcomes for those White negotiators higher on in-group affect who face Black counterparts would be the result of a *chilling and competing* process, including lower trust, lower liking, and a more competitive bargaining approach. We measure process variables related to these assumptions and test for mediation.

Method

Because of the potential sensitivity of the racial in-group identification measure, we measured it in a pretest one week prior to the negotiation task. Participants were recruited under the cover story that the pretest and negotiation task were two unrelated studies being carried out in co-operation by two different graduate students and that the second one had particular entrance criteria such that not everyone would be invited to participate.

Design

The design involved a manipulated factor (partner race, White vs. Black) and a continuously measured individual difference variable (racial in-group affect). We matched the White participants and their ostensible partners on gender. As an incentive to perform well on the task, tickets for five draws of $100 cash were given in proportion to the points earned in the negotiation.

Pretest

Two hundred and eighteen undergraduate students taking business and psychology courses at a small Canadian university participated in the pretest. All White participants were called and invited to participate in the negotiation task approximately one week later. The pretest included demographic items, a measure of racial in-group identification, covariate measures, and several filler scales to help reduce the salience of the racial in-group identification scale.

Participants

Eighty-one White participants ($n = 39$ Black partner condition, $n = 42$ White partner condition) returned for the main study involving an electronically mediated negotiation task with an ostensible partner (a confederate of the experiment). The sample was 73% female and had an average age of 20.4 years.

Measures

Covariates

In our regression models predicting joint gains and process measures, we control for four covariates. We control for participant gender because males tend to outperform females in negotiations by a small amount on average (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998), and because some situations activate gender triggers such that males or females perform substantially better (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005). We control for age to account for differences in experience with negotiation, exposure to the workplace, and possible cohort-related differences in exposure to or perceptions of out-groups. Given the sensitivity of issues of race and the common desire of White North Americans to avoid the appearance of prejudice (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010; Plant & Divine, 1998), we also controlled for two scales from Lennox and Wolfe's (1984) Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (RSMS) that tap responsiveness to sensitive social situations: Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior of Others (e.g., "I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes," six items, $\alpha = .75$) and Ability to Modify Self-Presentation (e.g., "In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for," seven items, $\alpha = .82$). These scales have established internal consistency and test–retest reliability (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984).

In-Group Identification

We administered Cameron's (2004) three-factor measure of social identity due to the evidence for the strong reliability and conceptual and empirical distinctiveness of its facets (Cameron, 2004; Cameron & Lalonde, 2001; Obst & White, 2005). This scale is comprised of a cognitive *centrality* component, an *affect* or evaluative component, and an interdependence or *ties* component. As discussed, our main interest was in the affective factor of Cameron's (2004) three-factor model because of our theoretical expectation that this facet would best predict both a bonding and co-operating with same-group members, and distancing and competing with out-group members. The in-group affect scale's four items ask how much the individual likes his or her in-group, which we customized for racial in-group (e.g., "In general, I'm

glad to be a member of my racial/ethnic group," $\alpha = .77$). We also administered the other subscales: In-group ties, which refers to the extent to which individuals feel they are similar or connected to their in-group (e.g., "I have a lot in common with other members of my racial/ethnic group," four items, $\alpha = .60$), and centrality, which measures whether being a member of the in-group is important to the individual (e.g., "Overall, being a member of my racial/ethnic group has very little to do with how I feel about myself," four items, $\alpha = .55$). Participants responded to all subscales using a 6-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree). The internal consistency reliabilities for these two scales were low in our sample, in contrast to their typical range of $\alpha = .70$–.80 (Cameron, 2004).

Filler Items

During the pretest, participants also filled out measures of homophobia, depression, and hypercompetitiveness, to further mask the purposes of the study.

Negotiation Task

The negotiation task was conducted via remote e-chat, and the cover story of the study was the investigation of computer-based negotiations. We modified the New Recruit task (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), creating a five-issue negotiation scenario between a job candidate and a hiring manager. The issues of starting salary and amount of vacation time were integrative issues, health insurance plan and the way in which overtime was paid were symmetrical distributive issues, and the location of employment was a compatible issue. The job candidate role explained that the candidate had a lifestyle such that vacation time for travel was of utmost importance, whereas the hiring manager's role explained that starting salary was the top issue.

Because one of our primary interests was the effect of the independent variables on joint value creation (integration), we set up the payoffs so that trade-offs were considerably more lucrative if they were 100% trades, that is, an agreement in which the salary is the lowest option and the vacation days are the highest. The payoffs in the task were also designed to make the top two issues much more important than the remaining issues: Issues were worth a maximum of 65 points, 32 points, 12 points, 8 points, and 4 points in order of importance. These modifications to the case were designed to reflect the reality that often, to reap significant benefits of log-rolling, parties need to prioritize their interests and fully trade them off (accepting the least desirable option on a less important issue in exchange for the most desirable option on a more important issue, Thompson, 2012). In combination with the tough distributive bargaining stance the confederate script assumed, this point structure gave incentive for participants to demonstrate the true "resistance to yielding" behavior that characterizes deeply integrative deals (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984).

Confederate Script

Because our student participants were more likely to be able to envision and relate to the new recruit role, all participants were assigned to play the role of a new recruit while confederates played the role of the manager to provide maximal realism to the scenario. During the e-chat negotiations, confederates were trained to administer nearly verbatim scripted responses to the offers and comments of the White participant partners by cutting, pasting, and modifying an electronic version of the script in a separate computer laboratory from the participants. Confederates opened the negotiation with a scripted line stating the basic agenda and identifying salary and vacation time as most important to them. After this point, the script forces the participant to lead the offer-making in order for variance in the dyadic result to be due only to the negotiation behavior of the real participant.

For each issue or package of issues, the script provides blocks of text and counter-offers in three categories based on what the participant does: chit-chat, content (interests), and offers. If the participant chats, the confederate chats back; if the participant discusses interests without making offers, the

confederate does too; and if the participant makes an offer, the confederate counter-offers with a comment. The confederate's script is one of a very tough bargainer who does not concede easily (and less so on priority issues) in order that the negotiated settlements also reflect the distributive bargaining skills of the participant. For example on salary, the top priority issue for the manager (confederate) role, the participant had to hold firm on an offer for three rounds of bargaining before the manager conceded by increasing the salary one step higher, whereas for overtime, the lowest priority issue for the manager role, worth 8 points, the manager always agreed after only one counter-offer. Package deals in which integrative trades are made across salary and vacation time had a separate flow chart such that confederates never proposed trade-offs but were responsive to participant proposals to do so. The full confederate script can be obtained by contacting the first author.

Confederates, Manipulation, and Procedure

The study employed four university-aged actors to serve as confederates in the study: One Black male, one Black female, one White male, and one White female. Four participants arrived to a classroom for each session, along with the four actors posing as students. The study was introduced as an investigation about computer-based bargaining, and participants were told they would be randomly paired with one of the other students to conduct a negotiation over e-chat. Participants (and confederates) introduced themselves to the group, and we took a digital head-shot photo of each person as their online bargaining "profile picture." We then assigned all participants to the candidate role using a faux random-assignment procedure and gave everyone a preparation period to review their role materials. Meanwhile, actual random assignment of participants to the White versus Black partner condition occurred in the two breakout computer laboratories via a coin flip. To manipulate partner race, a Black or White confederate picture and name, matched on gender, was loaded as the profile of one's partner on *MSN Chat*. So, for example, if a White female was assigned to the Black partner condition, the picture of the Black female confederate was shown as her partner's profile. Participants (Candidates) and confederates (Recruiters) were led to these separate prepared computer laboratories to negotiate for up to 40 minutes (impasse = 0 points). Agreement rates were high (89.6%) and did not differ significantly by experimental condition (Black partner, 86.5%; White partner, 92.5%; $\chi^2[1] = .75$, $p = .39$).

After a deal or the time limit was reached, participants completed an online postnegotiation survey that recorded the deal, two hypothesized process measure (trust, liking), and perceptions of the study's goals (designed to capture any suspicions about the confederates). Participants were debriefed regarding the use of confederates via e-mail once all the data were collected.

Dependent Measure

The dependent measure was the integrative performance of the participant as reflected by the *joint gain* from the negotiation, that is, the sum of the participant's plus the confederate's points earned in the deal.

Process Measures

As outlined in the introduction, we expected the interaction of race and in-group affect to elicit different processes in terms of co-operativeness versus competitiveness and warm versus cold interpersonal interactions. As an objective measure of competitive bargaining approach, the job candidate's *opening offer* on vacation time (maximum days of vacation being a high priority in the role) was coded from negotiation transcripts. However, due to a server problem, unfortunately, only 75% of the electronic negotiation transcript files were properly saved such that the analysis of opening offer as a mediator is tested only among these 61 (of 81) negotiation. We note that our main interaction between condition and in-group

affect on joint gains was still significant in this subsample, and it was the only significant effect ($B = .36$, $t[46] = 2.50$, $p = .02$, $R^2 = .19$).

We measured perceived trust and liking of the partner as indicators of the warm versus cold feeling of the interpersonal connection for the participant, measured on the postnegotiation survey. *Trust* was assessed with six items about trust of the partner's intentions (e.g., "My partner was trying to take advantage of me," reverse coded, "My partner was trying to reach an equal solution with me," "I do not trust my partner," reverse coded, $\alpha = .63$) on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree). *Liking* was assessed with six questions from Coyne's (1976) desire for future interaction scale (e.g., "Would you like to meet the other participant outside the experiment?", "Would you be willing to work with the other participant on a job?", "Would you consider admitting the other participant to your circle of friends?", $\alpha = .90$) on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at All to 7 = Very Much).

Results

We report means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among all variables in Table 1 and regression results in Table 2. It is noteworthy that our in-group affect measure's items (some reflected) indicate feelings ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree) with liking the White group. This scale had a skewed distribution, ranging from 2.25 to 6.0 with only one participant scoring lower than 3 (Slightly Disagree). In other words, virtually no participants endorsed a negatively valenced evaluation of their White in-group. This measure in this particular sample therefore primarily represents a continuum from feeling neutral to feeling strongly positively about the White group, a fact that will guide our interpretation of results.

To test the main and interactive effects of in-group affect and race of partner on joint gains and hypothesized process variables, we used multiple regression with sequential steps of predictors: (a) covariates age, gender, and the two self-monitoring scales, (b) partner race (0 = White partner, 1 = Black partner) and in-group affect, and (c) a multiplicative term for the partner race by in-group affect interaction.

Joint Gains

Because of the payoffs and the standardization of the confederate script used in this study, joint gains should be primarily determined by the extent to which the participant proposed and agreed to tradeoffs between differently valued negotiation issues. Therefore, although typically considered a dyadic outcome, in our study, joint gains primarily reflect the integrative negotiation performance of the White participant.

Hypothesis 1, which predicted an overall decrease in integrative negotiation performance for those with Black partners, was not supported. Partner race did not show a significant main effect on joint gains (Black $M = 76.92$, $SD = 38.63$, White $M = 88.13$, $SD = 35.76$, $B = .10$, $t[67] = 0.82$, $p = .42$), nor did in-group affect ($B = -.02$, $t[67] = -0.18$, $p = .86$). However, supporting Hypothesis 2, there was a significant Partner Race by In-group Affect interaction ($B = .42$, $t[66] = 3.50$, $p = .001$, total $R = .44$, $R^2 = .195$). The shape and simple effects of the interaction supported Hypotheses 2a and 2b (see Figure 1). Among participants with a Black confederate partner, higher in-group affect was associated with lower joint gains (simple effect: $B = -.47$, $t[31] = -2.73$, $p = .01$, $R^2 = .30$), whereas the opposite was true for participants paired with a White confederate partner, for whom higher in-group affect was associated with higher joint gains (simple effect: $B = .41$, $t[31] = 2.46$, $p = .02$, $R^2 = .22$).

In developing our hypotheses, we argued that the divergence in negotiation approach for high in-group affect White negotiators paired with White versus Black partners would be unique to the affective facet of racial identification. That is, we expected no interaction between partner race and the other

Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Variable Intercorrelations (n = 81)

Variables	Mean	*SD*	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
Independent variables												
Partner race (1 = White)			1.0									
In-group	4.98	0.76	.04	1.0								
Covariates												
Age	20.39	2.87	.29*	−.05	1.0							
Gender (Male)			−.05	.02	.11	1.0						
Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (RSMS) self- presentation	4.32	0.75	−.12	.09	.03	−.05	1.0					
RSMS sensitivity	4.23	0.80	−.18	.0	−.11	−.11	.47***	1.0				
Dependent variables												
Joint gains	81.81	39.54	.12	−.02	.16	.12	.08	−.05	1.0			
Opening offer	23.87	5.52	.20	.39**	.11	.42**	−.21	−.11	−.01	1.0		
Trust	4.87	0.85	−.17	.06	.11	−.12	.20	.12	.18	−.10	1.0	
Liking	4.29	1.13	−.22	−.03	.09	.18	.06	.17	.06	−.02	.49***	1.0

Note. Gender is coded 0 = Female, 1 = Male; Partner Race is coded 0 = Black partner, 1 = White partner.
*$p \leq .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Table 2
Regression Analyses Predicting Negotiation Outcomes and Perceptions

	Joint gains		Opening offer		Trust		Liking	
Variable	*β*	*t*	*β*	*t*	*β*	*t*	*β*	*t*
Step 1 Covariates								
Gender (Male)	.06	0.48	.39	2.91**	−.07	−0.56	.27	2.33*
Age	.15	1.25	.05	0.34	.14	1.15	.09	0.73
Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (RSMS) Sensitivity	−.03	0.24	−.04	−0.32	.07	0.50	.23	1.95
RSMS self-presentation	.07	0.53	−.19	−1.37	.04	0.33	−.15	−1.26
	$R^2\Delta$ = .035, $F(4,69)$ = 0.63		$R^2\Delta$ = .18, $F(4,49)$ = 2.60*		$R^2\Delta$ = .03, $F(4,66)$ = 0.51		$R^2\Delta$ = .135, $F(4,66)$ = 2.58*	
Step 2 Main effects								
Partner Race	.10	0.82	.13	0.98	−.15	−1.18	−.21	−1.72
In-group affect	−.02	−0.18	.27	2.00	.17	1.33	.00	0.01
	$R^2\Delta$ = .01, $F(6,67)$ = .35		$R^2\Delta$ = .08, $F(6,47)$ = 2.44		$R^2\Delta$ = .044, $F(6,64)$ = 1.49		$R^2\Delta$ = .04, $F(6,64)$ = 1.48	
Step 3 Interaction								
Partner race * In-group affect	.42	3.50***	−.28	−2.06*	.27	2.11	.18	1.45
	$R^2\Delta$ = .15, $F(7,66)$ = 12.26***		$R^2\Delta$ = .06, $F(7,46)$ = 4.23*		$R^2\Delta$ = .062, $F(7,63)$ = 4.40*		$R^2\Delta$ = .03, $F(7,63)$ = 2.10	
Total model	R = .44, R^2 = .195		R = .56, R^2 = .32		R = .37, R^2 = .14		R = .45, R^2 = .20	

Note. Degrees of freedom from Step 1 to Step 3: Joint gains = $t(69)$, $t(67)$, $t(66)$; Opening offer = $t(49)$, $t(47)$, $t(46)$; Trust = $t(66)$, $t(64)$, $t(63)$; Liking = $t(66)$, $t(64)$, $t(63)$.
*$p \leq .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.



Figure 1. Effect of (confederate) partner race and (participant) in-group affect on joint gains.
Note. Low and high in-group affect graphed as ± 1 standard deviation from the sample mean. Plot points adjusted for age, gender, and self-monitoring covariates. Joint gain outcome is measured in points in the negotiation role play and greater points indicate stronger negotiation performance of the dyad.



Figure 2. Effect of (confederate) partner race and in-group affect on demandingness of opening offer.
Note. Low and high in-group affect graphed as ± 1 standard deviation from the sample mean. Plot points adjusted for age, gender, and self-monitoring covariates.



Figure 3. Effect of (confederate) partner race and (participant) in-group affect on trust in partner.
Note. Low and high in-group affect graphed as ± 1 standard deviation from the sample mean. Plot points adjusted for age, gender, and self-monitoring covariates.

facets of Cameron's (2004) in-group identity scale, centrality and ties. We ran analyses to test this assumption because we had administered Cameron's full scale and therefore had items for all three facets. Confirming our expectation about the unique role of in-group affect under the situational threat of negotiations, when we replicated our main analysis by predicting joint gains from the four covariates, the

main effects of partner race and the other identification scales (separately), and the interaction of partner race with centrality and ties, there were no significant main or interactive effects (i.e., partner race * in-group centrality $F[1, 66] = 0.10$, $p = .75$; partner race * in-group ties $F[1, 68] = 0.77$, $p = .38$).

Analysis of Process Measures

To test whether and how the expected process variables (trust, liking, and opening offer) explain the effects of racial in-group affect and race of negotiation partner on joint gains, we followed procedures for testing for moderated mediation outlined by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007). Moderated mediation is present when the mediated effect varies as a function of some variable, but Preacher et al. (2007) described five specific types or models. Of these, "Model 2" is relevant to this study because the strength of the effect of in-group affect on the mediators is expected to vary by partner race, creating a moderated mediation effect. That is, we expected that White negotiators facing White versus Black partners would experience opposite effects of their in-group affect on the process variables, creating differential mediation effects. We tested this expected pattern of effects with two analyses recommended by Preacher et al. (2007): (a) We test the significance of the interaction of in-group affect and race of partner on the mediators themselves using multiple regression with simple effects to follow up, just as we did with joint gains. Variables with significant interactions in consistent direction to the effect on joint gain are potential mediators. And (b) we test whether partner race moderates the mediation, that is, whether there are significantly different indirect effects of mediators according to whether the partner was White versus Black, using the Preacher et al. (2007) macro for SPSS (computer software).

Opening Offer

Analyses supported opening offer as a moderated process variable: (a) Controlling for main effects and covariates, there was a significant partner race by in-group affect interaction on competitiveness of the opening offer for vacation days: $B = -.28$, $t(46) = -2.06$, $p = .045$, R^2 change = .06, R^2 model = .32. This interaction was such that for White participants negotiating with a Black confederate partner, higher in-group affect was associated with making more competitive opening offers (simple effect: $B = .53$, $t[23] = 2.64$, $p = .015$, R^2 change = .22, R^2 model = .28), whereas there was no significant effect among participants negotiating with a White partner ($B = -.18$, $t[19] = -1.05$, $p = .31$, R^2 change = .03, R^2 model = .53; see Figure 2). Further, (b) the indirect effect of opening offer (mediating between in-group identification and joint gains) varied significantly based on White versus Black partner race: $b = 38.00$, $t(53) = 2.50$, $p = .02$ (Preacher et al., 2007, Model 2).

Trust

Our analyses supported trust as a moderated process variable: (a) Controlling for main effects and covariates, there was indeed a significant partner race by in-group affect interaction on trust in partner ($B = .27$, $t[63] = 2.10$, $p = .04$, total $R = .37$, $R^2 = .138$). The direction of this interaction was such that with a White confederate partner, higher in-group affect was associated with higher trust (simple effect: $B = .35$, $t[29] = 2.03$, $p = .05$), but among participants with a Black partner, higher in-group affect was not significantly associated with trust (simple effect: $B = -.16$, $t[30] = -0.73$, $p = .47$). Reflecting this outcome, (b) the indirect effect of trust (trust mediating between in-group affect and joint gains) varied significantly based on White versus Black partner race: $b = 41.15$, $t[70] = 3.20$, $p = .002$ (Preacher et al., 2007, Model 2).

Liking

There was insufficient support for liking as a moderated process variable: (a) Controlling for main effects and covariates, there was no significant Partner Race by In-group Affect interaction on liking of one's partner ($B = .27$, $t(63) = 2.33$, $p = .02$, R^2 change = .03; R^2 total model = .20). Yet, (b) the indirect

effect of liking (mediating between in-group affect and joint gains) varied significantly based on White versus Black partner race: $b = 44.30$, $t[70] = 3.51$, $p = .001$ (Preacher et al., 2007, Model 2). Whereas for participants negotiating with a White partner, in-group affect was not predictive of liking for one's partner (simple effect: $B = .11$, $t[29] = 0.67$, $p = .51$, $R^2 = .24$), for participants negotiating with a Black partner, greater in-group affect was associated with liking the partner less (simple effect: $B = -.38$, $t[30] = -2.32$, $p = .03$, $R^2 = .39$). However, the evidence does not meet all the requirements for moderated mediation.

Discussion

Our results demonstrate that White negotiators' levels of racial in-group affect have a unique influence on whether negotiations are colored by the seemingly irrelevant fact of their negotiation counterpart's race. Based on our analysis that negotiation, especially among historically conflictual out-group members, holds the potential to prime situational threat, we hypothesized and found that high levels of racial in-group affect in White negotiators precipitated a trusting, integrative negotiation approach with White partners and a competitive, distributive negotiation approach with Black partners. White negotiators with higher in-group affect felt more trust toward fellow White counterparts, which in turn facilitated joint gains. With Black partners, White negotiators higher on in-group affect negotiated more competitively, which in turn was a barrier to joint gains with Black partners, as we had anticipated. They also reported liking their Black partners less the more they liked their White group.

In essence, more affectively identified White negotiators showed a *chilling and competing* approach with Black partners. We believe this dominating stance (i.e., Rahim, 1983; competitive social motivation, Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007) was evoked by the combination of greater positive evaluation of their own group, a salient interaction with a member of a historically conflictual out-group (Duckitt et al., 2005; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001), and the competition over resources inherent in dyadic negotiation. More highly identified White participants may have had a heightened sense of us-them differentiation facing a Black counterpart under these circumstances, which enhanced their competitive motivation (Duckitt et al., 2005; Mummendey et al., 2001). Future research would advance our initial contribution by measuring and testing for the deeper underlying dynamics that may drive this dominating approach at the bargaining table, such as perceived threat, desire to protect one's own resources, or desire to advance one's relative gains.

These patterns were quite the opposite for high in-group affect White negotiators interacting with other White individuals, who showed a *warming and co-operating* approach. These negotiators felt greater trust in their same-race partners to the extent that they like and identify with the White group, and this accounted for their greater joint dyadic gains in the negotiation. This is particularly interesting given our experimental method, because the partner's behavior was scripted, with all confederates enacting a tough, slow-to-concede negotiating style. To the extent that White negotiators felt positively about their White group, they advanced some credit or "benefit of the doubt" to this tough partner. This result extends previous work demonstrating that situational manipulations to increase the salience or awareness of common in-group status increased the equality of negotiation outcomes, satisfaction, and the perceived co-operation and fairness of the interaction (Kerr, Garst, Lewandowski, & Harris, 1997; Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993). Our study shows that for White individuals high on in-group affect, who feel very positively about their White group, their in-group affect serves as an automatic internal cue to trust others of their group, an orientation that promoted uncovering integrative potential in our negotiation task.

By extension, our results indicate that White negotiators who are not particularly "glad to be White" are able to seek and share information about underlying interests (Thompson, 1991) equally well with Black or with other White counterparts. Because these individuals do not feel particularly positively about or connected to their White peers, they did not respond to the threats inherent in negotiation by moving into a dominating mode with Black counterparts, nor did they feel an automatic trust with

same-race partners (Vorauer et al., 1998). They may also feel little or no anxiety in response to interracial interaction (Finchilescu, 2010). Future research would advance our understanding of the reactions of low in-group affect individuals by measuring some of these specific responses to the interaction, such as anxiety, sense of similarity, or sense of self-other overlap, with partners of different backgrounds.

Further, it is important to note that the in-group affect scale measures the whole range of negative to positive feelings about one's in-group. In our sample, almost no participants endorsed negative feelings about the White group, such that relatively low affect indicated neutrality, or an absence of strong feelings, about the White group. Our data suggest that strong negative feelings toward one's White race group may be relatively rare, and we note that our data do not illuminate whether negative in-group affect White individuals would have equivalent performance in negotiations with White versus Black partners. It seems likely they would show a reverse pattern to high in-group affect White negotiators, bonding and integrating significantly better with Black counterparts and being more demanding with White counterparts.

The Meaning of Affective Racial Identification When Under Threat

We specifically measured the affective-evaluative component of White negotiators' racial identification in this study because the nature of the hypothesized responses of high in-group affect individuals to White versus Black others in negotiation were inherently about interpersonal feelings (trust, liking, dominating). Recent research on in-group identification is clear that cognitive versus affective facets are distinct and that the overall importance (i.e., centrality) of an identity to the self-concept should be active and predictive in different situations than the emotional valence of that identity (Cameron, 2004; Cameron & Lalonde, 2001; Obst & White, 2005). Indeed under threat, it is specifically the affective dimension that is activated to respond with in-group favoritism and out-group antipathy (Duckitt et al., 2005; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). This was confirmed in our data, in that the centrality and ties facets of Cameron's (2004) social identity scale did not interact with partner race to determine joint outcomes, whereas the in-group affect measure did.

Despite the fact that overtly expressed or *old-fashioned* racism has steadily decreased in North America since the 1960s (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), recent research has identified more subtle and pervasive interracial responses of White individuals that can still greatly disadvantage minorities in organizations (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). For example, the so-called *aversive racism*, or holding negative feelings and associations regarding minority groups, predicts racial discrimination in organizational decisions when objective facts are ambiguous or discrimination can otherwise be rationalized (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). According to our results, in-group affect may be an important subtle predictor of behavior in interracial contexts with a threat component, such as negotiations, as it is capable of relating to the direction of interpersonal bonding, trust development, and development of mutual gains *both* with same-race negotiation partners and other-race partners.

Our results might also be due to the particular dynamics of feeling quite positively about being White in North America. Given that European Americans have roots in many nations and ethnicities, and often combinations within their own ethnic heritage, the White group is arguably more loose and diverse than other races in North America. There is some common perception of Whiteness as a default social category in the United States (McDermott & Samson, 2005). Feeling very positively about this diffuse group membership may amount to feeling strongly that one is prototypically "American" or "nonethnic" (Knowles & Peng, 2005; Yogeeswaran, Nilanjana, Adelman, Eccleston, & Parker, 2011), and that this is preferable to being part of an ethnic subgroup.

No Performance Decrement for Cross-Race (White–Black) Negotiating Dyads?

Given that the mere fact of out-group membership based on a variety of individual characteristics has been shown to decrease the co-operativeness or the joint outcomes of negotiation dyads in previous

research (Adair et al., 2001; Harinck & Ellemers, 2006; Moore et al., 1999), our finding that there was no overall decrement in joint gains for White–Black dyads compared with White–White dyads is anomalous. Our results also contradict real-world empirical evidence that there is a one-sided decrement for Black individuals in consumer and salary negotiations in North America (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995; Gillis & Alexander, 2004; Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000). It is possible that our prenegotiation face-to-face introductions of participants and confederates, designed to prevent any potential suspicions that the confederates were not real negotiators, served to warm up the affective tone of interactions. Past research shows that relatively mild communication (Kerr et al., 1997) and personalization (Moore et al., 1999) interventions can promote greater co-operation and joint gains among out-group members interacting in competitive tasks. Our instruction session may have thereby reduced the initial discomfort that some White participants felt in interacting with a Black counterpart, eliminating one source of decrement in joint gains. A related possibility is that our participants may have perceived themselves to be in-group members in terms of belonging to the same university, dampening the overall decrement of negotiation performance when the partner was Black.

Limitations and Future Directions

Before discussing broader implications of our work, its limitations should be noted. First, this investigation comprised an initial exploration of the issues involved for negotiators from different racial backgrounds, focusing on the reactions of White negotiators. We acknowledge there is a dearth of literature exploring how Black and other North American minority individuals respond to interracial interaction. A fascinating recent contribution has identified that, while White Americans are primarily concerned with being liked and perceived as moral in interracial interactions, Black and Latino Americans seek to be respected and seen as competent (Bergsieker et al., 2010). This raises the possibility of unproductive *stereotype threat* in negotiation situations for Black and Latino individuals facing White counterparts.

Also, as with much experimental research, our sample was constrained to university students, most of typical age. We felt it important to conduct this first research in a controlled manner, under laboratory conditions. However, the results reported may therefore be slanted toward the reactions of young adults and may not generalize to experienced workplace negotiators. Expanding this line of research to include samples that are more representative of the workforce will be crucial for increasing its external validity.

Implications and Conclusions

This study brings into focus the critical importance of individual differences in in-group affect for understanding the effects of group membership on intergroup behavior, in this case, on negotiation performance. Strong affective identification with the White group related to markedly different negotiation performance with White versus Black partners. These results have implications for racially diverse negotiating dyads, negotiating teams, and interdependent work groups within increasingly global and multicultural organizational environments (Gandz, 2001; Toossi, 2006).

Dyads of mixed racial backgrounds from historically opposed groups or stigmatized groups may be working uphill to connect, build trust, and uncover integrative potential if one or more of the members is affectively identified with their racial group. And although our results were reasonably strong, we anticipate even stronger effects in actual organizational negotiations if *both* dyad members of a mixed race pair felt very positively about belonging to their in-groups. The development of rapport, trust, and integrative deal-making might be seriously impaired.

It would be informative for training and intervention to establish whether the more competitive negotiation approach of high-affect White negotiators with Black counterparts involves conscious strategy

versus less deliberate, instinctual responses to out-group members (i.e., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). In the case of more conscious choices to bargain in a competitive fashion with Black counterparts, work on contact and exposure to out-group members suggests that comfort with, and affinity for, Black counterparts can increase with repeated interracial interactions (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Alternately, it may be effective to appeal to the self-interest of high in-group affect White individuals by making a business case for changing their negotiation style to a more integrative approach: The dominating approach will fail to uncover many joint gain opportunities. Considering that in this study, the dominating trend with Black partners was driven by one's affective orientation, negotiation training that helps decrease the accessibility of negative affective reactions to out-group members may intercept and alter the impact of these feelings on outcomes. Alternatively, training negotiators facing racial out-group members to focus on making an overarching common in-group membership salient (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2009), or to perspective-take (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), may be beneficial for high in-group affect White individuals and their out-group negotiation partners, avoiding the loss of valuable win–win solutions.

Negotiating teams are likely to suffer co-ordination problems and an unproductively competitive external bargaining stance if they are not able to deal effectively with the racial diversity of their members (Halevy, 2008; van Dick et al., 2008). So what can be done to counteract the potentially negative effects of diversity among team members that can derive from the high in-group affect of members, particularly White members? Among diverse work teams, it is not always the case that simple repeated exposure (Plant, 2004) or working with out-group members on a common task will improve attitudes of majority group members toward the out-group (Bettencourt, Molix, Talley, & Eubanks, 2007). However, a strong peer support climate (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Vashdi, 2005), visionary leadership that does not subcategorize the group members (Greer et al., 2012), and pro-diversity beliefs (van Dick et al., 2008) relate to overcoming the barriers to connection and performance that diverse membership can pose. Given the common goals of negotiating teams and work groups, enhancing and leading a strong and cohesive supportive social climate and ensuring productivity might trump the initial reticence or competitive instincts of more high in-group affect group members.

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