

# What's in a Name? The Representation of Terrorism Using Political Organization Names

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## Abstract

The present contribution introduces representation theory of terrorism. The basic proposition is that comparison of the names of nonviolent and violent political organizations reveals core characteristics of terrorist organizations. Accordingly, eight characteristics are identified: Hostility, Absolutism, Authoritarianism, Action Orientation, Resistance, Militancy, Achievement Motivation, and Superiority. An empirical study among college students, comparing those preferring groups that possess these characteristics with those preferring groups that do not possess these characteristics, shows that greater endorsement of groups that possess these characteristics is associated with greater support for group-based violence. Representation theory provides a novel way of looking at terrorism, specifies indicators of violent intent and generates new hypothesis regarding the nature of terrorism.

Terrorism studies aim for a thorough understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, specification of indicators that predict violent intent, and the assessment of hypotheses regarding the nature of terrorism. Particularly since the events of September 11, 2001, the study of terrorism has witnessed tremendous growth (see Hoffman, 2006; Schmid, 2011; Smelser, 2007, for overviews). Yet, amidst considerable progress in the documentation of terrorist incidents and knowledge about specific cases of terrorism in the present (e.g., Al Qaeda; Gerges, 2011) and the past (e.g., Horgan, 2012, on the Provisional IRA), perhaps the most fundamental questions of the field, including those about the nature of terrorism and about the predictors of terrorist activity, have largely remained unanswered.

Some have even argued that a quest for general principles of terrorism may be futile (e.g., Crenshaw, 1995; Horgan, 2005; Sageman, 2004). Indeed, one might say that terrorism is an inherently political phenomenon, with even the definition of terrorism being solely a matter of political statement (see Hoffman, 2006, for a discussion). As the famous adage goes, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Others have argued that terrorism is inherently bound by context, with each case or episode requiring its own unique, historical analysis (Crenshaw, 1995; Sageman, 2004). In the field of the psychology of terrorism too, scholars have been eager to emphasize that there is no such thing as a universal terrorist personality or a psychopathology specific to terrorists (Horgan, 2005; Post, 2007; Victoroff, 2005). Furthermore, Schmid and Jongman's (1988) study on the definition of terrorism is nowadays more often cited for the fact that no less than 109 different definitions were identified, more so than for finding conclusive evidence for the universal nature of terrorism.

Thus, the representation of terrorism and of individual terrorists remains among the field's most contentious issues. While this article may not provide a definitive answer to the issue of what terrorism is, under what conditions it will occur, and how it relates to individual psychology, it does introduce a new perspective on these issues. The article introduces a theory, labeled here as representation theory, that seeks to find a new way of describing what terrorism is, what the underlying dimensions of terrorism are, and how these dimensions help to understand psychological aspects of terrorist engagement. In doing so, it yields hypotheses that can be used for further study.

## Representation Theory

At its core, representation theory considers terrorism to be a political organizational phenomenon. This assumption is consistent with Della Porta (1995), McCauley (2002), Merari (1990), and others (i.e., Rapoport, 2001, for an edited collection of contribution on terrorist organizations), who all suggest that organizations are critical in providing terrorists the facilities, training, resources, and ideological frames to carry out their deeds.

A second assumption of representation theory states that a comparison between violent and nonviolent political organizations will uncover the unique characteristics of the violent political engagement. Smith (2008) makes a similar argument in claiming that to understand the dynamics of terrorist activity and the implicit violent intent of terrorist groups, one should analyze the difference in political exclamations between violent political organizations and their nonviolent counterparts. This assumption is also in line with the work of Karagiannis and McCauley (2006), which focuses on Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a radical group committed to nonviolence, to better understand the conditions under which political activism becomes violent.

While the first two assumptions of representation theory may be fairly uncontroversial, a third introduces a novel idea to terrorism studies. The third assumption holds that to uncover the unique characteristics of violent political engagement, the

names of violent and nonviolent terrorist organizations serve as useful sources of information. It is specifically assumed that the names of the organization convey the meanings, intentions, attitudes, and so forth that a political organization aspires to. In a way, political organization names are thus comparable to brand names in marketing (cf. Lieb & Shah, 2010; Smith & French, 2009) that have been argued to “serve as carriers of culture” (Aaker, Benet-Martínez, & Garolera, 2001, p. 492). Aaker et al. (2001) add that “the meaning embedded in brands can serve to represent and institutionalize the values and beliefs of a culture” (p. 492). Thus, to the extent that names of political organizations can be assumed to reflect a particular brand, it follows that these names can serve as carriers of the values and beliefs of a particular political culture.

A comparison of names of violent and nonviolent political organizations may thus contribute to a characterization of the core values of violent political organizations, and thereby contribute to a representation of terrorism. Once the core values are identified, laboratory tests can be used to assess whether endorsement of values associated with violent political organizations is indeed related to support for violence for political ends. Accordingly, this article first describes results from a comprehensive comparison of violent and nonviolent political organization names (Study 1), then the method that was used to infer core values of violent political organizations from these organization names (Study 2), and finally laboratory research that sought to empirically assess the hypothesized relation between the core values and political violence (Study 3).

## Study 1

To further illustrate the core tenet of representation theory, one could take the names of two political organizations, the “Democratic Alliance for Justice” and the “Communist Student Guerrilla for Liberation and Revolution,” as an example. During several presentations, the first author of this article has informally asked his audience which of these parties is most likely to use violence. And in all presentation, the latter is consistently chosen. Apparently, there is something in the name of the second organization that implicates the violent nature of the organization. The question is “Which exact words in a political organization name signal the intention to use violence to achieve political ideals?” Study 1 aims to answer this question.

## Method

An answer to this question requires databases containing a large number of nonviolent and violent political organizations. A comprehensive list of worldwide political organization names is derived from the online version of the CIA World Factbook. In addition, the Global Terrorism Database I (GTD) contains an extensive list of the names of political organizations that have used violence to pursue their political agenda in the period from 1970 to 1997 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Combining these lists of organization names, and performing a word frequency analysis, allows classification of the differences between violent and nonviolent political organization labels.

### *Scatter Plot Analysis of the Difference Between Violent and Nonviolent Organizations*

Table 1 describes the words most frequently occurring within seven clusters<sup>1</sup>: organizations, participatory context, principle of governance, ideology, position, constituency, and goals. The definitions of each of these clusters will be given later.

Each of the words depicted in Table 1 occur at least 15 times in the combined CIA/GTD list. The cutoff of 15 was taken to avoid specific cases to overly color the analysis. For each of the words, a “terrorism value” (T-value) is computed. The value is based on the number of times a word occurs in the GTD relative to the total number of times the word occurs in the combined CIA Factbook/GTD list. Because the CIA Factbook contains 2,264 organization names and the GTD contains 2,340 organization names, the word frequencies in the CIA Factbook list were multiplied by 1.0336 ( $2,340/2,264$ ) to ensure that a T-value of .5 indicates an equal occurrence in the CIA factbook lists and GTD, and only a T-value of 1 indicates that the name label exclusively occurs in the GTD list. The analysis of T-values per cluster is presented later.

## Results

*Cluster 1 “Organization”* refers to the way in which the organization type is described by the organization. The combined GTD/CIA list includes 22 types of organizations. Figure 1a depicts the scatterplot for the organization types. “Party” is by far the most common organization designation. “Coalition,” “Alliance,” “Union,” “United,” and “Party” occur more frequently in the names of political organizations than in terrorist organizations. The first three organization designations (Coalition, Alliance, and Union) in particular suggest a degree of individuality and distinctiveness among the organization’s constituency. The concepts of coalition, alliance etc., all suggest that the group consists of separable elements that have independently joined the group. In contrast, terrorist organizations appear to lack this individuality and plurality. Here, one finds organization labels such as “Nucleus” that cannot be subdivided into smaller particles. Furthermore, the high T-value of the designations “Army,” “Command,” and “Front” underscores the militant orientation of terrorist organizations. And in contrast to both the political and the terrorism poles of the T-value spectrum, the intermediate concepts of “Movement” and “Force” imply dynamism.

*Cluster 2 “Participatory Context”* designates the sphere of participation of the organization. Five concepts fall within this cluster, which form two clearly distinguishable political and terrorist concentrations (see Figure 1b). “Rally,” “Congress,” and “Forum” are

<sup>1</sup>The seven clusters were determined in the following way: Upon having identified the words, the first author of this paper made a first preliminary grouping of the words into clusters. He then asked five colleagues to do the same. As a result, six independent ways of clustering the words were obtained. Differences between the ways of clustering were resolved through a 1-hr discussion session. Although the five colleagues contributed to the clustering, the first author of this article holds the sole responsibility for the current way of presenting the words in seven clusters. It is recognized that other forms of clustering are also possible. The way in which the words are clustered affects the scatterplot analyses. It does not, however, affect subsequent analyses reported in this article.

Table 1

*The Most Frequently Occurring Name Labels in Violent and Nonviolent Political Organizations Categorized in Seven Main Clusters*

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Participatory Context</i>	<i>Governance</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>Goals</i>
Party	Rally	Democratic	Communist	New	People	Democracy
Movement	Congress	Revolutionary	Christian	Progressive	Labor	Action
Front	Guerrilla	Popular	Liberal	Resistance	Students	Progress
Union	Struggle	Patriotic	Nationalist	Red	Workers	Development
Group	Forum	Republican	Socialist	Left	Democrats	Freedom
Alliance		Social	Islamic	Fighting	Youth	Renewal
Organization		Proletarian	African	Independent	Free	Justice
United		Militant	Communism	Separatist	Muslims	Independence
Army		Civic	Arab	Armed	All	Solidarity
Force		Activist		Green	Society	Change
Coalition		Martyr		Rebel	Tribe	Defense
League				Center	Fatherland	Peace
Commando				Against		Reform
Command				Autonomous		Rights
Brigade				Radical		Revolution
Council				Extremist		Liberation
Committee				Anti		
Association						
Federation						
Nuclei						
Nucleus						
Unit						

*Note.* The cluster names are depicted in italics.

concentrated as prototypically political. All three constructs suggest participation on the basis of debate. On the other side, “Guerrilla” and “Struggle” have a high T-value. In both cases, the focus is not on debate but on action and combat.

*Cluster 3 “Principles of Governance”* refers to the basis of exercising authority. Two units are distinguishable (Figure 1c). “Democratic,” “Social,” “Civic,” “Republican,” “Popular,” and “Patriotic” all assume a social basis for the exercise of authority, although the breadth of this basis varies. “Revolutionary,” “Martyr,” and “Proletarian” have a high T-value. The three concepts are more grounded in abstract ideology than social community, assume absolute authority, and suggest a transcendental orientation.

*Cluster 4 “Ideology”* comprises collections of principles and concepts about the nature and functioning of culture, community, and politics. “Communism” is singled out as the ideology with a relatively high T-value (see Figure 1d). Ideologies with a low value T-value are divided into three subgroups. “Liberalism” and “Socialism” are industrial ideologies. “Christianity” and “Islam” are religious ideologies, and “Arab,” “African”, and “Nationalist” refer to nationalist independence movements. The relatively low T-values of “Islam” and “Nationalist” may be considered noteworthy. While










Figure 1. (a–g) Scatterplots based on T-value per cluster. Scatterplots show the extent to which a word in the organization name fits the prototype “terrorism” or fits the prototype “[nonviolent] politics.” The position of the words in the scatterplot is determined by the terrorism value and the adjusted frequency of occurrence. The x-axis indicates the terrorism value of a word (range, 0–1). As a word occurs more frequently in the GTD than in the combined GTD/CIA list, the T-value is higher, and hence the word is depicted more on the right side of the plot. A lower T-value indicates a higher relative frequency in the CIA political parties list, and words on the left side of the plot can therefore be interpreted to be more “political.” The y-axis represents the adjusted frequency of the word. The y-score gives the highest score in GTD frequency or the adjusted CIA Factbook frequency, whichever is higher.

counter-terrorism efforts have aimed at Islamic ideology and nationalist groups are often cast in a negative light, the current results show that both Islam and Nationalism are not typically associated with violent political engagement.

*Cluster 5 “Position”* reflects the stance of a political organization in relation to other political actors. Figure 1e reveals a large gap between positions with low and high T-values. “New,” “Progressive,” “Green,” “Independent,” “Center,” “Left,” and “Radical” represent a varied collection of designations that appear to be prototypical for the non-violent political domain. The domain of terrorist organizations also harbors a variety of positions. “Resistance” and “Rebel” reflect the reactant stance of terrorist organizations, while “Armed,” “Fighting,” and “Militant” pertain to the terrorist militant ways of political participation.

*Cluster 6 “Constituency”* refers to the people or group whose interests the organization claims to represent. Figure 1f shows that “Democrats” and “Labor[ors]” are typical political constituencies. “Students” and “Tribes” are constituencies with a high T-value. A relatively large number of constituencies fall in between the politics and terrorist poles, including “Workers,” “Society,” “Fatherland,” “Free,” “Youth,” and “Muslims.” Perhaps this concentration between extremes can be understood as “battleground constituencies,” in the sense that both nonviolent and violent political party may adopt the cause of these constituencies. “People,” with a relatively low T-value, is by far the most commonly used constituency label.

*Cluster 7 “Goals”* include the labels that contain information about desired changes or states. The number of goals with a low T-value is far greater than the number of targets with a high T-value (see Figure 1g). “Liberation” figures as the most common goal among terrorist organizations. “Revolution,” “Defense,” and “Action” also have a high T-value. Compared to political goals, the labels pertaining to the goals of terrorist organizations appear more general and aimed *against* a social reality rather than *for* a political change.

## Frequency Analysis

The vast majority of the analyzed words occur in both the terrorist database and the political organization database. This underlines the assumption that terrorism is a political phenomenon. Nonetheless, frequency analysis yields a bimodal rather than normal distribution (Figure 2). Most of the analyzed words have either a very low or very high T-value, with few words having an intermediate T-value. Within the realm of politics,




Figure 2. Histogram of T-value frequencies.

terrorism appears to implicate a rupture from mainstream engagement, suggesting it is best described in its own terms.

## Study 2

Study 2 aims to further characterize political violent organizations. In describing the scatterplots of Study 1, I suggested that particular words may reveal general characteristics, or values of a terrorist organization. For instance, in describing the words in the “position” cluster, I indicated that words typically associated with violence such as “resistance” and “rebel” may imply that “resistance” is a general characteristic of violent groups. Above and beyond the simple interpretation of the words, the extent to which political violence is associated with certain organizational characteristics can also be determined in a more sophisticated manner.

Recall that the T-value refers to the degree to which a word of a political organization name frequently occurs in politically violent groups relative to nonviolent groups. The T-value is therefore a quantitative indicator of the degree to which a particular word is associated with political violence. If, in addition to the T-value, a quantitative indicator is construed of the extent to which a certain word from an organization name signifies a certain organizational characteristic, then a correlation between the T-value of the word and the degree of association of the word with a particular value provides an indication of the extent to which the organizational value is associated with political violence. Study 2 uses this logic to come an indication of the extent to which particular organizational values are associated with violence.

To derive the values of violence from political organization labels, it is of pertinence to (a) identify organizational values; (b) obtain quantitative indicators of the extent to

which political organization names indicate the existence of particular values; and (c) use correlation analysis to examine the degree of significance of the relation between political values and political violence.

## Step 1

The literature on management contains a host of characterizations of organizational cultures. Hofstede's (1980) representation of national cultures in terms of four dimensions (collectivism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance, with a fifth dimension, long-term orientation, that was added later) is a classic in this context. Likewise, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) distinguished seven dimensions of cross-cultural differences: universalism versus particularism, individualism versus collectivism, neutral versus emotional; specific versus diffuse; achievement versus ascription; sequential versus synchronic; internal versus external control. Researchers of aggression have also identified relevant group level characteristics associated with violence. Eidelson and Eidelson (2003) distinguished five characteristics of group-based violence: collective perceptions of superiority, collective perceptions of injustice, collective perception of being threatened, collective perception of vulnerability, and the absence of collective perceptions of helplessness. Moreover, in the literature on violent extremism, several characteristics have been linked to violent extremism, including orientation toward action (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010), authoritarianism (Motyl, Hart, & Pyszczynski, 2010), absolutism (Juergensmeyer, 2006), and millenarianism (Lifton, 2007).

Note that some of these characteristics are quite similar to each other. Therefore, some characteristics were slightly reformulated so as to avoid overlap between characteristics. In addition, three values were added (hostility, militancy, and resistance) because they were assumed to be strongly linked to political violence (cf. Prentice, Taylor, Rayson, Hoskins, & O'Loughlin, 2011). Therefore, to examine the potential relation between cultural characteristics and violence, 16 characteristics were studied.

- (1) Collectivism: The prioritization of community interests above those of the individual.
- (2) Achievement motivation: The intense desire for achievement.
- (3) Uncertainty avoidance: The extent to which the uncertain elicits anxiety.
- (4) Authoritarianism: The extent to which the group or organization is expected to submit to a single authority.
- (5) Absolutism: The extent to which one believes there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged.
- (6) Superiority: The extent to which one feels one's own group is better than other groups.
- (7) Universalism: The extent to which one believes there are universal rules.
- (8) Particularism: The extent to which a social community is regulated on the basis of informal social relations.
- (9) Justice: The extent to which one is sensitive toward justice and injustice.
- (10) Distrust: The extent to which one distrusts other people and other groups.

- (11) Vulnerability: The extent to which one feels vulnerable to external threats.
- (12) Millenarianism: Belief in the coming of a fundamental transformation in society.
- (13) Helplessness: Belief in one's inability to effectively cope with circumstances.
- (14) Militancy: Belief in the value of a combative stance.
- (15) Hostility: Tendency to angrily deny alternative perceptions.
- (16) Resistance: Tendency to stand up against undesired circumstances.

### Step 2

To determine to what extent the words in political organization names express the 16 values as described earlier, six academics with expertise in the field of politics were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 to 5 the degree to which they thought the words in the organization names (depicted in Table 1) are expressive of each of the 16 characteristics just mentioned (with a score of 1 meaning “not at all expressive” to 5 meaning “very expressive” of the characteristic under consideration). With the exception of one rater, a reasonable degree of interrator agreement was reached, with the five remaining raters producing a Pearson-correlation consistency of  $r = .66$ . One rater deviated considerably from the others, as reflected in his very low Pearson-correlation consistency with the other raters ( $r < .24$ ). Therefore, scores from this rater were excluded from further analyses. A generalized degree of association between the organizational words and organizational characteristics was determined by taking the most frequently occurring score among the five remaining raters (in all cases, there was agreement among at least three raters, and hence there was always a majority decision).

### Step 3

With a quantitative indicator of the extent to which words of political organization names are associated with the use of force and a quantitative indicator of the degree




Figure 3. Degree of correlation between cultural values and T-value. The y-axis depicts the correlation.

political organization names convey an organizational value or characteristic, it becomes possible to determine the degree to which particular characteristics are associated with violence. Specifically, the correlation between the two indicators provides an indication of the degree of association between the characteristic and violence.

The outcome of this correlation analysis is shown in Figure 3. For 11 of the 16 characteristics, there was a significant correlation (i.e.,  $p < .05$ ). In eight of the cases, there was a significant positive correlation. That is, Hostility, Absolutism, Authoritarianism, Action Orientation, Resistance, Militancy, Achievement motivation, and Superiority were found to be positively and significantly associated with violence. Universalism, Justice, and Collectivism were found to be significantly negatively correlated with violence. The remaining five characteristics were not significantly correlated with violence. The present results, as depicted in Figure 3, provide a representation of the culture of terrorism, in the sense that they show eight values to be significantly and positively associated with violence for political purposes.

### Study 3

A crucial test of validity comprises a study that assesses whether endorsement of these eight values is associated with greater support for the use of violence for political purposes. The purpose of Study 3 is to provide this test. To this end, a “reasons to belong scale” was construed that assesses the extent of endorsement of the 16 values mentioned earlier (the description of this scale will follow in the method section). Study 3 examines whether endorsement of the eight values associated with violence correlate with support for the use of violence to resolve political conflict.

Moreover, to the extent that the eight values associated with violence indeed predict the support of violence for political purposes, it is of interest to explore the psychological mindset of those endorsing the eight values. The examination of the psychology behind the endorsement of the eight values was more for the purpose of exploration rather than testing. To be sure, a direct test is lacking, showing that endorsement of the eight values is more prominent among people who have joined a terrorist organization than those who are not part of a terrorist organization. Therefore, the analysis of psychological correlates does not necessarily correspond to the psychological correlates of terrorist engagement. By examining the psychological correlates of endorsement of these eight values one nonetheless attains a sense of correspondence between the psychology of terrorism and the psychology of endorsement of the eight values associated with violence.

In Study 3, participants filled out the “reasons to belong scale,” were then asked to indicate their preference for violent versus nonviolent options to resolve a political conflict and were asked to fill out a number of personality questionnaire items to assess potential personality correlates of endorsement of the eight values associated with violence. Preference for violent versus nonviolent options to resolve a political conflict was assessed using participants’ applicability ratings of attitudinal items that directly pertained to the use of violence to resolve political dispute, and using a scenario whereby participants read the story of a social group and were asked to indicate their preference

for either one of two factions, one advocating violence, and the other advocating peaceful means to address the grievances of the group.

## Method

### *Participants*

A total of 129 psychology students from the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, participated in the study.

### *Procedure and Materials*

All participants completed the study and received credit for their research participation requirement. Participants filled out the questionnaires in individual cubicles. All instructions and tasks were computerized. Participants received instructions through the computer and typed in their answer on the computer. Participants were informed that the goal of the study was to test some new materials for further study.

Participants first filled out the “reasons to belong scale.” The scale comprised a general instruction, a generic sentence stem, and then 16 completions. The instruction stated that the scale consists of 16 items. Participants were instructed to complete the generic sentence stem, using a scale ranging from 1 (indicating complete disagreement with the item) to 9 (indicating full agreement with the item). Participants were encouraged to complete the questionnaire with their gut level response. The generic sentence stem was presented directly below the instruction. It stated “I feel I particularly belong to a group...” Below the generic sentence were 16 completions that corresponded to the 16 values of interest (see Study 2, Step 1 for details). One item, for instance, read “when the group engages in all sorts of activities,” whereby the answer reflects the extent to which one values action by a group. Another item read “when the group provides certainty and grip,” reflecting the value of uncertainty avoidance. The complete scale is depicted in Appendix 1.

Next, two measures were included to assess whether the participants that endorsed the eight values associated with violence indeed exhibited greater support for the use of violence for political purposes. First, participants were directly asked on a 9-point scale to indicate their level of disagreement/agreement with the statement “Also when there are innocent victims, the use of violence is justified when you are fighting for the right cause”.

A second measure used to assess group differences in support for violence capitalized on a scenario in which a political situation was described, whereby two factions were in dispute over the use of violence to advance their cause. The story was loosely inspired by the Dutch Moluccan struggle for an independent state during the late 1960s and 1970s. The full text of the story is shown in Appendix 2. Participants first read the story. Immediately after reading the text, participants were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale the extent to which they sympathized with either the nonviolent party or the violent party.

To examine the psychological correlates of this endorsement, a scale was constructed, which was included at the end of the study. The scale contained items relating to a number of psychological constructs that have been linked with the mindset of terrorists.

The relevant psychological constructs were taken from a review on the terrorist mindset by Victoroff (2005). Twenty-four constructs were identified from this review. For each construct one item or two items were included in the scale, yielding a 42-item scale. In some cases, two items were deemed necessary because the identified construct consisted of multiple components. For example, the construct of need for closure (e.g., Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009) entails both a need for swift decisions, a preference for certainty, and a need to avoid ambiguity. Hence, two items were included to cover the construct of the need for closure. Appendix 3 depicts the scale.

## Results

### *Endorsement of Values*

Those participants that indicated stronger endorsement of the eight values associated with violence (Hostility, Absolutism, Authoritarianism, Action Orientation, Resistance, Militancy, Achievement Motivation, and Superiority) compared to the eight values that were not associated with violence were grouped together. They were then contrasted with the participants that indicated greater endorsement of the eight values that were not associated with violence. In correspondence with the idea that violence for political purposes is limited to a minority of a given population, only 12 participants indicated greater endorsement of the “violent” compared to the “nonviolent” values.

### *Support for Violence*

Regarding the statement “Also when there are innocent victims, the use of violence is justified when you are fighting for the right cause”, a *t*-test revealed that the “violent” participants were indeed more supportive of this statement than the “nonviolent” participants, with  $t(1, 127) = 2.284$ ,  $p < .03$ ,  $d = .75$ , and  $M = 3.00$  ( $SD = 1.128$ ) for the 12 “violent” participants and  $M = 2.04$  ( $SD = 1.404$ ) for the remaining “nonviolent” participants. Regarding the appraisal of violent and nonviolent options to settle the political situation presented to participants, statistical analysis of these scores again yielded a significant difference between the two value orientations. Specifically, endorsement of the eight values associated with violence was found to correspond to greater support for the party that advocated violence, with the comparison yielding  $t(127) = 2.336$ ,  $p < .03$ ,  $d = .55$  ( $M = 4.25$ ,  $SD = 2.59$  for the “violent” participants versus  $M = 3.09$ ,  $SD = 1.52$  for the “nonviolent” participants). Overall then, both tests corroborated the central notion that endorsement of eight values associated with violence (Hostility, Absolutism, Authoritarianism, Action Orientation, Resistance, Militancy, Achievement Motivation, and Superiority) is associated with support of the use of violence for political purposes. It is especially noteworthy that these eight values were derived from an analysis of organization names of violent and nonviolent political organizations, and their predictive quality was shown among a population of university students.

### *Psychological Characteristics and Endorsement of Violent Values*

Of the 42 items pertaining to psychological characteristics, four were found to be significantly associated with endorsement of the eight “violent” values. The means for the items

“I am depressed,”  $t(29.90) = 3.265, p < .004, d = .62, M = 1.25 (SD = 0.452)$  versus  $M = 1.80 (SD = 1.169)$ , “There are too many new things coming at me,”  $t(127) = 2.208, p < .03, d = .39, M = 2.58 (SD = 1.38)$  versus  $M = 3.79 (SD = 1.85)$ , and “I am insecure about myself,”  $t(127) = 2.21, p < .02, d = .43, M = 3.00 (SD = 1.81)$  versus  $M = 4.50 (SD = 1.94)$ , were lower among participants endorsing the eight values than those who did not. In contrast, participants endorsing the eight values were significantly more in agreement with the item, “Ultimately, it is all about struggle and competition,”  $t(127) = 2.51, p < .02, d = .45, M = 4.00 (SD = 1.71)$  versus  $M = 2.85 (SD = 1.49)$ . The results suggest that those endorsing the eight values are characterized by focus (in the sense that they are less overwhelmed by new information), by self-confidence (in the sense that they are more secure about themselves), by a positive outlook on life (in the sense that they are less depressed), and by competitiveness (in the sense that they believe life is about struggle and competition). At first sight then, endorsement of the eight values associated with violence appears unrelated to any form of psychological dysfunction. In fact, on the basis of these findings one may infer a tendency in the opposite direction.

## General Discussion

The goal of this article has been to introduce representation theory. The theory aims to contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and to delineate indicators of violent intent. The idea behind the theory is that comparison between names of violent and nonviolent political organizations helps to identify organization labels that are characteristic of violent political organizations. These organization labels, in turn, provide information about the nature of a terrorist organization. A correlational analysis that assessed the degree of convergence of the link between organization labels and violence on the one hand and organization labels and cultural characteristics on the other, yielded eight organizational characteristics associated with violence: Hostility, Absolutism, Authoritarianism, Action Orientation, Resistance, Militancy, Achievement motivation, and Superiority. A scale that assesses endorsement of these values relative to endorsement of eight values not associated with violence was found to predict support for violence for political purposes. Specifically, those having stronger endorsement of the eight values associated with violence relative to eight values not associated with violence exhibited greater support for the use of violence for political purposes. On a psychological level, endorsement of the eight values associated with violence corresponded to self-certainty, focus, a positive outlook on life, and competitiveness.

### What is in a Name?

One of the most defining characteristics of the present research is the use of labels from political organizations' names to infer general characteristics of terrorist organizations. There are clear advantages to the use of organization names. Names of political organizations are similar to titles in nonfiction prose: In that they convey the core of the message. Moreover, names are easy to analyze. Names are also easily accessible, precisely

because political organizations have an interest in communicating their message, notably through the use of labels. The meanings conveyed in a name have the additional advantage of resulting from the interpretations of the organization rather than from those of a researcher or analyst. As such, names provide a “quick and dirty” insight into the nature of an organization. The use of political organization names for a general analysis of terrorism was corroborated by a study showing that eight values derived from an analysis of violent and nonviolent organization names predicted support for the use of violence for political purposes among a sample of university student participants.

Despite the appeal of the use of organization names to determine threat level, however, it should be acknowledged that there are limitations to this approach. First, although the current analysis is based on more than 4,000 names of political organizations, some of the organizations are excluded from the analysis because of their idiosyncratic nature. Most strikingly, “Al-Qaida,” that is, “the base” is unique in its name and hence, one cannot compute the extent to which the word is associated with violence. Nonetheless, based on the eight values associated with violence, the absolutist suggestion of “the base” does provide a hint of violent intent. Second, the analysis is also problematic when it comes to organization names that are based on the personal names or specific names. Indeed, there are many examples of both (e.g., Abu Nidal, 2 of June Movement, 23 of September Communist League). While most of these organization names also contain labels relating to organization type (e.g., “movement”) or ideology (e.g., “communist”) and therefore provide some hints of violent intent, idiosyncratic labeling clearly poses a challenge to the claim that the current analysis is of use in predicting violent intent. Again, the use of organizational values derived from the organization names rather than the actual labels helps to make claims beyond specific organizations. These organization values could perhaps be used further to identify indicators of these values, for example, specific characteristics of speeches by organizations. These indicators could then be applied to an ever greater number of political organizations.

## Context Dependency

The idiosyncratic nature of organization names may stem in part from the persuasive appeal of specific labels. Idiosyncratic name labels are also chosen to attract a specific audience. The latter observation also complicates the current analysis. If name labels are used to attract a specific audience, it follows that the meaning of the political organization labels may only be understood in the specific context of the relation between the organization and its target audience. Indeed, the idea that terrorism can be studied beyond the specific historical context in which it manifested remains a matter of considerable debate within terrorism studies (Crenshaw, 1995; Sageman, 2004). If terrorist activity can only be studied in its historical context, it follows that comparing and aggregating organization labels is unlikely to contribute to an understanding of terrorism. However, the ultimate validity of the present generic representation of terrorism relies on its ability to predict terrorism outside of the contexts from which the analysis was derived. And clearly, even among a group of university students, the core concepts

of the present analysis were shown to be of use in predicting the appeal of violent options to advance a political cause.

## Theory in Terrorism Studies

In closing, it is perhaps noteworthy that the present work shows the use of context independent theorizing for understanding terrorism and predicting support for political violence. This demonstration goes against much of the research on terrorism studies, which appears to be largely limited to the analysis of specific historical episodes. Indeed, quite a number of scholars warn against overgeneralizing the analysis based on one historical case to another. Nonetheless, theories and laboratory studies may deserve greater consideration in the study of terrorism. Propositions and hypotheses about the nature and origins of terrorism should be tested outside the context from which they are inferred. Only by developing frameworks that specify general conditions under which terrorism occurs, does it become possible to not only describe the story of particular episodes of terrorism, but also to predict the occurrence of new terrorist acts. Theory, then, may be essential to moving ahead in countering terrorism.

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## Appendix 1: The Reasons to Belong Scale

This questionnaire concerns preferences in one's social life. People are almost always in the company of others. Think of family, fellow students, colleagues, a circle of friends, a

sports club, etc. We are interested in what you consider of importance when you are in the company of others; in what type of company, you feel at home.

Below, you find a generic sentence that is followed by 16 statements. Please indicate using the accompanying 9-point scale after each statement the extent to which you find the statement applicable to you.

I feel I particularly belong to a group when:

- (1) The interests of the group supersede everything else (absolutism).
- (2) Group life entails all sorts of activities (action orientation).
- (3) The group is competitive, and fights for its own ideals (militancy).
- (4) The group resists against wrongdoings (resistance).
- (5) The group is superior in all respect compared to other groups (superiority).
- (6) The group is committed to justice (justice).
- (7) The group is vulnerable and unites to overcome this vulnerability (vulnerability).
- (8) When other groups threaten one's group (distrust).
- (9) The group is incapable to defend its interests (helplessness).
- (10) There is a strong sense of community (collectivism).
- (11) The group provides certainty and grip (uncertainty avoidance).
- (12) There is a strong leader and fixed rules (authoritarianism).
- (13) The group is focused on achievement (achievement motivation).
- (14) The group is governed by rules that everybody understands and can live up to (universalism).
- (15) The group is characterized by unique, very personal ties (collectivism).
- (16) The group is doing everything to fight its adversaries (hostility).

## Appendix 2: Scenario Used to Assess Differences in Support for Violence

The *X* came in Country *Y* for a temporary stay. Country *Y* had promised them their own state. In Country *Y*, they stayed in camps, in generally moderate to poor conditions. After the *X* had waited a generation for Country *Y* to fulfill its promise, the *X* knew almost for sure they would remain in country *Y*. The government of Country *Y* was not willing or able to meet the promise of a free state for *X*. The *X* became divided. Party CG thought that *X* should remain loyal to Country *Y* and that their own cause could only be achieved through dialogue and negotiation. In contrast, the FG party argued that *X* had already been waiting too long and that too few promises had been fulfilled. This party thought that only through the use of force, also against civilians, the existence and the interests of the *X* could be effectively defended.

## Appendix 3: Motivation Scale

Below, you find statements that can be more or less applicable to yourself. Use the accompanying 9-point scale to indicate for each item to what extent you find the statements applicable to you.

- (1) I feel sad and listless.

- (2) I fear death.
- (3) There are too many new things coming at me.
- (4) I am depressed.
- (5) I feel little concerned about the fate of others.
- (6) I have difficulty understanding others.
- (7) I admire people who sacrifice for a higher cause.
- (8) It is important for me to engage for a higher cause.
- (9) I get inspiration from the life and deeds of the great personalities of this world and of history.
- (10) I have heroes that inspire me.
- (11) I feel frustrated in my ambitions.
- (12) There are people who try to stop me in realizing my ambitions.
- (13) I feel deprived.
- (14) Others have done me wrong.
- (15) I am a real "group animal."
- (16) My social environment is very important to me.
- (17) During my youth I had warm ties with my parents.
- (18) I feel resentment towards my parents.
- (19) I have difficulty getting satisfaction out of my friendships and relationships.
- (20) It is difficult for me to get a durable, personal relationship with others.
- (21) I have the idea that I am someone.
- (22) I am insecure about myself.
- (23) I have had difficulty to find my true self.
- (24) It has taken me a long time to find satisfaction and self-pride.
- (25) I have had difficulty to find who I am.
- (26) It takes a struggle to find your place in the world.
- (27) Ultimately, it is all about competition and struggle.
- (28) I can do things better than others.
- (29) I am indispensable to my social environment.
- (30) Others abuse my talents.
- (31) Others are following me.
- (32) I am struggling with information overload.
- (33) There are too many new things coming at me.
- (34) I find it of importance to have order and structure in my life.
- (35) I like it when things are neat and tidy.
- (36) I prefer to make swift decisions.
- (37) I prefer certainty, and to avoid uncertainty.
- (38) I like to think about things.
- (39) There is still a lot to discover, and I want to experience as much as possible.
- (40) I am very adventurous.
- (41) As a result of a number of negative experiences, I feel humiliated.
- (42) I am looking for revenge for what has been done to me.

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