Anticipating Happiness in a Future Negotiation: Anticipated Happiness, Propensity to Initiate a Negotiation, and Individual Outcomes

Dejun Tony Kong,[1] Ece Tuncel,[2] and Judi McLean Parks[1]

1 Olin Business School, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, U.S.A.
2 George Herbert Walker School of Business and Technology, Webster University, St. Louis, MO, U.S.A.

Keywords
negotiation, emotions, experimental research.

Correspondence
Dejun Tony Kong, Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, U.S.A.; e-mail: KongD@wustl.edu.

Abstract

We examined the role of anticipated happiness in negotiation settings. Anticipated happiness is the happiness that individuals expect to experience in the future if certain events do or do not occur. In two studies, we tested the argument that anticipated happiness initiates an approach goal, leading individuals to promote economic interests. Study 1 revealed that anticipated happiness was positively related to the propensity to initiate a negotiation, mediated by an approach goal. In Study 2, we found that anticipated happiness about reaching the target value increased the individual negotiation outcome, mediated by actual target value. Our studies provide insight into how anticipated happiness influences motivation, behavior, and ultimately individual outcomes in negotiations.

Emotions perform informational and regulatory functions. They can guide judgment and decision making and motivate information processing and behavior (Peters, Västfjäll, Gärling, & Slovic, 2006). Negotiations are one such judgment and decision-making process (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), which is infused with emotions (Barry, 2008; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Druckman & Olekalns, 2008). The majority of negotiation research on emotions has focused on examining the effects of experienced or immediate emotions. This line of research has demonstrated that emotions experienced during a negotiation

We thank Center for Research in Economics and Strategy (CRES) at Washington University in St. Louis for funding our first study. We also appreciate the feedback from the editor and reviewers of *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* and two anonymous reviewers of the 23rd annual meeting of International Association for Conflict Management.

have significant effects on negotiator cognition and behavior, thus influencing negotiation processes and outcomes (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Brett et al., 2007; Campagna, Kong, Mislin, & Bottom, 2011; Friedman et al., 2004; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Kong & Bottom, 2010; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004, 2006; Wood & Schweitzer, 2011).

In addition to "real time" phenomena, ruminating on future events also may be important. Thinking about the future is an important component of human cognition (Atance & O'Neill, 2001) and almost all types of decisions involve predictions about future feelings (March, 1978). While previous research has uncovered the role of emotions that arise during a negotiation, it has not examined how *anticipated emotions* influence negotiator behavior and outcomes. Anticipated emotions are one component of the foreseen consequences of a decision. They are emotions that individuals expect to experience in the future if certain events do or do not occur (Baumgartner, Pieters, & Bagozzi, 2008; Loewenstein, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). It is a well-established finding that individuals come to negotiation settings with expectations regarding their outcomes (Barry & Oliver, 1996; O'Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2005; Patton & Balakrishnan, 2009; Raiffa, 1982; Rubin, Kim, & Peretz, 1990), formulating predictions about how they would feel if they do or do not achieve these outcomes. Predictions about how one would feel in response to future negotiation outcomes may be as critical as immediate emotions in influencing present decisions and strategies (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007).

In this article, we focus on *anticipated happiness*—happiness that individuals expect to experience if certain events do or do not occur—and examine how it relates to the propensity to initiate a negotiation and to negotiation outcomes. Generally, negotiations have been conceptualized as anxiety-inducing situations (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006; Wood & Schweitzer, 2011). Accordingly, some individuals view an upcoming negotiation as a threat, anticipating an unfavorable outcome and feeling the associated negative emotions. On the other hand, others perceive negotiations as a challenge, especially when they believe that they have the resources to meet the situational demands (O'Connor, Arnold, & Maurizio, 2010). We argue that such expectations of positive negotiation outcomes heighten anticipated happiness, which would act as a motivational force (Raghunathan & Trope, 2002; Trope & Neter, 1994) in coping with the demands of a negotiation. Based on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994), we assert that imagining how good it would feel to achieve a desired outcome before negotiating will direct negotiators' focus and motivation on achieving these outcomes. This motivational orientation would be reflected in the desire to initiate a negotiation in the absence of explicit cues that demand it and lead negotiators to set high aspirations, ultimately advancing self-interest.

In the following section, we further discuss the notion of anticipated happiness and distinguish it from related constructs. Then, we discuss how anticipated happiness prompts a self-regulatory process that increases the propensity to initiate a negotiation and individual negotiation outcome.

Anticipated Happiness

Anticipated emotions result from prefactual appraisals (Gleicher, Boninger, Strathman, Armor, & Ahn, 1995) or mental simulations of future events (Baumgartner et al., 2008). Mental simulations are imagined representations or cognitive constructions of future events (Taylor & Schneider, 1989). When engaged in mentally simulating future events, individuals imagine themselves in the situation and predict the potential consequences of the event, which may even lead them to experience its potential effects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Pham & Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Pham, 1996; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). When mentally simulating an event associated with desirable outcomes, individuals experience high levels of anticipated happiness.

Previous research has primarily focused on outcome-based anticipated emotions (e.g., Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996), examining how individuals would feel in response to the outcome of a future event. Research on mental simulation, on the other hand, has maintained that individuals also could simulate the underlying process of an event (Taylor et al., 1998) and anticipate feeling emotions along the way. For example, individuals may expect pleasant or unpleasant negotiation processes with their counterparts and anticipate feeling positive or negative emotions during the negotiation. However, the extant research has not fully informed us about whether individuals can anticipate experiencing certain emotions in the process of an event without thinking about its consequences. Accordingly, we focused primarily on outcome-based anticipated happiness (i.e., how happy one anticipates feeling if a positive negotiation outcome is achieved) in negotiations.

Anticipated happiness is related to but conceptually distinct from state (situational) and trait (dispositional) optimism (Armor & Taylor, 1998) (see Table 1 for distinctions among the constructs). Anticipated happiness is an affective reaction that is expected to be *experienced in the future* in response to the outcome of an event. It relates to the question of ''How would I feel if X happened or did not happen?'' State optimism, on the other hand, is an anticipatory affective reaction that individuals *experience in the present* in response to the prospect of a future event (Baumgartner et al., 2008). It relates to the question of ''What is the likelihood of X happening in the future?'' Although distinct constructs, anticipated happiness possibly can influence state optimism such that anticipating happiness in the future may lead an individual to experience happiness at present or vice versa. In contrast, trait optimism is a stable personality trait, not driven by the situation. That is, some individuals are generally more optimistic than others regardless of the situation they encounter. However, the two constructs are related in that optimistic individuals may perceive a high likelihood of positive outcomes happening to them in the future, thus experiencing high levels of anticipated happiness.

Anticipated Happiness and Self-Regulation

Research on anticipated emotions has not clearly specified how anticipated emotions influence behaviors (e.g., Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001; Perugini & Conner, 2000). However, the research on mental simulations has provided insight (Baumeister et al., 2007).

Table 1
Construct Comparisons among Anticipated Happiness, State Optimism, and Dispositional Optimism

	Anticipated Happiness	State Optimism	Dispositional Optimism
Category	Anticipated emotion	Anticipatory emotion	Trait attitude
Conceptualization	Anticipated happiness is a pleasurable or satisfying emotional experience that individuals anticipate to experience in the *future* if an event or outcome does or does not occur. It is a future-oriented emotion that is expected to be experienced in the future regarding the occurrence (or not) of an event.	A mood associated with a specific expectation about the social or material future—one which the evaluator regards as socially desirable, to his (or her) advantage, or for his (or her) pleasure (Tiger, 1979, p.18). It is conceptualized as an immediate/current emotional characteristic that is both motivated and motivating (Peterson, 2000). It is a future-oriented emotion that is experienced *in the present* regarding the likelihood of the occurrence of a specific event.	An attitude with an expectation about the social or material future—one which the evaluator regards as socially desirable, to his (or her) advantage, or for his (or her) pleasure (Tiger, 1979, p.18). It is conceptualized as a cognitive characteristic (e.g., a general attitude or goal) that is both motivated and motivating (Peterson, 2000). It is a future-oriented attitude regarding the *likelihood* of the occurrence of desired events in general.
Questions answered	How would I feel if X happened or did not happen? Situation or state influences the answer to the question.	What is the likelihood of X happening in the future? Situation or state influences the answer to the question.	What is the likelihood of X happening in the future? Situational influences are irrelevant to the answer to the question since it is a trait-based construct.
Operationalization	Studies have focused on the happiness that individuals anticipate if a goal is achieved or not achieved (outcome-based). Participants to indicate how they would feel if a specific (situational) goal is (is not) achieved using emotion adjectives. For example, Bagozzi et al. (2003) asked subjects to list some personal goals that are important to them and rate how they would feel if they were to succeed in achieving these goals using emotion adjectives such as excited, delighted, happy, glad, and satisfied.	Research has used multiple questions to solicit responses about the emotional characteristic associated with an expectation about specific future event. Situated optimism is often assessed with ad hoc scales or scales adapted from the dispositional optimism scales by changing time frames (e.g., Kluemper et al., 2009).	Research has used multiple questions to solicit responses about the attitude associated with an expectation about the future in general. Dispositional optimism is often assessed with Life Orientation Test (e.g., ''In uncertain times, I usually expect the best''; ''Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.'') (Scheier & Carver, 1985). It is correlated with the Big Five personality traits.

Table 1
(Continued)

	Anticipated Happiness	State Optimism	Dispositional Optimism
Category	Anticipated emotion	Anticipatory emotion	Trait attitude
Predictive value	Predictive in specific contexts (e.g., contexts related to the achievement of a specific goal).	Predictive in specific contexts.	Predictive in general contexts.
Antecedents	By definition, mental simulation is the antecedent of anticipated emotions including anticipated happiness (Baumeister et al., 2007).	Perceived frequency of events, perceived locus of control, perceived severity of events, immediate emotions (e.g., anxiety), self-esteem (Harris et al., 2008).	Gender (Chang, 1998), education (Skinner et al., 1998), age (Scheier & Carver, 1993; Skinner et al., 1998), culture (Scheier & Carver, 1993).
Consequences	Positive anticipated emotions are related to goal desire (Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001), goal intention (e.g., Baumgartner et al., 2008), etc.	State optimism can influence risk behavior (Taylor et al., 1992), coping (Taylor et al., 1992), subjective well-being (Taylor et al., 1992), job satisfaction (Kluemper et al., 2009), affective commitment (Kluemper et al., 2009), etc.	Dispositional optimism is related to coping (Brissette et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 1992), social support, subjective well-being (Brissette et al., 2002), physical well-being (Scheier & Carver, 1987), risk behavior (Taylor et al., 1992), etc.

Mental simulations help individuals construct their future reality (Taylor & Schneider, 1989), making events seem more concrete, decreasing the psychological distance between the present and the future (Taylor & Schneider, 1989; Taylor et al., 1998). By increasing the psychological proximity of a pleasant future event, mental simulations increase the subjective likelihood of goal attainment and the subjective value of the goal (Atkinson & Birch, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Pham & Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 1998). These two subjective perceptions are independent, yet often interact to predict motivation for action (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Atkinson, 1964; Bagozzi, 1981; Brehm & Self, 1989; Eccles et al., 1983; Feather, 1982; Oettingen, Bulgarella, Henderson, & Gollwitzer, 2004; Vroom, 1964; Wright & Brehm, 1989). This motivation activates self-regulatory processes such as approach and avoidance, depending on the goal (Taylor & Pham, 1996; Taylor & Schneider, 1989; Taylor et al., 1998). Taylor et al. (1998) argued that ''[a]n important [and vital] function of mental simulations is that they produce links to action by virtue of the self-regulatory activities they evoke'' (p.431).

Goals are broadly defined as ''representational structures that guide the system in its pursuit of a reference or end state'' (Markman & Brendl, 2000, p;.98). Desirable end states instigate a self-regulation process focused on *approach* goals, whereas undesirable end states prompt *avoidance* goals (Higgins, 1987). Approach goals are related to reaching aspirations, growth, and accomplishment, whereas avoidance goals are related to security and safety (Higgins, 1997, 1998). These goals evoke motivational orientations that guide cognition and behavior (Friedman & Förster, 2001; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). For example, approach goals are usually associated with a focus on positive meanings such as success and hence can promote risk-taking behavior to meet objectives. Conversely, avoidance goals are associated with a focus on negative meanings and lead to risk aversion to maintain a safe distance from an undesired end state (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999).

The majority of research on self-regulatory systems have treated regulatory foci as individual differences; however, regulatory foci as the way individuals approach desired end states and avoid undesired end states can be induced by situational cues such as feedback (Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995), task contingency (Roney et al., 1995), the framing of rewards systems (Higgins, 2000), and the priming of hopes or duties (Higgins, 2000). We argue that anticipated happiness as a situational factor would instigate an approach goal related to attaining positive economic outcomes, which would be manifested in the willingness to initiate a negotiation and maximizing individual gain. It should be noted that anticipated happiness is a future-oriented emotional reaction to an occurrence (or not) of a future event or outcome. It is different from promotion focus, which arises as the current/immediate inclination toward the desirable end state.

Anticipated Happiness and Self-Regulation in Negotiation

Prior to negotiating, individuals tend to appraise the upcoming negotiation in terms of situational demands (primary appraisal) and whether they possess the resources to meet these demands (secondary appraisal) (O'Connor et al., 2010). If negotiators perceive that their resources exceed the demands of the situation, they would develop positive

feelings about the negotiation outcomes, perceiving the negotiation as a reasonable challenge and/or an opportunity to gain access to resources. Conversely, negotiators may perceive the future negotiation as a threat if they believe that the demands of the situation exceed their capacity. Negotiators with challenge appraisals are more likely to anticipate positive emotions than those with threat appraisals.

Initiating negotiations entails both potential benefits and costs as it increases the possibility of achieving gains while simultaneously making one vulnerable to others' exploitative actions. We argue that anticipated happiness would evoke an approach goal, focusing attention on gains (Higgins, 1997, 1998) such that the future negotiation is perceived as an opportunity to improve the current situation rather than as a threat. This, in turn, would increase the propensity to initiate a negotiation in the absence of any externally induced demands.

Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between anticipated happiness related to initiating a negotiation and the propensity to initiate a negotiation, mediated by an approach goal.

In the negotiation context, approach goals are related to the value that negotiator hope to achieve (Pruitt & Drews, 1969) and have been operationalized as the ''level of aspiration'' (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960) and ''target point'' (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Avoidance goals are related to the value negotiators find minimally acceptable (Pruitt & Drews, 1969) and have been examined as the ''resistance point'' (Walton & McKersie, 1965) and ''reservation price'' (Raiffa, 1982). We argue that anticipated happiness—by promoting approach goals—will lead negotiators to set a high target point, which typically leads to a high individual outcome (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005; Siegel & Fouraker, 1960; White & Neale, 1994). Thus,

Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between anticipated happiness related to reaching the target point and the individual negotiation outcome, mediated by the target point.

We tested these hypotheses in two studies. In Study 1, using a scenario methodology, we examined how anticipated happiness about the initiation of a negotiation was related to the propensity to initiate a negotiation (Hypotheses 1). In the second study, we examined how anticipated happiness about reaching the target point was related to individual outcomes (Hypothesis 2) in a face-to-face, dyadic negotiation setting.

Study 1

Method

Participants

Ninety adults (18–66 years old; 60.0% female, 78.9% Caucasian/White; 87.8% Americans) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were eligible to participate in the study via the Internet. Each individual received 50 cents for their anonymous participation. MTurk is an online community where diverse individuals are able to participate

in surveys in return for monetary compensation (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, in press). Research has shown that internet-based studies generalize across presentation formats, are consistent with findings from traditional methods, and are not adversely influenced by nonserious or repeat responders (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; McGraw, Tew, & Williams, 2000).

We had three participant eligibility criteria in addition to the age requirement (18 years old or above). First, our negotiation scenario was about a potential salary negotiation. Given that average salary across occupational groups varies from one country to another, we limited our final sample to those living in the U.S. so that our materials would be more realistic. Second, we only included individuals who were pursuing or had a Bachelor's degree or higher, given that education might influence salary expectations (e.g., McMahon & Wagner, 1981). Third, we limited the sample to those who had an adequate command of English. (i.e., English being the first, second, or third language), in order to ensure comprehension of the scenarios. In addition to the self-report item, we asked participants in an open-ended question to finish the negotiation scenario using their imagination. We double-checked their command of English by reading their answers to the open-ended question. The average age was 34.11 (SD = 13.07). On average, each participant has had 8.03 different paid jobs (SD = 12.73) and engaged in 2.11 salary negotiations (SD = 3.69) in the past.

Procedure

Participants read a salary negotiation scenario (see Appendix 1) and answered questions regarding the scenario. We used a salary negotiation context for the following reasons. First, in the workplace, salary negotiations are common (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). However, the decision about whether to initiate a salary negotiation is often discretionary (Babcock et al., 2006), providing a suitable context to assess individuals' propensity to initiate a negotiation. Second, some prior experience with or exposure to an event is necessary to mentally simulate that event (Baumeister et al., 2007). As most working adults are familiar with salary negotiations, they would be able to imagine the process of initiating a negotiation. Finally, individuals who negotiate their salaries tend to have higher salaries in the long term than those who do not (Small et al., 2007). Therefore, the initiation of a negotiation makes a pleasant future outcome possible, which is a precursor to anticipated happiness.

In the scenario, we asked participants to imagine that they were a sales manager in a medium-sized company with initiatives for increasing its market share. As the sales manager, they made a number of significant contributions to increase the market share and hence expected to receive a salary increase. However, given that the sales staff failed to meet their quota, the sales manager received a lower performance evaluation than those received in previous years. Hence, the sales manager started thinking about whether to negotiate with a human resource (HR) manager named Pat in order to increase the current salary of $80,000. We told participants that the competitive market range for the sales manager position was $75,000–$115,000. Additionally, we told participants that it was unlikely that the sales manager could find a job in a different company given the tough economic times.

We asked two questions to ensure that participants read the scenario carefully and understood the important salary information: (1) ''According to the scenario, what is your current salary?'' with four options (a) *$75,000*, (b) *$80,000*, (c) *$100,000*, and (d) *Other (please specify)*; and (2) ''According to the scenario, what is the competitive market range for sales managers?'' with four options (a) *$80,000–$110,000*, (b) *$70,000–$120,000*, (c) *$75,000–$115,000*, and (d) *Other (please specify)*. The probability of the participants having a correct guess on both four-option questions without reading the scenario was low (1/16 = .0625). We excluded eight individuals who did not correctly answer the questions, leaving 82 participants in the final sample. After reading the scenario, participants indicated their propensity to initiate a salary negotiation and answered the scenario-related questions. Finally, we debriefed and thanked the participants.

Measures

Anticipated happiness. We followed Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Basuroy (2003) in measuring anticipated happiness related to the initiation of a negotiation. Bagozzi and colleagues asked individuals to indicate how they would feel *if they succeeded in achieving their personal goals* using emotion adjectives. Our participants, after reading the scenario, indicated the extent to which they would feel happy, elated, and pleased during the negotiation if they initiated a negotiation using a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *extremely*) (α = .87). We averaged participants' responses to emotion adjectives to create an anticipated happiness scale. Higher values on the scale indicated higher anticipated happiness.

Goals. Both approach goals (e.g., attaining more economic resources) and avoidance goals (e.g., preserving current economic resources) are relevant in the negotiation context (Galinsky et al., 2005). Therefore, we measured both types of goals, controlling for the avoidance goal in our analysis. We assessed each goal with three items. Participants indicated the extent to which they would focus on the following *if they negotiated*: (1) Approach goal (α = .83)—''attaining the best possible salary'', ''getting a big salary jump'', and ''achieving the salary goals''; (2) Avoidance goal (α = .81)—''securing the current job'', ''avoiding creating trouble'', and ''preventing negative outcomes'' (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *a great deal*). The items successfully loaded onto two factors that emerged with Eigenvalues of 2.01 (41.55% of variance) and 2.49 (33.47% of variance) in a promax-rotated factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation. The first factor was the approach goal with factor loadings of .83, .74, and .79. The second factor was the avoidance goal with factor loadings of .64, .87, and .84. We composed the approach and avoidance goal scales averaging responses to three items. Higher values on each scale indicated higher levels of each goal.

Propensity to initiate a negotiation (PIN). We tailored Babcock et al.'s (2006) Propensity to Initiate Negotiation Scale which included items related to opportunity, entitlement, and apprehension to fit our negotiation scenario (see Appendix 2 for a comparison of Babcock et al.'s (2006) PINS and our scale). Participants responded to the items on a 7-point scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). After reverse-scoring some of

the items, we averaged participants' responses to all of the items to measure their PIN ($\alpha = .83$). However, a promax-rotated factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation suggested that these items loaded on two factors with Eigenvalues above 1. The first factor (Eigenvalue = 5.15, 42.88% of the variance explained) was labeled as "PIN-opportunity recognition" with all the factor loadings above .62. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 2.37, 19.75% of the variance explained) was labeled as "PIN-apprehension" with all the factor loadings above .67. The item "Just because I want a salary increase, it doesn't mean I am entitled to get it" did not load on either factor (the absolute value of the factor loading was below .20). Therefore, we eliminated this item from the scale. PIN-opportunity recognition and PIN-apprehension had good internal consistency ($\alpha = .88$ and $\alpha = .90$ respectively). Given that these two components were correlated ($r = -.37$, $p < .001$) and that we were interested in participants' overall propensity to initiate a negotiation, we used the aggregated PIN measure to test our hypotheses. Higher values on the scale indicated a higher propensity to initiate negotiations.

Big Five personality. We also evaluated participants' Big Five personality traits with Saucier's (1994) 40-item Mini-Markers on a 7-point scale from 1 (*not at all characteristic of me*) to 7 (*extremely characteristic of me*). The Big Five personality traits can predict negotiators' propensity to initiate a negotiation. For example, agreeableness is considered stereotypically feminine (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007) and neuroticism is related to face threat sensitivity (Kong, Tuncel, & McLean Parks, 2010), both of which are negatively related to the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Therefore, we included all of the Big Five personality traits as control variables.

Trait dominant regulatory focus. In addition, dominant regulatory focus as an individual difference variable may be related to the propensity to initiate a negotiation. We used Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda's (2002) scale to measure participants' trait promotion focus (nine items; $\alpha = .87$) and trait prevention focus (nine items; $\alpha = .91$) on a 7-point scale from 1 (*not at all characteristic of me*) to 7 (*extremely characteristic of me*). Following Lockwood et al.'s (1992) practice, we subtracted the trait prevention focus value from the trait promotion focus value to generate a dominant regulatory focus value. A positive value indicated a promotion focus, whereas a negative value indicated a prevention focus.

Demographics. Finally, we controlled for biological sex (1 = *female* and 0 = *male*) and age. Research has shown that females have a lower propensity to initiate a negotiation (Bowles et al., 2007; Kong et al., 2010; Small et al., 2007), making it necessary to control for the effects of biological sex on our dependent variable. Additionally, age is related to individuals' ranking in an organization, thus may influence their propensity to initiate a negotiation.

Results

Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study variables. The PIN was positively correlated with anticipated happiness ($r = .40$, $p < .001$)

Table 2
Study 1 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
PIN	3.97	1.04													
PIN-opportunity recognition	4.73	1.20	.85***												
PIN-apprehension	4.94	1.31	−.81***	−.37***											
Anticipated happiness	2.33	1.21	.40***	.23*	−.44***										
Approach goal	4.70	1.32	.62***	.62***	−.40***	.27*									
Avoidance goal	5.19	1.39	−.20	−.02	.33**	.04	−.11								
Extraversion	4.14	1.19	.23*	.05	−.34**	.11	.15	−.12							
Agreeableness	5.25	1.00	−.24*	−.22*	.18	−.08	−.04	.21	.06						
Conscientiousness	5.13	.96	−.03	−.03	.03	−.17	−.02	.18	.04	.26*					
Neuroticism	3.59	.94	−.16	.03	.31**	−.07	−.04	−.04	−.32**	−.43***	−.27*				
Openness	5.23	.97	−.07	−.06	.06	−.20	.05	−.09	.35**	.14	.16	−.18			
Dominant regulatory focus	.80	1.63	.19	.07	−.25*	−.08	.11	−.14	.50***	.23*	.20	−.45***	.36***		
Age	34.95	13.23	−.01	−.02	.00	−.07	−.18	.22*	−.01	.13	.12	−.24*	−.23*	.14	
Female	.61	.49	−.16	−.15	.11	.03	.02	−.13	−.03	.14	−.02	.06	−.31**	−.09	−.01

Note. $N = 82$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).
PIN, propensity to initiate a negotiation

and the approach goal ($r = .62$, $p < .001$), but *not* the avoidance goal ($r = -.20$, *n.s.*). The PIN-opportunity recognition was also positively correlated with anticipated happiness ($r = .23$, $p < .05$) and the approach goal ($r = .62$, $p < .001$), but *not* the avoidance goal ($r = -.02$, *n.s.*). The PIN-apprehension was negatively correlated with anticipated happiness ($r = -.44$, $p < .001$) and the approach goal ($r = -.40$, $p < .001$) but positively correlated with the avoidance goal ($r = .33$, $p < .01$). Anticipated happiness was positively correlated with the approach goal ($r = .27$, $p < .05$), but *not* with the avoidance goal ($r = .04$, *n.s.*).

In addition, we conducted a promax-rotated factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation on the items of PIN-opportunity recognition and apprehension, approach and avoidance goals, and anticipated happiness to empirically differentiate among them. As expected, five factors with Eigenvalues above 1 emerged (see Table 3). All of the factor loadings were above .50.

Table 3
Study 1 Factor Analysis Results

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Item	PIN-opportunity recognition	PIN-apprehension	Anticipated happiness	Avoidance goal	Approach goal
Eigenvalue	6.81	3.07	2.41	1.32	1.20
% of variance explained	34.04%	15.36%	12.07%	6.59%	6.01%
PIN 1	.81	−.11	−.19	.08	.02
PIN 2	.82	.20	.05	.00	.21
PIN 3	.67	−.05	.03	−.10	−.27
PIN 4	.83	.07	−.04	−.02	.11
PIN 5	.68	.04	.16	.04	−.04
PIN 6	.51	−.21	−.06	.17	.16
PIN 8	.14	.80	−.07	−.09	−.07
PIN 9	−.03	.72	.13	.02	−.18
PIN 10	−.12	.64	−.21	.18	.21
PIN 11	.05	.96	−.06	−.02	−.04
PIN 12	−.13	.69	.05	.10	−.05
Avoidance goal 1	.02	.14	.04	.62	.17
Avoidance goal 2	.03	−.08	−.07	.88	−.17
Avoidance goal 3	.04	.04	.16	.83	−.04
Approach goal 1	−.03	−.15	−.03	.06	.87
Approach goal 2	.15	.10	.18	−.25	.59
Approach goal 3	.03	−.07	.02	.02	.68
Anticipated happiness 1	.05	−.06	.87	.02	−.06
Anticipated happiness 2	−.19	.03	.80	.09	.14
Anticipated happiness 3	.13	−.07	.76	.01	.00

Note. $N = 82$. The factor analysis adopted a promax rotation with maximum likelihood estimation. The factor loadings above .40 are underscored.
PIN, propensity to initiate a negotiation

Table 4
Study 1 Regression Results

	PIN		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Predictor	*B (S.E.)*	*B (S.E.)*	*B (S.E.)*
(Constant)	7.89 (1.43)***	6.18 (1.44)***	4.50 (1.17)***
Age	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Female	−.35 (.24)	−.32 (.22)	−.42 (.18)*
Extraversion	.15 (.11)	.09 (.10)	.07 (.08)
Agreeableness	−.33 (.13)**	−.31 (.12)**	−.25 (.10)*
Conscientiousness	.00 (.12)	.05 (.11)	.06 (.09)
Neuroticism	−.25 (.14)	−.18 (.14)	−.17 (.11)
Openness	−.29 (.14)*	−.19 (.13)	−.20 (.10)
Dominant regulatory focus	.11 (.08)	.13 (.08)	.06 (.06)
Anticipated happiness		.29 (.09)***	.19 (.07)*
Approach goal			.42 (.06)***
Avoidance goal			−.11 (.06)
R^2	.23	.33	.60
ΔR^2		.10	.27
F	$F(8, 81) = 2.76$**	$F(9, 81) = 4.02$***	$F(11, 81) = 9.69$***

Note. $N = 82$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).
PIN, propensity to initiate a negotiation

Table 4 presents the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results. Hypothesis 1 proposed that there would be a positive relationship between anticipated happiness and the PIN, mediated by the approach goal. After controlling for age, biological sex, the Big Five personality traits, and dominant regulatory focus, anticipated happiness ($B = .29$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$) explained an additional 10% of the variance in the PIN. We also found that this positive relationship was partially mediated by the approach goal (Sobel $z = 2.30$, $p = .02$) (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). We conducted a supplementary bootstrap analysis (a nonparametric re-sampling procedure to test mediation) with 500 replications to test for mediation. A bootstrap analysis does not impose the normality assumption for the sampling distribution (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2008) and is especially useful for small to moderate samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We found that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval [.03, .24] for the indirect effect size excluded zero, suggesting a significant mediating effect of the approach goal (cf. Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The avoidance goal did not mediate the relationship between anticipated happiness and PIN (Sobel $z = -.38$, *n.s.*). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported.[1]

[1]Considering that previous salary negotiation experiences may influence individuals' propensity to initiate a salary negotiation, we also conducted a regression analysis with the number of real-life salary negotiations participants reported as an additional control variable. The pattern of the results did not change.

Discussion

In Study 1, we demonstrated that anticipated happiness about the initiation of a negotiation was positively related to the PIN above and beyond trait dominant regulatory focus. This relationship was mediated by the approach goal. In particular, negotiators who anticipated happiness perceived initiating the negotiation as an opportunity, not as a threat. This finding suggests that anticipated happiness provides a psychological buffer against negative appraisals of the situation and leads individuals to focus on maximizing their individual outcome. Finally, we found partial mediation of the approach goal on the relationship between anticipated happiness and the PIN. While it is possible that partial mediation is the true relationship, it is also possible that our anticipated happiness measure constrained the relationship.

In Study 2, we examined the role of anticipated happiness in a face-to-face, dyadic negotiation. We refined our measure of anticipated happiness, making it focus on the negotiation outcome. More precisely, we examined how negotiators' anticipated happiness about reaching the target point was related to their approach goals and their individual outcomes.

Study 2

Method

Participants and Procedure

Fifty graduate students (40% female and 60% male) at a private university in the Midwestern U.S. participated in a negotiation simulation between a manager and a worker as part of a classroom assignment of their negotiation course. The negotiation took place midway through the term, ensuring that they had been introduced to key concepts such as their Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), reservation price, and target price. To extend Study 1's salary negotiation findings into a different context, we used a case in Study 2 involving an errant worker and a manager who were negotiating disciplinary procedures. In this negotiation simulation, the worker had been involved in a number of automobile accidents while driving the company vehicle, yet refused to take responsibility. Given the worker's record, when there was another accident, the manager and the worker met to negotiate possible disciplinary actions, hoping to dispense with formal proceedings. Issues included such things as length of suspension and whether it was paid or not, taking a driving course, and the like. The negotiation task was structurally similar to New Recruit (Neale, 1997) in that both negotiations involve two distributive issues, two compatible issues, and four integrative issues (see Appendix 3 for the issues, payoffs, and structure of the negotiation, as well as comparison with the structurally similar New Recruit case). In addition to negotiating the case, participants completed pre- and postnegotiation questionnaires as part of their class activity. We did not provide participants with an explicit BATNA; instead, we let them determine their own BATNAs after reading the role instructions. Their BATNAs were collected from a prenegotiation preparation sheet, where they

were asked, ostensibly as a check on their preparation for the negotiation, to state their BATNAs, as well as their reservation and target values. All dyads but three reached an agreement.

Measures

Anticipated happiness. Prior to the negotiation, participants indicated the extent to which they would feel happy, elated, and pleased *if they reached their target point* using a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *extremely*) (α = .71). We then averaged participants' responses to these emotion adjectives. Higher values on the scale indicated higher anticipated happiness.

BATNA. Participants completed a questionnaire prior to the negotiation in which they were asked to define their BATNAs (''What is the utility [an amount] of [their role]'s BATNA''). The reported BATNA values ranged from −100,000 to 27,000 overall, with a mean of −2,608.70. For the role of the worker, the range was −100,000 to 27,000 with a mean of −4,850, whereas management's reported range was from −13,000 to 22,500 with a mean of 59.52. Following Tripp and Sondak's (1992) suggestion, we used the reported BATNAs as the negotiation outcomes for those negotiators who reached an impasse.

Target point. We asked participants target points (''What is your target price'') before the negotiation. Considering the magnitude of the subsequent regression coefficients, we divided participants' target points by 1,000 for analysis. The range varied from 6.00 to 33.00 (the maximum a negotiator could gain potentially). The target point for participants with the manager's role ranged from 6.00 to 33.00 with a mean of 21.87. The target point for those with the worker's role ranged from 10.00 to 33.00 with a mean of 26.31.

Reservation point. To control for the relationship between the avoidance goal and the individual outcome, we asked participants about their reservation points (''What is your reservation price'') before the negotiation. Again, we divided the reservation points by 1,000 for analysis. The reservation point ranged from −100.00 to 27.00. The reservation point for participants with the manager's role ranged from −15.00 to 23.10 with a mean of 6.01. The reservation point for those with the worker's role ranged from −100.00 to 27.00 with a mean of 6.35.

Individual outcome. We calculated the individual outcome based on the respective payoff tables. We divided the individual outcome by 1,000 for analysis. The issues had both positive and negative values and therefore the range for individual outcome was −21.00–29.00. Individual outcomes for participants with the manager's role ranged from −9.00 to 16.50 with a mean of 7.17. Individual outcomes for those with the worker's role ranged from −21.00 to 29.00 with a mean of 15.27.

Results

Table 5 presents the correlations among the study variables. However, given the nonindependence of the individual outcomes of the two negotiation parties, correlations related to individual outcomes should be interpreted with caution (e.g., Jex & Bliese,

Table 5
Study 2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	*SD*
Full sample									
Individual outcome	11.22	9.24							
Anticipated happiness	5.87	.92	.24*						
Target point	24.09	7.69	.32**	.46****					
Reservation point	6.18	17.81	−.12	.11	.00				
Female	.40	.50	.01	−.08	−.10	.14			
Role (1 = manager, 0 = worker)	.50	.51	−.44****	−.20	−.29**	−.01	.08		
Subsamples (role)									
Individual outcome	7.17	6.49		.22	.14	−.17	.05	15.27	9.91
Anticipated happiness	5.69	.98	.12		.42**	.05	.09	6.05	.84
Target point	21.87	8.10	.35*	.43**		−.01	−.02	26.31	6.70
Reservation point	6.01	8.51	.02	.30	.02		.21	6.35	23.99
Female	.44	.51	.04	−.19	−.12	−.01		.36	.49

Note. $N = 50$ for the full sample and $N = 25$ for each subsample. For the subsamples, manager-role statistics appear below the diagonal, and worker-role statistics appear above the diagonal.
*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$; ****$p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Table 6
Study 2 Regression Results

	Individual Outcome	
	Model 1	Model 2
Predictor	*B (Robust SE)*	*B (Robust SE)*
(Constant)	13.73 (5.97)*	11.36 (7.41)
Female	1.07 (1.81)	1.57 (1.91)
Role (1 = manager, 0 = worker)	−7.00 (1.74)***	−6.43 (1.77)***
Dyad mean of anticipated happiness	.10 (.89)	−.29 (1.16)
Dyad-mean-centered anticipated happiness	3.29 (1.49)*	2.68 (1.70)
Target point		.19 (.09)*
Reservation point		−.07 (.05)
R^2	.25	.28
ΔR^2		.03
F	$F(4, 24) = 5.24$***	$F(6, 24) = 6.61$***

Note. $N = 50$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

1999). Table 5 also provides correlations within the subsamples (roles), but caution is still needed in interpreting the correlations related to individual outcome because of the violation of the error independence assumption. We found that anticipated happiness was positively correlated with the target point ($r = .46$, $p < .001$) but *not* with the reservation point ($r = .11$, *n.s.*).

Table 6 presents the results of regression analysis with cluster-robust standard errors (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). This analytical method accounts for error interdependence within dyads and error independence between dyads (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; e.g., Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik, 2004). We treated the negotiation dyad as the cluster. To facilitate the interpretation of results by separating individual variables from the dyadic impact, we used the dyad-level mean of anticipated happiness and the dyad-mean-centered anticipated happiness (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). A significant positive relationship between dyad-mean-centered anticipated happiness and individual outcome indicated that the negotiator with a higher level of anticipated happiness had a higher individual outcome than the counterpart. In addition, since the regression analysis required a normally distributed dependent variable, we checked the assumption and confirmed the normal distribution of the dependent variable—individual outcome (Kolmogorov–Smirnov $Z = .95$, *n.s.*).

After controlling for biological sex and the negotiation role, dyad-mean-centered anticipated happiness was positively related to the individual outcome ($B = 3.29$, $SE = 1.49$, $p < .05$). However, this relationship became nonsignificant when the target point was entered ($B = .19$, $SE = .09$, $p < .05$), indicating full mediation. A bootstrapping analysis with 500 replications indicated that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval [.09, 3.57] for the indirect effect size excluded zero. Therefore, we concluded that the target point had a significant mediation effect between anticipated happiness and the individual outcome (cf. Shrout & Bolger, 2002), supporting Hypothesis 2.

Discussion

In Study 2, we examined the role of anticipated happiness in a face-to-face, dyadic negotiation with an integrative potential. We found that anticipated happiness related to reaching the target point prompted an approach goal—as opposed to an avoidance goal—and helped negotiators claim more value. In this study, we used different measures of the approach goal (target point) and the avoidance goal (reservation point) than used in Study 1 and replicated our finding that anticipated happiness prompts an approach goal. Additionally, we were able to show that anticipated happiness was positively related to individual outcomes.

General Discussion

In this article, drawing from the mental simulation and regulatory focus literature, we examined the role of anticipated happiness in negotiation settings. In two studies, we demonstrated that anticipated happiness evoked an approach goal of attaining more economic resources, which increased the propensity to initiate a negotiation and also led individuals to reap larger benefits from the negotiation. We now turn to a

discussion of the theoretical implications of our results, followed by a discussion of the limitations of the studies, as well as future directions for research.

Theoretical Implications

Our research makes a number of theoretical contributions. First, previous negotiation research has primarily focused on understanding the effects of immediate emotions on negotiator behavior and cognition (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004, 2006; Wood & Schweitzer, 2011). However, anticipated emotions could be important as well in guiding negotiation behavior and affecting negotiation outcomes. Anticipated emotions serve as feedback mechanisms assisting individuals to regulate their behavior in the present, for example, as they prepare for negotiations. In addition, anticipated emotions facilitate decision making and behavioral control (Baumeister et al., 2007; Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). To our knowledge, our research is one of the few studies that have empirically examined this topic in the negotiation context. Our results demonstrated that directing focus on a positive negotiation outcome has motivational effects for negotiators.

Second, negotiation research has emphasized the significant role that expectations play in decisions to initiate negotiations (Babcock et al., 2006), negotiation processes (Patton & Balakrishnan, 2009), and social psychological outcomes (Patton & Balakrishnan, 2009). Barry and Oliver (1996) argued that positive anticipation and the associated positive affect would increase the likelihood of choosing negotiation over disengagement. Babcock and Laschever (2003) empirically demonstrated that feeling apprehensive about upcoming negotiations decreased the propensity to initiate negotiations and led to disengagement. Examining the effects of expectations on subjective negotiation outcomes, Oliver, Balakrishnan, and Barry (1994) found that deviation from expected negotiation outcomes was a stronger predictor of negotiator satisfaction than the actual outcomes. While these studies have shown that expectations are important determinants of cognition and behavior in negotiations, they have not systematically examined the process through which they exert their influence. We demonstrated *how* anticipated happiness influenced negotiators' behavioral intentions and outcomes.

Drawing from mental simulation theory (Taylor & Pham, 1996; Taylor & Schneider, 1989; Taylor et al., 1998), we argued that anticipated happiness resulting from mentally simulating a positive event makes the event's outcome seem more concrete and psychologically proximal. We found that this process prompted an approach goal characterized by a focus on success and goal attainment (Higgins, 1997, 1998), which in turn increased the propensity to initiate a negotiation above and beyond trait dominant regulatory focus. Anticipated happiness also enhanced value claimed by negotiators by leading them to set high target points (approach goals). Taken together, these findings demonstrated that anticipated happiness motivated action tendencies that helped reduce the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self, leading negotiators to advance their economic interests.

Third, our research contributes to the study of regulatory focus in the negotiation context. Galinsky et al. (2005) also studied regulatory focus in negotiations and found

that negotiators who focused on their ideal outcomes or target points claimed more value than those who focused on their minimum outcomes or reservation points. Our findings are consistent with those of Galinsky et al.'s (2005). We also examined a situational factor—anticipated happiness—as an antecedent of negotiators' regulatory foci. According to goal-setting theory, goal orientation provides a mental framework for individuals to have a positive interpretation of and response to a situation (Brett & VandeWalle, 1999). Anticipated happiness is associated with such a mental framework and leads individuals to reap larger benefits in negotiations.

In addition, previous research primarily has focused on emotions as consequences of *dispositional* regulatory focus and goal pursuit (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Brockner & Higgins, 2001). However, emotions can be antecedents of *momentary* regulatory focus as well, especially when emotions are future-oriented. Anticipated future outcomes and corresponding anticipated emotions provide self-defining goals that guide self-regulation (Baumeister et al., 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Anticipated emotions shape negotiators' future goals and proximal self-regulation, especially when proximal self-regulation is instrumental to the attainment of anticipated future outcomes. Thus, another contribution of our research is that we examined how negotiators' future-oriented emotions guide their self-regulation as they approach, prepare for, and execute a negotiation.

Directions of Future Negotiation Research

Our findings suggest potentially fruitful avenues for negotiation research. First, given that different emotions have different evolutionary functions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1980), it is important for future research to examine how different anticipated emotions influence negotiation behavior and outcomes. For example, anticipated regret or disappointment may have different effects on choices and behavior (e.g., Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). Anticipated disappointment may lead individuals to be more effortful, trying to live up to initial expectations. However, anticipated regret may lead them to delay their decisions to avoid regret. Examining different anticipated emotions would help explain what happens during the negotiation process and lead to a more complete understanding of the role of anticipated emotions.

Second, our research primarily focused on outcome-based anticipated happiness. However, future research should uncover whether and how process-based anticipated happiness influences negotiation behavior and outcomes. Process-based anticipated emotions can be related to the relational aspects of the negotiation process. They may influence trust building, interpersonal fairness, and subjective negotiation outcomes such as satisfaction with the relationship.

A third interesting avenue for future research is to examine how anticipated emotions interact with immediate emotions to affect negotiator behavior and outcomes. Loewenstein et al.'s (2001) risk-as-feeling hypothesis suggests that immediate emotions and cognitive evaluation mediate the impact of anticipated emotions on behavior. Additionally, Baumeister et al. (2007) argued that while individuals anticipate experiencing certain emotions during future events, they still may have immediate emotions triggered in the

situation. Taken together. these arguments suggest that anticipated emotions and immediate emotions may have independent and joint effects on negotiation behavior. For example, it is possible that imagining a negotiation outcome and anticipating happiness may attenuate the negative effects of immediate anger on the negotiation process by helping focal negotiators regulate their own and counterparts' counterproductive behavior.

Limitations

Like all research, our studies have limitations. In many cases, these limitations also suggest future research directions. First, like Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007), we used a scenario methodology to examine how anticipated happiness predicted the propensity to initiate a negotiation in Study 1. Because we were interested in examining individuals' intention to initiate a negotiation, this was an appropriate methodology as a first step. Connecting this relationship with the potential to initiate or withdraw from an actual negotiation would allow the observation of how their intentions would predict the actual behavior (e.g., Babcock et al., 2006), and possible mechanisms which might intervene.

The second limitation arises from the anticipated happiness measure used in Study 1. Although our purpose was to understand how individuals would feel about initiating negotiations, wording of the question may have led participants to think and mentally simulate the negotiation process *and* outcome. We developed a context-specific measure as a result, one that more precisely focused on the outcomes. Each of these measures—one that focuses on both process and outcome and one that focuses on outcomes only—may be useful in different contexts. In this study, given we found similar motivational effects of anticipated happiness in Study 2 with different measures, we believe anticipated happiness does influence actual behavior.

Finally, in our studies, we mainly focused on outcome-based anticipated happiness to take the first step in examining the effects of anticipated emotions in the negotiation context. As noted earlier, mental simulation theory has suggested that individuals imagine and mentally simulate not only the outcome but also the process of an event. Therefore, future studies should examine whether process-based anticipated happiness is empirically distinct from outcome-based anticipated happiness and predicts different negotiation outcomes. For example, it is possible that process-based anticipated emotions would be more strongly related to relational outcomes than outcome-based anticipated emotions.

Conclusion

Anticipated happiness facilitates enhancing economic interest in negotiation contexts, through prompting approach goals. Our findings enrich our understanding of the role of emotions in negotiations and compliment research on immediate emotions in negotiations by demonstrating that negotiators' appraisals of future outcomes exert equally important influences on their present behavior as their immediate environment.

References

Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *50*, 179–211.

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). *Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Amodio, D. M., Shah, J. Y., Sigelman, J., Brazy, P. C., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2004). Implicit regulatory focus associated with asymmetrical frontal cortical activity. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *40*, 225–232.

Armor, D. A., & Taylor, S. E. (1998). Situated optimism: Specific outcome expectancies and self-regulation. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *30*, 309–379.

Atance, C. M., & O'Neill, D. K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *5*, 533–539.

Atkinson, J. W. (1964). Towards experimental analysis of human motivation in terms of motives, expectancies, and incentives. In J. W. Atkinson (Ed.), *Motives in fantasy, action, and society* (pp. 288–305). Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.

Atkinson, J. W., & Birch, D. (1974). The dynamics of achievement-oriented activity. In J. W. Atkinson & J. O. Raynor (Eds.), *Motivation and Achievement* (pp. 271–325). Washington, DC: Winston.

Babcock, L., Gelfand, M., Small, D., & Stayn, H. (2006). Gender differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations. In D. D. Cremer, M. Zeelenberg & J. K. Murnighan (Eds.), *Social psychology and economics* (pp. 239–259). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Babcock, L., & Laschever, S. (2003). *Women don't ask: Negotiation and the gender divide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bagozzi, R. P. (1981). Attitudes, intentions, and behavior: A test of some key hypotheses. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *41*, 607–627.

Bagozzi, R. P., Dholakia, U. M., & Basuroy, S. (2003). How effortful decisions get enacted: The motivating role of decision processes, desires, and anticipated emotions. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, *16*, 273–295.

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*, 1173–1182.

Barry, B. (2008). Negotiator affect: The state of the art (and the science). *Group Decision and Negotiation*, *17*, 97–105.

Barry, B., & Oliver, R. L. (1996). Affect in dyadic negotiation: A model and propositions. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *67*, 127–143.

Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion shapes behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *11*, 167–203.

Baumgartner, H., Pieters, R., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2008). Future-oriented emotions: Conceptualization and behavioral effects. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38*, 685–696.

Bazerman, M. H., & Carroll, J. S. (1987). Negotiator cognition. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior*, Vol 9. (pp. 247–288). Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Bowles, H. R., Babcock, L., & Lai, L. (2007). Social incentives for gender differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations: Sometimes it does hurt to ask. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *103*, 84–103.

Brehm, J. W., & Self, E. (1989). The intensity of motivation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *40*, 109–131.

Brett, J. M., Olekalns, M., Friedman, R., Goates, N., Anderson, C., & Lisco, C. C. (2007). Sticks and stones: Language, face, and online dispute resolution. *Academy of Management Journal*, *50*, 85–99.

Brett, J. F., & VandeWalle, D. (1999). Goal orientation and goal content as predictors of performance in a training program. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *84*, 863–873.

Brissette, I., Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (2002). The role of optimism in social network development, coping, and psychological adjustment during a life transition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*, 102–111.

Brockner, J., & Higgins, E. T. (2001). Regulatory focus theory: Implications for the study of emotions at work. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *86*, 35–66.

Bryk, A. S., & Raudenbush, S. W. (1992). *Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data analysis methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Buhrmester, M. D., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon Mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *6*, 3–5.

Campagna, R., Kong, D. T., Mislin, A., & Bottom, W. P. (2011). *Of Machiavelli and mad men: The impact of strategic expression of emotion on trust and negotiated agreement*. To be presented at the annual meeting of Academy of Management, San Antonio, TX, August 12-16.

Chang, E. C. (1998). Dispositional optimism and primary and secondary appraisal of a stressor: Controlling for confounding influences and relations to coping and psychological and physical adjustment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 1109–1120.

Crowe, E., & Higgins, E. T. (1997). Regulatory focus and strategic inclinations: Promotion and prevention in decision-making. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *69*, 117–132.

Druckman, D., & Olekalns, M. (2008). Emotions in negotiation. *Group Decision and Negotiation*, *17*, 1–11.

Eccles, J. S., Adler, T. F., Futterman, R., Goff, S. B., Kaczala, C. M., Meece, J. L., et al. (1983). Expectancies, values, and academic behaviors. In J. T. Spence (Ed.), *Achievement and Achievement Motivation* (pp. 75–146). San Francisco, CA: Freeman.

Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. (1993). *An introduction to the bootstrap*. New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC.

Feather, N. T. (Ed.) (1982). *Expectations and actions: Expectancy value models in psychology*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Foo, M. D., Elfenbein, H. A., Tan, H. H., & Aik, V. C. (2004). Emotional intelligence and negotiation: The tension between creating and claiming value. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, *15*, 411–429.

Friedman, R., Anderson, C., Brett, J., Olekalns, M., Goates, N., & Lisco, C. C. (2004). The positive and negative effects of anger on dispute resolution: Evidence from electronically mediated disputes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *89*, 369–376.

Friedman, R. S., & Förster, J. (2001). The effects of promotion and prevention cues on creativity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*, 1001–1013.

Frijda, N. H. (1986). *The emotions*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Galinsky, A. D., Leonardelli, G. J., Okhuysen, G. A., & Mussweiler, T. (2005). Regulatory focus at the bargaining table: Promoting distributive and integrative success. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*, 1087–1098.

Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*, 657–669.

Gleicher, F., Boninger, D. S., Strathman, A., Armor, D., & Ahn, M. (1995). With an eye toward the future: The impact of counterfactual thinking on affect, attitudes, and behavior. In N. J. Roese & J. M. Olson (Eds.), *What might have been: The social psychology of counterfactual thinking* (pp. 283–304). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Gosling, S. D., Vazire, S., Srivastava, S., & John, O. P. (2004). Should we trust web-based studies? A comparative analysis of six preconceptions about Internet questionnaires. *American Psychologist*, *59*, 93–104.

Harris, P. R., Griffin, D. W., & Murray, S. (2008). Testing the limits of optimistic bias: Event and person moderators in a multilevel framework. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*, 1225–1237.

Hegtvedt, K. A., & Killian, C. (1999). Fairness and emotions: Reactions to the process and outcomes of negotiations. *Social Forces*, *78*, 269–302.

Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review*, *94*, 319–340.

Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. *American Psychologist*, *52*, 1280–1300.

Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol. 30 (pp. 1–46). New York: Academic Press.

Higgins, E. T. (2000). Making a good decision: Value from fit. *American Psychologist*, *55*, 1217–1230.

Higgins, E. T., Roney, C. J. R., Crowe, E., & Hymes, C. (1994). Ideal versus ought predictions for approach and avoidance: Distinct self-regulatory systems. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *66*, 276–286.

Higgins, E. T., Shah, J. Y., & Friedman, R. (1997). Emotional responses to goal attainment: Strength of regulatory focus as moderator. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *72*, 515–525.

Jex, S. M., & Bliese, P. D. (1999). Efficacy beliefs as a moderator of the impact of work-related stressors: A multilevel study. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *84*, 349–361.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (pp. 201–208). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kluemper, D. H., Little, L. M., & DeGroot, T. (2009). State or trait: Effects of state optimism on job-related outcomes. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *30*, 209–231.

Kong, D. T., & Bottom, W. P. (2010). *Emotional intelligence, negotiation outcome, and negotiation behavior*. Presented at the annual meeting of Academy of Management, Montreal, Canada, August 6–10.

Kong, D. T., Tuncel, E., & McLean Parks, J. (2010). *Positive face threat sensitivity and conflict aversion in negotiation*. Presented at the annual meeting of Academy of Management, Montreal, Canada, August 6–10.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Liberman, N., Idson, L. C., Camacho, C. J., & Higgins, E. T. (1999). Promotion and prevention choices between stability and change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *77*, 1135–1145.

Lockwood, P., Jordan, C. H., & Kunda, Z. (2002). Motivation by positive or negative role models: Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*, 854–864.

Loewenstein, G. (2000). Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior. *American Economic Review*, *90*, 426–432.

Loewenstein, G., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. *Psychological Bulletin*, *127*, 267–286.

MacKinnon, D. P., Fairchild, A. J., & Fritz, M. S. (2007). Mediation analysis. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *58*, 593–614.

Magee, J. C., Galinsky, A. D., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2007). Power, propensity to negotiate, and moving first in competitive interactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*, 200–212.

March, J. (1978). Bounded rationality, ambiguity and the engineering of choice. *Bell Journal of Economics*, *9*, 587–608.

Markman, A. B., & Brendl, M. C. (2000). The influence of goals on value and choice. In D. L. Medin (Ed.), *The psychology of learning and motivation*, Vol 39 (pp. 97–129). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

McGraw, K. O., Tew, M. D., & Williams, J. E. (2000). The integrity of web-delivered experiments: Can you trust the data? *Psychological Science*, *11*, 502–506.

McMahon, W. W., & Wagner, A. P. (1981). Expected returns to investment in higher education. *Journal of Human Resources*, *16*, 274–285.

Mellers, B. A., & McGraw, A. P. (2001). Anticipated emotions as guides to choice. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *10*, 210–214.

Mellers, B., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999). Emotion-based choice. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *128*, 332–345.

Neale, M. A. (1997). New Recruit. In J. M. Brett (Ed.), *Negotiation and decision making exercises*. Evanston, IL: Dispute Resolution Research Center, Northwestern University.

Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). Perspectives for understanding negotiation: Viewing negotiation as a judgmental process. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *29*, 33–55.

O'Connor, K. M., Arnold, J. A., & Burris, E. R. (2005). Negotiators' bargaining histories and their effects on future negotiation performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *90*, 350–362.

O'Connor, K. M., Arnold, J. A., & Maurizio, A. M. (2010). The prospect of negotiating: Stress, cognitive appraisal, and performance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *46*, 729–735.

Oettingen, G., Bulgarella, C., Henderson, M., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2004). The self-regulation of goal pursuit. In R. A. Wright, J. Greenberg & S. S. Brehm (Eds.), *Motivation analyses of social behavior: Building on Jack Brehm's contributions to psychology* (pp. 225–244). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Oliver, R. L., Balakrishnan, P. V., & Barry, B. (1994). Outcome satisfaction in negotiation: A test of expectancy disconfirmation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *60*, 252–275.

Patton, C., & Balakrishnan, P. V. (2009). The impact of expectation of future negotiation interaction on bargaining processes and outcomes. *Journal of Business Research*, *63*, 809–816.

Perugini, M., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2001). The role of desires and anticipated emotions in goal-directed behaviours: Broadening and deepening the theory of planned behaviour. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *40*, 79–98.

Perugini, M., & Conner, M. (2000). Predicting and understanding behavioral volitions: The interplay between goals and behaviors. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *30*, 705–731.

Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Gärling, T., & Slovic, P. (2006). Affect and decision making: A ''hot'' topic. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, *19*, 79–85.

Peterson, C. (2000). The future of optimism. *American Psychologist*, *55*, 44–55.

Pham, L. B., & Taylor, S. E. (1999). From thought to action: Effects of process- versus outcome-based mental simulations on performance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *25*, 250–260.

Plutchik, R. (1980). *Emotion: A psychevolutionary synthesis*. New York: Harper and Row.

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavioral Research Methods*, *40*, 879–891.

Pruitt, D. G., & Drews, J. L. (1969). The effect of time pressure, time elapsed, and the opponent's concession rate on behavior in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *5*, 43–60.

Raghunathan, R., & Trope, Y. (2002). Walking the tightrope between feeling good and being accurate: Mood as a resource in processing persuasive messages. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*, 510–525.

Raiffa, H. (1982). *The art and science of negotiations*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Richard, R., van der Pligt, J., & de Vries, N. (1996). Anticipated regret and time perspective: Changing sexual risk taking behavior. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, *9*, 185–199.

Roney, C. J. R., Higgins, E. T., & Shah, J. (1995). Goals and framing: How outcome focus influences motivation and emotion. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *21*, 1151–1160.

Rubin, J. Z., Kim, S. H., & Peretz, N. M. (1990). Expectancy effects and negotiation. *Journal of Social Issues*, *46*, 125–139.

Saucier, G. (1994). Mini-markers: A brief version of Goldberg's Unipolar Big-Five Markers. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *63*, 506–516.

Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). Optimism, coping, and health: Assessment and implications of generalized outcome expectancies. *Health Psychology*, *4*, 219–247.

Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1987). Dispositional optimism and physical well-being: The influence of generalized outcome expectancies on health. *Journal of Personality*, *55*, 169–210.

Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1993). On the power of positive thinking: The benefits of being optimistic. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *2*, 26–30.

Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and non-experimental studies: New procedures and recommendations. *Psychological Methods*, *7*, 422–445.

Siegel, S., & Fouraker, L. E. (1960). *Bargaining and group decision making*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Skinner, C. S., Kreuter, M. W., Korbrin, S., & Strecher, V. J. (1998). Perceived and actual breast cancer risk: Optimistic and pessimistic biases. *Journal of Health Psychology*, *3*, 181–193.

Small, D. A., Gelfand, M., Babcock, L., & Gettman, H. (2007). Who goes to the bargaining table? The influence of gender and framing on the initiation of negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*, 600–613.

Taylor, S. E., Kemeny, M. E., Aspinwall, L. G., Schneider, S. C., Rodriguez, R., & Herbert, M. (1992). Optimism, coping, psychological distress, and high-risk sexual behavior among men at risk for AIDS. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*, 460–473.

Taylor, S. E., & Pham, L. B. (1996). Mental simulation, motivation, and action. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior* (pp. 219–235). New York: Guilford.

Taylor, S. E., Pham, L. B., Rivkin, I. D., & Armor, D. A. (1998). Harnessing the imagination: Mental simulation, self-regulation, and coping. *American Psychologist*, *53*, 429–439.

Taylor, S. E., & Schneider, S. K. (1989). Coping and the simulation of events. *Social Cognition*, *7*, 174–194.

Thompson, L. (1990). Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical issues. *Psychological Bulletin*, *108*, 515–532.

Thompson, L., & Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *47*, 98–123.

Tiger, L. (1979). *Optimism: The biology of hope*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Tripp, T. M., & Sondak, H. (1992). An evaluation of dependent variables in experimental negotiation studies: Impasse rates and Pareto efficiency. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *51*, 273–295.

Trope, Y., & Neter, E. (1994). Reconciling competing motives in self-evaluation: The role of self-control in feedback seeking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *66*, 646–657.

Van Boven, L., & Ashworth, L. (2007). Looking forward, looking back: Anticipation is more evocative than retrospection. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *136*, 289–300.

Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*, 57–76.

Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*, 124–142.

Vroom, V. H. (1964). *Work and motivation*. New York: Wiley.

Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. (1965). *A behavioral theory of labor negotiations*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

White, S. B., & Neale, M. A. (1994). The role of negotiator aspirations and settlement expectancies in bargaining outcomes. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *57*, 303–317.

Wood, A. M., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2011). Can nervous nelly negotiate? How anxiety causes negotiators to make low first offers, exit early, and earn less profit. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *115*, 43–54.

Wright, R., & Brehm, J. W. (1989). Energization and goal attractiveness. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Goal concepts in personality and social psychology* (pp. 169–210). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., Manstead, A. S. R., & van der Pligt, J. (2000). On bad decisions and disconfirmed expectancies: The psychology of regret and disappointment. *Cognition and Emotion*, *14*, 521–541.

Dejun Tony Kong is a doctoral student in Organizational Behavior at the Olin Business School of Washington University in St. Louis, where he was named a Hubert C. Moog

Scholar in recognition of academic excellence. His research interests include negotiation, trust, emotions, risk behavior, and cross-cultural management.

Ece Tuncel is an Assistant Professor of Management at Webster University, St. Louis. She received her PhD in Organizational Behavior from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Her research examines the influence of cognition, emotions, and personality on decision making, especially in negotiation and group settings.

Judi McLean Parks is on the faculty of the Olin Graduate School of Business at Washington University in St Louis, where she holds the Ruben C & Anne Carpenter Taylor Professorship in Organizational Behavior. Her recent research efforts have been directed toward issues pertaining to negotiations, workplace conflict, injustice, revenge, and 'crimes of obedience'. She was the founding editor of Negotiation and Conflict Management Research and a past editor of the International Journal of Conflict Management.

Appendix 1

Salary Negotiation Scenario (Study 1)

Imagine that you are a sales manager in a medium-sized company. You are responsible for directing and supervising your sales staff. You coordinate the operations of your sales department by establishing territories, goals, and quotas for your sales staff. Recently, your company has undertaken several initiatives to increase its market share, so you have been working really hard to create new ideas that will contribute to the company's growth.

In light of your recent contributions to your company, you have started re-evaluating your salary. Your current annual salary is $80,000 ($80K). You think that this salary may not reflect the amount of effort you have been putting into your work. In the past several months, you have come up with some ideas to improve sales in your own and other territories. Some of these ideas have already been put to use and you expect your company to have higher profit margins in the foreseeable future. Therefore, you think you probably deserve a higher salary. You know that the competitive market range of annual salary for sales managers is between $75,000 ($75K) and $115,000 ($115K), but the actual pay may vary largely from company to company and from individual to individual. In addition, you are a bit pessimistic about finding another job in the short run as many companies are downsizing.

Your performance evaluations have been consistently high until the last review 4 months ago. The new HR manager, Pat, gave you a relatively low performance review since some of your sales staff did not meet their quotas. In the recent performance review, Pat revealed concerns about your skills in developing your sales staff and giving them autonomy in their territories and asked you work on these issues. You think that Pat may have attributed the staff's failure in meeting their goals to your management skills. You believe that other factors, such as the lack of a company-wide training program, may account for the performance of your staff.

You start thinking whether or not to negotiate for a salary increase with Pat...

Appendix 2

Comparison of Propensity to Initiate a Negotiation Scale (Study 1)

Babcock's Component	Babcock et al.'s (2006) PIN Scale	Revised Component	Revised PIN Scale (Study 1)
1. Opportunity recognition		1. Opportunity recognition	
Item 1	Most things are negotiable	Item 1	My salary is negotiable
Item 2	Many interactions I have during the day can be opportunities to improve my situation	Item 2	The negotiation would be an opportunity to increase my salary
Item 3	There are many things available to people, if only people asked for them	Item 3	The salary increase would be available to me, if only I ask for it
Item 4	I often see changes to improve my circumstances	Item 4	I would see an opportunity to increase my salary
2. Entitlement			
Item 5	I think situations should be changed to fit my desire	Item 5	Pat would accommodate my expectation of a higher salary
Item 6	I usually feel that I've earned the right to have things go my way	Item 6	I feel that I have earned the right to have a salary increase
Item 7	Just because I want something, it doesn't mean I am entitled to get it. (R)	Item 7*	Just because I want a salary increase, it doesn't mean I am entitled to get it. (R)
3. Apprehension		2. Apprehension	
Item 8	I feel anxious when I have to ask for something I want. (R)	Item 8	I would feel anxious to ask for a salary increase. (R)
Item 9	It always takes me a long time to work up the courage to ask for things I want. (R)	Item 9	It would take me a long time to work up the courage to ask for a salary increase. (R)
Item 10	I feel nervous when I am in situations in which I have to persuade others to give me things that I want. (R)	Item 10	I would feel nervous to persuade Pat to give me a salary increase. (R)
Item 11	I experience a lot of stress when I think about asking for something I want. (R)	Item 11	I would experience a lot of stress to ask for a salary increase. (R)
Item 12	It always feels so unpleasant to ask for things for myself. (R)	Item 12	It would feel so unpleasant to ask for a salary increase. (R)

Note. *This item was excluded from our scale because of the low factor loading in the factor analysis. Items with (R) are the reverse-scored items.

Appendix 3

Comparison of Experimental Case (Disciplinary) to New Recruit (Employment) Negotiation (Study 2)

	New Recruit			Experimental Case			Type of Issue
	Issue	Recruiter range	Candidate range	Issue	Management range	Worker range	
Issue 1	Salary	–6,000–0 (increment 1,500)	–6,000–0 (increment 1,500)	Dock in pay	–15,000–0 (increment 3,750)	–15,000–0 (increment 3,750)	Distributive
Issue 2	Starting date	0–2,400 (increment 600)	0–2,400 (increment 600)	Union representation	0–6,000 (increment 1,500)	0–6,000 (increment 1,500)	Distributive
Issue 3	Location	0–1,200 (increment 300)	0–1,200 (increment 300)	Counseling period	0–3,000 (increment 750)	0–3,000 (increment 750)	Compatible
Issue 4	Job assignment	–2,400–0 (increment 600)	–2,400–0 (increment 600)	Retraining & monitored performance	–6,000–0 (increment 3,750)	–6,000–0 (increment 3,750)	Compatible
Issue 5	Bonus	0–1,600 (increment 400)	0–4,000 (increment 1,000)	Suspension period	0–4,000 (increment 1,000)	0–10,000 (increment 2,500)	Integrative
Issue 6	Vacation time	0–4,000 (increment 1,000)	0–1,600 (increment 400)	Transfer/ Reassignment	0–10,000 (increment 2,500)	0–4,000 (increment 1,000)	Integrative
Issue 7	Moving expense coverage	0–800 (increment 200)	0–3,200 (increment 800)	Demotion & review period	0–2,000 (increment 500)	0–8,000 (increment 2,000)	Integrative
Issue 8	Insurance coverage	0–3,200 (increment 800)	0–800 (increment 200)	Last chance agreement terms	8,000–0 (increment 2,000)	0–2,000 (increment 500)	Integrative

Note. The New Recruit exercise is from Neale (1997). Each issue had five settlement points, with range & incremental loss/gain for each position in parentheses.