Cultural Differences in Goal-directed Interaction Patterns in Negotiation

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Keywords
negotiation, culture, interaction goals, behavioral sequences, reciprocity.

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Abstract

This study examines cultural differences in how negotiators reciprocate, complement, and transform their counterpart's strategic approach as a result of their and (detection of) their counterparts' interaction goals and how such strategic sequences predict joint gains. Sixty-seven negotiation dyads (35 Chinese, 32 US Americans) simulated an employment contract negotiation. In response to counterparts' competitive goals, Chinese increased distributive complementary sequences, whereas US Americans reduced distributive transformation. In response to counterparts' cooperative goals, US Americans increased integrative reciprocity, whereas Chinese reduced integrative transformation. In addition, although Chinese used less integrative reciprocity and less integrative transformation, these sequences had a significant effect on their joint profit, whereas such effect was nonsignificant for US Americans. The study provides insights about the impact of culture as domain-specific knowledge structures on micro-level communication processes.

Negotiation is commonly considered a goal-directed communication process through which two or more interdependent parties seek to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome (Putnam & Roloff, 1992). Negotiators often enter a negotiation with some motivational goals, consciously or unconsciously, which can influence their cognitive schemas (Carnevale & Probst, 1998), perception of fairness (De Dreu & Van Lang, 1995), information processing (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002), strategic choice (Tjosvold, 1998), and negotiation outcomes (e.g., Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996, for a meta-analysis, see De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Although researchers have noted that negotiator motivation is associated with cultural values (e.g., Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006; Hulbert, Correa da Silva, & Adegboyega, 2001), little research has assessed whether and how cultures may differ in the ways in which negotiators' goals and motives (re)shape their moves and turns in the bargaining process.

Volume 4, Number 3, Pages 178–199

This article seeks to extend existing research by demonstrating how negotiators from two contrastive national cultures, Chinese and US Americans, differ in the extent to which they reciprocate, complement, and transform their counterpart's strategic approach as a result of their and (detection of) their counterpart's goal pursuit, as well as how these strategic responses influence joint gains. The following sections review theory and research that inform the key hypotheses of the study, describe the methods and results, and discuss its theoretical and practical implications.

Culture, Social Motivation, and Interaction Goals

In social psychology, culture has been defined as a set of socially created mechanisms, or "syndromes," that govern how individuals interact with others and adapt to the social environments (Triandis, 1993). One of the primary dimensions that are used to differentiate between cultures and their members is collectivism–individualism, or the extent to which people in a society are autonomous individuals versus embedded within groups (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). In general, people in individualistic societies, such as the United States, emphasize autonomy, independence, and assertion of self-goals and concerns, whereas people in collectivistic societies, such as Japan and China, emphasize harmony, interdependence, and concern for group interests (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The individualism and collectivism dimension has been widely used to account for behavioral differences across cultures in conflict and negotiation situations (e.g., Brett & Okumura, 1998; Cai & Fink, 2002; Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Tinsley, 1998). Nevertheless, research concerning how US Americans and East Asians differ in social motivations is not without contradictions.

One stream of research suggests that US Americans are more oriented toward a competitive, win–lose frame of negotiation because the accumulation of economic capital is consistent with individualists' conceptions of selves as achievers, whereas East Asians are more oriented toward a cooperative frame of negotiation because they perceive themselves as part of a social network and place more emphasis on relational capital (Adair & Brett, 2004). Gelfand and Realo (1999) found that although accountability promoted competition for individualists, it increased concessionary intentions and cooperative behaviors for collectivists. Similarly, Gelfand et al. (2001) found that US Americans focused on winning, whereas Japanese focused on compromise in their cognitive frames of conflict. Both Japanese and Chinese were reported to prefer negotiating with individuals who are part of their relationship networks even if it means potentially less economic benefits (Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Hulbert et al. (2001) found that allocentrism, a derivative of collectivism, was associated with cooperation, whereas idiocentrism, a derivative of individualism, was associated with noncooperation.

Another stream of research, however, suggests opposite directions. Tinsley (1998) found that US Americans used interests strategies (i.e., focused on integrating the underlying interests of each side, rather than winning or losing) more than Japanese, whereas Japanese used power strategies (i.e., focused on forcing conciliation on the basis

of his or her social status) more than US Americans in a dispute resolution situation. Several studies with simulated business negotiations showed that US Americans used integrative tactics more frequently, whereas Japanese and Chinese negotiators used distributive tactics more frequently (e.g., Adair et al., 2004; Liu, 2009) because US Americans tend to adopt an interest-based cognitive frame, whereas East Asians, a power-based cognitive frame (Brett & Okumura, 1998). Ma's (2007) study showed that in business negotiations, competing was the second preferred conflict management style for Chinese, next to compromising.

Such inconsistencies suggest that culture's influence on cognition and behavior is complex and contextual. The relationship between negotiating parties, which varies both horizontally (e.g., ingroup vs. outgroup) and vertically (e.g., superiors vs. subordinates), often interacts with collectivism and individualism in activating domain-specific cultural schemas to guide negotiators' strategic choice (Morris & Fu, 2001). As holistic thinkers who are more sensitive to relationships and subtle changes in situations (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), East Asians can adopt drastically different approaches to negotiation when the relational contexts change. For example, Gelfand and Realo (1999) found that in the high accountability condition, collectivism promotes cooperative behavior, whereas in the low accountability condition, collectivism is negatively associated with cooperative behavior. This is likely because for members of collectivistic cultures, negotiation is a situation that involves openly confronting the counterpart concerning issues of conflicting interests and is therefore inherently competitive; it is only when a norm-enhancement mechanism is activated (i.e., negotiators' accountability for others) that they will exhibit a collectivism-based culturally prototypical social motivation—cooperation.

Although research on social motivation provides insights about negotiators' strategic choice, it is primarily concerned with an instrumental goal (i.e., the desire to attain certain distributions of outcomes between oneself and the other party) that is often examined as a dichotomous trait variable (e.g., proself vs. prosocial value orientations). Researchers have noted that negotiators also pursue identity and relational goals that may change, impede, or facilitate their instrumental goals (Liu & Wang, 2010; Wilson & Putnam, 1990). These interaction goals arise from the contextual features of a bargaining situation; the motivational orientation and strength of these goals are found to have a significant influence on negotiators' strategic choice as well as negotiation outcomes (Liu & Wilson, 2011).

The current study seeks to understand how culture interacts with situational factors (i.e., contextually determined interaction goals) in shaping the bargaining process. Because members of collectivistic cultures are sensitive to face concerns and relationships, eight interaction goals that vary in type (instrumental, identity, and relational goals) and social motivation (competitive and cooperative) are examined within a context in which two negotiators, who are strangers to each other, are completing a simulated employment contract negotiation after settling a distributive side issue. Although goal pursuit may differ across cultures and roles (Liu & Wilson, 2011), the focus of the study is to examine whether negotiating parties' interaction goals may prompt (dis)similar interaction patterns across cultures.

Culture and Strategy Sequences

Despite the plethora of research on culture and negotiation in the past two decades, only a small number of studies have examined cultural differences in the actual communication processes, mostly in terms of the frequency of various bargaining tactics (e.g., Adair et al., 2004; Cai et al., 2000; Liu, 2009; Tinsley, 1998). Negotiation research has long demonstrated that the sequencing and phasing of communication behaviors provide unique insights about how settlement is reached (e.g., Donohue, 1981; Olekalns et al., 1996; Putnam & Jones, 1982). It is not until recently that research on culture and negotiation began to investigate culturally (dis)similar patterns in negotiators' behavioral sequences over time (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005; Giebels & Taylor, 2009).

Prior research has identified three types of strategy sequences: reciprocal, complementary, and structural (or transformational) sequences (see Table 1 for definitions and examples). *Reciprocal* sequences occur when negotiators match each other's moves exactly; they serve to establish and maintain a shared, dominant strategic orientation for the bargaining process (Olekalns & Weingart, 2008). Research has shown that distributive reciprocity (i.e., reciprocal sequences involving the use of value-claiming tactics, such as positional statements and contentious arguments) is associated with greater likelihood of impasses (Putnam & Jones, 1982) and smaller joint gains (Olekalns & Smith, 2000), whereas integrative reciprocity (i.e., reciprocal sequences involving the use of value-creation tactics, such as priority information exchange and package offers) is associated with greater joint gains (Liu, in press; Olekalns & Smith, 2003). As a process maintenance mechanism, the direction and duration of behavioral reciprocity are shaped by the motivational orientation and strength of negotiators' goals. As negotiators place greater emphasis on competitively oriented goals, they are more likely to display distributive reciprocity and less likely to engage in integrative reciprocity, although such influence was found to decrease over time (Liu, in press).

Complementary sequences occur when negotiators begin to discuss different issue(s) or different aspect(s) of the same issue(s) along the same strategic orientation. Although they do not shift the negotiation toward a different direction, they may signal a transition to a new stage of the negotiation or a disinterest in reciprocating the counterpart's (counter) offers or (counter) arguments, thus attenuating the dominant strategic orientation of the negotiation (Liu, in press). They do not contribute to value creation because shifting to a new issue without linking it to the old one contributes little to the discovery of integrative potential; nor do they help negotiators to claim more value for themselves. As a micro-level process management mechanism, the use of complementary sequences may not result from negotiators' negotiation-wide, superordinate goals, but is likely influenced by their local goals (pertaining to small segments of negotiation, see Wilson & Putnam, 1990) or detection of their counterparts' goals.

Transformational sequences involve a complete shift in the strategic orientation of the interaction. Distributive transformation occurs when a negotiator responds to the counterpart's integrative behavior with a distributive approach, seeking to claim more value for him/herself based on the counterpart's integrative efforts, whereas integrative

Table 1
Definitions and Examples of Strategy Sequence Categories

Sequence categories	Definitions and examples
Distributive reciprocal (DR)	Matching a distributive strategy with a distributive strategy Employer: …so a week and a half [vacation], I think will be good. Employee: I still would like to go with 2 weeks. [DR]
Integrative reciprocal (IR)	Matching an integrative strategy with an integrative strategy Employee: I can be flexible with the medical coverage because again this is not as big of a concern to me as the salary. Employer: Well if you want to go with $58,000 we are going to have to give you the minimum medical coverage. So the minimum is 60%. [IR]
Distributive complementary (DC)	Responding to a distributive strategy by shifting to a different issue or aspect, still using a distributive approach Employee: I won't be able to start at $50,000. That's just not something I'll be able to do, so I'd like to negotiate that. Employer: Um, let's see here. In terms of the salary, what are your main concerns? [DC]
Integrative complementary (IC)	Responding to an integrative strategy by shifting to a new set of issue or aspects, still using an integrative approach Employee: I'm hoping to start at the higher end of the salary, $56,000 or $58,000, and I would like to start in March. Employer: Umm… what are your preferences in terms of medical or vacation? [IC]
Distributive transformational (DT)	Responding to an integrative strategy with a distributive approach Employee: Yes, I'm willing to go with $54,000 if you can guarantee the 100% medical benefits. Employer: Absolutely not. … there is no way, honestly, that the company can survive putting all our starters in the 100% medical. [DT]
Integrative transformational (IT)	Responding to a distributive strategy with an integrative approach Employer: We can go up to like $54,000. Yes, this is half way to what you are looking at, as a compromise. Employee: What if we kept the 60% and did $56,000 And the $2000 could probably compensate the 40% that comes out of my own pocket. [IT]

Note. Strategy sequence codes in the examples are within square brackets.

transformation occurs when a negotiator responds to the counterpart's distributive behavior with an integrative approach, seeking to expand the pie for both parties. The frequency of transformational sequences indicates a mismatch between negotiating parties' strategic orientations; frequent use of distributive transformation has been found to benefit one's own individual gains, whereas frequent use of integrative transformation, the counterpart's gains (Liu, in press). As a process shift mechanism, transformational sequences are used as a deliberate attempt either to change the negotiation dynamic or to prevent a strategic redirection by the counterpart (Olekalns & Weingart, 2008).

Recent research shows that the use of distributive transformation is associated with (detection of) the counterpart's goals (the more competitive the counterpart, the less frequently it is used; the more cooperative the counterpart, the more frequently it is used), whereas the use of integrative transformation is negatively influenced by one's own competitive goals (Liu, in press).

Recent research suggests that virtually all populations demonstrate some behavioral reciprocity, especially negative reciprocity (i.e., the willingness to punish hostile actions), although the magnitude varies substantially across societies (Gächer & Herrmann, 2009; Henrich et al., 2005, 2006). Among the factors that motivate strong negative reciprocity are relative pay-offs (Zizzo, 2003; Fliessbach et al. 2007), concerns for dominance (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995), and perceptions of group boundaries, especially in societies that are structured along strong private networks with much cooperation within networks and little beyond (Gächer & Herrmann, 2009). The Chinese culture is known as one that values reciprocity (Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991). Yang (1957) explained that such a cultural norm results from the belief that ''favors done for others are often considered …'social investments' for which handsome returns are expected'' (p. 291). In intergroup conflict situations, however, reciprocating other's hostile actions is not only normative but also an important means to protect self (or ingroup)-interests and maintain dignity, as demonstrated by a household saying popularized by Mao Tse-dong, founder of People's Republic of China, ''No offense, no attack; if offended, flight back tit-for-tat.'' Embedded in the Chinese notion of reciprocity is an assumption that the current interaction has long-term identity and relational consequences. A competitive orientation, for Chinese negotiators, implies seeing little potential for cultivating a long-term relationship and therefore may trigger responses that are typical of outgroup relationships, such as back-and-forth haggling (see Graham & Lam, 2003). When such an orientation is observed in the counterpart, the Chinese are likely to increase distributive responses. Kopelman and Rosette (2008) found that Hong Kong Chinese executive managers were less likely to accept an offer when the counterparts displayed negative emotions, as compared with Israeli managers.

In the U.S. culture, although reciprocity is also a prevalent cultural norm, it is driven primarily by a concern for fairness and equity (Fehr & Gächer, 2000). A competitive orientation, for US Americans, often means seeking to maximize one's own share of the resources. As analytical thinkers who tend to separate specific issues from the broader social environment (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), US Americans are less likely to be anchored by their counterpart's behaviors and infer relational consequences from the current interaction (Liu, Friedman, & Chi, 2005). Liu (2009) found that when counterparts were angry, Chinese negotiators *increased* their distributive tactics (a reciprocal response that emphasizes value claiming), whereas US Americans *reduced* their distributive tactics (a nonreciprocal response that de-emphasizes value claiming). These findings suggest that for the Chinese, a strategic response is driven less by a desire to maximize material gains but more by a desire to symbolically reciprocate the counterpart's strategic orientation as inferred from his or her attitude and behavior. American negotiators, on the other hand, are more oriented toward interests than toward power dominance (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Tinsley, 1998); as such, they are more likely to display

strategic flexibility and turn the negotiation toward a self-beneficial, if not mutually beneficial, direction, unless doing so implies a lack of concern for fairness and equity. Therefore, the study hypothesizes that:

H1: Culture will influence strategy sequences, such that Chinese negotiators will use distributive reciprocity more often than US Americans, whereas US Americans will use complementary and transformational sequences more often than Chinese.

H2: Culture will moderate the influence of competitive goals on distributive sequences, such that: (a) they will increase negotiators' distributive reciprocity for Chinese but not for US Americans; (b) they will *increase* counterparts' distributive reciprocal and complementary sequences for Chinese (i.e., to maintain value-claiming efforts), but (c) *decrease* counterparts' distributive transformational sequences for US Americans (i.e., to abstain from value-claiming efforts).

In addition, negotiation is a context characterized by directly discussing issues of conflicting interests (between strangers in the current study). For collectivistic Chinese who tend to prefer avoiding or yielding in conflict situations because of face concerns (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003), such direct confrontation may activate a power schema characteristic of outgroup interactions. A cooperative orientation in bargaining interactions, for the Chinese, may entail positive face concerns toward the counterpart and a willingness to compromise or de-emphasize value claiming (Ma, 2007), whereas for US Americans who are information-oriented rather than relationship-oriented (Graham & Lam, 2003), it may indicate a willingness to explore means for expanding the pie, or emphasize value creation. Therefore, the study hypothesizes:

H3: US Americans will use more integrative reciprocity than Chinese negotiators.

H4: Culture will moderate the influence of cooperative goals on strategy sequences, such that (a) they will increase negotiators' integrative reciprocity for US Americans but (b) decrease negotiators' distributive transformation for Chinese.

Furthermore, given the confrontational nature of negotiation, when the counterpart displays a cooperative orientation through positive facework, it may bring ambiguity to the interaction for Chinese negotiators, especially when the counterpart also uses distributive (value claiming) behaviors; as a result, they are less likely to shift negotiation toward a different (integrative) direction. On the other hand, for task-oriented US Americans, a cooperative orientation indicates a desire to expand the pie for both parties, which does not necessarily preclude the use of distributive (value claiming) tactics. Therefore, the study continues to hypothesize that:

H4: (c) cooperative goals will increase counterparts' integrative reciprocity for US Americans but (b) decrease counterparts' integrative transformation for Chinese.

Research shows that different cultures take different paths to negotiate joint gains. Members of East Asian cultures (e.g., Japan and China) are known as holistic thinkers (e.g., Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett, 2003) and high-context communicators (Hall, 1976); during the negotiation process, they may communicate and integrate information

indirectly from multiple channels. Adair and Brett (2005) found that Japanese negotiators used offer proposals as a sophisticated inferential search engine to identify integrative potential. Liu and Wilson (2011) found that although Chinese negotiators used more persuasion tactics than US Americans, this strategy reduced joint profit only for US Americans; on the other hand, although US Americans proposed more integrative multi-issue offers than Chinese, this strategy increased joint gains only for Chinese. One possible explanation is that persuasion holds different meanings in different cultures. Graham and Lam (2003) described the American style of negotiating as the "argument culture" and the Chinese style of negotiating as the "haggling culture" (p. 85). While US Americans tend to focus on logical arguments and factual evidence to achieve the goal of persuasion, for the Chinese "the best compromises are derived only through the ritual back-and-forth of haggling" (p. 84). In other words, the goal of haggling is not necessarily to persuade the counterpart to accept or reject a position, but as a necessary means to exchange information so as to identify mutually acceptable solutions. Although both types of responses are generally classified as exhibiting a distributive orientation, the Chinese may infer integrative information from a haggling process to improve the quality of integrative tactics. Thus, the study hypothesizes:

H5: Culture will moderate the influence of strategy sequences on joint profit, such that integrative sequences will have a stronger effect on joint profit for Chinese than for US Americans.

Method

Participants

Seventy Chinese (34 men and 36 women) and 64 American students (32 men and 32 women) in a mid-western university participated in this study ($N = 134$) in an interaction laboratory over a period of three months; each received a $7 compensation. Ninety-three percent ($N = 65$) of the Chinese participants reported having resided in the United States for less than 5 years. The majority of them were graduate students ($N = 62$, 88.6%) above 25 years of age ($N = 61$, 87.1%), whereas over half of the American participants were undergraduate students ($N = 36$, 56.3%) between 19 and 24 years of age ($N = 41$, 64.1%). The inclusion (or exclusion) of age as a covariate did not produce different results. Upon arrival at the research laboratory, students were instructed to read and sign a consent form before they completed a series of tasks.

Experimental Design and Hypothetical Scenarios

Participants were randomly paired to form same-sex, same-culture negotiation dyads. Dyad members were randomly assigned to one of two bargaining roles (employer vs. employee) to perform a job contract negotiation. The majority of participants ($N = 112$, 83.6%) reported that they did not know the other person prior to the study. Those who reported knowing each other ($N = 22$, 16.4%) reported a low level of knowledge

($M = 1.83$, $SD = .99$) on a 7-point bipolar scale, which was significantly below the midpoint according to a one-sample t test, $t(21) = 6.74$, $p < .001$. Before the core negotiation began, participants were asked to complete a single-issue task concerning the kind of laptop computer the employee would receive from the company. This prenegotiation task functioned simply as a ''warm-up'' task (a) to allow participants to interact with their partner before they formed interaction goals for the main task with the same partner and (b) to highlight the competitive elements of negotiation to discourage participants from reporting only presumably socially appropriate (cooperative) goals (see Liu & Wilson, 2011).

Participants were then given a scenario of the main task, which involved core terms of employment, including multiple issues (salary, medical coverage, vacation, and start date) that contained integrative potential (i.e., both parties could ''win'' by trading off issues of differential importance). Before beginning the second task, participants read a description of the issues to be negotiated and responded to a 37-item questionnaire regarding the perceived importance of various goals they might pursue in the main negotiation. Participants were separated into different rooms when reading the scenarios and responding to the questionnaires so that they could ask questions without the presence of the other party. After responding to the goals questionnaire, participants met again to complete the main negotiation and then were debriefed.

The negotiation scenario has been used in previous studies (e.g., Liu, 2009). The payoff schedule for the four issues discussed was designed in ways that reflected three types of negotiation: integrative, distributive, and compatible. Salary and medical coverage were integrative issues (i.e., salary was worth more points for employees while medical coverage was worth more points for managers, creating the potential for formulating a mutually beneficial agreement); vacation was a zero-sum distributive issue; start date was a common-value compatible issue (i.e., both parties had the same preference for this issue, though participants, blind to each other's payoff schedule, had to figure it out for themselves). To ensure that Chinese participants would fully understand the simulation material, all the scenarios and questionnaires were translated into Chinese and then back-translated into English by Chinese graduate students who were experienced in bilingual translation. Chinese participants were encouraged to speak Chinese for optimal communication effectiveness.

Instrumentation

Interaction Goals

The study used the same measures of interaction goals as those used by Liu and Wilson (2011). Thirty-seven items measured eight goals on a Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Sample items include the following: ''I want to maximize the total number of points I can earn in the negotiation'' (maximizing one's own profit), ''I want to make sure that Mr. Hale will not achieve his goals by the end of the negotiation'' (minimizing the other party's profit), ''I want to find a solution that meets both parties' needs and concerns'' (maximizing both parties' profit), ''I want to understand what Mr. Hale's concerns are in the negotiation'' (understanding the other's concerns), ''I want to

appear forceful so that Mr. Hale knows I can't be easily taken advantage of'' (appearing forceful and assertive), ''I want to appear polite and respectful during the negotiation'' (appearing considerate and cooperative), ''I want to convince Mr. Hale that I have opportunities with other companies'' (gaining power), and ''I want Mr. Hale to know that I care about our relationship'' (promoting a positive relationship). Based on confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) performed to assess the factor structure of the eight goals, 30 of 37 items loaded significantly on their respective factors and were retained (factor loadings ranging from .45 to.97). Cronbach's *alpha* ranged between .69 and .86.

A second-order CFA was then performed on the eight goals to confirm a two-factor structure: cooperative versus competitive goals. The goal of ''maximizing one's own profit'' was found to correlate positively with goals of both motivational orientations. Because theoretically it captures an individualistic rather than competitive orientation, it was dropped from subsequent analysis. The CFA then produced a good model fit, $\chi^2(11) = 16.67$, $p = .12$. Factor loadings ranged from .53 to .85 for the competitive scale and from .40 to .89 for the cooperative scale. The two second-order factors were used for subsequent statistical analyses. Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics from both cultural samples.

Negotiation Outcomes

Joint gain was the total number of points that each pair of participants jointly earned. *Individual gain* was the number of points each individual earned. Three of the sixty-seven negotiation dyads chose to reach an impasse, even though they were told doing so would result in zero points and were given sufficient time to negotiate. Because such a decision is likely to reflect the influence of interaction goals, data from the three dyads were retained in the analysis. The total number of points that participants could earn by

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Interaction Goals

	American (N = 64)		Chinese (N = 70)	
	α	*M (SD)*	α	*M (SD)*
Cooperatively oriented goals				
Maximize both parties' profit	.83	5.35 (1.29)	.85	5.41 (1.26)
Understand other's concerns	.84	5.50 (1.19)	.88	5.74 (1.11)
Appear cooperative and considerate	.72	5.75 (.75)	.80	5.71 (1.04)
Promote a positive relationship	.84	5.71 (.87)	.85	5.62 (1.07)
Competitively oriented goals				
Maximize one's own profit*	.78	6.06 (.88)	.60	6.19 (.79)
Minimize the other's profit	.72	3.84 (1.50)	.72	4.31 (1.49)
Appear forceful and assertive	.82	5.32 (1.11)	.74	5.30 (1.37)
Gain power over the other	.89	4.87 (1.48)	.72	5.80 (.97)
Cooperative goals	.72	5.58 (.77)	.74	5.62 (.84)
Competitive goals	.75	4.68 (1.12)	.72	5.14 (1.04)

Note. *''Maximize one's own profit'' was excluded from the two second-order factors (competitive and cooperative goals) because of cross-loadings.

reaching a straight compromise for each issue was assigned to each individual in the three dyads, as has been the practice in many previous studies (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Preliminary analyses indicated that inclusion (or exclusion) of the three dyads did not produce different results.

Coding Strategy Sequences

Based on transcriptions of 67 videotaped negotiations, two coders proficient in both English and Chinese were trained to code all the speaking turns as one of six codes. Each code represents a strategic response to a prior speaking turn stated by the counterpart. Coders unitized the data by identifying every complete speaking turn in a transcript (i.e., an actions and/or statement made by an individual while holding the floor, Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004). When a negotiator uses vocal fillers, repeats, or paraphrases the counterpart's message to confirm understanding, it is not considered a complete speaking turn and therefore not coded. The unitizing reliability based on a subset of transcripts ($N = 10$, 15%) was satisfactory (Guetzkow's U was .04). Disagreements were resolved through discussion.

Coders then placed each speaking turn in one of the six coding (strategy sequence) categories (for definitions and examples, see Table 1). Based on the definitions, each code involves determining (a) the dominant strategic approach of the prior speaking turn stated by the counterpart, (b) the dominant strategic approach of the current speaking turn, and (c) whether the current speaking turn involves a discussion of new issues or different aspects of the same issue. The strategic approach is considered distributive when the speaking turn involves single-issue offers, demands, refusals, positional statements, persuasive (counter) arguments, and threats, whereas the strategic approach is considered integrative when the speaking turn involves asking or sharing priority information, proposing package offers, or making connections between multiple issues. Cohen's kappa was .88. Disagreements were resolved through further discussion. One of the coders coded the rest of the transcripts.

There was substantial variation in the amount of time it took participants to finish this negotiation, with American participants ranging from 3.5 to 24.5 min and Chinese participants from 5.0 to 29.5 min. As a result, there was substantial variation in the total number of strategy sequences. The raw number of sequences in each category, therefore, is no longer meaningful unless the total number of sequences is taken into account. In addition, all strategy sequences were positively skewed (skewness values ranged between 1.04 and 3.28). Owing to these two issues, transformation procedures were performed for each type of strategy sequence by log transforming a proportion score between the number of sequences of each type and the total number of sequences used by each participant. After transformation, the normality of the distributions was much improved (skewness values ranged between −.57 and .16).

Results

Given that data were collected from dyad members who interacted with each other during the bargaining process, the degree of nonindependence for dyadic data was assessed

Table 3
Intraclass Correlations of Independent and Dependent Measures

Independent and dependent measures	All (N = 67)	American (N = 32)	Chinese (N = 35)
Competitive goals	.03	.12	−.01
Cooperative goals	−.28*	−.16	−.40*
Distributive reciprocal	.81**	.81**	.81**
Integrative reciprocal	.92**	.91**	.92**
Distributive complementary	.74**	.64**	.69**
Integrative complementary	.94**	.84**	.99**
Distributive transformational	.26*	.25	.06
Integrative transformational	.17	.34	−.11

*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

using Pearson product–moment correlation coefficients between dyad members' scores, referred to as intraclass correlations (see Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). The data set was structured in a pairwise fashion so that each individual's scores was associated with his or her partner's scores. Table 3 summarizes the intraclass correlations for all the measures used in this study. Results indicated that all dyad members' strategy sequences but one (integrative transformation) were associated, which warrants the assumption of nonindependence for analyzing dyadic data.

Hypotheses 1 and 3 predicted how Chinese and American negotiators would differ in the use of strategy sequences. A two-way ANOVA was performed with each type of strategy sequences as the DV, culture as a between-group factor, and role as a repeated measure factor to account for the interdependence between dyad members. Culture did not have a significant effect on distributive reciprocity, $F(1, 65) = 2.18$, $p = .15$, $\eta^2 = .03$, but had a significant effect on distributive complementary, $F(1, 65) = 26.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .24$, integrative complementary, $F(1, 65) = 33.21$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .34$, distributive transformational, $F(1, 65) = 21.93$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .25$, and integrative transformational sequences, $F(1, 65) = 12.79$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$, with US Americans using all these strategy sequences more often than Chinese negotiators. H1 was largely supported. In addition, culture had a significant main effect on integrative reciprocal sequences, $F(1, 65) = 12.79$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .16$, with US Americans displaying more integrative reciprocity than the Chinese. H3 was supported. Figure 1 describes how each of the six types of sequences differs by culture in this study.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that culture would moderate the influence of competitive goals on distributive strategy sequences. Multilevel modeling (MLM) analyses were performed to assess both actor and partner effects of competitive goals, as well as their interactions with culture, on each type of distributive sequences (reciprocal, complementary, and transformational), known as the actor–partner interdependence models (APIM, see Kenny et al., 2006; Liu, 2009). Centering was performed before product terms between culture and goals were computed. Although the interaction effects were found nonsignificant, the *two-intercept APIM model* approach proposed by Kenny et al. to obtain separate parameter estimates for Chinese and US Americans yielded support



Figure 1. Culture differences in the use of strategy sequences. The frequencies of sequences are indicated by transformed scores.

Table 4
A Contrast of Actor and Partner Effects of Competitive Goals by Culture

	Distributive reciprocal	Distributive complementary	Distributive transformational
Fixed components	*b (r)*	*b (r)*	*b (r)*
Actor's competitive (Am)	.00 (.01)	.01 (.05)	00 (.01)
Actor's competitive (Ch)	.04** (.22)	−.01 (.06)	.00 (.03)
Partner's competitive (Am)	−.01 (.05)	.01 (.06)	−.04* (.18)
Partner's competitive (Ch)	.01 (.07)	.04** (.21)	−.01 (.06)

Note. *b* represents the unstandardized parameter estimate of each IV, whereas *r* indicates the effect size of the IV computed from the *t* value of the parameter estimate: $r = \sqrt{t^2/(df + t^2)}$
*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$.

for the hypothesized cultural differences. As Table 4 shows, competitive goals led to greater use of distributive reciprocity for Chinese ($b = .04$, $p < .05$), but not for US Americans ($b = .00$, $p = .96$). H2a was supported. In addition, counterparts' competitive goals caused Chinese negotiators to *increase* distributive complementary sequences ($b = .04$, $p < .05$), but this partner effect was not found for US Americans ($b = .01$, $p = .61$). However, counterpart's competitive goals had no significant effect on distributive reciprocity for either Chinese ($b = .01$, $p = .51$) or US Americans ($b = -.01$), although consistent with the prediction, the direction of association was positive for Chinese and negative for US Americans. H2b was partially supported. On the other hand, counterparts' competitive goals caused American negotiators to *reduce* distributive transformational sequences (with a marginally significant effect, $p = .06$), but this partner effect was not found for Chinese ($p = .46$). H2c was supported.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that culture would moderate the influence of cooperative goals on integrative reciprocity and the two types of transformational sequences. MLM

analyses were performed to assess both actor and partner effects of cooperative goals, as well as their interactions with culture, on the three types of sequences. Results showed a nonsignificant interaction effect between culture and *actor's* cooperative goals on integrative reciprocity, $b = -.04$, $t = -1.62$, $p = .11$, $r = .19$, and a trend for an interaction effect between culture and *actor's* cooperative goals on distributive transformational sequences, $b = -.02$, $t = -1.64$, $p = .10$, $r = .15$. Analyses using the two-intercept APIM models to probe interactions (see Table 5) indicated a trend that cooperative goals led to greater use of integrative reciprocity for US Americans ($b = .05$, $p < .10$), but not for Chinese ($b = -.02$, $p = .53$). H4a was weakly supported. In addition, there was also a trend that cooperative goals reduced the use of distributive transformation for Chinese ($b = -.03$, $p < .09$), but not for US Americans ($b = .01$, $p = .56$). H4b was weakly supported.

Furthermore, results showed a nonsignificant interaction effect between culture and *counterparts*' cooperative goals on integrative reciprocity, $b = -.03$, $t = -1.43$, $p = .16$, $r = .17$, and a significant interaction effect between culture and *counterparts*' cooperative goals in integrative transformation, $b = -.03$, $t = -2.07$, $p < .05$, $r = .19$. Decomposition of the interactions indicated that counterparts' cooperative goals caused US Americans to increase integrative reciprocity ($b = .05$, $p < .10$), but this partner effect was not found for Chinese negotiators ($b = -.01$, $p = .69$). H4c was weakly supported. On the other hand, counterpart's cooperative goals caused Chinese negotiators to decrease integrative transformation (at a marginally significant level, $b = -.04$, $p = .06$), but this partner effect was not found for US Americans ($b = .02$, $p = .39$). H4d was supported. It should be noted that the directions of associations for the two cultures are opposite between cooperative goals and all three types of strategy sequences.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that culture would moderate the influence of strategy sequences on joint profit. Dyadic scores for independent (competitive and cooperative goals) and dependent (the six types of strategy sequences) variables were computed for each negotiation dyad by adding up dyad members' scores on these variables. Multiple regression procedures were performed with each type of strategy sequences as the DV,

Table 5
A Contrast of Actor and Partner Effects of Cooperative Goals by Culture

	Integrative reciprocal	Distributive transformational	Integrative transformational
Fixed components	*b (r)*	*b (r)*	*b (r)*
Actor's cooperative (Am)	.05* (.20)	.01 (.05)	.02 (.10)
Actor's cooperative (Ch)	−.02 (.08)	−.03* (.17)	.02 (.08)
Partner's cooperative (Am)	.05* (.20)	.02 (.11)	.02 (.08)
Partner's cooperative (Ch)	−.01 (.05)	−.01 (.06)	−.04* (.19)

Note. *b* represents the unstandardized parameter estimate of each IV, whereas *r* indicates the effect size of the IV computed from the *t* value of the parameter estimate: $r = \sqrt{t^2/(df + t^2)}$
*$p < .10$.

Table 6
The Influence of Culture and Strategy Sequences on Joint Profit

	Dependent measure: joint profit		
	OLS	Simple slopes	
	All (N = 67) b	Culture = 1 (Ch: N = 35) b	Culture = −1 (Am: N = 32) b
Independent measures: strategy sequences			
Distributive reciprocal	−80.45	−19.15	−141.75
Integrative reciprocal	240.60	423.71**	57.50
Distributive complementary	−183.26	−19.17	−347.36
Integrative complementary	−96.13	−438.70	246.45
Distributive transformational	−527.50	−437.32	−617.69
Integrative transformational	674.50*	738.70*	610.30
Culture	27.87		
Culture × Distributive reciprocal	61.30		
Culture × Integrative reciprocal	183.10		
Culture × Distributive complementary	164.10		
Culture × Integrative complementary	−342.57*		
Culture × Distributive transformational	90.19		
Culture × Integrative transformational	64.20		

Note. *p < .10, **p < .05; b represents unstandardized regression coefficients; R = .67, R^2 = .45, F(13, 53) = 3.34, p < .001.

and cooperative and competitive goals, culture, as well as the product terms between culture and both types of goals as the IVs.

Results are summarized in Table 6. There was a marginally significant interaction effect between culture and integrative complementary sequences (p = .07) when all the other sequences and product terms were statistically controlled. To probe interactions, the simple slopes technique (also referred to as the ''pick-a-point'' approach, e.g., Hayes & Matthes, 2009; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) was used to assess the significance of the associations between strategy sequences (IV) and joint profit (DV) at different levels of culture (−1 = US Americans; 1 = Chinese). As Table 6 shows, integrative complementary sequences had no significant effect on joint profit for either culture; however, the direction of association was positive for US Americans yet negative for Chinese. In addition, both integrative reciprocal (p < .05) and integrative transformational sequences (p < .10) had a positive effect on joint profit for Chinese, but not for US Americans; H5 was supported.

Discussion

Although there has been abundant research on culture and negotiation in the past two decades, analyses of culture's influence on communication behaviors have primarily focused on frequencies of bargaining tactics used by each negotiator independently.

Relatively few studies have examined the interrelationships among negotiating parties' behaviors, which can provide unique insights about how culture influences the way in which negotiators interpret and respond to their counterparts' messages (Adair, 2003; Adair & Brett, 2005; Giebels & Taylor, 2009; Taylor & Donald, 2003, 2004). In addition, although ample evidence suggests that negotiators' strategic choice is driven by their social motivation (see De Dreu et al., 2000; Tjosvold, 1998), little research has assessed whether the way in which negotiators' goals and motives drive their and their counterparts' strategic responses varies by culture. The current study seeks to extend existing research by examining how culture interacts with negotiators' contextually determined interaction goals in shaping their behavioral sequences in the bargaining process.

Given the contextual features of a job contract negotiation, the study measured eight interaction goals that varied in type and motivational orientation after negotiators completed a single-issue, distributive negotiation task with their counterparts, but before they began to negotiate, the main issues of an employment contract with each other. A cultural comparison of these goals showed that Chinese participants placed greater importance on competitive goals than American participants, such as ''minimizing the counterpart's profit'' and ''gaining power over the other party'' (see Table 2); however, the two cultures did not differ on perceived importance of cooperative goals. These results are consistent with the cross-cultural negotiation literature that suggests that US Americans are more inclined to apply interest frames, whereas East Asians, power frames in negotiation (Adair et al., 2004; Brett & Okumura, 1998; Liu, 2009; Morris & Fu, 2001; Tinsley, 1998). On a behavioral level, the current study provides further evidence by showing that US Americans used more integrative reciprocity and demonstrated greater strategic flexibility, that is, used more nonreciprocal (complementary and transformational) sequences, than Chinese negotiators, even though the two cultures did not differ in the amount of distributive reciprocity.

Furthermore, for US Americans, the use of distributive reciprocity was influenced by neither their own, nor their counterparts', competitive goals, whereas for Chinese negotiators, the more emphasis they placed on competitive goals, the more distributive reciprocity they displayed in the negotiation. In addition, when the counterpart's competitive goals were (presumably) detected, there was a trend that US Americans reduced their distributive transformational sequences (or refrained from a desire to claim more value for themselves), whereas Chinese negotiators increased their distributive complementary sequences (or continued to adopt a primarily distributive approach). Taken together, these findings suggest that for Chinese negotiators, reciprocation of the counterparts' distributive (value-claiming) approach is symbolically consistent with their cognitive schema of viewing negotiation as a power-based, win–lose game, whereas for US Americans, reciprocation of the counterpart's distributive behaviors is driven more by a concern for equity and fairness (Fehr & Gächer, 2000), than by their desire to gain an upper hand over the counterpart.

On the other hand, for Chinese negotiators, the use of integrative reciprocity was influenced by neither their own, nor their counterparts', cooperative goals. Whereas for US Americans, the more emphasis they placed on cooperative goals, the more integrative reciprocity they displayed in the negotiation (i.e., emphasized value

creation), for Chinese negotiators, when they placed more emphasis on cooperative goals, they used less distributive transformation in response to their counterparts' integrative behaviors (i.e., de-emphasized value claiming). In addition, when the counterpart's cooperative goals were (presumably) detected, US Americans increased integrative reciprocity, whereas Chinese negotiators reduced integrative transformation in response to their counterparts' distributive behaviors. Taken together, these findings suggest that for US Americans, reciprocation of the counterparts' integrative (value-creation) approach is consistent with their cognitive schema of viewing negotiation as a means to fulfill individual needs and interests; a cooperative orientation means going beyond claiming value for oneself, but also creating value for both parties. On the other hand, for Chinese negotiators, a cooperative orientation to negotiation means sacrificing one's own needs and interests to help the counterpart achieve goals. Therefore, not only did they refrain from value claiming themselves when they pursued cooperative goals, but they also expected a cooperative counterpart to behave the same way. A cooperative orientation displayed by the counterpart (through positive facework and relationship building strategies presumably) and yet accompanied by value-claiming behaviors poses ambiguity to the Chinese negotiators, hence their reduced likelihood to respond to the counterpart by turning the negotiation toward an integrative direction.

Nevertheless, as previous research has indicated, different cultures take different paths for improving joint gains. Although US Americans used integrative reciprocity and integrative transformation more often than Chinese, these responses did not help them improve joint gains. On the other hand, although Chinese negotiators used both types of integrative sequences less often, those that were used significantly increased their joint gains. It is likely that the Chinese are capable of accumulating information concerning preferences and priorities through back-and-forth haggling (see Graham & Lam, 2003), which is typically considered a primarily distributive dynamic; when they do reciprocate integrative proposals, they can use them more effectively. Taken together, these findings suggest that the competitive–cooperative dimension is independent of the distributive–integrative dimension, whereas the former is more concerned with the socio-emotional aspects of the negotiation, the latter is more concerned with the instrumental aspects. Our understanding about culture and negotiation can be expanded by examining these two as complementary dimensions.

Theoretical Implications

Existing research has followed two trends in explaining culture's effects on negotiation behavior (Brett & Crotty, 2008). The dominant paradigm, which has been called the dimensional approach, or trait approach, involves conceptualizing culture as a set of stable, general characteristics, such as individuals' cultural values along dimensions of individualism–collectivism, power distance, and so forth (Morris & Fu, 2001), whereas the second trend, which is called the constructivist approach, involves conceptualizing culture as domain-specific knowledge structures that guide negotiators' behaviors only when they are activated by situational cues (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez,

2000). Findings from the current study provide support for the second approach, especially in accounting for negotiators' micro-level, moment-to-moment behavioral responses in the bargaining process.

Specifically, this study suggests that US American and Chinese negotiators have different knowledge structures—implicit theories, cognitive schemas, frames, mental models, and so forth—about negotiation (e.g., US Americans are oriented towards interests, whereas Chinese negotiators, power). As a result, they place emphasis on a different set of goals than those from the other culture (e.g., Chinese negotiators focused more on competitive goals than US Americans). In addition, their judgment of the nature and purpose of the negotiation (e.g., to fulfill needs and interests vs. to manage identities and relationships) and their judgment of their counterpart's intentions as well as what constitutes normative behaviors to respond to those intentions (e.g., to increase integrative reciprocity vs. to decrease integrative transformation in response to counterparts' goals) also differ from each other's. Consequently, the same set of goals and motives are likely to prompt different behavioral sequences for members of different cultures.

The study also shows that interaction goals can serve as a viable means to account for culture's effects on communication behaviors in ways that are consistent with the constructivist approach. Unlike social motivation, which has been examined primarily as a dichotomous trait variable, interaction goals capture negotiators' desires that are peculiar to the specific interaction context along three dimensions (instrumental, identity, and relational) and two motivational orientations (competitive and cooperative) (see Wilson & Putnam, 1990). As such, they represent negotiators' situation-specific knowledge structures concerning what is important and what is not; as negotiation unfolds, negotiators' interaction goals are subject to change. In the current study, interaction goals were measured via participants' one-time self-reports. Alternative means, such as asking participants to watch their videotaped interactions and report their interaction goals at regular intervals (e.g., 1–2-min intervals), will allow researchers to capture the fluid nature of interaction goals (see Keck & Samp, 2007) as a potential mechanism to account for the micro-level communication processes.

Nevertheless, interaction goals do not directly capture how individuals from different cultures actually conceptualize the interrelationships between various components that define a bargaining situation (e.g., the issues, parties, and alternatives). Other cognitive mechanisms, such as mental models (i.e., cognitive representations of a bargaining situation), can provide additional insights. For example, by examining culture's impact on element centrality in a bargaining situation (e.g., the salience of instrumental vs. socio-emotional elements in a cognitive network), the (dis)similarity of both negotiators' mental models, as well as the amount of negotiators' mental model change from before till after the negotiation, important insights can be generated about the social cognitive processes through which negotiators from two different cultures adapt (or not adapt) to each other's cognitive schemas, which can then help explain the type of settlement reached. Research has shown that findings from cross-cultural comparisons may not be generalizable to intercultural negotiation contexts (e.g., Brett & Okumura, 1998). Future research should apply the constructivist approach to directly examining intercultural negotiation processes.

Conclusion and Limitations

On a practical level, findings from the current study suggest that to negotiate effectively across cultural boundaries, negotiators should not only learn about the different negotiating styles as well as communication norms in different cultures, but also the psychological processes that may (de)activate such behaviors so as to adapt to such cultural differences at the bargaining table. Although the study provides considerable insights to culture and negotiation research, it is not without limitations. Because of resources-related constraints, the study used undergraduate and graduate students as the primary participants. In addition, Chinese participants were sojourners to the United States rather than resident Chinese that have never been exposed to a foreign culture. In addition, because of the small sample size (32 American dyads and 35 Chinese dyads), a relatively liberal level of significance (.10) was used in determining what results to report. Future research should seek to replicate the study with working professionals from both countries with a much larger sample size.

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