Leveling the Playing Field: Negotiating Opportunities and Recognition in Gendered Jobs

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Abstract

In gendered jobs, how do women and men negotiate opportunities to perform and receive recognition for their accomplishments? Women face disadvantages negotiating the workplace, especially in male-dominated positions, while men receive advantages even in female-dominated jobs. This article uses research on gender inequality on Wall Street to illustrate how gender schemas sustain gender inequality in career opportunities, access to networks and mentors, and evaluations of performance. Women on Wall Street faced exclusionary networks and assumptions that men were more competent at finance. The article then focuses on strategies that some women on Wall Street have used to successfully negotiate career opportunities and recognition. These strategies include developing expertise, specializing in financial products, and seeking positions with objective performance criteria.

In gendered jobs, how do women and men negotiate opportunities to perform and receive recognition for their accomplishments? Existing literature reveals that women face disadvantages negotiating the workplace, especially in male-dominated positions, while men receive advantages even in female-dominated jobs. In this article, I will use my research on gender inequality on Wall Street to illustrate how gender schemas sustain gender inequality in career opportunities, access to networks and mentors, and evaluations of performance. I then focus on some strategies that women on Wall Street have used to successfully negotiate career opportunities and recognition.

Negotiation Contexts

Negotiation involves a mutual discussion with the goal of resolving a difference of opinion or a dispute, or of settling the terms of an agreement or transaction. In gendered

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jobs, workers negotiate compensation, work assignments, leadership roles, work hours and location, travel demands, office space, and other conditions of work (Strauss, 1978). The negotiation context is defined by the properties and conditions of the immediate setting that influence how people will negotiate. Negotiation contexts are embedded within larger structural contexts, where power relations define who controls the interaction (Donohue & Kolt, 1992; Strauss, 1978). Individuals with power have a negotiating advantage in shadow negotiations, which occur below the surface and involve negotiation of the relationship between negotiating partners (Kolb & Williams, 2003). In the shadow negotiation, negotiating parties have expectations about the negotiation that can influence the outcome, typically in ways that are advantageous for the powerful party and put those with less power at a disadvantage. Because women have less power than men in most contexts, this means that women and men do not negotiate on a level playing field.

All negotiation contexts are gendered, and most are gender unequal, because of the ubiquity of cultural *gender schemas*. Gender schemas are "a set of implicit, or nonconscious hypotheses about sex differences that shape men's and women's professional lives by over-rating men's work while under-rating women's work" (Valian, 1998, p. 2). Gender schemas are usually unarticulated, but they comprise general ideas about men and women that condition reactions to individual men and women (Kreiger, 1995; Reskin, 2000, 2003; Valian, 1998). In workplaces, gender schemas are often firmly embedded within institutional cultures and practices. Cultural gender schemas impose a number of obstacles to success for women in male-dominated fields, while putting men in female-dominated fields on a fast track (Acker, 1990; Budig, 2002; Valian, 1998; Williams, 1995).

A Highly Male-Dominated Negotiation Context: Wall Street

This article will illustrate opportunities for and constraints on negotiation in a male-dominated career context: Wall Street. The Wall Street example is used because many consider its reward system—bonuses tied to 360-degree performance evaluations—to be the gold standard for meritocratic compensation. At the same time, Wall Street is a highly male-dominated arena and gender schemas infiltrate its reward system and systematically produce gender inequality (Roth, 2006). If gender schemas promote inequality in this context, which is supposedly driven only by money, then they are likely to have an impact on women's ability to negotiate opportunities and recognition in other settings.

Wall Street has traditionally been a challenging environment for women, and first-generation as well as second-generation gender issues are prevalent. The women who first entered Wall Street as professionals in the 1970s faced blatant discrimination: they were excluded or ejected from business meetings in all-male clubs and were often told outright that they would receive lower pay than men. At that time the glass ceiling blocking women was obvious, as was the clear underpayment of women relative to their male peers—sometimes despite superior performance (Fisher, 1989; Herera, 1997). By the 1990s there was a marked increase in the number of women entering the securities industry, as well as the promotion of some of the pioneers who broke gender barriers in the 1970s to senior positions. Goldman Sachs named Abby Joseph Cohen a partner in

1998 (Browning, 1998) in its last partnership selection before the company went public in 1999.

But despite the overall improvement in the climate in these firms, three major Wall Street firms—Smith Barney, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley—have each paid out more than $100 million since the late 1990s to resolve sex discrimination suits. On April 19, 2004, a panel of arbitrators awarded Hydie Sumner $2.2 million dollars for sex discrimination (McGeehan, 2004). Sumner, a female stockbroker, was one of 2,800 women who brought a class action suit against Merrill Lynch. Once all claims have been heard in the case, Merrill Lynch will have awarded approximately $250 million to the plaintiffs (Touryalai, 2007). Also in 2004, Morgan Stanley paid a settlement of $54 million in an EEOC sex discrimination case (Ackman, 2004; McGeehan, 2004). The lead plaintiff, Allison Schieffelin, received $12 million; the settlement granted another $2 million to diversity programs to promote the advancement of women within the firm. Schieffelin claimed that she and other women were denied equitable pay and promotions and had been excluded from company functions because of their gender. The EEOC found that less-deserving men had been promoted while Schieffelin, a high producer in international equity sales, remained in a lower level position. The firm retaliated against her when she filed complaints, in violation of equal employment opportunity law.

More recent events have produced ongoing evidence of gender inequity in financial services. Oppenheimer & Co. paid $85,500 in September 2006 to settle a lawsuit alleging discriminatory hiring practices (Reuters, 2006). In the suit, Oppenheimer denied job interviews to Jaime Sanders and other women, telling them that the advertised position had been filled, while granting interviews to Sanders' brother and other men.

Six months later, in March 2007, an arbitration panel awarded Nancy Thomas $420,000 as part of the class action suit against Merrill Lynch (Antilla, 2007; Touryalai, 2007). This award was paltry given that Thomas' sexual harassment case was known in the brokerage industry for its "particularly vulgar intimidation and harassment" (Antilla, 2007). Morgan Stanley also settled a class action suit in March 2007, in which more than 3,000 brokers claimed there was unlawful gender and age discrimination in its brokerage division (Morgan Stanley settles sex bias suit, 2007). These class action suits against two of Wall Street's largest investment banks alleged that the firms discriminated against women in training, mentoring, account assignments, and in taking part in company-approved partnership arrangements with other brokers, all of which compounded direct discrimination in compensation and promotion.

The settlements in these suits may have had limited impact on conditions for women on the ground, and meager awards in recent settlements suggest the settlements may provide Wall Street firms with too little incentive to change business as usual. An industry insider, Elaine La Roche, stated, "I think in recent years the advances made by women in the 1990s have reversed" (Thomas, 2007: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/01/business/01wall.html). In December 2007, Morgan Stanley fired Zoe Cruz, its highest ranking woman executive, who was widely viewed as Wall Street's best bet for a woman chief executive. Following her dismissal, many felt that there were no women on Wall Street that had a chance of being promoted to chief executive. Industry insiders

wondered if Cruz's status as a demanding woman executive in the highly male-dominated securities industry may have tipped the scales against her (Thomas, 2007).

The Wall Street Study

In the late 1990s, I interviewed 76 current or former Wall Street financial professionals (Roth, 2006). The 32 men and 44 women had graduated with MBA degrees from elite business schools from 1991 through 1993 and took positions in corporate finance, public finance, sales, trading, equity research, or asset management in the top nine Wall Street firms. These men and women were highly similar in their educational backgrounds, their work experience prior to completing business school, and the other characteristics that they brought to their jobs. Despite this similarity, the men and women exhibited a larger than average gender gap in pay. Overall, women earned 39% less than otherwise similar men, and they earned 29% less than men who worked the same number of hours, in the same areas of the industry, and at the same rank (Roth, 2006). This reflects gender differences in negotiations over access to opportunities and recognition for accomplishments, which undergird pay decisions, more than it represents differences in whether men or women ask for more pay.

Despite the fact that many view Wall Street's reward structure as a "meritocracy," gender schemas disadvantaged women and advantaged men who were otherwise similar. Women faced obstacles negotiating access to better work assignments, and received less credit for their skills and accomplishments in the evaluations upon which compensation was based. Two cognitive processes produced subtle forms of discrimination in relationships with managers, peers, and subordinates: the tendency for people to prefer others who are like themselves and cultural beliefs that men are more competent than women, even when their actual performance is similar (Reskin, 2000; Ridgeway, 1997). On Wall Street, these cognitive biases profoundly affected opportunities to perform, evaluations of performance, and pay, although there were women who were highly successful on Wall Street's own terms (Roth, 2006). Some women improved their bargaining position with the aid of powerful sponsors, specialized expertise, and measurable performance. But to negotiate access to the best accounts, clients, and deals, and to obtain recognition of their performance, they had to combat exclusionary networks and double standards, while demonstrating what they had to offer to their negotiating partners more explicitly than men did and emulating male work patterns.

Exclusionary Networks

Experimental research has found that individuals have "in-group preferences"—also called "homophily preferences" or "homosocial reproduction"—which means that they prefer to associate with others who are similar to themselves (Berscheid & Hatfield, 1978; Kanter, 1977; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Smith-Lovin & McPherson, 1993). Similarity or difference may be established in many ways, but traits like gender and race are immediately visible and socially salient, often affecting friendships, trust, and sponsorship of others (Erickson, Albanese, & Drakulic, 2000; Ibarra,

1997; Kanter, 1977; Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989). People tend to automatically feel more comfortable in same-sex and same-race friendships and to favor colleagues of the same gender and race. Given that most people favor others who are like themselves, workers who resemble their coworkers and managers have advantages. On Wall Street, men's tendency to associate with other men put them at an advantage in access to mentors, access to informal networks of information, work assignments, performance evaluations, and relative compensation (Roth, 2006).

White men on Wall Street sometimes implied that similarity to others in their group offered them advantages and made the work environment more fun. Informal networks could provide helpful resources and important sources of "scouting information" that helped individuals position themselves for successful negotiations (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Kolb & Williams, 2003). In contrast, women were often excluded from workplace networks on Wall Street, making it more difficult to establish solid relationships with coworkers and managers. Tracy[1] described how she was excluded in her job as a trader:

> Me and this other woman were total outcasts. … There were, on our immediate desk, there were six of us. The rest of the group would play golf every weekend. They'd go out to dinners and whatnot. We were never invited once. It was pathetic. To tell you the truth, because of that we had absolutely no desire to do anything social with them, but they were like a boys' club and we were just the two chicks who didn't fit in. It wasn't fun. They certainly didn't sit and talk to us on the desk and they ignored us at work, but socially they completely ignored us. And it was obviously a little harder to fit in when somebody spends the whole weekend with the other three of them, playing golf and going on vacations together. Going to strip clubs together and stuff like that. It's kind of hard to fit in.

In this case, men in the group engaged in male-bonding activities with each other. By doing so, they built valuable relationships with each other that provided good sources of information and enhanced their bargaining position. They successfully excluded women, thus maintaining more resources within their own clique and limiting the women's power to bargain for their own interests.

Lack of access to workplace networks also reduced women's access to plum assignments and recognition. Amanda started in corporate finance, but her firm had a limited flow of deals in her specialized area. She believed that she was paid less than her male peers because her managers assigned women to detail-oriented work for prospective clients while men worked on the small number of live deals:

> I did expect the pay to be fairly good but I realized it wasn't as good as some of my peers. … I think in some respects it was because I wasn't working on deals, because there were so few deals and the deals that they had were given to the guys. ... Maybe because they did more politicking than myself. That was the primary reason. And it was run by guys and guys like to work with guys.

She believed that success in the job required hard work, long hours, and quantitative skills, but alliances with more senior employees offered men in her group better access to clients and accounts for reasons unrelated to their effort or ability. Allison was unable

[1]All names are pseudonyms.

to negotiate these types of alliances because she shared less in common with more powerful players due to her gender. She subsequently transferred into equity research, where there were more women, and then moved to a buy-side firm where her earnings were lower.

Senior workers' in-group preferences led to selective mentorship and unequal support. Most mentoring relationships were informal, and arose due to affinities between junior and senior employees. Because senior workers on Wall Street are more likely to be men, they are likely to mentor other men. They are also more likely to give workers like themselves the benefit of the doubt when it comes to evaluating them: excusing poor performance as caused by external factors, while rewarding good performance as expressive of their intrinsic ability and effort. For workers in the minority, the inability to find a mentor could produce disadvantages in competition for resources and access to deals. Sometimes Wall Street firms assigned mentors to junior workers but did not make them accountable for helping their protégés to succeed, thus making these measures ineffective.

Negotiating in the Shadow of Exclusionary Networks

Some women on Wall Street were lucky: they had strong mentors who negotiated opportunities and recognition for them, helping the women gain access to avenues that were typically closed. Caroline, a highly successful investment banker, had a powerful mentor who helped her to be promoted ahead of schedule:

> I had a terrific mentor, the head of the group at the time, and I think that when I first interviewed with the firm I thought that this person was very insightful, which is one of the reasons that I ultimately took the job. … I worked my rear end off for the first year or year and a half, and he actually recommended to the firm that I be accelerated or pulled out of my class and move ahead a year. Which had only been done, I guess, in the history of the firm in investment banking, a couple of times. It was a pretty amazing thing for me.

As in this case, a mentoring relationship with a powerful man could open avenues that were typically closed and strengthened the resources that women could use to negotiate for themselves as they moved forward in their careers.

Gendered Jobs

Women's negotiating position on Wall Street is shaped by gendered jobs, in which there is a general tendency to view men as more competent than women and to hold women to higher standards. Experimental research has consistently found that people view men as more competent, give men more opportunities to demonstrate their competence, and give men the benefit of the doubt more often than women (Berger, Hamit Fiske, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Webster & Foschi, 1988). People tend to assume that men are better at male-dominated or gender-neutral tasks, and therefore hold men to a lower standard, rating a man's performance as better than a similar performance by a woman. This double standard reduces women's bargaining position, especially if they work in

male-dominated jobs: they must demonstrate superior performance to be rated as equally competent (Foschi, 1996, 2000; Kreiger, 1995; Reskin, 2000, 2003; Ridgeway, 1997; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004). On Wall Street, 73% of the women that I interviewed believed that their opportunities to perform were limited by assumptions that women are not competent in finance.

Because Wall Street is traditionally a male domain, managers, coworkers, and clients often assumed that men had natural abilities in finance. The industry culture heightened this problem by overvaluing displays of masculinity as indicators of competence. Maureen described expectations about competence and authority and evaluations of performance for women in corporate finance:

> First of all, clients always assume that I'm a junior person on the team. Always. Even clients who know me, if there's a new analyst,[2] a male analyst, they will assume he is senior to me. Always. … People here automatically assume that women are dumb. Dumber than men. Not as insightful, which is very often not true. Very often. I see it all the time and a lot of it comes from the behavior. Junior men will jump in and make a point, even though they're absolutely WRONG. I see it all the time. … I think the work women do is far superior in terms of the attention to detail and level of concern that it be right. I find that an absolutely 100% true corollary in the junior women, and men are very sloppy and make mistakes all the time. [They] don't also have the process of thinking through stuff a lot of times.

Maureen believed that men in her work environment consistently had lower expectations of women, and evaluated them as less competent. But while she viewed women's performance as generally superior in quality and accuracy, she found that women constantly needed to prove themselves because of double standards and the valorization of masculinity in this industry.

Assumptions that women were less competent meant that women had to actively demonstrate superior competence. Thirty-four percent of the women interviewed specifically pointed to double standards or undue harshness in comparison with men. Karen, whose firm had asked her to move from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) into a lower paying administrative position, noted that men in investment banking provided each other with valuable assistance and informal mentoring, while women were held to higher standards for competence:

> Around here, at least, if you're liked, you don't have to be a star performer to get ahead as a guy, whereas women, I think that category doesn't exist. It doesn't matter whether they like you or not, they base it more on your performance. But for guys, it can be a very mediocre white male, but because he's liked and he's congenial, he gets through the ranks. And it just doesn't happen for women at all. You really have to prove yourself.

Karen believed that men gave other men the benefit of the doubt, holding them to lower standards for performance and giving them advantages in their performance

[2]Analysts in investment banking are the lowest ranking employees. They are usually young college graduates who work for 2 years to gain some experience before going to business school, and they perform the most menial tasks.

reviews. She also believed that her lack of success in M&A was at least partly a consequence of additional scrutiny of her as a woman.

Women who had proven themselves and attained positions of power were often especially negatively regarded because they faced expectations that they would behave in appropriately feminine ways that clashed with definitions of managerial competence in Wall Street's male-dominated culture. Those who moved up were expected to be tough, competitive, and aggressive as Wall Street high-rollers, and yet to be nice, nurturing, and kind because they were women. It is, of course, impossible for anyone to fulfill these expectations simultaneously. Cultural gender schemas lead people to have difficulties accepting aggressive and dominant behavior from women, like speaking with a stern facial expression, making a lot of eye contact while speaking, or making verbal or nonverbal threats (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). At the same time, women on Wall Street had to exhibit "masculine" personality traits and contradict expectations of femininity to prove their competence within Wall Street's culture. When expectations for their behavior are so contradictory, how can women compete?

Negotiating in the Shadow of Gendered Jobs

Gender stereotypes and the increased scrutiny that women faced because of their lower status were aspects of the negotiation context that worked against women on Wall Street, tipping the shadow negotiation to their disadvantage. This hindered their ability to negotiate access to opportunities and recognition for their contributions because they began in an inferior bargaining position. But some women developed strategies to improve their negotiating position on Wall Street. Sometimes they developed specialized expertise, which made it difficult for others to question the value of their contributions and thus strengthened their bargaining position. For example, after she moved into sales, Barbara had more knowledge about the securities that she was selling than even senior workers at her firm:

> I was really lucky. They really, I would have to say that I really felt that they were happy to have me. They were really happy to have someone who had worked in a top three firm in mortgages. In a bulge-bracket. It was a very positive experience. There were reasons for it. There were things I knew that they didn't know, and we built on that.

Her experience at her first firm gave her valuable expertise with securities that her second firm was only beginning to offer. Like Barbara, women could gain task-specific reputations that overrode negative beliefs about women's competence by covering a specific product or region that their firms valued, or by obtaining an Institutional Investor ranking in research.

Some highly successful women on Wall Street strategically avoided industry specializations where client relationships would be difficult to establish (e.g., automotive), and specialized instead in financial products, where their expertise and credibility would be clear. By doing so, these women changed the terms of the shadow negotiation: access to valued work assignments would not be based on the in-group preferences of clients or managers and their contributions would be more transparent, thus reducing the impact

of stereotyped views of their abilities. For example, Elise worked with oil and gas clients for over 2 years but did not think that she would have long-term success with clients in such a male-dominated industry. She said:

> I felt like the best way for me to get ahead as a woman in investment banking was maybe with the products. Because if you're an industry person, the CEO or the CFO is always going to understand the industry better than you because they live it. And the only talent you can really bring to that person is being able to be their confidante, meaning I know the top CEOs of the top three retail companies and the benefit for me is to tell CEO #1 something I learned from CEO #2 in an industry, because there's always product people who will tell the client about the product. I just realized that it's going to be extraordinarily hard for me to be that confidante to CEOs in any industry, especially [oil and gas industries] and I don't think that's bad or good—I just think that's a fact. So I figured from a product side I would always know more about the market and the product than the company, because that's not what they do for a living and I would have a lot more credibility out of the box.

By changing areas to specialize in a financial product, Elise focused on aspects of her work that were within her control: quantitative skills and knowledge of finance. This could be a useful strategy for both women and men, but tended to be more important for women. In fact, establishing specialized expertise was critical for women when gender schemas worked against their career opportunities and recognition.

Another strategy among successful women was to work in areas with measurable performance. It was especially difficult for women on Wall Street to gain recognition for their performance when evaluation criteria were subjective, because women in male-dominated fields face higher standards for competence. Successful women selected areas of the industry where their performance was measurable and, therefore, evaluation criteria were more objective. For example, Emma described how she chose to specialize in a quantitative product:

> I think some of the best advice I got was from a woman in that group. She was the only woman in that group and she said, "As a woman on Wall Street, go get the nerdiest job straight out of business school that you can get. Go get the quant job and then if you want to go be a generalist in corporate finance eventually, whatever, but at least you've established, 'I can handle this level of quantitative work.'" So I took the job at [my first Wall Street firm] in asset-backed securities just because that was the most quantitative job at the best firm that I would be able to get a job at.

Choosing a quantitative job insulated Emma from some biases in others' evaluations because she had concrete output. Women like Emma could negotiate recognition for their contributions more successfully when evaluation criteria were objective. This reinforces the findings of experimental research on gender in negotiation, which has found that solid comparison cases and a clear economic logic reduce the impact of gender-specific criteria (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005). In contrast, ambiguous criteria for evaluation produce significant gender differences in negotiation (Bowles et al., 2005). Some areas of Wall Street, like sales and trading, had objective measures of performance but others, like corporate finance, required more subjective judgments. The more rational, objective, and transparent the performance criteria, the better women's chances

of overriding gender schemas that undermined the recognition of their accomplishments.

Gendered Work

In sum, women in male-dominated jobs like those on Wall Street can succeed within the existing negotiation context if they obtain they assistance of sponsors, have specialized expertise that their employers value, and their performance is clearly measurable. The same things can strengthen men's bargaining position, but are less critical for men because gender schemas offer men advantages. Because men receive the benefit of the doubt in most work settings, they take smaller risks by specializing in areas where relationships are important or performance criteria are subjective. But women who succeeded on Wall Street needed to emulate male career patterns while they pursued specialized expertise and measurable performance.

Male-dominated careers like those on Wall Street contain underlying assumptions that are based on male life experiences, positing an ideal worker with no obligations to anything outside of work and with a support person to take care of all nonwork aspects of life (Acker, 1990; Bailyn, 2003; Ely & Padavic, 2007; Roth, 2006; Williams, 2000). The ideal Wall Street worker is a workaholic who can work very long hours and has no external obligations. Workers without outside lives had better access to accounts and deals and were evaluated as better performers, and the women who succeeded fit this norm as closely as possible (Roth, 2006). A workaholic culture is not unique to Wall Street—inflexibility, long hours, and face-time are entrenched in many high-paying careers. In these careers, which are gendered as male, workers demonstrate career commitment by centering their life on their work (Bailyn, 2003; Blair-Loy, 2003; Jacobs & Gerson, 2004; Stone, 2007).

The definition of the ideal worker as completely devoted to work is based on a breadwinner–homemaker division of labor in the family, and forms an ''institutionalized'' assumption: one that involves habitual and legitimized patterns of action that span organizations and are resistant to change (Blair-Loy, 2003; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Jepperson, 1991; Stone, 2007; Williams, 2000). This was one obstacle that did not appear to be negotiable on Wall Street, and others have made similar observations in other work settings (Acker, 1990; Bailyn, 2003; Blair-Loy, 2003; Fletcher, 1999; Stone, 2007; Williams, 2000). Women on Wall Street did not manage to overturn the gendered ideal worker notion, and thus were only successful if (or as long as) they could emulate male patterns. In this sense, successful women's strategies were limited: they did not challenge the terms of the negotiation context itself.

Some might argue that because both men and women who exhibit complete devotion to work can succeed, difficulties living up to the ideal worker norm must result from the shortcomings of individuals (Blair-Loy, 2003). But the ideal worker norm has disparate implications by gender: cultural definitions of women as caregivers and uncommitted to work and of men as exclusively committed to work undermine women's relative bargaining position while inflating men's. Even if some women make themselves fit and are successful, like some women on Wall Street, the existing structure of the reward

system and the career culture remains intact. As Bailyn (2003) observed regarding academia, true equity requires that men and women face equal constraints, while current "ideal worker" notions create gender-unequal constraints. The ideal worker notion, which is embedded in institutional cultures and practices that appear neutral but have disparate impact on women, is built on masculine values and the life situation of men who have dominated the workplace. In this sense, organizations create and reinforce gender schemas (Acker, 1990; Ely & Padavic, 2007).

Conclusions

Negotiation over opportunities and recognition in the workplace occurs within the context of gendered jobs and gendered work patterns. Women in male-dominated jobs, like those on Wall Street, have made some important gains, but gender schemas and ideal worker norms pose continuing obstacles and pay inequity persists. But because access to opportunities and recognition for accomplishments underlie compensation, negotiation differences in gendered jobs are much more complicated than the observation that "women don't ask" for more money (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).

Both individuals and organizations can create some conditions for successful negotiation over the assignment of work and thus workplace opportunities. If a woman has a strong mentor to sponsor her success, and if organizations offer incentives for individuals with power to mentor women, then women in male-dominated jobs can negotiate better access to resources and opportunities. When women develop specialized expertise and when organizations target women for training in cutting-edge areas, then women can better negotiate both opportunities and recognition for their contributions. If evaluation criteria are objective and output-oriented rather than subjective and relationship-dependent, women in male-dominated jobs are more likely to receive recognition for their accomplishments. Demonstrated skills or performance can facilitate negotiation over pay and other types of recognition, as well as access to future opportunities and resources.

My findings and those from other organizational research address subtle discrimination caused by gender schemas and thus speak to some second-generation discrimination issues. However, second-generation issues are troubling for workplaces because they often require changes in organizational and professional cultures. Commitments to organizational routines and "business as usual" are significant challenges to implementing this type of change. In my research on men and women who worked on Wall Street, the organizational culture was both macho and workaholic; macho was slightly more negotiable than workaholic. The strategies of the most successful women—to develop specialized expertise and to find areas where performance was measurable—could partially address the problems posed by a culture of machismo, as it is difficult to deny the expertise of someone who has become truly indispensible or to refuse to compensate a key player who has demonstrated measurable results. However, the workaholic culture was a bigger challenge, and one that derailed some of the women that I interviewed. This was an area that was, up to this point, nonnegotiable: fit the ideal worker norm or leave. This ideal worker norm demands complete devotion to career and is structured

along an all-or-nothing cultural template that is falsely gender-neutral because employers, workers, men in families, and even women themselves define care work as women's responsibility (Bailyn, 2003; Blair-Loy, 2003; Roth, 2006; Stone, 2007; Williams, 2000). As a result, women need to negotiate about issues that men do not: family policies, flexible schedules, reproductive bodies, and gendered jobs. These issues are assumed to be male-patterned, so that men are less likely to need to negotiate because they fit the default assumptions about workers. Cultural belief systems like the ideal worker notion are largely invisible and unacknowledged, and are rarely challenged by workers (Roth, 2006; Stone, 2007). In fact, workers seem to absorb these norms in osmosis-like fashion. Meanwhile, the intensity of the ideal worker norm has escalated over time, and poses significant and continuing gendered challenges.

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