

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Termination as a Tactic and Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka¹

Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Keywords

third-party intervention, tactics, ethnic conflict, mediation.

Correspondence

Kristine Höglund, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Box 514, Uppsala 75120, Sweden; e-mail: kristine.hoglund@pcr.uu.se.

Abstract

What explains a mediator's choice of tactic when faced with a situation of crisis? This article focuses on mediation in internal armed conflicts and on one particular mediation tactic: the use of the exit option as a means to pressure the parties to enter into negotiations and make concessions to end the war. We examine the conditions under which the exit option—here referred to as the termination tactic—is likely to be used. Utilizing a cost-benefit approach, we develop a theoretical framework for understanding when mediators will employ the termination tactic. The framework is applied to four crises in the Sri Lankan peace process (2000–2006), during which Norway acted as a mediator. The analysis indicates that the termination tactic is employed when mediators (a) expect few rewards from involvement in the process, (b) deem other tactics as being ineffective, and (c) perceive that the parties have incentives for mediation.

Introduction

The mediator's termination tactic—the exit option—can be an important tool for overcoming obstacles in precarious negotiation processes that seek to end long-standing and violent conflicts. Consider the following empirical examples from different peace

¹The authors have contributed equally to this article—the order of authors is alphabetical. We thank Ralph Sundberg for invaluable research assistance on the Sri Lankan case. This article has been presented at the Research Seminar at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in 2007 and the Nordic Workshop on War, Peace and Development in Sri Lanka, Göteborg, January, 2007. We thank participants of those events for constructive comments. We acknowledge generous funding from Sida/Sarec and the Swedish Research Council.

processes. During the Middle East peace process in 1991, U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, expressed frustration over the parties' intransigent negotiation behavior. When other tactics had proved ineffective, all that was left for the mediator was to confront the parties with the threat of withdrawal. By leaving "the dead cat on their doorstep," the mediator could pressure the parties to overcome obstacles for a settlement (Baker, 1999: 188). In the former Yugoslavia, the American negotiator Holbrooke was confronted by the Bosnian-Serb leader Karadzic' intransigence during a crucial point in the negotiations. Holbrooke's response was to threaten to terminate his mediation effort, which led the obstruction to a halt (Holbrooke, 1999: 341–342). U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, using the real deadline of U.S. elections and change of administration when mediating in the Southern Africa in the late 1980s, was able move the Angolans, Cubans, and South Africans in the direction of an agreement (Crocker 1999: 229). These examples give evidence to the importance of the termination tactic that appears to be utilized fairly often by mediators in efforts to push the parties toward peace.

Mediators seeking to promote peace in protracted conflicts have several potential tactics at their disposal. One of the tactics that can be utilized is the exit option. In fact, as Princen (1992) points out, the termination tactic is the one source of leverage that all types of mediators have in common. The concept of a withdrawal tactic is here suggested as an intentional move by a third party as opposed to a decision to withdraw because the third party is seeing its presence as useless. Although the termination tactic is commonly listed among the potential mediation tactics, few scholars have explicitly devoted attention to issues concerning its usage and effectiveness. This article addresses this research gap.

This article examines the termination tactic both conceptually and empirically. The main contribution of the article is theoretical: it represents an effort to develop a cost–benefit analysis framework for explaining when the termination tactic is used by mediators, in particular in mediation efforts in internal armed conflicts. We pursue this task also by empirically examining a recent case of international mediation: the Norwegian mediation effort in Sri Lanka, which officially began in the year 2000. In a comparative analysis of matched cases, we analyze four instances of crises in the peace process: two instances where the mediators used this tactic and two instances where they did not. Comparing these instances, we shed light on the conditions under which mediators use the question of their own presence as a method for solving crises and pushing the process forward. Our analysis is informed by field studies in Sri Lanka, and interviews with, for instance, Norwegian officials and diaspora representatives.

This study offers insights for third-party actors in internal armed conflict. In terms of civil war negotiations, our study links up with research on spoiler management. Spoilers are those actors in a peace process discontent with it and who seek to sabotage its progress (Stedman, 1997). While the spoiler literature primarily has been focused on non-state actors, such as rebels and guerrilla groups, spoilers can also emerge on the state side (Höglund & Zartman, 2006). In this sense, the termination tactic can be a potential tactic to manage spoilers on both the state side and the rebel side.

The analysis of the peace process crises in Sri Lanka and the actions by the Norwegian mediators suggest that the mediator's decision to use the termination tactics is determined by both the mediator's motives for being involved in the negotiation process and the expected effectiveness of the tactic itself. Our analysis suggests that the termination tactic will be applied when the mediator (a) expects few rewards from being involved as a mediator, (b) considers other mediation tactics as bearing little fruit, and (c) perceives that the belligerent have incentives for mediation.

The article proceeds as follows. We start by outlining the theoretical framework, which suggests a set of factors that can influence the mediator's choice to employ the termination tactic. We then discuss the Norwegian mediation in Sri Lanka 2000–2006, with a focus on four critical junctures in the peace process. From the comparison of the crises, we arrive at some general conclusions and relate them to debates on mediation strategies and tactics, "peace conditionality," and third-party credibility. Finally, we discuss avenues for new research in this area. In particular, the theoretical framework developed through the study of the Sri Lankan case can be used to derive testable hypotheses that future research can examine on a larger set of cases.

Mediation Strategy and Termination Tactics

Mediation research has developed into an exciting field of study (see e.g., Bercovitch, 2002; Wall, Stark, & Standifler, 2001). There are several different strategies to use for the mediator who engages to solve an armed conflict. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) distinguishes between (a) communication-facilitation strategies, which focuses on communication, trust-building, and the creation of a climate conducive for negotiation, (b) procedural strategies, where the mediator has more control over the process and context of negotiation by decisions over where meetings are held, contacts with media, and other structural factors and (c) directive strategies, in which the mediator seeks to influence both the process and the substance of negotiations, through more coercive measures. The tools at disposal depend on the resources that the mediator possesses. A mediator with extensive military or economic resources may mount enough pressure on the parties to force them to abandon their original aspirations and instead choose to settle with a compromise. A less resourceful mediator can be beneficial to the process by communicating secret information about the parties' willingness to find a political solution without losing face (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994).

The termination tactic is one of many tactics that can be used under the umbrella of *directive* strategies—or *manipulation* strategies—of mediators (Touval & Zartman, 1985: 126–129). Interestingly, it is a kind of coercive tactic that even mediators with little (economic, military or political) clout can use. With this tactic, the mediator threatens to withdraw its activities to put pressure on the parties. The driving logic behind the termination tactic is that conflicts will only be solved if an element of urgency is introduced. The source of leverage that termination can contribute "lies in the mediator's ability to withdraw and leave the parties to their own devices and their continuing conflict [...] If the mutually hurting stalemate is present, they will be sensitive to the threat of leaving" (Touval & Zartman, 2001: 437).

The termination tactic is similar to what has been termed the “withdrawal strategy” in the spoiler literature (Stedman, 1997). It is one of the ways in which the international community can deal with those actors who are displeased with the terms of a peace agreement and who seek to disrupt it. In this context, Stedman has highlighted some of the difficulties of using the strategy. For instance, withdrawal punishes all parties in the negotiation process equally; it does not discriminate between those actors who are fulfilling their obligations and those who are not. The parties must also see third-party exit as punishment. In a worst-case scenario, the strategy may have an adverse effect if termination is seen as a lack of commitment to peace on part of the mediator (Stedman, 1997).

The above discussion identifies some of the previous thinking on the prospects of using the termination tactic. Building on this earlier work, we suggest a theoretical framework that identifies the conditions for when this tactic will be applied, taking into account the mediator’s motives, the means at disposal, and their expected effect. Our theoretical framework is basically a cost–benefit analysis as viewed from the mediator’s perspective. We begin by examining the mediator’s motives, and how they may factor into the decision on when to use the termination tactic. We then discuss the termination tactic as a means that the mediator will use given that the tactic will be expected to be more effective than alternative tactics. We end by outlining the mediator’s assessment of the parties’ incentives for mediation, which depends on the relative value of a settlement vis-à-vis a return to war, or in other words, the mediator’s evaluation of the primary parties’ cost–benefit analysis of pursuing the conflict track versus the negotiation track.

The Mediator’s Motives

A first factor relates to the *value the mediator attaches to the mediation effort itself*. The evaluation is not constant, but rather likely to be reassessed in response to changing circumstances. The context in which the mediators evaluate the choice of tactic—in this case whether to terminate the mediation service—is a dynamic environment. Thus, the assessment of a certain tactic can change (sometimes fairly rapidly) during a peace process. We expect that the mediators will consider the termination tactic only when they expect low rewards for being involved in the negotiation process. Basically, the termination tactic implies that the mediator must be ready to give up the position as a third party, and the mediator can be expected to do so if the cost of third-party engagement is high, in economical, practical, or political terms. In addition, the termination tactic will be used if the mediator reaps few benefits from being a mediator. If, on the other hand, the mediator’s rewards from being involved in the negotiation process substantially outbalance the costs of withdrawal, then the mediator will be reluctant to give up its third-party position.

Previous research on mediators’ motives suggests that there are both benefits (minimizing collateral damage, build reputation, earn prestige) and costs (time, frustration, and expended political capital) involved in mediation (Young, 1972). We here distinguish between rewards from involvement in the negotiation process irrespective of

outcome, so-called process rewards, and the value the mediator attaches to a settlement itself, referred to as the “achievement” rewards (Mitchell, 1988: 33). It is important to note that the value a mediator attaches to engagement may transcend the rewards related to a particular conflict. Svensson (2007a) suggests that one plausible explanation for why a threat of withdrawal cannot be successfully employed by some types of mediators is to be found in the high value mediators attach to the peace process and their own role in that regard. If the reputation of the mediator is at stake, the mediators themselves may have a “vested interest” in a continuation of a peace process.

The Mediator’s Means

A second factor behind the use of the termination tactic is the *feasibility of other tactics*. We suggest that the termination tactic is more likely to be used when other tactics are perceived as unlikely to be effective. These alternative tactics include other forms of directive mediation tactics, such as promising resources, and threatening to take side, but also tactics that are associated with other mediation styles, such as the role of formulator and that of communicator (Touval & Zartman, 1985). Such assessment, in turn, depends on the cost of using other tactics and the probability that these tactics will yield positive results (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000). If other tactics are deemed inefficient or too costly, then the mediator will be more likely to use the threat of exit. Commonly, the basis for such expectation of the mediator would be previous experiences during the peace process: the mediator or other mediators might have tried different tactics with no or negative results, which informs the mediator’s expectation on this matter.

The Parties’ Incentives for Mediation

A third factor determining when the termination tactic will be employed is the mediator’s assessment of the *parties’ incentives for mediation*. When the mediators consider using the termination tactic, they must take into consideration how the parties value the mediation effort. When the parties’ incentives for mediation are high, the termination tactic is considered to be more useful. When the parties’ incentives for mediation are low, the threat of mediation withdrawal will be a less fruitful tactic. The parties’ incentives for mediation basically boil down to two dimensions: the benefits of war and the benefits of peace. Only when the belligerents value a settlement higher than continued conflict can the threat of termination be a source of leverage for the mediator (Stedman, 1997; Touval & Zartman, 2001). The parties’ incentives for mediation depend on their expected costs of continued conflict relative to what the parties expect they can gain at the negotiation table (Mason & Fett, 1996). These two dimensions are interrelated. As can be seen in Table 1, there are theoretically four possible scenarios, which create different incentives for mediation efforts.

The first scenario (upper left corner of the table) is when there is a high likelihood of reaching a peace deal, but at the same time, there is also a risk of return to a costly

Table 1
Parties' Incentives for Mediation

	High likelihood of settlement	Low likelihood of settlement
High risk of war	High incentives for mediation	Intermediate incentives for mediation
Low risk of war	Intermediate incentives for mediation	Low incentives for mediation

war. Here, the “push” factor of the risk of war and the “pull” factor work simultaneously to create high incentives for mediation. Thus, when the prospects for reaching a mutually beneficial agreement are high and the risks of war are present, threats to end the mediation effort are most likely to be effective. The second scenario (upper right corner of the table) is created when there is a risk of war and there is little chance of reaching a peace deal. Here, the parties have intermediate incentives for mediation. The “push” factor influences the parties, although the “pull” factor is not present. Thus, if the parties perceive a high risk for a (return to) war, the withdrawal of the mediation would come at a high cost. The third scenario (lower left corner of the table) is when the parties have high chance to reach a peace deal, and there is little risk of war. This is where the “pull” factor is predominant. Once again, the parties in this scenario will have intermediate incentives for mediation. The fourth and last scenario (lower right corner of the table) is when there is a “no war-no peace” situation. This is when there is neither a push nor a pull factor that can influence the parties. Hence, in these kinds of situation, the parties will have low incentives for mediation.

This framework suggests several research questions that will guide the analysis of crises in the Sri Lankan peace process. First, what was the mediators’ motive—did they at the particular point of the process consider the value of the mediation as high or low? Second, what other means were available for the mediators—were other tactics for the third party potentially fruitful? Third, what was the mediators’ assessment of the parties’ perception and incentives—did the parties in conflict have incentives for mediation? These questions will be explored in each of the four crises episodes.

Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka

Norway has had a long history of engagement in Sri Lanka through development assistance. The violent conflict in Sri Lanka between the separatist rebel group LTTE and the government forces escalated into full war in 1983 and was until 2009 interrupted only by incomplete efforts to solve the conflict (e.g., Loganathan, 1996; de Silva & Peiris, 2000). The armed conflict came to an end after a massive government offensive, which led to the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009.

Norway officially became the mediator in 2000, and the peace efforts were facilitated by the election in 2001, which put a new government in place in Sri Lanka. Before Norway’s role did become public, a period of preparations and contacts in secret had taken place. In February 2002, the LTTE and the government agreed on a ceasefire agreement, which also established the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to oversee the

ceasefire. SLMM consisted of monitors from the Nordic countries. Norway made a large contribution in terms of the personnel and resources to this mission, and the Norwegian government appointed the head of the mission. In addition, Norway—together with the United States, Japan, and European Union—acted as a cochair of the donor activities that were carried out in support of the peace process.

The peace process resulted in direct talks between the government and the LTTE, but before a conclusive peace agreement was signed, the rebels withdrew from the peace talks in April 2003. The violence escalated in 2005 and 2006 to a state of war, but it was not until January 2008 that the government formally withdrew from the ceasefire agreement.²

Norway's involvement as a mediator has to be understood against the background of Norway as a small country with a tradition of promoting conflict resolution and human rights in the international arena. Norway has been directly involved in peacemaking efforts in, for instance, Israel–Palestine and Guatemala (Kelleher & Taulbee, 2006). While Norway had links with Sri Lanka through its development assistance and the Tamil diaspora in Norway, it has no major political and economical interest in Sri Lanka or in the region. Such concerns were important for India—the regional great power. India's complicated history with the Sri Lankan conflict and its interests in the region have made India reluctant to support international mediation in Sri Lanka (Höglund & Svensson, 2008; Keethaponcalan, 2005; Martin, 2006; Moolakkattu, 2005; Palihapitiya, 2007).

Engaging or Disengaging? Four Instances of Crises

Norway's official mediation effort extended over more than 6 years and was characterized by continuity rather than disengagement. In fact, the Norwegian mediation effort was in many respects unique in its long duration. Many mediators enter because of pressing security or humanitarian needs, and mediation under such circumstances is used as a tool for immediate crises management (Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala, & Nuamah, 2006). However, the Norwegians worked toward a resolution of the conflict in a more gradual manner and over a long time-period.

To improve the understanding of when a termination tactic is used, we analyze four instances of crises, or critical junctures in the negotiation process. In this article, we perceive a crisis to occur in the peace process when there is a significant move away from settlement by the parties to the negotiation process. This definition of crisis captures the dynamics of a negotiation process in a directional rather than a static manner. The conceptualization follows Druckman's work on turning points and crises (Druckman, 1986, 2001).

In this study, we analyze two clear-cut instances when the termination was used in connection with a crisis, that it, when a threat—implicitly or explicitly—of disengagement was made by the Norwegian mediators. First, in November 2003, Norway suspended its mediation role following the constitutional crisis in Sri Lanka. Second, in

²For analyses of the 2002 peace initiative, see Rupesinghe (2006b) and Uyangoda and Perera (2003).

June 2006, Norway asked the parties to—in writing—reiterate their commitment to the ceasefire agreement, originally reached in February 2002. From what we have been able to ascertain through a systematic analysis of the peace process, these were the only two instances when the termination tactic was used.

To be able to address the question relating to when and why the termination tactic is employed, we identified two similar situations of crises where the termination tactic was not used. In April 2003, the peace process experienced a serious crisis when the LTTE withdrew from peace negotiations after not being invited to a donor meeting in Washington DC. About 1 year later, in March 2004, the peace process experienced another critical juncture when a faction broke away from the LTTE. In neither of these cases did the Norwegian mediators use the termination tactic to solve the crises. The cases were thus selected on the basis of the similarity in situation and the variation in the outcome relating to the use or nonuse of the termination tactic. Such a research design is common in comparative case study research since it allows for identification of the conditions that can account for the difference (George & Bennet, 2005: 80). We have sought to reduce selection bias by basing our selection of cases on a clearly defined type of situation and by applying these criteria systematically to the peace process, instead of basing the selection on the hypothesized relationship.

How does the Sri Lankan case help us understand why a termination strategy is chosen? We now turn to an analysis of each of the crises. The analysis is based primarily on secondary sources but is informed by fieldwork carried out in Sri Lanka (December 2002, November 2003, January 2006, December 2006, September and November/December 2007) and in Norway (February and April 2008).

Washington Donor Meeting, April 2003

The first crisis happened in April 2003. The crisis centered on the issue of the LTTE's participation in a donor meeting in Washington which was in preparation for a donor conference in Tokyo to support the peace process. In this crisis, the Norwegians did not use the threat of the termination tactic.

At the time of the crisis, six rounds of talks had been held between the LTTE and the government. From the very beginning of the peace process, the government and the LTTE had agreed to approach the donor community in a joint partnership (Bastian, 2006; Goodhand & Klem, 2005). A donor conference was to be held in Tokyo in June 2003 to provide for major development assistance to Sri Lanka. However, the listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government had the consequence that the LTTE would not be able to participate in a preparatory meeting in Washington D.C. In early April, the LTTE expressed disappointment over not having been invited to the conference and a few weeks later, the LTTE left the peace talks indefinitely, with one of the official reasons being the exclusion from the Washington donor meeting (Balasingham, 2004: 443–444).

At this stage of the peace process, the international actors showed an interest in actively contributing to a peaceful settlement, primarily through financial aid linked to progress in the peace process. At the donor meeting in Washington, donors pledged

about 3 billion U.S. dollars for a 3-year period, and it was attended by major actors such as United States, Japan, European Union, and the World Bank. Norway took a lead role in this international engagement, which gave them an important role among international actors. This in turn made the mediator role more beneficial. As expressed by Norwegian mediator, Erik Solheim: “the involvement in peace processes creates interest in Norway with other major countries of the world” (Rupesinghe, 2006a: 341).

To get the LTTE back to the negotiation table, the Norwegians engaged actively with the LTTE. Norway also stated that LTTE participation at the Tokyo conference was crucial to garner support to fund for reconstruction (Sirilal, 2003). Hence, the Norwegian mediators displayed confidence in the use of other mediation tactics, especially the economic incentives for promoting peace.

The parties valued the prospects for a settlement in quite different terms. Prime Minister Wickremasinghe claimed that substantial progress toward peace and development had been made and viewed the outcome of the donor conferences in a positive light (Sambandan, 2003). The government had an ambition to create an ‘international safety net’ to ensure the success of the peace process by gaining support of international actors to produce a peace dividend (Bastian, 2006). The LTTE, on the other hand, stated that the major problem was that what was agreed upon in talks was not being implemented. In addition, the government’s decision to participate in the donor meetings without the LTTE was perceived as a shift toward a unilateral strategy away from negotiations (Balasingham, 2004: 430).

At the same time, the risk for violent confrontation was quite low. The ceasefire agreement was to a large extent upheld by the LTTE and the government. Although there were several violations to the agreement (in particular, accusations of forced recruitment by the LTTE and some serious incidents at sea), it was largely being respected by the signatories (Höglund, 2005). In this sense, there was no urgent need for a settlement.

The Constitutional Crisis, November 2003

The first crisis in which Norway used the termination tactic occurred in November 2003. This is the only time during the peace process that the mediators took the decision to explicitly put the mediation effort “on hold” (Interview by Helgeson, BBC, 2003). The background was the chaotic political situation in Colombo. A political crisis had been unleashed on November 4, with President Kumaratunga’s decision to overtake three important ministries (the defense, the mass media, and the police), announce a state of emergency, and suspend the parliament. The situation was complicated by the fact that Prime Minister Wickremasinghe, who had signed the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, represented a different party than the President.

Against the backdrop of the unfolding crisis, Norway withdrew its mediation activities on November 14. The motive for withdrawal of the mediation was stated quite clearly by the Norwegian mediators. The crisis had made the government declare the peace talks with the LTTE postponed until the situation was solved. Hence, the Norwegian mediators identified, at this particular point in the process, the main obstacle for the

continuation of the process as being the unclear authority structure in the South. Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vidar Helgesen, stated that:

[p]eace talks could have started tomorrow, provided there were clarity about who is holding political authority and responsibility on behalf of the Government.[...] The resumption of peace talks is seriously impeded by the political crisis in the south. This has disturbed the peace process [...]

Statement issued by Royal Norwegian Embassy
Colombo, November 14, 2003.

With a main dividing line within one of the parties to the negotiation process—between the Prime Minister and the President—dialogue was considered meaningless. In addition, the Norwegian mediators did not see themselves as having a mandate to mediate between the Prime Minister and the President (BBC, 2003). Thus, other tools and tactics than the exit strategy were deemed inefficient until the power struggle in Colombo was sorted out.

At the time of the constitutional crisis, the prospects for a settlement were quite likely. In fact, the political crisis came at a time when there was a general expectation of a breakthrough in the political process. The talks had been stalled since April 2003 when the LTTE withdrew from the peace talks. However, in October, the LTTE had presented its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) (Balasingham, 2004: 503–514). The government responded by stating that although the parties' positions were far apart, the way forward was through political dialogue (Peiris, 2003). Hence, the stage was set for negotiations, in substantial questions on how the conflict could be solved. Both sides had presented their positions on a solution and had also expressed willingness to negotiate over a possible compromise solution (Keethaponcalan, 2008: 113–114). The LTTE proposal was deemed as being “historical” by the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, and “provide[ed] a good basis for resuming negotiations” (BBC, 2003). Thus, the parties had strong incentives to seek a settlement, rather than opting for the battlefield.

At the time of the constitutional crisis, the role of the Norwegian mediators was being reevaluated. This largely had to do with President Kumaratunga's ambivalent position about the Norwegians. On the one hand, Kumaratunga had initially invited Norway to try to find a political solution to the armed conflict (Keethaponcalan, 2005: 207). On the other hand, she was an outspoken critic of the Norwegian mediation effort and was of the position that they had overstepped their mandate as facilitators. There were incentives for Norway to avoid a situation where its position as mediator was put in question. With President Kumaratunga's increased power, a downgrading of Norway became a real possibility. Instead of suffering image loss, the mediators may have opted for preemptive measures by suspending their activities.

The constitutional crisis was not solved until April 2004 when new elections to the parliament were held. These had been called after a period of unsuccessful attempts to unite the two main political contestants—the President and the Prime Minister. The election was won by a coalition of parties, including President Kumaratunga's party. Mahinda Rajapakse was appointed new Prime Minister. After an invitation by Kumaratunga on 23 April, Norway resumed its mediation (Noyahr, 2006: 364). Hence,

after a period of political turmoil, the question of political authority was settled, and it became clear who were to be the spokespersons on the government side. In this sense, a precondition for the continuation of the peace process was fulfilled.

The Karuna Breakaway Crisis, March 2004

A third crisis happened during the spring of 2003 when the LTTE experienced a split in its organization. On this occasion, the Norwegian mediators opted for other tactics than during the constitutional crisis and they did not use the termination tactic.

The crisis began on March 3, when LTTE's Colonel Muralitharan, alias Karuna, requested that the breakaway group should be treated as a separate entity from the main LTTE. This soon led to intense fighting between the LTTE and its breakaway faction. The split has been attributed to several factors, among those a historical conflict between Tamils in the East and the North, as well as in that eastern Tamils have a disproportional small number of representatives in the higher ranks of the LTTE, while more foot soldiers have been recruited from the East (Ganguly, 2004: 913–14).

At this point of the process, the position of the Norwegian mediators was, in fact, in a process of being strengthened. The President—without stating any preconditions or limitations on the mediator's functions—requested Norway to reenter and once again take up its role as facilitator in the peace process.

The Karuna breakaway took both the Norwegians and the Sri Lankan government by surprise. The mediators chose not to engage directly with the LTTE, but regarded it as an internal matter of the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government also chose not to engage; however, soon allegations about state-sponsored support to Karuna surfaced, which became a source of conflict with the LTTE (Perera, 2004a).

In spite of the split within the LTTE, the Norwegians seemed confident that negotiations could recommence. They engaged in prenegotiation attempts, with high-level involvement. Choosing not to engage with the LTTE at this point in time might have been detrimental to the peace process. The LTTE claimed to be the “sole representative” of the Tamil people. If the Norwegians had entered into dialogue with Karuna, they would have betrayed the LTTE, possibly damaging the trust between the rebels and the mediators.³

The conflict between the LTTE and the Karuna faction developed into a new phase since the LTTE was not accepting the collaboration between Karuna's cadres and the Sri Lankan Army. In a letter to the SLMM, the rebels threatened a return to war if the situation did not improve (TamilNet, 2004). However, there were assurances from both sides that the ceasefire would continue (Reuters, 2004). The risk of war was therefore increasing, but was not imminent.

On the political front, the possibility of finding a solution to the conflict was waning. Although the Norwegians had expressed some optimism, it was increasingly clear that there were few possibilities for direct negotiations between the parties. Norway appears to have assessed the parties incentives for negotiation as low and stated that direct talks between the parties were unlikely in the near future (AFP, 2004).

³This view has been ascertained in confidential interviews with informants.

The Failed Oslo Negotiation Crisis, June 2006

A fourth crisis took place when the Norwegian mediators, on June 9, 2006, asked the government and the LTTE to reiterate their commitment to the peace process after a failed negotiation round, planned to take place in Oslo the day before. The talks were to center on the fate of the SLMM, whose monitors from EU countries (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) had been asked to leave after the EU listing of the LTTE as a terrorist entity. In this case, the threat of withdrawal loomed largely in the background, with the mediators using the question of their engagement to save the peace process.

Ahead of the talks, Norway had asked for a written response by the parties regarding five “questions relating to their commitment to the ceasefire” (BBC, 2006). The response would be decisive for the future role of the Norwegian government, the SLMM, and other international actors. The government responded affirmatively to the questions, whereas LTTE reiterated its demand that observers from the EU countries should be replaced (TamilNet, 2006a). Analyzing the questions relating to the parties’ commitment to the ceasefire that Norway had asked, one important aspiration of the third party can be discerned. The question about the safety of the SLMM personnel had become acute following incidents during the spring of 2006, where LTTE Sea Tigers had attacked Navy vessels with SLMM monitors onboard. Hence, at this point of the process, the benefit of pursuing mediation was quite low, and the risk involved was substantial.

Employing the termination tactic was done following an intense, but unsuccessful, attempt to facilitate dialogue between the belligerents through negotiations in Oslo. Other tactics—including economic incentives and terrorist listings by the international community—had shown to be ineffective, resulting in an inability to prevent the escalation of the conflict.

A withdrawal of Norwegian mediation efforts could be seen as threatening for the parties, given that a return to war was a real possibility at this point. The parties had intermediate incentives for mediation, since there was an intense risk of a return to war. Year 2005 and 2006 had seen a trend of escalation in violence, and the risk of a resumption of the war was imminent. The Norwegian mediator Solheim stated that “Sri Lanka is on the brink of very negative developments” (Cited in AFP, 2006). The risk of a return to full-scale war made a possible Norwegian withdrawal fraught with dangers. For instance, the political head of the LTTE, Tamilchelvan, expressed the fear that war would be unavoidable if Norway suspended its monitoring function (TamilNet, 2006b).

The failure to solve the crisis regarding the SLMM monitors and the implementation of the ceasefire contributed to the final breakdown of the peace process. The conflict went into an acute phase when the Sri Lankan Army launched an offensive in the summer of 2006. By the beginning of 2008, the government of Sri Lanka formally declared that they no longer supported the ceasefire agreement.

Comparing the Crises

How does the Sri Lankan case inform us about the use of the termination tactic? Of the four crises we analyze, the termination tactic was used in two of them: as a response

to the constitutional crisis of 2003 and after the failed Oslo negotiations in 2006. Why did the Norwegian mediators employ the threat of withdrawal—explicitly or implicitly—in these instances and not in the two others? A first general reflection is that the termination tactic is not commonly used and that the threat to withdraw departs from Norway's overall mediation strategy. Norway has primarily pursued a strategy based on a communication-facilitation approach. Termination, on the other hand, is a more coercive strategy. Normally, only strong mediators can successfully use coercive strategies. Norway's strength as a mediator derives from its perceived legitimacy. If the mediator constantly threatens to abandon the peace process, the primary parties are likely to seek another mediator. Nonetheless, the Norwegians resorted to the termination tactic on at least two occasions. What influenced their decision to do so? Table 2 summarizes the conditions concerning the mediator's motives, means, and assessment of the conflict as outlined in the theoretical framework, in each of the crises.

We have suggested that there are three factors that can help explain the mediator's decision to use the termination tactic. First of all, in both of the instances where the termination tactic was used, the value of the mediation effort itself was in doubt. During the constitutional crisis, Norway's role was under the threat of being completely downgraded as President Kumaratunga, who had voiced vigorous criticism of the Norwegians, was gaining power. During the crisis following the failed Oslo negotiations, the SLMM, and in effect, Norwegian, and other Nordic citizens were under physical threat. Under such conditions, the threat of withdrawal was an option that would not only benefit the peace process, but also the mediators. As a contrast, after the Washington donor-meeting crisis, the Norwegians were reaping the benefits of their involvement in Sri Lanka. With the increased attention from important international actors like the United States and the European Union, Norway was at the center of world politics.

Secondly, the feasibility of other tactics also seems to have had an important impact on the mediator's decision to make a threat to withdraw. The failed Oslo negotiations

Table 2
Conditions Influencing the Use of the Termination Tactic

	Washington donor-meeting crisis (April 2003)	Constitutional crisis (November 2003)	Karuna breakaway crisis (March 2004)	Failed Oslo negotiation-crisis (June 2006)
Mediator's motives				
Value of mediation?	High	Low	High	Low
Mediator's means				
Availability of other tactics?	Yes	No	Yes	No
Mediator's assessment of the parties				
Parties' incentives for mediation?	Low (no war—no peace)	Intermediate (peace likelihood)	Low (no war—no peace)	Intermediate (war risk)
Use of termination tactic	No	Yes	No	Yes

had been preceded by intense efforts by the mediators to persuade the parties back to the negotiation table. When the Oslo talks also failed, all other means but the threat of withdrawal had been attempted. The situation was quite different during the constitutional crisis. In the Norwegian view, no meaningful talks between the LTTE and the government could be held with the serious divide in the Sri Lankan central government. Withdrawing was the only option, since mediating between the President and the Prime Minister was beyond the Norwegian mandate. Here, it is interesting to compare Norway's decision to continue the dialogue with the LTTE in spite of the split within the organization, which came as a result of Karuna's decision to form a breakaway group. In this situation, withdrawing might even have been damaging to the process. LTTE was at the time concerned about its reputation as being the "sole representative" of the Tamil people. Karuna's revolt seriously questioned this claim. If the Norwegians would have chosen to withdraw at this point, it might have compromised Norway's relationship with the LTTE. Another important finding emerges from the crisis over the Washington donor meeting. At this stage, there was a strong belief in economic incentives to bring the LTTE back to the peace process. For this reason, the termination tactic was not deemed as necessary, as other measures bore the potential of being fruitful.

Thirdly, the parties' incentives for mediation also factored into Norway's decision to use the termination tactic. Norway opted for the termination tactic when the parties' incentives for mediation were intermediate (although theoretically possible, none of the crises took place when there were high incentives for mediation). By contrast, when the parties' incentives for mediation were low, the termination tactic was not utilized. A line of reasoning found in the spoiler debate is that the success of a withdrawal threat is dependent on, among other factors, the type of actor the third parties are facing. If one of the parties in the peace process is a "total spoiler"—completely unable or unwilling to compromise—a threat of withdrawal can actually be counter-productive. Under such circumstances, total spoilers are given a veto over the implementation of a peace agreement (Stedman, 1997: 45). Similarly, if one of the actors in a negotiation process seeks a return to war, then the termination of mediation will be perceived as a possibility rather than a threat. Hence, the effect of this strategy depends on the motives of the belligerents. Without classifying any of the sides in terms of the spoiler terminology, it may be observed that the parties in 2006 seemed to rely on unilateral military strategies. By contrast, in 2003, the parties advanced their goals mainly through joint negotiations. In this sense, the termination strategy implied a heavier cost for the parties in 2003, compared to 2006.

Alternative Explanations and Discussion

Above, we have outlined what we consider to be the three dominant factors behind the mediator's decision to use the termination tactic. However, there are several alternative explanations that deserve to be discussed here. After this elaboration, we will discuss some additional theoretical implications of our analysis.

A first factor influencing the use of the termination tactic has to do with the availability of alternative mediators or negotiation channels. In several instances of armed

conflict, there seem to be an abundance of willing mediators (Betts, 1999; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2004). If there is a pool of potential mediators that all sides can agree to accept, the termination of activities by one particular mediator might not be seen as particularly hazardous for the continuation of the process (Betts, 1999: 176). On the other hand, if the parties need a particular mediator, withdrawal would have disastrous consequences. However, in this case, the availability of other mediators is a factor that does not vary substantially across the crises. During the peace process in Sri Lanka, there was basically only one mediator, although the Norwegian mediation was accompanied and supported by the co-chairs of the donor activities in Sri Lanka.

The use of the termination tactic could also be dependent on the value the parties attach to the mediator's involvement in the process. If the parties need a particular mediator, the termination tactic would be more applicable. In the Sri Lankan case, the analysis is complicated by the fact that the parties had divergent views on the importance of Norway. The legitimacy of the Norwegian mediators was dependent on the perception of them as committed and skillful peacemakers, and both parties' acceptance. There is no doubt that Norway as a mediator was valuable in the sense that it helped the parties reach the ceasefire agreement and to bring the LTTE into the peace process. However, a large share of the public did not approve of Norway. For instance, Norway has been seen as biased in favor of the LTTE. The Peace Confidence Index (PCI) showed that, in March 2005, more than 70% of the Tamil community held Norway as the most suitable state to play a facilitator's role in the peace process. However, only 13.5% of the Sinhalese favored Norway over other potential mediators.⁴ The dissatisfaction with Norway's role in Sri Lanka manifested itself in vigorous opposition in particular emerging from the radical parties JVP and JHU. The JVP campaigned for the withdrawal of Norwegian mediators, which they considered as an example of neo-colonialism (Perera, 2004b). In this context, Norwegian mediation withdrawal would embolden the nationalist forces of the Sinhalese. To stay on would be an act of solidarity with the moderate forces in the internal power struggle between hawks and doves.

Two additional theoretical points can be made from the analysis, which relates more to the effect of the tactic than to when a mediator chooses to use it. A first point is that the outcome of the termination tactic, the two times it was employed, was quite different. In the first instance, following the constitutional crisis, it helped produce progress in the peace process. Although Kumaratunga held a critical stance before the crisis, her statements indicate a more conciliatory mode once Norway had suspended its activities. Hence, after a period of political turmoil, the question of political authority was settled, and it became clear who were to be the spokespersons on the government side. In this sense, a precondition for continuation of the peace process was fulfilled. In the other case, the termination tactic was employed, following the failed Oslo negotiations, the aim Norway sought to achieve by using the termination strategy was not reached. In its own evaluation of events in the months directly following the employment of the termination strategy, the SLMM complained about the lack of safety for the monitors. The report

⁴Available on <http://www.cpalanka.org>.

states that “the inability of both LTTE and GOSL to guarantee the safety of the SLMM staff has led to further limitations of SLMM Freedom of Movement” (SLMM, 2006).

Tentatively, we suggest that the difference between the push and the pull factor could help explain this difference in outcome. We have suggested previously that the push and the pull factor affect the parties’ incentives for mediation. Hence, it is either the good prospect of a settlement that is pulling the parties, or the cost for a nonsettlement that is pushing them. Yet, these two factors can also be analytically separated. The termination tactic seems to be a more fruitful approach when the negotiation channel seemed feasible, whereas used with less effect when the threat of war was imminent. The conceptual framework developed by Druckman in relation to crises and turning points in international negotiations can potentially be a useful track for further research on the type of tactic that works best in specific crises. Druckman’s framework stresses the interplay between the situation at hand, the reaction of the actors (the tactic in this case) and consequences (Druckman, 1986). A development of the crisis concept that would allow for a distinction between different types of crises could facilitate an understanding of the crises in which the termination tactic can be effective in bringing about positive change.

A second point relates to the question of credibility. The credibility of a threat of withdrawal is, as with any type of threat, dependent on the belief that the actor stating the threat will actually follow through on its threat. How credible was Norway in this sense? Norway has been engaged in Sri Lanka not only as a mediator but also as one of the contributing nations to the SLMM and through its long-standing commitment as a donor. This multiplicity of third-party roles makes the issue of credibility particularly complex. On the one hand, it made Norway an influential third party. If Norway was to disengage completely, then it would most probably have severely undermined the peace process. Withdrawal would have implied loss of an effective monitoring mechanism, loss of a channel for political dialogue, and loss of economic resources for developmental activities. On the other hand, the Norwegians may have been noncredible in the sense that no one believed that they would abandon their “investments” in the peace process. The stakes were simply too high. The credibility of the termination threat was also contingent upon the mediator’s motives. The overall rationale for Norwegian mediation can be sought in its interest to pursue a peaceful solution to the armed conflict. This may explain why they successfully could withdraw when the risk of sliding back into war was low (the constitutional crisis), whereas when the war risk was imminent (failed Oslo negotiations), the Norwegian mediators could not credibly threaten to abandon their third-party role. Anticipating this, the belligerents made—in the second incident where the termination strategy was used—little effort of living up to the stated commitment of ensuring the safety of the SLMM personnel.

Conclusions

The mediator’s application of a certain tactic is not accidental, but is normally a deliberate decision based on a set of factors. The accomplishments generated by a termination tactic are dependent on a number of factors and must be evaluated in light of what achievements the mediator is expecting or hoping for. Stedman argues that the

withdrawal strategy is not a very sophisticated tool for third-party actors to use (Stedman, 1997). However, the analysis here suggests otherwise. The deliberate disengagement from mediation may under some circumstances be an important source of influence for a mediator that has few other tools available.

As with any method of mediation, termination has its strength and limitations. This article points to the difficulty of weak mediators to use this strategy, since their strength lies in their commitment to the peace process itself. Yet, under extreme situations, when both the mediator and the parties find further dialogue an unfeasible avenue, the termination threat can be used. This assessment is also dependent on the mediator's availability of other means to influence the parties.

The termination tactic has important ramifications for several other important areas in the study of international mediation, in particular relating to mandates and power. Mediation can be mandated from an institution outside the conflict or alternatively from the parties themselves. This is what Maundi et al. refers to as "entry by proposition" versus "entry by invitation" (2006: 6). In Sri Lanka, the Norwegian mediation effort was built on the premises that the parties (that is, the two primary parties) had ownership over the conflict and its solution. The use of the termination tactic is likely to be more credible when the mediators are invited by the parties, since that invitation is an indication of a parties' need for mediation—a need that also can make the threat of termination more usable.

The strengths and weaknesses of the termination tactic can also be linked to the debate on power in international mediation (Kleiboer, 2002; Svensson, 2007b; Touval, 1992). The termination tactic is the one tactic that mediators commonly seen as less powerful can use as a type of coercive tactic to achieve progress. Paradoxically, even a "trust mediator" may need to utilize threats, even though the use of threat is commonly seen as an obstacle for effective mediation. As Princen (1992: 58) points out, "the intermediary can find itself employing the very kinds of tactics it is discouraging the disputants from using." The extent to which power- and trust mediators respectively can effectively utilize the termination threat is a fruitful avenue for future research.

An important avenue for further research is to develop a more sophisticated analysis to specify the type of conflict and conflict actors, the characteristics of the mediator needed for that particular conflict, and the timing of the termination tactic, to be able to build a fuller theoretical understanding of when the termination tactic is a preferred choice of mediators and when it can successfully be applied. As pointed out by Bercovitch and Gartner, there is a "[c]lose relationship between who mediates, what mediators can do, the nature and intensity of a conflict, and the likely range of outcome" (2006: 333). Broader comparative analysis involving several cases is also called for in this regard. In particular, we need broader comparative studies to disentangle the different mechanisms behind the use of the termination tactic. This study has generated some hypotheses that can be tested on a broader set of cases.

The peace process in Sri Lanka under the auspices of the Norwegian facilitators ultimately failed. The parties returned to the battlefield with increased ferocity and the ceasefire agreement was formally abandoned by the government in early 2008. The armed phase of this conflict ended dramatically in May 2009 with LTTE defeat. As we

have seen in this analysis, the use of the exit option can be fruitful in circumstances where there is a political will to continue with the peace process. However, when the parties are determined to return to a one-sided violence track, there is very little mediators can do. In fact, any Norwegian threats to withdraw would not be deemed costly for the parties at this point in the process, since they attached very little value to the negotiation track.

References

- AFP (2004, May 3). Sri Lanka Tigers in leadership battle.
- AFP (2006, May 27). Sri Lanka could be heading for war: Norwegian envoy.
- Baker, J. A. (1999). The road to Madrid. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson & P. Aall (Eds.), *Herding cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex World* (pp. 185–205). Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Balasingham, A. (2004). *War and peace: Armed struggle and peace efforts of liberation Tigers*. Mitcham, Surrey: Fairmax Publishing.
- Bastian, S. (2006). How development undermined peace. In K. Rupesinghe (Ed.), *Negotiating peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, failures and lessons* (Vol. 2, pp. 245–278). Colombo: Foundation of Co-Existence.
- BBC (2003, November 14). Norway explains peace role.
- BBC (2006, June 9). Norway seeks Lanka commitment.
- Bercovitch, J. (Ed.) (2002). *Studies in international mediation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Bercovitch, J., & Gartner, S. S. (2006). Is there method in the madness of mediation: Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation. *International Interactions*, 32, 329–354.
- Bercovitch, J., & Houston, A. (2000). Why do they do it like this? An analysis of the factors influencing mediation behaviour in international conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44, 170–202.
- Betts, W. (1999). Third party mediation: An obstacle to peace in Nagorno Karabakh. *SAIS Review*, 19, 161–183.
- Crocker, C. A. (1999). Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola settlement of 1988. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson & P. Aall (Eds.), *Herding cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex World* (pp. 207–244). Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O., & Aall, P. (2004). *Taming intractable conflicts: Mediation in the hardest cases*. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Druckman, D. (1986). Stages, turning points and crises: Negotiating military base rights, Spain and the United States. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30, 327–360.
- Druckman, D. (2001). Turning points in international negotiation: A comparative perspective. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, 519–544.
- Ganguly, R. (2004). Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict: At a crossroad between peace and war. *Third World Quarterly*, 25, 903–918.
- George, A., & Bennet, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Goodhand, J., & Klem, B. (2005). *Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka*. Colombo: Asia Foundation.

- Höglund, K. (2005). Violence and the peace process in Sri Lanka. *Civil Wars*, 7, 156–170.
- Höglund, K., & Svensson, I. (2008). Damned if you do, and damned if you don't: Nordic involvement and third-party neutrality in Sri Lanka. *International Negotiation*, 13, 341–364.
- Höglund, K., & Zartman, I. W. (2006). Violence by the state: Official spoilers and their allies. In J. Darby (Ed.), *Violence and reconstruction* (pp. 11–31). South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Holbrooke, R. (1999). The road to Sarajevo. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson & P. Aall (Eds.), *Herding cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex World* (pp. 325–344). Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Keethaponcalan, S. I. (2005). The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and the dynamics of third party activity. In J. Uyangoda (Ed.), *Conflict, conflict resolution & peace building* (pp. 202–224). Colombo: Colombo University.
- Keethaponcalan, S. I. (2008). *Sri Lanka: Politics of power, crisis and peace 2000–2005*. Colombo/Chennai: Kumaran Book House.
- Kelleher, A., & Taulbee, J. L. (2006). Bridging the gap: Building peace Norwegian style. *Peace and Change*, 31, 479–505.
- Kleiboer, M. (2002). Great power mediation: Using leverage to make peace. In J. Bercovitch (Ed.), *Studies in international mediation: Essays in honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin* (pp. 127–140). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Loganathan, K. (1996). *Lost opportunities: Past attempts at resolving ethnic conflict*. Colombo: CEPRA, Faculty of Law.
- Martin, H. (2006). *Kings of peace, pawns of war: The untold story of peace-making*. New York: Continuum.
- Mason, D. T., & Fett, P. J. (1996). How civil wars end: A rational choice approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40, 546–568.
- Maundi, M. O., Zartman, I. W., Khadiagala, G., & Nuamah, K. (2006). *Getting in: Mediator's entry into the settlement of African conflicts*. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Mitchell, C. R. (1988). The motives for mediation. In C. R. Mitchell & K. Webb (Eds.), *New approaches to international mediation* (pp. 29–51). London: Greenwood Press.
- Moolakkattu, J. S. (2005). Peace facilitation by small states: Norway in Sri Lanka. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40, 358–402.
- Noyahr, K. (2006). The role of the international community. In K. Rupesinghe (Ed.), *Negotiating peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, failures and lessons* (Vol. 2, pp. 355–404). Colombo: Foundation for Co-Existence.
- Palihapitiya, M. (2007). Of a Norwegian summer and a Viking intervention in Sri Lanka. *Asian Journal of Public Affairs*, 1, 39–53.
- Peiris, G. L. (2003, November 1). Statement by the Government of Sri Lanka.
- Perera, J. (2004a, March 8). LTTE split. *Current Situation*. Available at: <http://www.peace-sri-lanka.org>.
- Perera, J. (2004b, April 12). Arresting the slide towards breakdown. *Current Situation*. Available at: <http://www.peace-sri-lanka.org>.
- Princen, T. (1992). *Intermediaries in international conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Reuters (2004, March 4). Conflicting reports about Sri Lanka rebel split.

- Rubin, J. Z., Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (1994). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Rupesinghe, K. (2006a). Interview with Erik Solheim, Minister of International Development. In K. Rupesinghe (Ed.), *Negotiating peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, failures and lessons* (Vol. 2, pp. 339–354). Colombo: Foundation for Co-Existence.
- Rupesinghe, K. (Ed.) (2006b). *Negotiating peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, failures and lessons* (Vol. 2). Colombo: Foundation for Co-Existence.
- Sambandan, V. S. (2003, May 12). Peace process in trouble. *Daily Mirror*.
- de Silva, K. M., & Peiris, G. H. (2000). *Pursuit of peace in Sri Lanka: Past failures and future prospect*. Kandy/Washington, DC: ICES/USIP.
- Sirilal, R. (2003, May 8). Akashi says more talks needed. *Daily Mirror*.
- Stedman, S. J. (1997). Spoiler problems in peace processes. *International Security*, 22, 5–53.
- Svensson, I. (2007a). Democracies, disengagement and deals: Exploring the effect of different types of mediations in internal armed conflicts. In K. Ström & M. Öberg (Eds.), *Governance, resources, and civil conflicts* (pp. 227–246). London: Routledge.
- Svensson, I. (2007b). Mediation with muscles or minds? Exploring power and pure mediators in civil wars. *International Negotiation*, 12, 229–248.
- TamilNet (2004, May 8). Peace process, MoU at grave risk.
- TamilNet (2006a, June 23). Nordic countries to discuss SLMM's future role.
- TamilNet (2006b, June 25). War unavoidable if Norway suspends monitoring function—Thamilchelvan.
- Touval, S. (1992). The superpowers as mediators. In J. Bercovitch & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), *Mediation in international relations* (pp. 232–248). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Touval, S., & Zartman, I. W. (Eds.) (1985). *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*. London: Westview Press.
- Touval, S., & Zartman, I. W. (2001). International mediation in the post-cold war era. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson & P. Aall (Eds.), *Turbulent peace* (pp. 427–443). Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Uyangoda, J., & Perera, M. (Eds.) (2003). *Sri Lanka's peace process 2002: Critical perspectives*. Colombo: Social Scientists' Association.
- Wall, J. A., Stark, J. B., & Standifler, R. L. (2001). Mediation: A current review and theory development. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, 370–391.
- Young, O.R. (1972). Intermediaries: Additional thoughts on third parties. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16, 51–65.

Kristine Höglund (PhD Uppsala University 2004) is Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. Her research has covered issues such as the dilemmas of democratization in countries emerging from violent conflict, the causes and consequences of electoral violence, the importance of trust in peace negotiation processes, and the role of international actors in dealing with crises in war-torn societies. Her work has been published in journals such as *Democratization*, *Review of International Studies*, *Negotiation Journal*, *International Negotiation* and *International Peacekeeping*. She is the author of *Peace Negotiations in the Shadow of Violence*

(2008, Martinus Nijhoff) and is currently co-editing the book *Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges* (forthcoming 2011, Routledge).

Isak Svensson is Assistant Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Postdoctoral Fellow at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Otago University, New Zealand. His research has covered primarily issues such as bias and neutrality in international mediation, and religious dimensions of armed conflicts. He has published in journals such as *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *International Negotiation*, and *European Journal of International Relations*. He is author of *The Go Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation*, together with Peter Wallensteen, published in 2010 at the United States Institute of Peace Press.